A PAUSED PARTNERSHIP? Sri Lanka’s Incomplete Integration into the SCO

By Abheetha Kodikara

The ‘Shanghai Five’ organization was renamed in 2001 as the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ with the inclusion of Uzbekistan. The next large expansion was the inclusion of India and Pakistan in 2017. The organization also has categories such as observer states and dialogue partners, which bring together many countries. Sri Lanka obtained dialogue partnership in 2009 and still remains in that position today. This article attempts to understand why Sri Lanka has remained a dialogue partner for sixteen years.

Many countries that joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after Sri Lanka, have already progressed beyond observer status to full membership. Against this background Sri Lanka’s limited interest or awareness of the SCO has become questionable. Did Sri Lanka ever want to go beyond dialogue partner status? Does Sri Lanka lack enthusiasm to seize opportunities through engagement with the SCO? Are there strategic planning gaps?

These aspects require analytical scrutiny. Since its establishment, the SCO has evolved into a powerful institution. It has expanded its network from Eurasia to South Asia, and further into West Asia. The attraction however is likely dependent on whether the goals of the partner countries have been met through the organization. The goals of the organization affect the engagement of the relevant countries, with the organization. The SCO is no longer limited to addressing terrorism, extremism and separatism. It also focuses on enhancing economic prosperity, trade among member states and energy cooperation.

In such a context, Sri Lanka’s prolonged status as a dialogue partner since 2009 indicates a lack of enthusiasm towards achieving more substantial goals. It must be questioned whether this is due to the country being trapped in significant debt dependency on China, or whether Sri Lanka is struggling to gain tangible benefits in trade, investment, and energy while maintaining a steady non-aligned foreign policy.

In 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding to create an Energy Club was signed among the SCO member states, observers, and dialogue partners. Yet, there remains a lack of awareness and knowledge of the steps taken by Sri Lanka to engage closely in the Energy Club.

An attempt is made to understand the lack of progress of membership from a theoretical perspective of regional cooperation. Starting with realism, it focuses on power dynamics, self-interest and survival strategies of states within an archaic global system. Why then has there been no attempt to increase power dynamics or self-interest? When considering regime theory and liberalism, the focus is on how institutions can enhance international and regional cooperation by working together. In the current world, it is increasingly important that states work together to achieve peace, security, prosperity, poverty reduction, and equality among other priorities. Thus, relatively small states like Sri Lanka would benefit economically, in fulfilling the nation’s needs.

In discussing the topic further, it is understood that policy reforms were not taken seriously or enthusiastically, by considering the benefits of cooperation. In addition, the lack of domestic awareness and institutional capacity are key arguments when it comes to Sri Lanka remaining at the same level on the SCO’s membership portal.

In fact, the awareness about the SCO among Sri Lanka’s policymakers, scholars, media and civil society is minimal. The absence of a national policy on SCO engagement and the minimal attention or sustainability of a dedicated SCO unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underlines this weakness. The critique here is that for any multilateral partnership, whether it is SCO or any other regional alliance, in order to yield a meaningful process, there must be domestic institutional readiness and proper awareness. Without an official framework and policy structures, the partnership cannot evolve beyond symbolic affiliation.

What is also relevant for this study is the absence of bilateral follow-up mechanisms between Sri Lanka and Central Asian states. This is a key challenge as, unlike the other dialogue partners such as Türkiye or Egypt which have leveraged bilateral ties with SCO members, Sri Lanka lacks the structural bilateral dialogue or economic corridors. Sri Lanka also lacks free trade agreements or largescale diplomatic missions in several SCO countries. The absence of high-level political visits to and from key Central Asian States also further limits influence.

When examining these reasons, it is clear that improving dialogue partnership status would only be possible with parallel bilateral cooperation. Yet a point to urgently note is that Sri Lanka has not proactively engaged in such follow-up initiatives through SCO platforms.

Therefore, in conclusion, Sri Lanka must develop a National SCO engagement strategy, strengthen relations with Central Asian states, through trade, diplomacy and academic exchanges while managing India-China dynamics within the organization carefully to build institutional awareness about the potential of the SCO. Using the dialogue partnership platform to foster strategic trust would gradually strengthen the partnership and result in observer status.

The presence of Sri Lanka in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is mostly ceremonial. What should be realised is that cooperation would ensure economic benefits which Sri Lanka needs at this time.

China's Rising Status as a Mediator

 By Trivan Annakkarage

A mediator is often a neutral and respected third-party that aims to resolve prolonged disputes. In the context of International Relations, these prolonged disputes are usually associated between governments (of either two or more nation-states) or it may even be internal disputes within a nation-state, between its government and non-state actors such as secessionist movements, drug cartels, trade unions or even fundamentalist organizations. In all these instances, it is the public that suffer, and prolonged disputes would result in conflicts where the suffering is passed down to future generations thus fueling more resentment and complications. Hence, mediators are vital to bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table to agree on peaceful solutions.  

In China, mediation has a strong connection to the country’s three main religious philosophies namely Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism. Mediation is a practice that is considered as a means to preserve social harmony and relationships thus leading to social stability and inclusive development of societies. During its imperial period, China intervened as a mediator in international disputes. Examples include the Tang Dynasty (618-907) resolving disputes between nomadic groups in Central Asia to prevent potential disruptions to the Silk Route and during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) where Admiral Zheng He intervened to resolve internal disputes in the Malacca Sultanate. However, as technologically advanced European colonial powers and Imperial Japan overpowered Imperial China, Beijing gradually lost its leverage to act as a decisive mediator in international conflicts. With China entering its Century of Humiliation (1839-1945), its status as an international mediator gradually diminished.                     

During the Cold War (1947-1991), the United States and the Soviet Union intervened as mediators in several international disputes. Examples include United States’ role as a mediator in the Camp David Accords of 1978 that resulted in the normalization of Israel-Egypt relations and the Tashkent Declaration of 1965 which was mediated by the Soviet Union that marked the end of the Indo-Pakistani War which broke-out that year. However, the role of a mediator was not solely limited to the superpowers at the time because countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also acted as decisive mediators. The Algiers Accords of 1981 mediated by Algeria saw the United States and Iran amicably ending the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981. Notably, the Colombo Proposals of 1962 which were jointly mediated by six NAM countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic) paved the way to end the Sino-Indian War which took place that year.     

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party maintained a non-interventionist foreign policy into the affairs of other nation-states. It could be argued that this policy was beneficial because in 1971, the majority of countries voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) that recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the UN.

