INDIA AND CHINA’S ABSENCE AT THE FIFA WORLD CUP: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR SOFT POWER?

By Sisaru Diyunuge

Forty-eight countries played in the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which was sixteen more than the previous tournament in Qatar. This expansion opened the door for nations which were unheard of by spectators of football, notable examples are Cape Verde with a population of 500,000, and Curacao with a population of just 150,000 (Fortune, 2026). The presence of these two tiny nations at what is arguably the world’s biggest sporting event made two absences impossible to ignore – India and China, the world’s most populous nations.

Naturally, one might enquire how the world's most populous nations failed to find 11 persons to represent their sides at the world stage. Throughout the history of this tournament, China has had one appearance, whilst India has had none (NPR, 2026) - which is fewer times than Haiti, or even North Korea (ABC 2026; Al Jazeera 2026).

Often, one might argue that China and India do not prioritize football and that they excel at the Olympics, and at cricket, respectively. However, it is reported that China may boast a football fan base of approximately 200 million with a growing domestic league (Reuters 2026), whilst India is not far along. This article explores the question of why China and India are consistently unable to turn this huge amount of interest in the sport into talent and why this might be costing them soft power on the global stage.

It is understood that if any country wants to make the world cup, let alone play well in it, it has to turn its youth into elite players. These countries often build institutions with a strict hierarchy – at the foundation is the most basic necessity, a space to play, i.e. hard infrastructure such as pitches and stadiums. This is because more pitches allow as many members as possible of the youth to showcase their talents early on.

Next, there are multiple developmental organizations such as clubs and academies which oversee the talent of these youngsters. Further up the hierarchy, one will find the football leagues. And finally, the last stage is making it for the national team – there is no better example of this hierarchy working that in the French national team and star player Kylian Mbappe (The Guardian, 2022). Nonetheless, India and China’s problem is not that they do not have this hierarchy, instead, their hierarchy is chaotic.

INDIA

Bobby Ghosh writes (2026) that India was in fact a world-power in the sport of football in the 1960s and even made it to the semi-finals in the Olympics and was invited to play the FIFA world cup. Ghosh (2026) goes to mention that a key ailment India’s football culture faces is a lack of self-confidence – in 1971 India beat England, its former colonizer in cricket, a decade later India became world champions of cricket and by the 21st century cricket was practically a religion in India.

By the mid 2000s, India invested heavily in building a solid cricket hierarchy – stadiums, academies, leagues such IPL which turn out to be multibillion dollar success stories. Cricket’s rise came at the demise of India’s football culture. In its 2023 report, India’s football federation cites many obvious hurdles such as low participation, lack of urban facilities, lack of trained personnel. Even members of the youth who start playing would soon run out of places to play (Khel Now, 2023), and the Indian football federation stated that there were less than 100 developmental clubs and for the very few players who end up making it to the Indian super league have to deal with constant chaos.

When the Indian football federation put the league up for sale, they could not attract commercial sponsors due to a lack of demand in viewer interests (The Guardian, 2026). To add to the already existing concerns, the federation’s officials are constantly accused of mass corruption and football’s governing body FIFA even banned India’s football federation temporarily for malpractices and bad governance (The Times of India 2024; The Times of India, 2022). Ghosh (2026) argues that because the wider Indian population does not show an interest towards football, there will be no interest shown by politicians thus the necessary institutional reform might never come through.

CHINA

Unlike in India, China’s approach is top-down. In fact, China’s President Xi Jinping has mentioned a three-step plan: 1) qualify for the world cup, 2) host the world cup, and 3) win the world cup (Reuters, 2026; The Guardian, 2015). China is no stranger to making the top-down approach work – China's extraordinary performance at the Olympics was the result of carefully crafted state policy in lifting the image of the country. However, experts say it is in fact the opposite approach needed to make football work – the bottom-up approach.

In 2015, the Chinese state took the first steps to building a strong football governing body in the country from the bottom – China pledged to build 70,000 pitches, 20,000 training centers and eventually get 30 million children playing football while strengthening the academies and leagues and finally to turn the Chinese Super League into one of the world’s best (British Council, 2016). While everything China did looked just right on paper, there was one social aspect which the system could not break; the Gaokao exams left millions of teenagers with no choice but to leave their sporting careers behind.

Eventually, due to a lack of players in the system, financial woes from the Evergreen crash and the COVID-19 pandemic, all collectively resulted in many of the super league clubs folding. Worse still, the Chinese system placed individuals from non-football, non-sports related government institutions to head and manage the hierarchy.

THE QUESTION OF DUAL NATIONALITY

Cape Verde and Curacao, along with countries like Qatar have allowed foreign-born players with the relevant countries’ ancestry along with others with dual passports to play for their national teams (Forbes, 2026). However, India and China, although possessing a large diaspora spread across the globe, have not done so because these two countries have no option for their citizens to hold dual citizenship.

HOW IS IT RELEVANT TO SOFT-POWER?

While governments do not negotiate trade agreements or security partnerships based on football, the influence it has in contemporary times is not an aspect that one could ignore. Both China and India are making inroads in Africa for influence in trade and security. Africa by and large is a footballing continent, and this can be a great tool for both countries to use.

Often India and China must deal with Europe, West Asia and Central Asia for the same reasons of trade and security – all footballing continents. Football can be used as a tool of influence, and in tougher conversations a deal-breaker. Thus, their absence is highlighted amongst football fans and noticed by its global partners.

