INDIA AND CHINA’S ABSENCE AT THE FIFA WORLD CUP: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR SOFT POWER?

By Sisaru Diyunuge

Forty-eight countries played in the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which was sixteen more than the previous tournament in Qatar. This expansion opened the door for nations which were unheard of by spectators of football, notable examples are Cape Verde with a population of 500,000, and Curacao with a population of just 150,000 (Fortune, 2026). The presence of these two tiny nations at what is arguably the world’s biggest sporting event made two absences impossible to ignore – India and China, the world’s most populous nations.

Naturally, one might enquire how the world's most populous nations failed to find 11 persons to represent their sides at the world stage. Throughout the history of this tournament, China has had one appearance, whilst India has had none (NPR, 2026) - which is fewer times than Haiti, or even North Korea (ABC 2026; Al Jazeera 2026).

Often, one might argue that China and India do not prioritize football and that they excel at the Olympics, and at cricket, respectively. However, it is reported that China may boast a football fan base of approximately 200 million with a growing domestic league (Reuters 2026), whilst India is not far along. This article explores the question of why China and India are consistently unable to turn this huge amount of interest in the sport into talent and why this might be costing them soft power on the global stage.

It is understood that if any country wants to make the world cup, let alone play well in it, it has to turn its youth into elite players. These countries often build institutions with a strict hierarchy – at the foundation is the most basic necessity, a space to play, i.e. hard infrastructure such as pitches and stadiums. This is because more pitches allow as many members as possible of the youth to showcase their talents early on.

Next, there are multiple developmental organizations such as clubs and academies which oversee the talent of these youngsters. Further up the hierarchy, one will find the football leagues. And finally, the last stage is making it for the national team – there is no better example of this hierarchy working that in the French national team and star player Kylian Mbappe (The Guardian, 2022). Nonetheless, India and China’s problem is not that they do not have this hierarchy, instead, their hierarchy is chaotic.

INDIA

Bobby Ghosh writes (2026) that India was in fact a world-power in the sport of football in the 1960s and even made it to the semi-finals in the Olympics and was invited to play the FIFA world cup. Ghosh (2026) goes to mention that a key ailment India’s football culture faces is a lack of self-confidence – in 1971 India beat England, its former colonizer in cricket, a decade later India became world champions of cricket and by the 21st century cricket was practically a religion in India.

By the mid 2000s, India invested heavily in building a solid cricket hierarchy – stadiums, academies, leagues such IPL which turn out to be multibillion dollar success stories. Cricket’s rise came at the demise of India’s football culture. In its 2023 report, India’s football federation cites many obvious hurdles such as low participation, lack of urban facilities, lack of trained personnel. Even members of the youth who start playing would soon run out of places to play (Khel Now, 2023), and the Indian football federation stated that there were less than 100 developmental clubs and for the very few players who end up making it to the Indian super league have to deal with constant chaos.

When the Indian football federation put the league up for sale, they could not attract commercial sponsors due to a lack of demand in viewer interests (The Guardian, 2026). To add to the already existing concerns, the federation’s officials are constantly accused of mass corruption and football’s governing body FIFA even banned India’s football federation temporarily for malpractices and bad governance (The Times of India 2024; The Times of India, 2022). Ghosh (2026) argues that because the wider Indian population does not show an interest towards football, there will be no interest shown by politicians thus the necessary institutional reform might never come through.

CHINA

Unlike in India, China’s approach is top-down. In fact, China’s President Xi Jinping has mentioned a three-step plan: 1) qualify for the world cup, 2) host the world cup, and 3) win the world cup (Reuters, 2026; The Guardian, 2015). China is no stranger to making the top-down approach work – China's extraordinary performance at the Olympics was the result of carefully crafted state policy in lifting the image of the country. However, experts say it is in fact the opposite approach needed to make football work – the bottom-up approach.

In 2015, the Chinese state took the first steps to building a strong football governing body in the country from the bottom – China pledged to build 70,000 pitches, 20,000 training centers and eventually get 30 million children playing football while strengthening the academies and leagues and finally to turn the Chinese Super League into one of the world’s best (British Council, 2016). While everything China did looked just right on paper, there was one social aspect which the system could not break; the Gaokao exams left millions of teenagers with no choice but to leave their sporting careers behind.