However, China did directly intervene in the affairs of other neighbouring countries only when there was a perceived threat to its sovereignty. Examples include direct intervention on the North Korean side in the Korean War of 1950-1953 and providing intelligence to North Vietnam in the Vietnam War of 1955-1975. These actions were a result of China’s determination to limit the influence of foreign powers in its neighbourhood – a key factor that would determine China’s rise as a mediator in the 21^st century.  

After the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 (between America’s Nixon Administration and Mao’s Government in China) followed by Beijing adopting the reform and opening up policy in 1978, China was on its path to becoming the factory of the world. As China reaped financial benefits from these initiatives it was vital for Beijing to develop and maintain strong economic links with many countries that invested and imported Chinese manufactured goods. This strong focus on economic development distanced China being involved in geopolitical tensions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. 

As the 21^st century unfolded, and with China overtaking Japan as the second largest economy in the world in 2010 (during the Presidency of Hu Jintao) followed by President Xi Jinping unveiling China’s monumental vision to resurrect the Silk Route via the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) three years later, it was evident that China was on its path to becoming a prospective global power. Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, it was a necessity for China to expand its footprint around the world. Nevertheless, for Beijing, it is paramount that China’s global image is not tarnished in the process as a positive force in the world. Hence it could be assessed that the relatively lesser negative historical baggage (associated with colonizing countries), and being a vital country in the global value chain, has benefitted China because its growing influence is both acknowledged and respected at the same time by many state and non-state actors. Hence, such a global standing permits China to engage in the affairs of mediating international disputes – complimenting Beijing’s commitment to preserve China’s image as a positive force in the world.    

However, as revealed by political scientist, Niklas Swanström (Executive Director, Sweden’s Institute for Security Development & Policy), mediation was an area that the People’s Republic of China had lack of knowledge and experience. Hence, before venturing into this space, China acted with caution. As highlighted by Helena Lagarda (Lead Analyst, Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies) China has engaged in low-key mediation in the Korean peninsula (since 2003) and in the conflict between Sudan-South Sudan (from 2008-2011). Although these mediation efforts have not resulted in successes, it was a testing ground for China to familiarise the art of mediation and learn how to secure its interest while maintaining its public image in the process.

These harbinger efforts to China’s rise as a mediator could be elaborated as follows. Facilitating between the United States (including its allies in the region - Japan and South Korea) and North Korea (about its nuclear weapons programme) placed China as a crucial stakeholder in this dispute. Hence as noted by Swanström, China’s mediation has prevented North Korea from reaching out to Russia for security guarantees that would have undermined China’s status in the region. With regard to Sudan and South Sudan, by intervening in the conflict, China has been able to secure its oil and mining contracts in both countries along with maintaining amicable relations – despite prevailing diplomatic tensions between Sudan and South Sudan over oil revenue.    

By the time BRI was formally announced in 2013, China had reasonably been exposed to the art of mediation. Since peaceful and stable nation-states and regions are vital to BRI’s success, the need to resolve conflicts in various regions along the land and maritime routes soon became a necessity if China wished to realise BRI. Therefore, BRI could be argued as a reason for China’s rising status as a mediator.    

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or commonly referred to as the Iranian Nuclear Deal) could be argued as a notable commitment by China in a multilateral mediation effort. Despite the United States withdrawing from the agreement in 2018 (during the first Trump Administration), China together with Russia stood firm with Iran. Regardless of repudiating the conditions under JCPOA, this resulted in Iran continuing cordial relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and not acting in isolation – a result that would have been detrimental to the stability of West Asia and ongoing BRI projects in the region.  

Given how difficult it is for the two nuclear-armed South Asian countries to agree on being part of a regional security body, China played a crucial mediating role to admit both India and Pakistan as members to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2018. As argued by Samuel Ramani (Associate Fellow, Britain’s Royal United Services Institute) in spite of close ties with Islamabad, Beijing is aware that for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC; a land route part of BRI) to bear fruit, it is essential to have New Delhi on its side because the proposed corridor cuts through the disputed region of Kashmir.

In 2022, Xi announced China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Boao Forum held that year. GSI is inspired by the concept of ‘indivisible security’. This rejects the idea of isolating national security of one country and emphasizes that one country’s national security is linked to other countries. Therefore, mutual dependence on security is the best way forward to create peace and stability in the world.    

With GSI now being part of the Chinese Communist Party’s policy, China’s most recent successful mediation effort was restoring diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023. According to Amrita Jash (Assistant Professor, India’s Manipal Academy of High Education), this achievement by China is as significant as the US-led mediation triumphs such as the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Abraham Accords of 2020. Regardless of being the present super-power, it is unfortunate that the United States was unable to amend relations between these two countries. It could be argued that it is primarily due to Washington’s interest in fostering tensions so that Saudi Arabia remains a market that imports American state-of-the art weapons to defend its borders and immediate neighbourhood from Iran. On the other hand, China’s goal to enhance international trade in general via BRI makes inclusivity easier hence delivery of mediation efforts.

As stated by Wang Huiyao (Founder, Centre for China & Globalization), China is able to leverage itself as a mediator due to its strong economic relations. China is the largest trading partner for India, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. This makes it relatively easier to project its soft power on disputing parties. China’s ongoing efforts include mediating conflicts between Russia versus Ukraine and Israel versus Palestine. Even among these countries China emerges as one of their largest (or even largest) trading partners. In 2023, taking note of China’s rising status as a mediator, French President Emmanuel Macron urged Xi to convince President Vladimir Putin to end its conflict with Ukraine. According Galia Lavi and Oded Eran (senior research personnel, Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies) the US-Israel bond would be challenged if the people of West Asia (including Israelis) begin to increasingly view China positively via its infrastructure projects in the region.     

As revealed by the British academic Hugo Slim, unlike the United States and its European allies, China does not impose liberal ideologies when mediating conflicts. What gives the Chinese Government leverage as a mediator is its deep understanding of the historic context of the dispute and being able to respect and work with governments that have different ideologies.       

As much as it seems that China focuses on fostering trade via BRI as means to resolve conflicts, in the process Beijing is also trying to gradually balance Washington’s influence. Moreover, with the United States shifting its focus to domestic affairs, there is opportunity for China to fill the vacancy of a mediator. In the process and in the words of Slim, China wishes to “de-occidentalise” the approach to mediation. According to Samir Bhattacharya (Associate Fellow, India’s Observer Research Foundation), China’s mediation follows a careful mix of three 3Is – interference, influence and intervention from which creative involvement is developed.