References

ABC News (2026) 'The first Asian team to win a game at the World Cup finals', ABC News, https://www.abc.net.au/asia/the-first-asian-team-to-win-a-game-at-the-world-cup-finals/106779976

Al Jazeera (2026) 'For Haitians in the US, the pride and joy of the World Cup comes with fear', Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2026/6/25/for-haitians-in-the-us-the-pride-and-joy-of-the-world-cup-comes-with-fear

All India Football Federation (2023) Vision 2047: The Indian Football Strategic Roadmap. https://www.the-aiff.com/media/uploads/2023/01/Vision-2047-The-Indian-Football-Strategic-Roadmap-2023-2047.pdf

British Council (2016) 'Medium and long-term plan for Chinese football development points to increased demand for education in sports-related fields', British Council Opportunities Insight, https://opportunities-insight.britishcouncil.org/short-articles/news/medium-and-long-term-plan-chinese-football-development-points-increased-demand

Forbes (2026) 'How diaspora recruitment has reshaped World Cup rosters', Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/clementelisi/2026/06/15/how-diaspora-recruitment-has-reshaped-world-cup-rosters/

Fortune (2026) 'The legend of Cape Verde: how an island of half a million built the best team at the World Cup', Fortune, https://fortune.com/2026/07/16/roberto-lopes-linkedin-spam-cape-verde/

Ghosh, B. (2026) 'The 156,000 and the 1.4 billion', Foreign Policy, 15 May. Republished by Almendron. https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/the-156000-and-the-1-4-billion/

Khel Now (2023) 'Indian football: AIFF roadmap simplified – youth leagues planned, structure, objectives, development', Khel Now, https://khelnow.com/football/2023-01-indian-football-aiff-roadmap-simplified-youth-leagues-planned-structure-objectives-development

NPR (2026) 'Why India and China, two of the largest countries, didn't have World Cup teams', NPR, https://www.npr.org/2026/07/10/nx-s1-5876069/why-india-and-china-two-of-the-largest-countries-didnt-have-world-cup-teams

Reuters (2026) 'FIFA faces World Cup broadcast crisis as India's Reliance offers $20mln in China deal', Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/fifa-faces-world-cup-broadcast-crisis-indias-reliance-offers-20-mln-china-deal-2026-05-04/

The Guardian (2015) ‘China sets goal of hosting World Cup with master plan for football’, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/17/china-sets-goal-of-hosting-world-cup-with-master-plan-for-football

The Guardian (2022) 'Project Mbappé: the making of France's football superstar', The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/dec/09/project-mbappe-the-making-of-frances-football-superstar

The Guardian (2026) 'No games, no league: City Football Group and Indian football's "global embarrassment"', The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2026/jan/07/no-games-no-league-city-football-group-indian-football-global-embarrassment-mumbai-city-manchester

Times of India (2024) 'AIFF terminates service of its legal head after he accused President Kalyan Chaubey of corruption', The Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/football/top-stories/aiff-terminates-service-of-its-legal-head-after-he-accused-president-kalyan-chaubey-of-corruption/articleshow/108184049.cms

CHINA – SRI LANKA RELATIONS: A New Chapter Opened in 2025

By Tharushika Peelikumbura and Yohan Soyza

In September 2024, Sri Lankans experienced a significant political shift in the country. 76 years of governance led by the United National Party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and its alliance, and later the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, were rejected by the public. The National People’s Power won the presidential and parliamentary elections within two months. With that a new era of Sri Lankan politics began, and this article attempts to focus on a new era in China-Sri Lanka bilateral relations.

Newly elected Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake paid a four-day state visit to the People’s Republic of China from 14 to 17 January 2025. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment, and Tourism, Vijitha Herath, the Minister of Transport, Highways, Ports, and Civil Aviation, Bimal Rathnayake and the Director General of Government Information, H. S. K. J. Bandara were seen joining the visit with Dissanayake. The four-day state visit included meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China Zhao Leji and others. The visit was significant for the relations between the two countries as the Sri Lankan delegation met high-ranking members from the Chinese Communist Party, signaling increased cooperation in the future.

Key Diplomatic Objectives

1. Reaffirmation of the One China Policy

During his visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), President Dissanayake reaffirmed Sri Lanka’s continuous support for the One China Policy, recognizing the PRC as the only legitimate China that exists. He also assured his commitment not to allow Sri Lanka’s territory to be used for any anti-Chinese activities. This stance is aligned with Sri Lanka’s strong diplomatic relations with China since the 1950s (Kuruwita, 2025), and stronger than ever before since President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s time in the office from 2005 to 2015.

2. Strengthening Economic and Strategic Ties

This state visit aimed to strengthen strategic and economic ties between the two nations. Several agreements were signed to advance the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, strengthen trade and investment, and promote cooperation in areas such as education, climate action and agriculture. China also pledged to support Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring efforts and encourage investments in areas such as green development and logistics (Kuruwita, 2025; Xinhua, 2025).

Both parties emphasized the importance of the cultural ties as mentioned in the joint statement between China and Sri Lanka, released in January 2025. Education and research were seen as significant opportunities to enhance cultural ties, as both parties promised to encourage more exchanges of students, teachers and researchers. China stated they welcome committed Sri Lankan students to pursue higher studies in China by providing them government scholarships, which will be a great chance for Sri Lankan students who wish to pursue their higher studies in a foreign university. China will also work with Sri Lanka to implement the Luban Workshop to create more professionals through vocational and technical training in Sri Lanka (Joint Statement between China and Sri Lanka, 2025)

3. Positioning within Global South multilateral frameworks

China and Sri Lanka emphasized global development initiatives and multilateralism. Both countries agreed to support each other by strengthening coordination and cooperation within large multilateral bodies like the United Nations Organization (UNO), and also to give focus on global issues such as climate change (Xinhua, 2025). Sri Lanka also seeks to leverage China’s BRI for development purposes and navigate risks in debt and regional power dynamics. The BRI is a great opportunity for Sri Lanka to enhance its network and connect with other partnering countries of the BRI.

Strategic Cooperation Areas

1. Development in Infrastructure

A major area of cooperation between the two countries includes infrastructure development, which is mainly led by the BRI. Notable projects in Sri Lanka include the Colombo Port City project and Hambantota Port. These projects can play a crucial role in Sri Lanka’s economic development and turn the island nation into a regional hub of business, transportation and maritime logistics if managed properly (Kuruwita, 2025; Xinhua, 2025). Table 1 provides an overview of the current ongoing Chinese projects in Sri Lanka.

