SRI LANKA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE: A FORGOTTEN VISION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Marking United Nations Day 2026

By Nethma Hettigedara

In October 2026, researchers representing the Awarelogue Asian Institute gathered at the United Nations Compound in Colombo for a knowledge seminar on ‘Sri Lanka and the United Nations General Assembly.’ They met with the UN Resident Coordinator, Marc-André Franche, to learn more about Sri Lanka's engagement with the UN. At a time when the UN is facing increasing scrutiny, and at a time when its complexities may not always be fully understood, this blog looks back at an important moment in Sri Lanka’s engagement with the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

Can a small island nation like ours influence the security of an entire ocean? Today, with all the geopolitics playing in the field, this might seem too ambitious to even talk about. But in 1971, Sri Lanka attempted exactly that. In 1971, at the 26th United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike proposed making the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. This was at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were expanding their naval presence. Now, more than five decades later, this remains a good example of the extent to which smaller states like Sri Lanka can influence international affairs.

The proposal was not something that appeared overnight. It emerged from decolonisation and the Non-Aligned Movement. On one hand, Britain was reducing its military presence east of Suez. On the other, the Indian Ocean was becoming an area of superpower competition involving warships, military bases and nuclear weapons. Sri Lanka feared that this rivalry could threaten the independence of newly sovereign countries. Needless to mention, there were regional concerns too, as removing foreign navies would not necessarily prevent a powerful neighbouring state from dominating the region.

Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike promoted this idea at the 1964 Cairo Non-Aligned Summit and developed it further at Lusaka in 1970. She stated at the Assembly that Indian Ocean countries needed peace to develop their economies and improve the lives of its people. Her proposal included restrictions on military installations, naval exercises and weapons testing. This was also while recognising the importance of international trade. Consequently, on 16 December 1971, the UNGA adopted Resolution 2832 (XXVI).

The resolution declared the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, a Zone of Peace. It received 61 votes in favour, none against and 55 abstentions. This showed that adopting a resolution did not necessarily mean everyone was in full agreement. Nonetheless, what Sri Lanka and its partners achieved was substantial. They were able to successfully bring the issue onto the UN agenda. In 1972, an Ad Hoc Committee was established to discuss implementation. However, getting an issue recognised was one thing, convincing powerful countries to act on it was another.

The proposal faced difficulties from the beginning. Sri Lanka’s original vision sought restrictions on military activities by both regional and external powers. But negotiations narrowed the focus mainly to great-power rivalry. The United States and the Soviet Union were unwilling to give up their military advantages. India supported the idea in principle but resisted restrictions on its own naval and nuclear capabilities. India's 1974 nuclear test further complicated matters. Furthermore, after 1977, Sri Lanka's changing foreign policy priorities and India’s influence also weakened the commitment.

Decades later, the Indian Ocean remains strategically important. Competition involving India, China and the United States now extends into ports, research vessels, investments and shipping routes. Given Sri Lanka's location, these developments can place the country under pressure from different sides.

Does all of this mean the idea of a peace zone has lost its relevance? Not necessarily. A completely demilitarised Indian Ocean may be difficult to achieve, but the need for peaceful cooperation still remains. Sri Lanka can continue supporting fair maritime rules, regional cooperation and an independent foreign policy.

Looking back, the proposal did not achieve everything it intended. Yet, calling it a failure would overlook an important achievement. We, as a small island nation, brought a major security concern before the world and made it part of the UNGA’s discussions.

Perhaps the most important lesson we can gain from this engagement with UNGA is that passing a resolution and making it a reality are two different things. The United Nations provides a platform for smaller nations to make their voices heard. But turning those ideas into action requires cooperation that goes beyond individual national interests. The challenge, then and now, is turning the vision of peace into reality.

References

Bandaranaike, S. (1971, October 12). Address to the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly. United Nations General Assembly, 1962nd plenary meeting.

De Silva, S. (2021). Disarmament, Indian Ocean and strategic externalities: The case of Sri Lanka. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 4(2), 268–286.

Joshi, Y. (2019). Whither non-alignment? Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and New Delhi's selective alignment with great powers during the Cold War, 1964–1979. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 30(1), 26–49.

Kandasamy, N. (2024). Indian Ocean internationalisms: The Sri Lankan pursuit of peace, 1971–89. Journal of Contemporary History, 59(4), 705–731.

Keerawella, G. B. (1988). The growth of superpower naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean and Sri Lankan response.

Waidyatilake, B. (2018). A smaller state’s quest for Indian Ocean security: The case of Sri Lanka. Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies.

A Gender-Sensitive Future for Sri Lanka-Netherlands Cooperation Post-Ditwah

By L. M. S. Navodya

A Shared and Uneven Past

Sri Lanka-Netherlands relations are among the island’s oldest European connections. Between 1640 and 1796, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was active on the island, leaving behind, through its administration, the thombos or the meticulous registers of families, estates, labour duties and taxes which are now preserved in the Sri Lanka National Archive. Reminding that the encounter between the two nations was never one between equals, the same scholarship notes that Sinhalese common law and Roman-Dutch law co-existed uncomfortably. Today, the thombos are also being used for gendered questions including those about excess female mortality and infanticide. This, therefore, suggests that even the shared archive contains women’s histories waiting to be read. The then Dutch Ambassador, Tanja Gonggrijp, in 2022, observed that the present relationship between the two nations has been shaped by this past and that the one-sided and unequal nature of colonial relations must be remembered alongside the collaborations worth celebrating.