The following map depicts China’s past and current efforts in the world. 

Source: Taken from Helena Legarda’s article titled, China wades into the Israel-Palestine conflict once more https://merics.org/en/comment/china-wades-israel-palestine-conflict-once-more

Nevertheless, there are several factors that challenge China’s rising status as a mediator. They include China’s dispute over the South China Sea, China’s attempts to incorporate Taiwan into its sovereign territory and China’s border disputes with India. As pointed out by the Brazilian Journalist, Fábio Galão, major criticism about China’s mediation is the lack of concern to hold conflicting parties accountable on human rights.

Traditionally, the country focuses strongly on working with state-actors rather than with non-state actors such as civil society organizations. This could be the reason why human rights and other similar concerns take a back-seat in the mediation agenda. Moreover, as the 21^st century unravels, mediation on topics such as climate change, migration and tariffs seem to take centre stage along with geopolitical tensions. This would further complicate mediation efforts. How well China navigates these issues and developments would depend on the Chinese Communist Party’s commitment to GSI and its creative involvement in mediation.        

References

Bhattacharya, S. (2024, August 7). China's conflict resolution mechanism in Africa: Mediation with Chinese characteristics. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-s-conflict-resolution-mechanism-in-africa-mediation-with-chinese-characteristics

Galão, F. (2023, May 9). How China has become the new mediator in global geopolitics. The Rio Times. https://www.riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/new-multipolar-world-order/how-china-has-become-the-new-mediator-in-global-geopolitics/

Huiyao, W. (2024, August 16). Why China is becoming a top choice mediator for global conflicts. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3274330/why-china-becoming-top-choice-mediator-global-conflicts

Jash, A. (2023, June 23). Saudi-Iran deal: A test case of China’s role as an international mediator. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/

Lavi, G., & Eran, O. (2023, April 4). Could China serve as an international mediator? Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48747

Legarda, H. (2018, August 22). China as a conflict mediator. MERICS. https://merics.org/en/comment/china-conflict-mediator

Ramani, S. (2018, July 9). Can China mediate between Pakistan and India? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/can-china-mediate-between-pakistan-and-india/

Slim, H. (2024). Mediation in the world and wars of the 2020s. Still Time to Talk. Conciliation Resources. https://www.c-r.org/accord/still-time-talk/mediation-world-and-wars-2020s

Swanström, N. (2024, June 5). China as a mediator in North Korea: Facilitating dialogues or mediating conflicts? The Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2024/china-as-a-mediator-in-north-korea-facilitating-dialogues-or-mediating-conflicts/

 

THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD: A Story of Survival and Triumph

By Sayuri Mohotti

 

“No one has been forgotten; nothing has been forgotten.”

-Olga Berggolts

Imagine being trapped in a city for nearly 900 days, cut off from the world, battling starvation, the relentless cold, and constant bombardment. That was the reality for the people of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) during one of the darkest chapters of World War II- the Siege of Leningrad.

The siege began on September 8, 1941, when Nazi Germany encircled the city, cutting off all supply routes. Leningrad was not just any city; it was a symbol of Soviet pride, an industrial powerhouse, and a vital strategic target for Hitler. For him, capturing Leningrad was not just about geography; it was about wiping it off the map as part of his plan for Lebensraum- clearing the way for German settlers.

Life Inside the Blockade

When the siege began, 2.8 million people were trapped within the city, including 400,000 children. Winter soon descended, with temperatures plummeting to -40°C. Without heating, electricity, or adequate food, survival became a daily battle.

Rations dropped to just 125 grams of bread per person per day for non-essential workers and dependents- with the bread often mixed with sawdust to make it last longer. People ate whatever they could find: wallpaper glue, petroleum jelly, even household pets. Starvation and disease swept through the city, claiming as many as 100,000 lives per month during the brutal winter of 1941-42.

Yet, amid the despair, the spirit of Leningrad's residents remained unbroken. They worked together to clear rubble, bury the dead, and keep the city alive. Cultural life became an act of defiance. In 1942, Dmitri Shostakovich’s 7th Symphony, composed during the siege, was performed in the city and broadcast to German forces, sending a clear message saying that that the city’s spirit could not be crushed.

A Lifeline Over Ice

The city’s only connection to the outside world was through a supply route across frozen Lake Ladoga, aptly named the ‘Road of Life’. This lifeline brought in food and supplies and allowed for the evacuation of half a million residents. It was not much, but it kept the city from collapsing.

Finally, after nearly two and a half years, the siege was lifted on January 27, 1944. By then, the city had endured 872 days of unimaginable suffering, but it had also become a symbol of resilience and unity.

 Why the Siege Still Matters

The Siege of Leningrad was not just a chapter in World War II- it was a testament to the strength of the human spirit. It showed how people can come together to face unimaginable odds, how art and culture can provide hope in the darkest times, and how resilience can outlast even the most determined oppressors.

Today, as we remember the 81^st anniversary of the siege’s end, it is a powerful reminder of the cost of war and the value of peace. The story of Leningrad is not just about survival; it is about triumph. And that is something worth reflecting on.

RUSSIA OVERSHADOWS G7 2022 SUMMIT

GUEST COMMENTARY by Banura Nandathilake

Despite being an informal collective of ‘advanced economic’ liberal democratic states, the Group of 7 (G7) bringing together Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom and the United States have fervent goals. Held from 26 to 28 June 2022, the summit was in response to a global society capsized by division and shocks, as a call to unite and join to defend ‘universal human rights and democratic values, the rules-based multilateral order, and the resilience of democratic societies’ (G7, 2022). The viability of such remains to be seen.

Formed in 1975, leading states in a world of global economic recession induced by the OPEC oil embargo understood it may be in their mutual interest to coordinate on macroeconomic interdependencies. While it was first a forum for Finance ministers to hold annual meetings, the G7 developed into a round-table between leaders of the Western World. In 1988, Russia joined the G7, which was then named the G8 albeit temporarily until Russia’s dismissal for its annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.

The G7 states in the contemporary, with an aggregate that represents 45 percent of the global economy in nominal terms and 10% of the world’s population, hold annual summits to coordinate economic policy goals, facilitate collective action on transnational issues and propagate neo liberal norms, in conjunction with the European Union and other invitees. All 7 member states are identified as mature and advanced democracies with a Human Development Index score of 0.800 or higher.