2. BRI Project Advancement

The state visit also highlighted the importance of continuing BRI projects in Sri Lanka. China promised strong support for Sri Lanka’s economic development, sovereignty, and independence. Both countries also signed 15 new agreements covering areas including economic development, education, media, culture, infrastructure, agriculture, digital economy, and marine economy. President Xi emphasized the importance of fostering new highlights and high-quality cooperation within the BRI while building a community of shared future with Sri Lanka. In response, Sri Lanka pledged to further deepen regional connectivity and welcome more Chinese investments. This collaboration also includes infrastructure development and other forms of multilateral cooperation addressing climate change, demonstrating the expanding scope and depth of bilateral relations (Desheng, 2025).

3. Investment in Maritime Infrastructure

Sri Lanka and China have multiple agreements on developing maritime infrastructure under the BRI projects. These projects include Hambantota International Port (HPI), aiming to make Sri Lanka a major maritime hub in the Indian Ocean Region by providing services such as port, energy, marine and port investment (Hambantota International Port Group, n.d.). The project also aims to create job opportunities that are estimated at around 50,000. However, since 2017, Sri Lanka has leased the port for 99 years to China Merchants Ports Holding Company (CMPort) in a debt-for-equity swap deal. Therefore, Sri Lankan decision-makers should work carefully and maintain high standards to maximize the benefits currently earning.

The Colombo Port City Project is another key project located on reclaimed land from the sea. The project is handled by the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) (CHEC Port City Colombo (Pvt) Ltd - Sri Lanka, n.d.). The China Merchants Ports Holding Company (CMPH) operates the Colombo International Container Terminals (CICT) as a joint venture company with the Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA). The CICT is the only deep-water port in South Asia at the moment, and they also aim to increase the capacity of the terminal and manage the container traffic (Details Business Areas, 2018).

4. Economic Collaboration

This includes increasing trade and investment, promoting agricultural cooperation, and developing digital economy partnerships, as it is one of the fastest-developing sectors globally, contributing over 15% to global GDP (Wignaraja and De Zylva, 2018). China has also agreed to assist Sri Lanka in debt restructuring, education, tourism development, logistics and green development (Kuruwita, 2025). China is also focusing on a free trade agreement (FTA) with Sri Lanka, as they already reached one recently with the Maldives (Shivamurthy, 2025).

5. $3.7 billion Sinopec Oil Refinery Project in Hambantota

As a major point of President Dissanayake’s 2025 visit to China, both nations agreed to a $3.7 billion oil refinery project in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. Sinopec will lead this project as decided after a bidding process. This step indicates a shift towards partnerships based on investment rather than financial loans (Moramudali and Chen, 2025).

6. Renewal of Currency Swap Agreement

During the state visit two nations agreed on a currency swap renewal. This is a pivotal point of Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring and economic stabilizing process, and it will also enhance economic cooperation between the two old friends (Kuruwita, 2025).

7. Expanding Trade and Investment

Both countries are highly focused on expanding trade and investment to provide a more friendly business atmosphere for Chinese enterprises in Sri Lanka. Digital transformation, green development, and logistics are the main aspects to be focused on (Kuruwita, 2025; Xinhua, 2025)

Table 1 above indicates that China’s main focus on infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka was mainly on roads, airports, seaports, energy, the telecommunication sector and water supply projects. By investing in such infrastructure projects, China created interdependencies and leveraged them significantly. Sri Lanka, as a strategic point in the Indian Ocean, could be pivotal for China to ensure its regional power balance in South Asia. But during the civil war times, China emerged as a major donor and development partner (Shivamurthy, 2025), proving China’s caring role for Global South partners. The authors assume that providing development assistance is not just a strategic step, it is also a significant priority of uplifting the global south partners while developing itself, as China is doing. If the public could understand this with an open mind, this might be seen as a positive opportunity to develop the country.

What is important is that the Sri Lankan policymakers need to carefully manage Chinese development loans to gain the maximum benefits. In this case, transparency is very important as the government officials are responsible for every decision they take on behalf of the public, and the decisions need to be transparent to the public. Evaluating and reporting each project is also crucial as they can be used to plan future projects carefully.

Geopolitical Context

As President Anura Kumara Dissanayake sets out on a strategic partnership with China, the geopolitical context surrounding this initiative cannot be overlooked. The Indian Ocean remains significant for international relations, and Sri Lanka's geographical position makes it a critical player in the balance of power among regional powers. Sri Lanka must therefore navigate its aspirations cautiously, serving both its national interests and the demands of powerful neighbouring countries.

1. Balancing Relations with Regional Powers

By reaffirming its ties with China, Sri Lanka finds itself seeking a delicate balance between India and China, two strong neighbours. Sri Lankan leadership often emphasizes the need for a non-aligned foreign policy, which allows it to engage with both nations without compromising its sovereignty. A diplomatic quote that describes this approach is from Dissanayake himself in which he notes that "We thrive best when our partnerships create opportunities for all parties involved." (Deccan Herald, 2025).

2. Strategic Positioning in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is becoming increasingly significant for trade routes and military presence. Sri Lanka's decision to strengthen ties with China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will likely enhance its strategic location in the region. China’s investments in maritime infrastructure aim to secure its maritime silk route, while Sri Lanka benefits from development and trade opportunities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2025). The growth in maritime infrastructure could lead to increased ship traffic through the Colombo harbour, thereby significantly boosting the Sri Lankan economy (Global Times, 2025).