Eventually, due to a lack of players in the system, financial woes from the Evergreen crash and the COVID-19 pandemic, all collectively resulted in many of the super league clubs folding. Worse still, the Chinese system placed individuals from non-football, non-sports related government institutions to head and manage the hierarchy.

THE QUESTION OF DUAL NATIONALITY

Cape Verde and Curacao, along with countries like Qatar have allowed foreign-born players with the relevant countries’ ancestry along with others with dual passports to play for their national teams (Forbes, 2026). However, India and China, although possessing a large diaspora spread across the globe, have not done so because these two countries have no option for their citizens to hold dual citizenship.

HOW IS IT RELEVANT TO SOFT-POWER?

While governments do not negotiate trade agreements or security partnerships based on football, the influence it has in contemporary times is not an aspect that one could ignore. Both China and India are making inroads in Africa for influence in trade and security. Africa by and large is a footballing continent, and this can be a great tool for both countries to use.

Often India and China must deal with Europe, West Asia and Central Asia for the same reasons of trade and security – all footballing continents. Football can be used as a tool of influence, and in tougher conversations a deal-breaker. Thus, their absence is highlighted amongst football fans and noticed by its global partners.

References

ABC News (2026) 'The first Asian team to win a game at the World Cup finals', ABC News, https://www.abc.net.au/asia/the-first-asian-team-to-win-a-game-at-the-world-cup-finals/106779976

Al Jazeera (2026) 'For Haitians in the US, the pride and joy of the World Cup comes with fear', Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2026/6/25/for-haitians-in-the-us-the-pride-and-joy-of-the-world-cup-comes-with-fear

All India Football Federation (2023) Vision 2047: The Indian Football Strategic Roadmap. https://www.the-aiff.com/media/uploads/2023/01/Vision-2047-The-Indian-Football-Strategic-Roadmap-2023-2047.pdf

British Council (2016) 'Medium and long-term plan for Chinese football development points to increased demand for education in sports-related fields', British Council Opportunities Insight, https://opportunities-insight.britishcouncil.org/short-articles/news/medium-and-long-term-plan-chinese-football-development-points-increased-demand

Forbes (2026) 'How diaspora recruitment has reshaped World Cup rosters', Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/clementelisi/2026/06/15/how-diaspora-recruitment-has-reshaped-world-cup-rosters/

Fortune (2026) 'The legend of Cape Verde: how an island of half a million built the best team at the World Cup', Fortune, https://fortune.com/2026/07/16/roberto-lopes-linkedin-spam-cape-verde/

Ghosh, B. (2026) 'The 156,000 and the 1.4 billion', Foreign Policy, 15 May. Republished by Almendron. https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/the-156000-and-the-1-4-billion/

Khel Now (2023) 'Indian football: AIFF roadmap simplified – youth leagues planned, structure, objectives, development', Khel Now, https://khelnow.com/football/2023-01-indian-football-aiff-roadmap-simplified-youth-leagues-planned-structure-objectives-development

NPR (2026) 'Why India and China, two of the largest countries, didn't have World Cup teams', NPR, https://www.npr.org/2026/07/10/nx-s1-5876069/why-india-and-china-two-of-the-largest-countries-didnt-have-world-cup-teams

Reuters (2026) 'FIFA faces World Cup broadcast crisis as India's Reliance offers $20mln in China deal', Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/fifa-faces-world-cup-broadcast-crisis-indias-reliance-offers-20-mln-china-deal-2026-05-04/

The Guardian (2015) ‘China sets goal of hosting World Cup with master plan for football’, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/17/china-sets-goal-of-hosting-world-cup-with-master-plan-for-football

The Guardian (2022) 'Project Mbappé: the making of France's football superstar', The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/dec/09/project-mbappe-the-making-of-frances-football-superstar

The Guardian (2026) 'No games, no league: City Football Group and Indian football's "global embarrassment"', The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2026/jan/07/no-games-no-league-city-football-group-indian-football-global-embarrassment-mumbai-city-manchester