Unlike international organisations and groups such as NATO, the G7 group has no formal legal existence, no permanent secretariat or official members. It thus has no legally binding rules that abide by or ratify states to uphold decisions and commitments made at G7 meetings. As such, while compliance with G7 norms is procedurally voluntary, they are impacted by social norms of persuasion, influence, mutual accountability and reputation. Topics of conversation between member states have encompassed growing challenges such as counterterrorism, development, education, health, human rights and climate change.

The 2022 Summit

From 26-28 June 2022, the leaders of G7 States met in Elmau, Germany joined by the leaders of Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal and South Africa, as well as Ukraine. Representatives included German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, US President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, French President Emmanuel Macron, European Council President Charles Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen,

The summit focused on the Covid-19 crisis, climate change, the Russian Ukrainian conflict, and China. 

Climate Change

The shared concerns of climate change were a major topic of discussion during the 2022 Summit. The group endorsed the goals of an open and cooperative international Climate Club, in alignment with the 1.5°C pathways and hastened the implementation of the Paris agreement. The group further pledged to commit to a decarbonised transportation sector by 2030, a fully or predominantly decarbonised power sector by 2035. However, the latter may have been incentivised by political concerns of Western states to a major degree.

Liberal Democracies of the West

Liberal democracies may be understood to exist where the state subscribes to a liberal economic system and a democratic political system. A concise summary of such is as a liberal economic system proscribes significant political control over an decentralised, capitalistic, market driven economic system, as it is understood that the market mechanism is the most efficient means of linking demand to supply, market to consumer. A democracy may be understood as a domestic political model which, in conjunction with an impartial judiciary, free media and others, elected representatives aim to promote a decentralised representative governance through accountable, transparent and inclusive institutions.

By virtue of being a liberal democracy, all member states find common ground, parallel norms, alignment of macro foreign policy goals and understanding with each other. This allows the informal G7 to coordinate hard power security and economic interdependence in addition to cooperating with civil society groups to promote human rights, and uphold a democratic zone of peace in the face of non-democratic powers. A strong culture of mutual accountability exists between G7 states. Accountability may be through internal processors of the forum, where social norms allow for persuasion and disincentivize coercion. Coercion may not at all be necessary, as liberal democratic states would all be of a positive sum world view. Furthermore, the level of trade interdependence between states would act as means of checks and balances, as every state is needed by the other, thus it is in every G7 state’s interest to be in their good books.

The Illiberal Rest

Russia and China, in addition to states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are understood by the West to be illiberal states. Both major powers, albeit one a receding power, have capitalist and liberal economic systems where the state’s political machine exerts a heavy pressure on the market mechanism. While the state may be able to provide a higher quality safety net to its citizens by restraining the destructive forces of capitalism to better allocate scarce resources amongst the vulnerable, significant barriers to such exist. China’s GDP has grown at a surprising rate vis a vis other developing states, which has allowed the CCP significant geopolitical leverage. However, China’s domestic political model is authoritarian, whereby citizens do not have much say in how they are governed. Exclusive political institutions have no means of accountability or transparency, which leads to significant corruption. As Wedeman (2004) analyses, corruption is a feature of the Chinese system, thereby stifling economic and social growth. Corruption and lack of domestic checks and balances to those in power may be more apparent in Russia than China, where the control of the Kremlin and the Oligarchs have poignant effects on not just its citizens but also its neighbours; as the lack of domestic accountability may mean the lack of stringent checks balances, which then mean lesser shackles on the zero-sum ambitions.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The Russia-Ukraine conflict may be interpreted as a conflict between the forces of liberal democratic values of positive peace, pluralism and self-determination versus a one man’s nostalgic dreams of a ‘Neo’ USSR. Being at complete odds, the reaffirmed condemnation of Russia’s ‘’illegal and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine’’ by the liberal democratic G7 states is hardly a surprise. Nor is their promise of ‘’needed financial, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support’’ for Ukraine in its defence of its sovereignty, during its path on a free and democratic society.

The Sanctions Regime

Sanctions and more sanctions were promised by the group of seven advanced economies, who vowed to “align and expand targeted sanctions to further restrict Russia’’ in its access to key technological industrial imports and services. Such a move would severely restrict the ability to sustain their war machine thereby adhering to security commitments to Ukraine. The G7 Leaders pledged new sanctions on Russians who had committed war crimes in Ukraine, and are contributing to exacerbating “global food insecurity” by “stealing and exporting Ukrainian grain”. New penalties on Russian gold exports were further proposed, as well as a cap on the oil price to phase out global dependency on Russian energy.

However, a complete restriction of the import of Russian energy may be an ambitious task. European nations such as France get a quarter of their oil and 40% of their gas from Russia. While Germany has halted the progress of the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the EU has currently agreed to reduce its Russian gas imports by only two-thirds. President Biden however is banning all Russian oil and gas imports to the US, and the UK is ready to phase out Russian oil by the end of the year. The US, UK and Ukrainian Leaders are keen for other G7 nations to follow suit.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who joined in on a trio of meetings via Videolink, stated that the summit will show "who is our friend, who is our partner and who sold us out and betrayed us". He reiterated his calls for fresh deliveries of weaponry, as he believes Russia will want to extend the war until winter wherein they could make new territorial gains to consolidate power. The financial support of G7 allies in 2022 already amounts to more than USD 2.8 billion in humanitarian aid, and a further USD 29.5 billion is pledged in supporting Ukrainian reconstruction.

China and the BRI

A growing China poses a “threefold threat” to G7 countries — economically, ideologically, and geopolitically. China’s GDP is second only to the US and it is fast catching up. China’s growing state-overseen tech industry, fuelled by globalisation and interdependence, is fast spreading a culture of surveillance and censorship, which act as means for the globalisation of authoritarianism. Said authoritarian ideals are further spread through Chinese geopolitical projects and alliances such as the BRI, which usually focus on developing, quasi democratic states with little to no accountability such as those in Africa and Central Asia. Furthermore, China’s action with regard to the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and its influence in Hong Kong have drawn condemnation from G7 members. China’s growing trade and defence ties with Russia have also caused concerns.

A Western Counter to the BRI

A Western counter to the BRI emerged during the G7 summit, aptly named Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. The BRI is a global infrastructure development strategy which was developed as per Chinese leader Xi Jinping's vision in 2013, as a means for China to assume a greater role in global politics by easing access to China and its capabilities and boosting global GDP. Dubbed the Belt and Road Initiative and with over 145 countries signed up, the BRI is currently constructing a network of overland routes, rail transportation, sea lanes and energy pipelines to connect China to Southeast Asia, Central and South Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa. However, the project has been criticised as a tool to increase China’s political leverage in developing countries. Thereby, the BRI has been criticised for neocolonialism, economic imperialism.