3. Diplomatic Support in International Forums

In the face of global challenges, Sri Lanka's collaboration with China also opens avenues for diplomatic backing in international forums. China's weight in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations provides an opportunity for Sri Lanka to express its interests more clearly (Sunday Times, 2021). This collaboration may come in the form of backing during discussions related to climate change, economic development, and regional security matters, aligning with China's global objectives while benefiting Sri Lanka’s international standing.

Recommended Policy Actions

For Sri Lanka to fully gain the benefits of its deepening relationship with China, several policy actions have been highlighted by scholars and policy institutes. Firstly, diversifying economic partnerships is essential. While Chinese collaborations offer significant opportunities, overdependence poses long-term risks. Strengthening ties with ASEAN countries, the European Union, and India can enhance economic resilience and geopolitical balance (Observer Research Foundation, 2025). Secondly, leveraging Chinese investments strategically can catalyze broader development. Beyond infrastructure, Sri Lanka can use these investments to expand sectors like energy, technology, and manufacturing, provided the projects are managed with transparency and long-term sustainability in mind (Global Times, 2025). Thirdly, maintaining diplomatic flexibility is crucial. A dynamic foreign policy that balances relations with both China and India, while promoting regional multilateralism, can help Sri Lanka navigate shifting geopolitical dynamics (Gateway House, 2025).

Amidst these high-level strategies, several modest yet impactful actions remain underutilized. One such initiative is the formation of an independent Foreign Investment Impact Assessment Taskforce, including members from civil society, academia, and business, to review and publicly brief on major bilateral projects, thereby increasing transparency and public trust. Additionally, bilingual digital dashboards that track project progress, financial flows, and social outcomes could facilitate data-driven adjustments and citizen engagement. The government could also embed policy nudges into contracts, such as local hiring quotas, incentives for technology transfer, and environmental safeguards, all achievable without extensive legislative overhaul. Finally, introducing foreign policy literacy modules in secondary education would help cultivate a more informed and globally aware generation. These grassroots-oriented actions are low-cost, culturally resonant, and politically feasible, yet they often remain sidelined in favor of grand diplomatic visions.

Potential Challenges

While the prospects of deepening relations with China appear promising, several well-documented challenges must be carefully managed. First, navigating regional power dynamics is crucial, as tensions between China and India over territorial disputes continue to escalate. Sri Lanka must tread carefully to avoid being drawn into broader geopolitical rivalries (Foreign Policy, 2024). Second, ensuring balanced international relations is vital. Strengthening ties with China should not come at the expense of alienating other key international partners, and a nuanced foreign policy is required to maintain this equilibrium (Deccan Herald, 2025). Third, the issue of maintaining economic sovereignty remains pressing. The influx of Chinese investments, while beneficial in the short term, may compromise Sri Lanka’s long-term control over strategic sectors unless protective mechanisms are in place (Chatham House, 2020).

Beyond these widely acknowledged strategic concerns, Sri Lanka also faces a set of more localized, systemic challenges that could quietly erode the benefits of foreign engagement. Entrenched bureaucratic inefficiencies often stall the implementation of large-scale agreements, regardless of high-level diplomatic progress. Additionally, the politicization of foreign investments, where projects become mired in domestic party politics, can cause mismanagement, public opposition, or abandonment. Another underappreciated challenge is the limited institutional capacity to enforce environmental, labor, and transparency standards in megaprojects funded by foreign entities. This gap can lead to exploitation, unequal benefits, and environmental harm. Furthermore, low levels of public awareness regarding the long-term implications of international partnerships hinder civic engagement and accountability. If left unaddressed, these domestic vulnerabilities risk undermining even the most strategically sound bilateral initiatives.

Conclusion

The strategic visit of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to China marked a significant milestone in the evolution of China-Sri Lanka relations. By deepening cooperation across multiple areas, reaffirming key diplomatic objectives, and maintaining a proactive diplomatic stance, Sri Lanka is poised to enhance its standing in the regional and global arena.

The evolving partnership between Sri Lanka and China presents a landscape rich with opportunity, but not without complexity. As strategic initiatives continue to deepen bilateral ties, Sri Lanka must remain vigilant in safeguarding its economic sovereignty, institutional integrity, and regional balance. The recent political transition signals a willingness to reset foreign policy priorities, but genuine success will depend not only on high-level diplomacy but also on transparent governance, inclusive development, and civic accountability.

In this significant chapter of its international engagement, Sri Lanka has the chance to reshape its role in the Indo-Pacific and the Global South. Whether it emerges as a strategic bridge or becomes strategically bridged over will depend on how well it can balance cooperation with caution, vision with vigilance. And here’s something to think about. If foreign partnerships are designed to build the nation’s future, should the people of that nation not be more actively involved in shaping how those partnerships unfold?

References

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A PAUSED PARTNERSHIP? Sri Lanka’s Incomplete Integration into the SCO

By Abheetha Kodikara

The ‘Shanghai Five’ organization was renamed in 2001 as the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ with the inclusion of Uzbekistan. The next large expansion was the inclusion of India and Pakistan in 2017. The organization also has categories such as observer states and dialogue partners, which bring together many countries. Sri Lanka obtained dialogue partnership in 2009 and still remains in that position today. This article attempts to understand why Sri Lanka has remained a dialogue partner for sixteen years.

Many countries that joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after Sri Lanka, have already progressed beyond observer status to full membership. Against this background Sri Lanka’s limited interest or awareness of the SCO has become questionable. Did Sri Lanka ever want to go beyond dialogue partner status? Does Sri Lanka lack enthusiasm to seize opportunities through engagement with the SCO? Are there strategic planning gaps?

These aspects require analytical scrutiny. Since its establishment, the SCO has evolved into a powerful institution. It has expanded its network from Eurasia to South Asia, and further into West Asia. The attraction however is likely dependent on whether the goals of the partner countries have been met through the organization. The goals of the organization affect the engagement of the relevant countries, with the organization. The SCO is no longer limited to addressing terrorism, extremism and separatism. It also focuses on enhancing economic prosperity, trade among member states and energy cooperation.