Times of India (2024) 'AIFF terminates service of its legal head after he accused President Kalyan Chaubey of corruption', The Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/football/top-stories/aiff-terminates-service-of-its-legal-head-after-he-accused-president-kalyan-chaubey-of-corruption/articleshow/108184049.cms

LADY PAMELA HICKS AND INDIA: A REFLECTION

By George I. H. Cooke

History is replete with persons who contributed to its making, and those who enjoyed a ringside seat of experiencing all that was unfolding. Lady Pamela Carmen Louise Hicks (nee Mountbatten) belongs to the latter. As the younger daughter of Lord Louis Mountbatten and Lady Edwina Mountbatten, she lived through numerous historic moments, throughout her life, but in particular, during her early formative years. Born in Madrid, Spain on 19 April 1929, Pamela was baptized two months later in the Royal Chapel at St James Palace, and had amongst her many godparents, King Alphonso XIII, the then King of Spain.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, Pamela and her sister Patricia were sent to the United States of America. However, her life took a drastic turn in 1947, with two particularly significant events – a new home in India and a family wedding in the United Kingdom. Both these events would have an extraordinary impact on the young girl, as she experienced firsthand, much that unfolded in both countries at that period of time.

A new home in India

The first, was her new home, in India, which was a considerable distance from the environs she had been used to and grownup in. Her father of course was no stranger to South Asia having lived in Ceylon in the early 1940s at the height of the Second World War, when he was the Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia. Her passage to India in February 1947, was owing to her parents being tasked with a new responsibility at the last stages of the colonial period in that country. A 17-year-old Pamela joined her parents on what would be a very adventurous trip to the subcontinent, with which connections would remain for years to come. Her daughter, India Hicks reflects that “The moment she arrived in India at the tender age of 17, following her parents who had been appointed as the last Viceroy and Vicereine, she was put to work in the medical camps just outside Delhi. This led to a lifelong involvement with charitable organisations - and to me being aware from an early age that ‘from whom much is given much is expected’.”

Her father’s term as Viceroy ended at the dawn of India’s independence in August 1947, and thereafter, he was appointed the first Governor-General on the Union of India, serving till 21 June 1948. Yet her association with India would continue. Prior to her father’s term ending, Pamela had been appointed as Assistant to Major General Thomas Wynford Rees, the head of the Military Committee of the Indian Emergency Cabinet. She had access to some of the most sensitive information of that time, as the partition was unfolding, leading to the creation of Pakistan and independence of India. She also served for a brief period as Secretary to V. K. Krishna Menon, following his appointment as India’s High Commissioner in London, widening her knowledge and understanding of India in that post-independence period.

Although young in years, Pamela’s work and enterprising nature had seen her engaging with many leaders, including Mahathma Gandhi with whom she had meditated, and the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, who would even write lengthy letter to the younger daughter of the Mountbattens. His association with the Mountbatten family has been extensively discussed, especially his closeness friendship with her mother, Lady Edwina Mountbatten, yet the trouble he took to write to young Pamela, long after she had left India and returned to London, was significant.

In one letter, preserved in the Nehru Archive, he writes to her about a short story she had given him for his views. “I liked reading it, and I think that it is very well written. It flows on smoothly without any padding. The reader becomes more and more interested in Neola and to some extent, of course, in the girl and her reactions to Neola. Thus, it becomes a live story which leaves an impression and a memory after reading it. Looked at from the point of view of an animal story, it is good, as it shows a great deal of intimate observation. I doubt if any expert zoologists have observed a Neola so carefully and noted its characteristics. Thus, your story has a certain scientific value.” He goes onto encourage her writing abilities noting that “I think it is so good that you are sure to find a periodical which will publish it. You must go ahead with this and you must also write some more.”

Nehru goes on to refer to a dinner the night before, at which he was joined by her mother, and an American singer and actress, Eartha Mae Kitt, and confiding in Pamela, he writes that “I am afraid that I was not terribly impressed in any way by the lady. It is not fair for me to judge her because I have not seen her performing. But I did not see anything terribly attractive or exciting about her.”