In such a context, the G7 had launched a $600bn Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative infrastructure plan to counter China, in private and public funds to finance infrastructure in developing low and middle-income countries over five years. By working to narrow the global investment gap, the B3W would create new Just Energy Transition Partnerships with Indonesia, India, Senegal and Vietnam, building on existing partnerships with South Africa.

While US President Biden understood that “Developing countries often lack the essential infrastructure to help navigate global shocks (thus) feel the impacts … and they have a harder time recovering,” he stressed that the B3W “isn’t aid or charity. It’s an investment that will deliver returns for everyone”. Despite being dwarfed in comparison to the multi-trillion-dollar BRI, the B3W offers means of accountability, transparency and mutual trust between the neo liberal developed states and the developing states. The initiative would, according to Biden, further allow developing states to “see the concrete benefits of partnering with democracies”. While a cynic may argue that the developed have no interest in the developing other than exploitation and/or self-interest, and such may be observed to be true, President Biden may have been right when he said that underdevelopment is “not just a humanitarian concern, but an economic and a security concern for all”.

Mutual gains depend on interdependence, and without developing countries, there cannot be any sustainable recovery of the world economy. However, the development of low-income states is necessary but insufficient for a holistic global economic recovery, which remains shadowed by the conflict of value systems: liberal and illiberal, democratic and authoritarian.

 

SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE 2022: DEEPENING DIPLOMACY AND DEFENCE

GUEST COMMENTARY by Banura Nandathilake

On 12^th June, Asia Pacific’s leading forum for defence diplomacy - the Shangri-La Dialogue ended after a pandemic-induced three-year hiatus. While the Dialogue is procedurally focused on cultivating a sense of security community within the Asia Pacific, which it solely lacks, this year’s event concluded under the uncertain shadow of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the increasingly tenuous US-Sino relations.

The Shangri-La Dialogue is an intergovernmental security conference held in Singapore, by the London based think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in collaboration with the government of Singapore. The Dialogue is chiefly attended by state actors such as Military chiefs, Defence and Foreign Ministers. However, non-state participants too, such as legislators, academic experts, distinguished journalists and business delegates attend the summit. Named after the host venue since 2002, the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore, the forum serves as a platform for debate, expression of views and discussion on specific issues through bilateral meetings. However, off the record meetings are also held, chaired by IISS, to advance policy goals more freely.

Apart from the host nation, participating countries for the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue included Australia, Cambodia, Brunei, Chile, France, Canada, China, India, Germany, Japan, Indonesia, Laos, South Korea, Myanmar, Mongolia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Thailand, Vietnam, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Dialogue was attended by about 500 delegates from more than 40 countries.

Forum Proceedings

The 2022 Dialogue, as all previous sessions, was commenced by Dr John Chipman, the Director-General and Chief Executive of the IISS. This year’s keynote address was given by Fumio Kishida, the Prime Minister of Japan, who set the overall tone for the dialogue - the need for security cooperation and collective action between state and non-state actors in the Asia pacific to counter growing threats in the region and beyond. Broad topics such as the US Indo-Pacific Strategy - a significant shift of resources from the Middle eastern theatre, Competition in a Multipolar world, Military Modernisation, Prescriptions for Myanmar and China’s vision for Regional Order were covered. 

US-China Relations - a String Pulled Taut

The 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue was a significant milestone in contemporary US-China relations. The forum facilitated a meeting between the U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and the Chinese Defence Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe, the first face-to-face encounter since President Biden's inauguration in January 2021. Any hope or reassuring signs of reinstalling lines of direct communication were dispelled by the increasingly sparring headline speeches and subsequent conversations between the two nations, on topics ranging from the status of Taiwan, proceedings within the South China Sea and questions and concerns surrounding grave human rights violations within China.

The US primary criticism of China’s international conduct centred around the latter’s coercive and aggressive actions in the disputed South China Sea, wherein China has constructed man made islands within the shared seaway in an attempt to solidify its claim to the areas enclosed by a ‘9-dash line’ which is claimed by Beijing to grant it exclusive rights, despite non-recognition by international law. “Indo-Pacific countries shouldn’t face political intimidation, economic coercion, or harassment by maritime militias,” Secretary Austin asserted, as “the PRC’s moves threaten to undermine security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.” He further reaffirmed the US position to defend its interests and those of its allies despite increased Chinese movement, mobilisation and pressure.

Secretary Austin’s Chinese counterpart's response was as headline jarring as his. Minister Wei Fenghe described his country’s position as one of self-defence in a global world of zero-sum, self-interested actors. Wei acknowledged his country’s increased nuclear and naval capabilities, in a speech peppered with warnings to tread carefully and avoid Chinese provocation. He further reaffirmed China’s strong stance of a rising great power, one of self-defence but also a crave for international legitimacy through recognition as a peaceful actor. Wei stressed that “It is a historic and strategic mistake to take China as a threat or enemy”. To ensure global peace and development, by virtue of China now being a great power, Wei called for a stop in attempts to “contain China, to stop interfering in China’s internal affairs, and stop harming China’s interests,” signalling that peace was conditional on China’s free reign. His speech further contained a stronger reiteration of the Chinese position on the disputed island of Taiwan - “If anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China – let me be clear – we will not hesitate to fight. We will fight at all costs and we will fight to the very end.”

Shared Ukrainian Costs

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy participated in this year’s Dialogue for the first time through a video link teleconference. Highlighting the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he urged the attendees of primarily Asian states to “remember that support and attention is not only for Ukraine but for (the greater Asia) as well, to ensure that our and your future is safe’’ in the contemporary globalised world. Despite Ukraine’s geographical distance from Asia, Russia’s invasion of his country has global implications, as the political, social and economic distance between countries are much shorter in the present than they ever were. Thus, the costs of war are shared between states, through trade interdependence, geopolitical institutions, and have direct effects such as rising global inflation.

Mr Zelenskyy further stressed that there are ideological costs, as “it is on the Ukrainian battlefield that the future rules of this world are being decided along with the boundaries of the possible.” His position drew clear parallels and a not-so-subtle nod to China's desire for Taiwanese reunification. The political alignments and the ideological divides of the attendee states were made abundantly clear as Prime Minister of Japan Kishida noted that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” further adding to the underlying tension of the Dialogue.