In such a context, Sri Lanka’s prolonged status as a dialogue partner since 2009 indicates a lack of enthusiasm towards achieving more substantial goals. It must be questioned whether this is due to the country being trapped in significant debt dependency on China, or whether Sri Lanka is struggling to gain tangible benefits in trade, investment, and energy while maintaining a steady non-aligned foreign policy.

In 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding to create an Energy Club was signed among the SCO member states, observers, and dialogue partners. Yet, there remains a lack of awareness and knowledge of the steps taken by Sri Lanka to engage closely in the Energy Club.

An attempt is made to understand the lack of progress of membership from a theoretical perspective of regional cooperation. Starting with realism, it focuses on power dynamics, self-interest and survival strategies of states within an archaic global system. Why then has there been no attempt to increase power dynamics or self-interest? When considering regime theory and liberalism, the focus is on how institutions can enhance international and regional cooperation by working together. In the current world, it is increasingly important that states work together to achieve peace, security, prosperity, poverty reduction, and equality among other priorities. Thus, relatively small states like Sri Lanka would benefit economically, in fulfilling the nation’s needs.

In discussing the topic further, it is understood that policy reforms were not taken seriously or enthusiastically, by considering the benefits of cooperation. In addition, the lack of domestic awareness and institutional capacity are key arguments when it comes to Sri Lanka remaining at the same level on the SCO’s membership portal.

In fact, the awareness about the SCO among Sri Lanka’s policymakers, scholars, media and civil society is minimal. The absence of a national policy on SCO engagement and the minimal attention or sustainability of a dedicated SCO unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underlines this weakness. The critique here is that for any multilateral partnership, whether it is SCO or any other regional alliance, in order to yield a meaningful process, there must be domestic institutional readiness and proper awareness. Without an official framework and policy structures, the partnership cannot evolve beyond symbolic affiliation.

What is also relevant for this study is the absence of bilateral follow-up mechanisms between Sri Lanka and Central Asian states. This is a key challenge as, unlike the other dialogue partners such as Türkiye or Egypt which have leveraged bilateral ties with SCO members, Sri Lanka lacks the structural bilateral dialogue or economic corridors. Sri Lanka also lacks free trade agreements or largescale diplomatic missions in several SCO countries. The absence of high-level political visits to and from key Central Asian States also further limits influence.

When examining these reasons, it is clear that improving dialogue partnership status would only be possible with parallel bilateral cooperation. Yet a point to urgently note is that Sri Lanka has not proactively engaged in such follow-up initiatives through SCO platforms.

Therefore, in conclusion, Sri Lanka must develop a National SCO engagement strategy, strengthen relations with Central Asian states, through trade, diplomacy and academic exchanges while managing India-China dynamics within the organization carefully to build institutional awareness about the potential of the SCO. Using the dialogue partnership platform to foster strategic trust would gradually strengthen the partnership and result in observer status.

The presence of Sri Lanka in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is mostly ceremonial. What should be realised is that cooperation would ensure economic benefits which Sri Lanka needs at this time.

China's Rising Status as a Mediator

 By Trivan Annakkarage

A mediator is often a neutral and respected third-party that aims to resolve prolonged disputes. In the context of International Relations, these prolonged disputes are usually associated between governments (of either two or more nation-states) or it may even be internal disputes within a nation-state, between its government and non-state actors such as secessionist movements, drug cartels, trade unions or even fundamentalist organizations. In all these instances, it is the public that suffer, and prolonged disputes would result in conflicts where the suffering is passed down to future generations thus fueling more resentment and complications. Hence, mediators are vital to bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table to agree on peaceful solutions.  

In China, mediation has a strong connection to the country’s three main religious philosophies namely Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism. Mediation is a practice that is considered as a means to preserve social harmony and relationships thus leading to social stability and inclusive development of societies. During its imperial period, China intervened as a mediator in international disputes. Examples include the Tang Dynasty (618-907) resolving disputes between nomadic groups in Central Asia to prevent potential disruptions to the Silk Route and during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) where Admiral Zheng He intervened to resolve internal disputes in the Malacca Sultanate. However, as technologically advanced European colonial powers and Imperial Japan overpowered Imperial China, Beijing gradually lost its leverage to act as a decisive mediator in international conflicts. With China entering its Century of Humiliation (1839-1945), its status as an international mediator gradually diminished.                     

During the Cold War (1947-1991), the United States and the Soviet Union intervened as mediators in several international disputes. Examples include United States’ role as a mediator in the Camp David Accords of 1978 that resulted in the normalization of Israel-Egypt relations and the Tashkent Declaration of 1965 which was mediated by the Soviet Union that marked the end of the Indo-Pakistani War which broke-out that year. However, the role of a mediator was not solely limited to the superpowers at the time because countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also acted as decisive mediators. The Algiers Accords of 1981 mediated by Algeria saw the United States and Iran amicably ending the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981. Notably, the Colombo Proposals of 1962 which were jointly mediated by six NAM countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic) paved the way to end the Sino-Indian War which took place that year.     

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party maintained a non-interventionist foreign policy into the affairs of other nation-states. It could be argued that this policy was beneficial because in 1971, the majority of countries voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) that recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the UN.

However, China did directly intervene in the affairs of other neighbouring countries only when there was a perceived threat to its sovereignty. Examples include direct intervention on the North Korean side in the Korean War of 1950-1953 and providing intelligence to North Vietnam in the Vietnam War of 1955-1975. These actions were a result of China’s determination to limit the influence of foreign powers in its neighbourhood – a key factor that would determine China’s rise as a mediator in the 21^st century.  

After the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 (between America’s Nixon Administration and Mao’s Government in China) followed by Beijing adopting the reform and opening up policy in 1978, China was on its path to becoming the factory of the world. As China reaped financial benefits from these initiatives it was vital for Beijing to develop and maintain strong economic links with many countries that invested and imported Chinese manufactured goods. This strong focus on economic development distanced China being involved in geopolitical tensions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. 