A month after Pamela Mountbatten married David Hicks in January 1960, her mother Lady Edwina Mountbatten died. The Indian Prime Minister’s sister, Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, serving at the time as India’s High Commissioner in London, wrote to her brother ahead of his visit to the United Kingdom stating that “He (Lord Mountbatten) clings to those who knew and loved Edwina. So, I have come to realise that he is very anxious that you should go to Broadlands. I know that a visit by you will help him and also Patricia and Pammy very much.” The closeness of these families was evident, well beyond their years of association in India, and ‘Pammy’ as Pamela Mountbatten is fondly referred to, cherished her time in India, even naming her youngest daughter after the country.

She would return to India many times, with her mother, husband or on her own, and most often stayed with Prime Minister Nehru. One of those visits with her mother was in the first quarter of 1959, when they travelled to various parts of the country. For Nehru however, the moment that stood out the most, and about which he wrote to Lord Mountbatten, “This afternoon I did something which I had been thinking of for the last ten years or more. Edwina and Pammy took me right up the great dome of Rashtrapati Bhavan and we looked at the city of Delhi spread out before us on all sides. It has grown greatly.”

Pamela’s connection to India was due initially to her accompanying her parents in 1947, but the strength of the relationship was evident just a year later when, Nehru acknowledged her in his farewell speech to the Mountbattens in June 1948, when he stated that “She came here straight from school, and possessing all the charm she does, she did a grown-up person’s work in this troubled scene of India. I do not know if all of you who are present here know the work she has done, but those who do know well how splendid that has been and how much it is appreciated.”

In the first two decades of the 21st century, the passion for writing, so carefully nurtured in her youth, as well as the exotic places and intriguing personalities she met across India, resulted in the publication of two particularly significant books - ‘India Remembered: A Personal Account of the Mountbattens During the Transfer of Power’ which was co-authored with her daughter, India, and published in 2007, and the second, ‘Daughter of Empire: Life as a Mountbatten’ which was released in 2014.

Closer to the Royal Family

The other significant development of 1947, was when her father’s sister’s son, Philip Mountbatten, married Princess Elizabeth, the heir to the British throne, on 20 November 1947. A young Pamela Mountbatten, who returned briefly from India, was one of the eight bridesmaids attending to the young princess at this wedding. Although their friendship extended to her younger days, even before the marriage, they would remain close over the years as Pamela was made a Lady-in-Waiting to the princess and thereafter continued in this position, when Elizabeth became Queen.

In 1952, when Princess Elizabeth was in Kenya on the first leg of a Commonwealth tour that would have also taken her to Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon, her father King George VI passed away. Lady Pamela Hicks, who was traveling with her, was present at Treetops Hotel, in Kenya’s Aberdare National Park, witnessing Princess Elizabeth becoming Queen Elizabeth.

When the postponed 1952 royal tour commenced at the end of 1953 and flowed into the next year, the royal couple, visited Ceylon in April 1954, and Pamela Mountbatten was Lady-in-Waiting to the Queen. She has been photographed at several events during the royal visit, the most notable being the opening of Parliament, which took place at the Independence Memorial Hall in Colombo.

Lady Pamela Hicks, served the Queen for many decades, travelling with her across the United Kingdom, and also to many countries, as she supported her longstanding friend, relative and sovereign. She was even seen at her funeral in September 2022, when an era ended, and the world that Pamela had grown-up in and known so well was gradually coming to a close. She had enjoyed the thrills of life, known kings and prime ministers, toured extensively, gained immense knowledge, and yet had also endured personal tragedy as when her mother passed away in her sleep in Malaysia in 1960, and when her father was assassinated on 27 August 1979 in Mullaghmore, Ireland by the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Her father had been in his fishing boat, with his eldest daughter, Patricia, her husband, John Knatchbull, their twin sons, and his daughter’s mother-in-law. The bomb claimed the lives of the last viceroy of India, one of his grandsons, the child’s grandmother and a boat assistant.