Collective Concerns of the Divided

Despite the lack of collective action on political qualms and tensions owing to non alignment of political compasses, the attendee states of the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue remained receptive to prescriptions for collective concerns. The Dialogue served as a platform to tackle contemporary issues such as global underdevelopment and need of environmental security as a response to climate change, and the green defence agenda wherein the low-lying nations of Maldives, Polynesia and Micronesia were focused upon. The scope of prescriptions for global development and climate degradation are far beyond a single state, and collective action of all nations has shared global benefits. However, talks of nuclear disarmament were pushed by Prime Minister Kishida, who raised the potential for nuclear weapons of China, Russia and North Korea, to cause devastation more than that which was experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite such a statement representing a significant change in the security environment, as it differed from the zero-sum, negative peace structure of the past, it was not well received possibly as one nation may seek to gain more from the said action than the other.

Why They Do What They Do

Security forums such as the Shangri-La Dialogue would be those where one is likely to hear more bad news than good. However, the 2022 forum was not so much a “glass half empty but more of a vessel placed precariously close to the edge of a table, one small slip away from smashing to pieces” (Sachdeva, 2022). As New Zealand Defence Minister Henare noted, there existed “an underlying tension”.

Borrowing from the English School of International Relations (Buzan et al 2002, Bull 1977) would contribute to an apt analysis of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Great power interests define international aspirations and ambitions, even in regional institutions. The Dialogue subscribed to the broad tensions of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the US-China hostilities. Military diplomacy and international institutions which are dominated by great power interests, and smaller developing states are more rule takers than agenda setters. Further, international and weak regional institutions would have little sway in changing great power behaviour and are platforms for great power machinations. Weak regional institutions and forums would have less stringent rules, and less enforcement of such rules which would serve as checks and balances to the power of larger states. Fora such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, as opposed to stronger institutions such as NATO do “not provide much in the way of reassurance about the future trajectory of the relationship (between states) and only reinforces the sense that competition between the two powers is likely to linger thereafter” (Parameswaran 2019).

The fact that the sour relations between US and China continued on since the 2019 Dialogue, which was dominated by the subject of heightened U.S.-China competition serves to solidify the aforementioned understanding.

Despite such dire notions for international cooperation and mitigating global anarchy, the Shangri-La Dialogue represents a necessary, albeit insufficient platform for diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of differences between states. Institutions are only as strong as the rules that states are willing to enforce on themselves. However, institutions and fora such as the Shangri-La Dialogue are still important platforms which aim to resolve statist tensions through negotiated compromise and diffused reciprocity over hard power coercion and war (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The contemporary world is interconnected, with the space and time between events and reactions to such decreasing at an exponential rate. The contemporary world cannot afford to disregard the power of diplomacy for in the words of Henry Kissinger, despite animosities of history, diplomacy serves as means of restraining power.

 

BEGGING AROUND THE WORLD: An Evolving or Receding Sri Lankan Foreign Policy?

 By George I. H. Cooke

Sri Lanka has now reached out to the Russian Federation owing to the growing national crisis in the island nation. A national crisis which involves foreign exchange, fuel, power, and of course basic essentials which have been scarce at intervals in the past several months. Yet the biggest crisis facing Sri Lanka is the lack of decisive strategizing. The country is on the eve of its 75^th anniversary of independence in 2023 but has no clear idea where the nation will be in the next couple of weeks let alone next year. Countries strategize by aiming for where they want to be and what they want to achieve for generations to come, but Sri Lanka has been left very much in the lurch due to poor decision making and short-sighted policies of consecutive administrations, which have put personal gain and party politics ahead of the country and its future.

Reflecting on 1931, when the British deemed it suitable to foist universal franchise on the Ceylonese it is possible to deduce that this was probably one of the biggest mistakes they made, or it was perhaps done with a view to continuing the unhealthy policy of ‘divide and rule’. Many Ceylonese leaders themselves were not overly thrilled with the prospect of universal franchise at the time, owing to their own concerns. However, with the testing of the waters in Ceylon so early in the last century, the island nation received, it can be argued, an early start over the rest in Asia. 

The pros and cons of that decision can be long debated, but from independence onwards, the people of Sri Lanka enjoyed the ability to elect leaders to lead the nation. Yet have the people matured as a polity? Churchill himself opined that ‘the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.’ While the statement maybe deemed arrogant in some quarters, it is proven continuously around the world. Just as leaders have focused on personal gain and party politics, voters too have focused on personal gain instead of questioning policy or seeking policy options, especially at times of elections, nor have they held their representatives accountable for decisions taken.

Russia is in the throes of a conflict and Sri Lanka did not defer the financial request despite this situation. The insult is increased when news of Sri Lanka’s abstention at the UN and information regarding the request are both made public at the same time, giving rise to the notion that Sri Lanka abstained expecting assistance in return. Russia is a country that has consistently supported Sri Lanka in the UN Security Council ever since diplomatic relations were established 65 years ago, and the position of Sri Lanka is justifiable but a lack of communication, or effective explanation of the Sri Lankan stance has given rise to misperceptions.

Countries such as India and China are quite probably dreading calls, requests for meetings or any form of correspondence emanating from Sri Lanka. These two countries have been continuously approached and have consistently responded positively to requests that have been forthcoming from Colombo. Other countries must be hugely worried when approached by Sri Lankan diplomats in their capitals, or when they are invited to the Foreign Ministry in Colombo. A country which has had a long history dating back thousands of years even sought assistance from Bangladesh which came into existence just fifty years ago. Bangladesh is currently galloping into the future as a result of effective and decisive strategizing. Turning to countries far and wide and expecting them to keep Sri Lanka afloat only raises the stakes against the country.

The abysmal point at which Sri Lanka finds itself at present is not one from which the country can never hope to return. It is reversible, thankfully. Yet the reversing needs to be done by those who decided to progress this far down this road. Borrowing from other countries, seeking currency swaps and begging around the world, has resulted in Sri Lanka falling in esteem, respect and recognition, which has in turn eroded investor confidence, damaged image and added to the woes of the island nation on the world stage.

It is not only the pandemic that is to blame. It is not only the lack of tourists in the last couple of years that is to blame. It is not only the Easter Sunday attacks and the fear it caused, that is to blame. It is not only the decades long conflict that ended nearly 13 years ago that is to blame. Undoubtedly these developments and events have all contributed to the current situation but it is clearly the lack of strategizing by successive governments that has brought the island to this abysmal point.