As the 21^st century unfolded, and with China overtaking Japan as the second largest economy in the world in 2010 (during the Presidency of Hu Jintao) followed by President Xi Jinping unveiling China’s monumental vision to resurrect the Silk Route via the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) three years later, it was evident that China was on its path to becoming a prospective global power. Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, it was a necessity for China to expand its footprint around the world. Nevertheless, for Beijing, it is paramount that China’s global image is not tarnished in the process as a positive force in the world. Hence it could be assessed that the relatively lesser negative historical baggage (associated with colonizing countries), and being a vital country in the global value chain, has benefitted China because its growing influence is both acknowledged and respected at the same time by many state and non-state actors. Hence, such a global standing permits China to engage in the affairs of mediating international disputes – complimenting Beijing’s commitment to preserve China’s image as a positive force in the world.    

However, as revealed by political scientist, Niklas Swanström (Executive Director, Sweden’s Institute for Security Development & Policy), mediation was an area that the People’s Republic of China had lack of knowledge and experience. Hence, before venturing into this space, China acted with caution. As highlighted by Helena Lagarda (Lead Analyst, Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies) China has engaged in low-key mediation in the Korean peninsula (since 2003) and in the conflict between Sudan-South Sudan (from 2008-2011). Although these mediation efforts have not resulted in successes, it was a testing ground for China to familiarise the art of mediation and learn how to secure its interest while maintaining its public image in the process.

These harbinger efforts to China’s rise as a mediator could be elaborated as follows. Facilitating between the United States (including its allies in the region - Japan and South Korea) and North Korea (about its nuclear weapons programme) placed China as a crucial stakeholder in this dispute. Hence as noted by Swanström, China’s mediation has prevented North Korea from reaching out to Russia for security guarantees that would have undermined China’s status in the region. With regard to Sudan and South Sudan, by intervening in the conflict, China has been able to secure its oil and mining contracts in both countries along with maintaining amicable relations – despite prevailing diplomatic tensions between Sudan and South Sudan over oil revenue.    

By the time BRI was formally announced in 2013, China had reasonably been exposed to the art of mediation. Since peaceful and stable nation-states and regions are vital to BRI’s success, the need to resolve conflicts in various regions along the land and maritime routes soon became a necessity if China wished to realise BRI. Therefore, BRI could be argued as a reason for China’s rising status as a mediator.    

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or commonly referred to as the Iranian Nuclear Deal) could be argued as a notable commitment by China in a multilateral mediation effort. Despite the United States withdrawing from the agreement in 2018 (during the first Trump Administration), China together with Russia stood firm with Iran. Regardless of repudiating the conditions under JCPOA, this resulted in Iran continuing cordial relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and not acting in isolation – a result that would have been detrimental to the stability of West Asia and ongoing BRI projects in the region.  

Given how difficult it is for the two nuclear-armed South Asian countries to agree on being part of a regional security body, China played a crucial mediating role to admit both India and Pakistan as members to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2018. As argued by Samuel Ramani (Associate Fellow, Britain’s Royal United Services Institute) in spite of close ties with Islamabad, Beijing is aware that for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC; a land route part of BRI) to bear fruit, it is essential to have New Delhi on its side because the proposed corridor cuts through the disputed region of Kashmir.

In 2022, Xi announced China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Boao Forum held that year. GSI is inspired by the concept of ‘indivisible security’. This rejects the idea of isolating national security of one country and emphasizes that one country’s national security is linked to other countries. Therefore, mutual dependence on security is the best way forward to create peace and stability in the world.    

With GSI now being part of the Chinese Communist Party’s policy, China’s most recent successful mediation effort was restoring diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023. According to Amrita Jash (Assistant Professor, India’s Manipal Academy of High Education), this achievement by China is as significant as the US-led mediation triumphs such as the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Abraham Accords of 2020. Regardless of being the present super-power, it is unfortunate that the United States was unable to amend relations between these two countries. It could be argued that it is primarily due to Washington’s interest in fostering tensions so that Saudi Arabia remains a market that imports American state-of-the art weapons to defend its borders and immediate neighbourhood from Iran. On the other hand, China’s goal to enhance international trade in general via BRI makes inclusivity easier hence delivery of mediation efforts.

As stated by Wang Huiyao (Founder, Centre for China & Globalization), China is able to leverage itself as a mediator due to its strong economic relations. China is the largest trading partner for India, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. This makes it relatively easier to project its soft power on disputing parties. China’s ongoing efforts include mediating conflicts between Russia versus Ukraine and Israel versus Palestine. Even among these countries China emerges as one of their largest (or even largest) trading partners. In 2023, taking note of China’s rising status as a mediator, French President Emmanuel Macron urged Xi to convince President Vladimir Putin to end its conflict with Ukraine. According Galia Lavi and Oded Eran (senior research personnel, Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies) the US-Israel bond would be challenged if the people of West Asia (including Israelis) begin to increasingly view China positively via its infrastructure projects in the region.     

As revealed by the British academic Hugo Slim, unlike the United States and its European allies, China does not impose liberal ideologies when mediating conflicts. What gives the Chinese Government leverage as a mediator is its deep understanding of the historic context of the dispute and being able to respect and work with governments that have different ideologies.       

As much as it seems that China focuses on fostering trade via BRI as means to resolve conflicts, in the process Beijing is also trying to gradually balance Washington’s influence. Moreover, with the United States shifting its focus to domestic affairs, there is opportunity for China to fill the vacancy of a mediator. In the process and in the words of Slim, China wishes to “de-occidentalise” the approach to mediation. According to Samir Bhattacharya (Associate Fellow, India’s Observer Research Foundation), China’s mediation follows a careful mix of three 3Is – interference, influence and intervention from which creative involvement is developed.