From Colony to Partner

The post-independence relationship between the two nations shifted gradually from aid to partnership. Dutch engagement deepened after the 2004 tsunami with the Dutch Foreign Minister visiting Sri Lanka in 2005, in what was among the first high-level post-disaster missions. By 2014, in the post-war era, Dutch officials described a shift from aid toward trade that prioritized water, agriculture, life sciences and health. This shift was accompanied by a more literal reckoning with the past. In July 2023, the Netherlands agreed to return six colonial-era artifacts looted during the 1765 Dutch siege of the Kandyan kingdom, including the ceremonial Cannon of Kandy, a ceremonial weapon made of bronze, silver and gold adorned with rubies, which was held by Rijksmuseum. As the two nations celebrate the 75th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations in 2026, the bilateral engagement of the two nations now spans trade, development, culture and people-to-people ties. The anniversary year has also see the announcement of a Dutch trade mission linked to Sri Lanka Expo 2027. Furthermore, the Netherlands contributed financially to the rehabilitation of the Vystwyke Canal in Colombo under the Dutch-Sri Lanka Mutual Heritage Programme.

Ditwah: A Test of the Partnership

Cyclone Ditwah affected Sri Lanka on the 28 November 2025, bringing strong winds, heavy rain, flooding and landslides that affected all 25 districts. By mid-December, roughly 2.2 million people had been affected, with over 100,000 houses been fully or partially damaged and more than 230,000 people been displaced at the peak of the emergency. As of 29 December, 646 deaths and 173 missing persons had been recorded by the Disaster Management Center.

At this critical hour of emergency, the Dutch response was swift at the diplomatic level. On the 2 of December 2025, Ambassador Wiebe de Boer pledged the Netherland’s support to Sri Lankan Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya to rebuild bridges destroyed by the floods and landslides while also engaging in a discussion on disaster risk reduction, flood management and inclusive development. Furthermore, in January 2026, the Deputy Minister of Defence appreciated the support extended by Netherlands during and after the disaster through its work with the European Union, while the Ambassador reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to sharing expertise, particularly on disaster risk reduction.

What Can the Netherlands Offer?

The most durable contribution of the Netherlands towards Sri Lanka may be institutional rather than material. The floods of 1993 and 1995 triggered a paradigm shift in Dutch flood management, from merely reinforcing defences to giving more room for rivers through the Room for River programme. The programme has received considerable scholarly credit for advancing integrated river basin management through a mixed centralized-decentralized governance approach. Operationally, the Dutch Disaster Risk Reduction and Surge Support (DRRS) programme deploys water experts across mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, and foreign governments and humanitarian actors may also request its support. Together with its MHPSS Surge Mechanism, it maintains rosters of experts in water management, WASH and mental health and psychological support. The suggested institutional mechanisms need to be adapted cautiously since Ditwah brought landslides as well as floods and Sri Lanka’s terrain is not the Dutch delta. Thus, what works best for a nation like Sri Lanka is the governance logic that includes long-term planning, coordination across levels of government and inclusive decision-making rather than any single engineering model.

The Veiled Dimensions of Disaster

Disasters have never been gender-neutral. According to Neumayer and Plumper’s study of 141 countries between 1981 and 2002, disasters kill more women than men on average or kill women at younger ages. The impact of disasters depends on the magnitude of the event, with the effect becoming stronger during severe disasters and weaker where the socio-economic status of women is higher. This, therefore, indicates that the vulnerability is socially constructed rather than biological. As Fisher notes, violence against women in post-tsunami Sri Lanka must be understood within the context of the violence that prevails in normal times and is exacerbated by the disaster.

Among these dimensions, menstruation remains one of the least visible. As noted by Muralidharan et al., menstrual health remains rarely discussed in the context of climate change, despite the disruptions to the access to menstrual information, products and services, as well as the intensification of existing inequalities caused by climate change. Sommer notes that although the attention to menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian settings is growing, consensus on the most effective and culturally appropriate responses remains insufficiently documented. My study on the impact of climate-induced disasters on menstrual rights, using India and Nepal as case studies, identifies a recurring causal chain where disaster-damaged WASH facilities and disrupted supply chains erode privacy and access to products, thereby making menstrual management unsafe and undignified. Adding to this context, the case of Sri Lanka demonstrates that this chain also intersects with a pre-existing problem in many South Asian contexts, since period poverty operates through inadequate education on sexual and reproductive health, weak infrastructure facilities in schools and workplaces and unaffordable products.

The international response to Ditwah shows both the need and the progress. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) delivered 700 pre-positioned dignity kits that included sanitary pads within the first 24 hours of the emergency declaration while also estimating that at least 50,000 more would be required. As per its March 2026 report, it had provided 2,997 dignity kits, 1024 maternity kits, more than 5,000 menstrual and adolescent kits and 50 transgender-specific kits. However, demonstrating that gendered vulnerability intersects with wider marginalization, OCHA cautioned that estate communities and people relying on informal livelihoods, land or housing remain disproportionately affected and may fall outside some assistance schemes.

A Call for Inclusive Assistance

Three practical directions follow regarding the post-Ditwah assistance from the Netherlands to Sri Lanka. First and foremost, ‘inclusive development’, which was already on the table when the Prime Minister met the Ambassador, needs an operational meaning that constitutes sex-disaggregated data and space for women’s organizations at the table in flood management and resilient-rebuilding planning. Furthermore, Dutch surge support could pair its water and WASH expertise with menstrual health expertise so that safe sanitation can be designed into safety centres rather than retrofitted. Last but not least, much of the Sri Lankan evidence on gender and disaster dates from the 2004 tsunami. Thus, Ditwah offers an opportunity for Sri Lanka and Dutch institutions to build a contemporary evidence base together.

An asymmetric partnership at the beginning has now reached 75 years of cooperation. Its next chapter should be measured not only by infrastructural development but also by whether resilience reaches those whose needs are least visible.