As a country, Sri Lanka is highly dependent on the outside world, and has been from independence onwards. This is true of most countries, owing to growing interdependence brought about through trade, investment and financial interactions. Yet one of the key errors that were made was in not focusing sufficiently on the apparatus that engages with the outside world – the Foreign Ministry and Foreign Service. Since 1977 when J. R. Jayewardene decided to appoint Sri Lanka’s first non-prime ministerial Foreign Minister, in A. C. S. Hameed, the Ministry and Service have received step-motherly treatment. There were slight gaps of exception, but against the entirety of history those periods remain relatively brief.

Budgetary allocations for the Ministry have been well below the requirements. Missions around the world have been understaffed, or staffed with political appointees who have been highly incompetent, except for a handful who went beyond the call of duty to enhance Sri Lanka’s image globally. For a country that is highly dependent on the outside world, it is clear that the institution tasked with international engagement must be strengthened. Capacity development should have been a crucial area of emphasis. Instead of sending Foreign Service officers for short term all expenses paid courses in other countries upon receiving invitations only, carefully constructed programmes in renowned international institutions, aimed at improving quality and capability, should have been the focus. Such programmes naturally require financial resources and this is just one reason why the ministry requires a higher budgetary allocation. The list of possibilities remains endless and it is understood that resources within the country are limited, but excellence as an end result cannot be expected if mediocre input is all the country can afford.

Despite these challenges the progress made and achievements to date are highly praiseworthy. The Foreign Service has been able to make this amount of progress owing mainly to individual capabilities rather than collective synergy. However, those with immense ability, are forced to function in a stifling environment. On the other hand, the refusal on the part of the bureaucracy to step forward and explain policy options, highlight concerns, and warn when peril is at hand, has collectively resulted in misguided policy decisions. The entirety of the bureaucracy in Sri Lanka has a responsibility to support a government in implementing its policies but must also be able to flag issues, raise concerns and highlight pitfalls, as otherwise it is the leadership that goes astray, taking the country with them.

In the year leading up to our 75^th anniversary of independence, Sri Lankans, and notably the state and private sectors should be preparing for the future, instead all are grappling with the present and completely unaware of the future. Can the situation get worse? It can and it will. Adopting piecemeal measures to tide over daily activities, waiting for ships to arrive and then hoping that sufficient dollars are available to pay for fuel, or turning to our neighbours and seeking their assistance on a daily basis is not the future that Sri Lanka or Sri Lankans deserve.

Sri Lanka is rich in resources, potential and opportunity. Strategizing for the future has been a key requirement in the years gone by, and is undoubtedly the burning need of the hour. It is not too late to do just that. Rather than continuously asking for fish, it is time that Sri Lanka learns how to fish. Herein lies the importance of a country’s Foreign Policy through which Sri Lanka must identify areas requiring development within the country; draw up a clear national plan of action; seek investment to suit the Sri Lankan plan; engage with technically advanced countries and seek technology transfers especially in the energy sector; ensure value addition within the country prior to natural resources being exported; and most importantly guarantee that Sri Lanka comes first in policy formulation and implementation. 

Although the present predicament might be thought to be a situation in which Sri Lanka is returning to an old policy, of begging around the world, which Professor Ediriweera Sarachchandra also highlighted in a publication many decades ago, the question that begs answering is whether Sri Lanka ever deviated from this policy!

 

SRI LANKA – SCO PARTNERSHIP: The Relevance a Decade after the Conflict

- George I. H. Cooke

In 2009, Sri Lanka defeated terrorism on its soil, ending the terrorist conflict that claimed thousands of lives, destroyed the Sri Lankan economy and set the country back by several decades. In the same year the country entered into partnership with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was a milestone for the grouping as it welcomed its first Dialogue Partner. For Sri Lanka, having ended a ruthless conflict, it was an opportunity to share the experience and enhance cooperation with a vital region of the world. A decade later an assessment of this relationship indicates the vast potential, untapped areas and hitherto unexplored prospects, for both the SCO and Sri Lanka, especially in the wake of the Easter Sunday attacks and the rise of extremism on the island. It questions the original rationale for gaining partnership and denotes the inherent need for strategizing foreign policy, on the part of Sri Lanka, if the relationship is to be strengthened and a mutually beneficial bond nurtured.

When the Council of Heads of State met in Yekaterinburg in June 2009, it was to implement a decision taken the year before, wherein the SCO was creating Dialogue Partner status for ‘a state or an organisation (that) shares the goals and principles of the SCO and wishes to establish relations of equal mutually beneficial partnership with the Organisation’ and to accord such status ‘to a state or an organisation who cooperates with the SCO in specific areas of activity envisaged by the Charter and other treaty documents in the framework of the Organisation.’

Pursuant to the signing of the Memorandum granting Sri Lanka Dialogue Partner status in May 2010, Russia observed that its implementation would lead to a strengthening of international connectivity and expand spheres of interaction between the SCO member states and Sri Lanka. This, Russia believed, would be mainly in the areas of ‘ensuring security and stability, combating terrorism and developing economic, trade and investment cooperation.’ A founder member of the Organisation, with whom bilateral ties have grown since such connectivity was embarked upon in 1957, Russia has remained an unwavering ally of Sri Lanka. The degree of cordiality, even during the Cold War and thereafter, is evidence of the strength of the foundation, and bodes well for the decades ahead.

China has consistently called for ‘upholding the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and pursuit of common development, in a bid to build a community of shared destiny in the region’. President Xi Jinping highlighted the relevance of the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ as “a guide to safeguard international fairness and justice, advocate multilateralism and the ideal of opening, respect each other's interests, oppose interference in other countries' internal affairs, solve disputes through peaceful means, and boost common development with the win-win ideal.” Collaboration through other mechanisms including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as direct economic partnerships have seen the building of a relationship based on history, but one that is directly relatable to the Rubber-Rice Pact of 1952 and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1957.

Although Russia and China remain the key guiders of the SCO, the role played by the four Central Asian countries, notably Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan cannot be discounted. Identified as critical for the achievement of the Asian Century, these four countries have experienced improving economies and thereby growing prosperity. The inclusion of India and Pakistan as the newest Members in 2017 reinvigorated the SCO, as its geography, population, economic potential and overall power grew in leaps and bounds, making it the largest regional organisation.