Following the death of her own husband, David Hicks on 29 March 1998, Lady Pamela Hicks continued to make the most of the years ahead of her. As her daughter India Hicks, in announcing her mother’s passing noted, “through the prism of a crowded and remarkable past, she made incomparable company, carrying her memories lightly, and always with humour. My mother maintained right up to the end, the impeccable style, sharp mind, and effortless charm that made her not only a cherished institution, but truly the last of her kind.”

The death of Pamela Carmen Louise Hicks (nee Mountbatten) on 5 June 2026 has seen the closure of yet another window into a past, that saw so much, meant so much and yet remains much of a mystery to many, especially in South Asia. ly the last of her kind.”

This article is part of 'The Window Series'

A PARADOX OF POWER: Trump’s Aggressive Foreign Policy Without War

By L. M. S. Navodya

Donald J. Trump, the 45th President of the United States of America, has turned out to be one of the most polarizing figures in modern political history. His foreign policy, in particular, has been criticized as erratic, aggressive, and dangerously unilateral. From launching trade wars to walking out of international agreements, Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine fundamentally restructured the U.S. approach to world affairs.

In spite of his combative rhetoric and diplomatic actions, Trump notably avoided traditional military conflicts and even attempted to de-escalate rising tensions, including an unexpected intervention in the recent India-Pakistan conflict following the Pahalgam attack. This paradox, however, deserves closer examination amid the flurry of criticisms.

Whitewashing Trump’s larger foreign policy legacy is not the goal of this article. Rather, it draws attention to a crucial, little-discussed trait: Trump’s unwillingness to involve the U.S. in new conflicts, despite his significant influence on the global order.

Economic nationalism, preference for bilateralism over multilateralism, and contempt for conventional diplomacy were the main tenets of Trump’s foreign policy philosophy. He withdrew from historic international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), imposed high tariffs on China, and started trade disputes with allies. Trump also criticised organisations like the World Health Organisation (WHO) and questioned mutual defence pledges, endangering North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) unity.

These actions painted a picture of a leader who was eager for conflict. However, in contrast to a number of his predecessors, Trump did not initiate any new wars. In fact, he emphasised returning American troops home and frequently voiced his disinterest in lengthy military conflicts. Thus, this strategy questions the widely held belief that an assertive foreign policy invariably results in war.

Trump’s handling of the rising tensions between India and Pakistan after the Pahalgam terrorist attack is a clear illustration of his strategy. India and Pakistan, two neighbours with nuclear weapons, were on the brink of war after the incident. Given Trump’s tough stance on terrorism and the strengthening U.S.-Indian relationship, international observers anticipated strong U.S. support for India’s military response.

Surprisingly, Trump played a more measured role. Rather than inflaming the situation, his administration engaged diplomatically with both New Delhi and Islamabad. Reports indicated that the U.S. had quietly but effectively urged restraint and encouraged backdoor talks between the two nations. Ultimately, a full-scale war was averted.

This response stood in contrast to Trump’s usual hyperbole. While the media spotlight remained on his tweets and trade tariffs, behind the scenes his administration was performing a classic de-escalation play—something reminiscent of traditional diplomacy. It was a subtle, unexpected pivot in a presidency marked by brashness and unpredictability.

Trump’s approach to the India-Pakistan crisis was not an isolated event. He consistently showed a dislike for military escalation during his presidencies. In the case of North Korea, Trump pursued diplomacy in the end, even holding historic summits with Kim Jong-un, despite engaging in a risky verbal sparring match.

A full-scale conflict with Iran was feared by many following the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani. Trump, however, favoured sanctions and rhetorical deterrence over more extensive military action.

Trump’s administration began negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, setting the stage for the eventual U.S. withdrawal, which his successor carried out. Additionally, Trump mostly avoided more extensive military engagement in Syria while launching limited missile strikes in response to the use of chemical weapons.

These incidents all reveal a leader who was remarkably reluctant to increase America’s military presence overseas, even though his tone and tactics were confrontational. It could be argued that Trump’s hesitation to go to war stemmed more from a political calculation related to his domestic base than from pacifism or humanitarian concerns. He was sceptical of ‘endless wars’ that had depleted American resources and morale as part of his ‘America First’ philosophy. Trump was able to appeal to war-weary voters while saving political capital for internal and economic conflicts by avoiding military involvement.