The following map depicts China’s past and current efforts in the world. 

Source: Taken from Helena Legarda’s article titled, China wades into the Israel-Palestine conflict once more https://merics.org/en/comment/china-wades-israel-palestine-conflict-once-more

Nevertheless, there are several factors that challenge China’s rising status as a mediator. They include China’s dispute over the South China Sea, China’s attempts to incorporate Taiwan into its sovereign territory and China’s border disputes with India. As pointed out by the Brazilian Journalist, Fábio Galão, major criticism about China’s mediation is the lack of concern to hold conflicting parties accountable on human rights.

Traditionally, the country focuses strongly on working with state-actors rather than with non-state actors such as civil society organizations. This could be the reason why human rights and other similar concerns take a back-seat in the mediation agenda. Moreover, as the 21^st century unravels, mediation on topics such as climate change, migration and tariffs seem to take centre stage along with geopolitical tensions. This would further complicate mediation efforts. How well China navigates these issues and developments would depend on the Chinese Communist Party’s commitment to GSI and its creative involvement in mediation.        

References

Bhattacharya, S. (2024, August 7). China's conflict resolution mechanism in Africa: Mediation with Chinese characteristics. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-s-conflict-resolution-mechanism-in-africa-mediation-with-chinese-characteristics

Galão, F. (2023, May 9). How China has become the new mediator in global geopolitics. The Rio Times. https://www.riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/new-multipolar-world-order/how-china-has-become-the-new-mediator-in-global-geopolitics/

Huiyao, W. (2024, August 16). Why China is becoming a top choice mediator for global conflicts. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3274330/why-china-becoming-top-choice-mediator-global-conflicts

Jash, A. (2023, June 23). Saudi-Iran deal: A test case of China’s role as an international mediator. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/

Lavi, G., & Eran, O. (2023, April 4). Could China serve as an international mediator? Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48747

Legarda, H. (2018, August 22). China as a conflict mediator. MERICS. https://merics.org/en/comment/china-conflict-mediator

Ramani, S. (2018, July 9). Can China mediate between Pakistan and India? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/can-china-mediate-between-pakistan-and-india/

Slim, H. (2024). Mediation in the world and wars of the 2020s. Still Time to Talk. Conciliation Resources. https://www.c-r.org/accord/still-time-talk/mediation-world-and-wars-2020s

Swanström, N. (2024, June 5). China as a mediator in North Korea: Facilitating dialogues or mediating conflicts? The Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2024/china-as-a-mediator-in-north-korea-facilitating-dialogues-or-mediating-conflicts/

 

SHINZO ABE: PRESERVING HIS LEGACY

Guest Commentary by Banura Nandathilake

Subscribers to international relations often come to a junction between theories: Realism, which posits a zero sum world where external circumstances such as hard power and anarchy that are beyond any individual define the ways in which states do what they do, and constructivism which understands an interdependent society of states where leaders truly have an tangible impact on inter-state relations through social mechanisms. The case for the latter seems to outweigh the former in the analysis of Shinzo Abe however, who left an ineffaceable mark on Japanese foreign policy, by guiding a largely pacifist Japan to one that actively moulds and shapes the security, economic and diplomatic architecture of the Indo Pacific and beyond.

As the heir of a distinguished political family, Abe entered politics in the 1990s where he sought to largely continue the policies of his grandfather, the former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi: Regain the ability to exert Japanese power on the regional and world stage by removing the shackles imposed by the US and a faction of the then Japanese political class. As such, Abe went on to become Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister with four terms (2006-7, 2012-14, 2014-17, 2017-20). On 8 July 2022 however, in an event that stunned the heavily gun restricted Japan, the former Japanese Prime Minister was shot and killed during his campaigning run for his party in the Japanese city of Nara. Despite the untimely passing of the "shadow shogun", the direction of Japan's future may be influenced by, thereby correlate with Abe's "vision" to a great extent (Green, CSIS 2022). Japan has built a full-fledged national security establishment, an estimated 1.7% growth in GDP in 2022, and is a bastion of neo liberal democratic policies in the Indo pacific. Below is an obituary for a man who had a heavy hand in reawakening Japan, wherein his effect on domestic and foreign policies will be appreciated.

Domestic Political Legacy

While for many, Abe’s career was one of dramatic and unlikely turns which spanned 14 years and saw him into extraordinary power to influence the direction of Japanese domestic policy, Sheila Smith of Council on Foreign Relations and others understand that a revised domestic constitution may be Abe's major legacy.

Just two days after Abe’s assassination, the Japanese voted in the Upper House election, awarding the government led by the current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida their anticipated victory. Interestingly, Smith notes that the assassination had no credible change in the election environment. The voter turnout was on par with previous years, and Abe’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a structural advantage as the smaller opposition parties did not form a united front thus further dividing the vote. As such, an Upper House win by the LDP could open an avenue for a Constitutional revision, once an ambition of the former Prime Minister. While factors that may postpone an immediate revision do exist, she notes that a revision could have a lasting impact on Abe’s legacy.

Abenomics

Abe’s vision was of regaining the ability to exercise Japanese power, by losing her shackles imposed by low domestic economic power and capital, which can then be turned into military might and diplomatic currency. However, Japanese capabilities were idling, due to the lack of opportunities as per legal and international constraints in the post WW2 era. In the understanding that securing Japan’s future would require an economy with a new foundation for growth, the economic programme “Abenomics” was born. The programme was an attempt to kickstart Japan’s dormant capabilities through expansionary monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, and a long list of industrial, labour, and regulatory policies to incentivise endogenous development. Abenomics aimed to shift production from agrarian or low value sectors to high income productive sectors to slow the decline of Japan’s labour force, in an “serious, sustained, and flexible attempt to grapple with Japan’s growth challenges” (Harris, FP 2022).