Although disturbing activities, in early 2019, raised the propensity for doubt to rise over the decision of including these two countries, it is in the long term, that the fruit of such action would be truly understood. The need for all members to engage in joint all-SCO military exercises, partake in military cooperation, as well as share intelligence, would, in hindsight be a realization of the sentiments expressed by President Xi at the Summit in Ufa in 2015. He called for members “to increase the action ability, create a strong security wall in the region.” The espousal of collective action included Xi’s emphasis on members being “more proactive in political contacts and coordination, work out response measures and together defend the security as well as stability in all member states of our organization.”

Though apparent that collective action would bode well for SCO members, it is the impact that such action would have elsewhere, that is significant. India and Pakistan, as members of the SCO, would be called upon to engage at varied levels and on numerous occasions. Given that all member states must uphold the core principle of non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs, in addition to conformity to the origin objective of creating a confidence-building forum to demilitarize borders, India and Pakistan would recognize the potential for themselves, of working together, for the realization of the Asian Century in the long term, and the need to counter terror in all its forms in the immediate to medium term. The results would be seen in their bilateral interactions and equally importantly in the South Asian region, in a decade and a half. 

Whilst countering terrorism, extremism and separatism within its region became the raison d'être of the SCO, it didn’t limit itself to these three ‘evils’ but explored economic connectivity and the promise of closer cooperation to enhance trade and prosperity among its member states.

In 2015, Sri Lanka sought to upgrade the relationship to Observer Status, during the presidency of the Russian Federation, at the High Level Conference on ‘Security and Stability in the Region of SCO’ in Moscow. Noting the new security challenges, including ‘illegal migration, human trafficking, drug trafficking, trans-national organised crime and cyber-terrorism,’ all of which constitute serious threats to regional and global security, Sri Lanka highlighted the efforts being taken to combat this menace, as the representative informed the gathering of how the island was being used by drug syndicates as a destination as well as a transit point.  A call that was made then, that remains relevant to date is the need for cooperation with SCO member states to overcome and thwart such attempts.

In January 2017, it was reported that the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and the defence establishment ‘will in the near future finish the preparation of the legal base for cooperation’. Auguring well for the future, it needs to be operationalised through a process of institutionalization through which accredited legal departments, specific arms of the military and law enforcement agencies would commence activities of cooperation, on basis of priority and with much urgency.

A decade after Sri Lanka became a Dialogue Partner it is prudent to reflect upon that which has been, and comprehend the diverse, indepth role that the country can play in and through the SCO. It must be a decision within the foreign policy establishment to enhance relations with the SCO, specifically in areas of countering terrorism, extremism, drug smuggling and transnational organised crime. The role that the Foreign Ministry could play in bridging the divide between and among law enforcement agencies and the military of Sri Lanka, with those of the SCO member states would augur well to consolidate a strong and timely deterrent to those engaging in such illegal activities, and more importantly improve standards at the national level. The mutual benefit that could be accrued to Sri Lanka remains vast.

The Easter Sunday attacks saw the island gripped once again with violence and mayhem, as extremists resorted to the usage of the most blatant form of terrorism - suicide bombers. They claimed 253 lives, attempted to destroy revered shrines and dealt a blow to the tourism industry. Three weeks later other extremist elements resorted to rioting in parts of the island, in a bid to gain political mileage. These are unfortunate occurrences on such a significant anniversary, as the programmes of reconciliation had begun to bear fruit, the communities on the island were looking ahead and the characteristics of democracy were clearly evident. 

Yet the lesson to be learnt a decade later is that while terrorism can be quelled, as proved by Sri Lanka in 2009, extremism is much harder to fight, owing to the ingrained nature of this phenomenon which results in the radicalization of individuals over and beyond the dogma of religious belief. Amidst the pain, anguish and fear that grips society at large, Sri Lanka stands at a cross road where a concerted effort would need to be made to abandon the far right. These attacks will enter the annals of history not just on the island but across the international domain as a day on which extremist elements used terror to wreck havoc, bring death to hundreds, injure hundreds more and instill a fear psychosis in society that will be felt for a considerable period of time.

The impact is manifold. While the grief stricken mourn those whose lives were ruthlessly sacrificed, the injured face the daunting task of recovery and moving on with life amidst recollections of that bloody day, and society at large copes with the stress and strain, it is the divisions caused that would be the hardest to heal.

The military’s success in curbing further attacks, identifying networks and rapid counter action proves, once again, its ability and capacity. It is at this juncture that Sri Lanka should be focused on building an image based on counter terrorism expertise that may be shared within the region and beyond. With the natural terrain within the country, the troops having first-hand experience in battling terrorism, the military hierarchy possessing the expertise of thwarting terror in all its forms and manifestations, contribute to a collective process wherein Sri Lanka has much to offer. The ideal platform for such an exercise is the SCO.

Although still a Dialogue Partner, Sri Lanka does possess the ability to play a greater role of engagement than it does at present. A precedent was set in 2017 when Turkey another Dialogue Partner, was unanimously elected to preside over the SCO Energy Club, after a proposal was made to permit all members having varied degrees of partnership to chair the Club for a year.  While Sri Lanka is also a member of the Energy Club and would, in due course, be able to preside over its deliberations, it is noteworthy that initiative could be taken in proposing similar arrangements in the fields of increased military and counter-terrorism cooperation, and intelligence sharing.

If the main rationale for including Dialogue Partners is to be realized wherein an ‘equal mutually beneficial partnership’ is built and cooperation engaged upon by such countries and the ‘SCO in specific areas of activity’, it is important that Dialogue Partners, particularly Sri Lanka, avail the opportunity of not only contributing towards the sustenance of the SCO but also comprehend the unique platform the SCO provides.

Validating the partnership must not be a process left to the SCO to embark upon solely, but one that is enthusiastically sought by Sri Lanka. In strategizing Foreign Policy for the next decade, it is the understanding of the importance of the Sri Lanka – SCO partnership that requires immediate attention. While the goal should be the attainment of full membership and the prospect of closer cooperation in the future, it is to the present that Sri Lanka must look in emphasizing the contribution that she can make to the SCO.

The SCO has emerged as a powerful entity within less than two decades since its formation in 2001. Starting off as the Shanghai Five in 1996, including Kazakhstan in 2001, and then India and Pakistan in 2017, it has evolved into a force that is yet to exercise its muscle but one which possesses immense potential on the world stage, and an entity to which Sri Lanka can contribute and from which the country could gain in the years ahead, This would be possible only if foreign policy was strategized to include the SCO as an integral organisation and not one in which Sri Lanka maintains token partnership.