Moreover, his preference for economic leverage—like sanctions and tariffs—offered him tools of coercion without triggering armed conflict. According to this perspective, Trump’s foreign policy was opportunistically restrained rather than dovish: aggressive in appearance but restrained in content. For years to come, Donald Trump’s foreign policy will be examined and debated. It was distinguished by an unreservedly nationalist mindset, an embrace of unpredictability, and a break from conventional U.S. diplomacy. Nonetheless, there was a constant refrain from going to war within this combative, frequently disruptive framework.

Along with other international hotspots, the post-Pahalgam mediation between India and Pakistan revealed an unexpected propensity for de-escalation and peace—at least militarily. This is not to say that Trump’s foreign policy was peaceful or conducive to world peace because most of his choices increased tensions and undermined international alliances. But to overlook the nuances of his anti-war stance is to overlook a crucial aspect of the Trump administration. Recognising contradictions is crucial to comprehending world leaders and their policies.

In many respects, Trump exemplified one: an aggressive foreign policy strategist who, in spite of his bombast, has thus far avoided involving the U.S. in new conflicts.

STRENGTHENING INTEGRATION: BIMSTEC as a Regional Pivot in Disaster Management

By Amasha Fernando

Disaster Management and Mitigation have become an essential concern within the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal, as many states face a rapid increase in climate catastrophes in the region. From powerful cyclones such as Fani (2019) and Fengal (2024) to the 7.7 magnitude earthquake in March 2025, which resulted in the loss of more than 3000 lives up to date in Myanmar, the region has faced alarming natural disasters, significantly, in the post-COVID-19 era since 2020. This has not only challenged the ecological balance of the region but also paved the way for massive damage to the regular lives of people.

These adversities, which escalate day by day, are a prominent concern addressed at national and regional levels within organizations such as ASEAN, BIMSTEC, and international coalitions like the G20. However, the frequency of the occurrence of natural hazards and their rising intensities calls for the need for practical and sustainable solutions at the national, regional, and international level.

In this context, the role of BIMSTEC in disaster management has increased considerably, as the changes in natural weather systems, particularly in the Bay of Bengal, create a significantly adverse impact on economic growth within the region. This article aims to discuss the latest developments of the climate catastrophes while exploring the effectiveness of current disaster mitigation mechanisms and offering suggestions to enhance the quality of assistance and humanitarian aid provided.

State of Nature Hazards within the Bay of Bengal littorals

The Bay of Bengal region, comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, has experienced multiple climate-related disasters in recent years, including cyclones, earthquakes, floods, and landslides. Renowned as the ‘Kalapani’ or the Black turbulent waters (Bose, 2023), the Bay of Bengal region faces at least 5 to 6 cyclones per year, while annual floods in states such as Bangladesh and India affect millions of lives. These directly result in deaths, infrastructure damage, and displacement while affecting livelihoods and economic functions of the region on a broad scale. According to National Cyclone Risk Mitigation Project (NCRMP) reports, 7, 516 km of India and 716 km of Bangladesh are exposed to nearly 10% of the world’s tropical cyclones. (Dhruba, 2023)

In comparison with the West, these cyclones possess unique characteristics and effects of wind speeds and rough seas, mainly affecting the weather conditions of states such as India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. An often-highlighted event among these is the Indian Ocean Tsunami, which occurred in 2004, resulting in over 30,000 fatalities, along with a US$1.5 billion economic loss in Sri Lanka alone, marking the most devastating natural disaster the island nation has faced to date. Simultaneously, over 10, 000 lives were lost within India due to this, followed by deaths in Myanmar and Thailand, and economies in all these states were affected as well, with the damage caused to agrarian lands. (Bose, 2023)

Many cyclones, such as Komen (2015), Roanu (2016), Amphan (2020), and Fengal (2024), which occurred during the past few years, affected communities largely in Myanmar and Bangladesh, in the following years marking a series of cyclones in between. These resulted in floods, rough seas, and torrential downpours, which worsen situations in the nations in the Bay of Bengal. As a result, floods become a frequent occurrence in these nations annually. According to government reports, floods in Kathmandu, Nepal, in September 2024 have killed more than 60 people, while 66 have gone missing. (OCHA, 2019) Moreover, scientists predict that Bangladesh, India, and China will be among the top 10 nations with the highest risks of facing the highest rainfall changes by 2100. (OCHA, 2024)