Abenomics was instrumental in reviving the Japanese economy, as well as supercharging Abe’s political career. The programme reversed years of stagnation, boosted corporate profits and state tax revenues, thereby reducing unemployment and crime. As such, Abe was able to coast past domestic elections, pausing the tradition of short-lived premierships in Japan. The resulting political durability allowed him to pursue long term ambitions, such as creating a National Security Council which distilled the defence apparatus through the Prime Minister’s office. Such a creation then allowed for a more active foreign policy over the existing passive structure, which sought to strengthen regional ties while balancing against regional hegemons. 

Japan-India Relations

Relations between Cold war Japan and India were one of polite distance: Japan was a US ally, while India was procedurally non-aligned with some overlap of interests with the USSR. Despite the deterioration of the said relations during the 1988 Indian nuclear missile test and the Japanese economic sanctions that followed, the two states were quick to repair and rebuild a “global partnership’’, proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro a few years later during his visit to India. However, it was Abe that built the stage for a more cohesive and interdependent Japanese-Indian relationship, such as the “India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership’’ (2007). Bilateral relations were further strengthened during Abe’s third term in 2014 through a “special and strategic partnership,” which encompassed diplomatic, security and economic sectors. Trade between Japan and India increased exponentially from 2007, while Japan and India cooperated on security issues in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad.

Moreover, it could be understood that Abe's 2007 visit to India was not only significant for the Japan-India relationship, but also India’s perception of itself and its role in the region (Miller, CFR 2022). Miller understands that it was Japan that influenced India, ‘a notoriously reluctant and cautious actor in global politics’ to join Abe’s Indo-Pacific vision, which now serves as an ideological, economic and military buffer to the rise of China. This vision of the “confluence of the two seas” - Pacific and Indian, were first outlined by Abe in his speech during his first visit to India in 2007, and laid the foundation for the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept which was later adopted by the United States.

China and the Quad

China’s rise in the contemporary era has been unprecedented. An authoritarian political system combined with a quasi-capitalist economic system has allowed China to gain regional hegemony and a global great power ranking, allowing its influential military, economic and diplomatic alliances. Such a rise presents a growing threat and demands a balance of power between China and the US and Allies. Of those allies, Abe represented a significant one: Japan.

While Abe was central in expanding India's position in the Indo-Pacific, his pragmatic approach to relations with China demanded a closer look. Abe could be considered a soft liner on Sino-Japan relations, so much so that he was called a "traitor" by many Japanese patriots. This may be so since the uneven economic balance of power weighed more towards China than Japan: Japan needed China for trade and manufacturing, than vice versa. However, as Mireya Solís, the director of the Centre for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution understood, despite his efforts to maintain closer relations with China “Abe felt very strongly that Japan could not live in an Asia where China had hegemony”. As such, Abe’s pragmatism recognised that despite interdependence and globalisation, China represented a challenge on all fronts, diplomatic, economic and military. Ergo, Abe may have been instrumental in setting the tone for the Japanese defence apparatus. Furthermore, Abe subscribed to right leaning nationalist policies domestically, as he helped coax a pacifist Japanese public to oppose China’s meteoric and bullish rise, further laying the groundwork for the direction of Japanese foreign policy.

However, his vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific may have trumped all else. His influence soon superseded national and regional boundaries, as President Joe Biden, who once worked with Abe as the vice president during the Obama administration, put it “He (Abe) was a champion of the Alliance between our nations and the friendship between our people”, and promised to continue Abe’s “vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific” (2022). The US and Japan, along with India and Australia, form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which represents a bulwark against China in the Indo-Pacific. While the US had more economic and military might than Japan, Abe was still paramount in laying the rhetorical groundwork for the Quad, “providing structural, conceptual ideas to things that needed to be provided at a time when it seemed like it was crumbling.” (Hornung, 2022).

On Taiwan

A great power conflict in East Asia appears to brew over the Island of Taiwan which stands a stone's throw away from the shores of China. While the ideological divide stems from the great powers US and China, US allies such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are not passive watchers either.

Japanese leaders before Abe were uncomfortable with using force to defend Taiwan, as implications of such a move for Japanese security, and how Japan's responses to such scenarios were heavily debated. But it was Abe that argued in 2021, “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance. President Xi Jinping in particular, should never have a misunderstanding in recognizing this”. Abe was thus paramount in transforming Japan’s relationship with Taiwan to counter threats from China, for he recognised a hegemonic China posed a risk not just to the security of the liberal democratic states of East Asia, but their economic and sociological institutions as well. As such, Prime Minister Abe emphasised shared economic, political and ideological values between Japan and Taiwan, where he referred to Taiwan as a “precious friend,” an angle the incoming governments adopted thereafter. Abe was an advocate of stronger relations with Taiwan so much so that he went on to argue that the US policy of strategic ambiguity was “fostering instability in the Indo-Pacific region” as he called out the US to “make clear that it will defend Taiwan against any attempted Chinese invasion.”

Furthermore, it was during Mr. Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister that one of the major sore points in the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Japan were resolved. After 17 years of negotiations, in 2013 Japan and Taiwan concluded Japanese recognition of Taiwanese Fishing rights in the East China Sea. As such, affection for Abe and Japan in Taiwan have reached record highs. Thus, after the news of Abe’s passing had reached Taiwan, President Tsai Ing-wen honoured “Taiwan’s most loyal best friend” with the national flag flown at half-mast.

Shinzo Abe could be called a realist, for he understood that despite diplomacy and the multilateral handshaking, states with different value systems and interests must communicate through hard power and deterrence. But to call him a pragmatist through the constructivist lens could be more apt, as he understood that despite anarchy and hard power considerations, leaders are still able to make a difference in the domestic and foreign policies of a state, thereby keeping up with an evolving world stage. As the world honours him in his passing, it is now up to his successors to carry his legacy forward.