The latest alarming disaster occurred in March 2025 with the 6.4 and 7.7 magnitude earthquakes, which devastated Myanmar, affecting nearly 9 million people who belong to 58 townships. The disaster resulted in nearly 3, 600 deaths, while 4, 800 people are reported to have suffered injuries. (UNICEF, 2025) Severe infrastructure damage, which includes 2, 311 schools and 193 healthcare facilities, has been reported, while vulnerable groups such as women and children face shortages of medication and other essential items.

In addition, states in the Bay of Bengal are prone to the novel developments of climate change, such as rising sea levels, extreme heatwaves, and loss of land, with coastal erosion. World Heritage sites such as the Sundarbans Mangrove Forest, the Sinharaja tropical rainforest, and their ecosystems are significantly affected by such conditions, worsening the ecological balance within the region. According to World Bank reports in 2000, the rise of sea levels by one metre tends to destroy the whole Sundarbans region. (Jabir et al., 2021) Meanwhile, island nations in the Indian Ocean, such as the Maldives, are at risk of being completely submerged by the rising ocean levels.

Climate Actions Taken as a Regional Hub

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was the primary catalyst that sparked discussions on disaster management within the region at the BIMSTEC level, shifting the irregular patterns of disaster mitigation from occasional aid provision for disasters such as cyclones. Following the 1994 Oslo guidelines on “The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief”, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) was introduced to the region, creating action plans at state and BIMTEC levels. The evolution of participation in disaster management comprises several stages. (Bose, 2023) They can be identified as follows. 1. Passive Phase (1997-2005) 2. Provisionally Responsive Phase (2005-2006) 3. Phase of Dormancy (2007-2014) 4. Proactive Phase (2015 to the present)

The passive phase consisted of the initial level agreements within the organization, where the groundwork for natural disaster mitigation and management was introduced. However, disaster management within the region was not considered a prominent concern at that juncture until the Tsunami of 2004 became the wake-up call to cooperate in disaster management. In the aftermath of the Tsunami, ‘Environment and Disaster Management’ was considered a fundamental area of concern within the region through the introduction of many collaborative efforts, with other organizations such as the SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC) and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) were pivotal in creating institutional solutions in disaster response.

Mechanisms such as conducting workshops, knowledge sharing, emergency response and the establishment of early warning systems were done, with the aid of foreign nations and international bodies such as the United Nations. Creation of the BIMSTEC Centre on Weather and Climate Change was prominent in this regard, as it nurtured frameworks to sign agreements at bilateral and multilateral levels, creating room for discussions in the sectors of multinational cooperation in managing disasters. (Cook & Chen, 2021) Predominantly, India led these initiatives as a regional powerhouse, in creating relevant policy frameworks and responsible institutions.

However, with the absence of substantial financial cooperation within the region, BIMSTEC’s unity in disaster management was largely dormant from 2007-2014. (Bose, 2023) Disaster management was limited to emergencies and early warning mechanisms during this time, while documentation efforts such as approving a Memorandum of Association to establish a Centre of Weather and Climate Response were made in strengthening preventive measures. Reasons such as the impending change of chairmanship in the organization, the need to establish a permanent secretariat in Dhaka, and the change of India’s maritime cooperation doctrine, paving the way for a prolonged era of inaction.

The change of political leadership after the election of 2014 marked a positive change in the activities of BIMSTEC. The Modi government focused on fostering cooperation through multilateral collaborations, establishing India’s role as the “net security provider” in the region. (Cook & Chen, 2021) However, the significance of India within the BIMTEC as a regional power and an emerging world power has created points to ponder, as the power imbalance may create a situation where climate issues of small nations are rejected.

The unity of BIMSTEC nations was further strengthened with the introduction of India’s “Act East policy.” Disaster risk prevention policies, such as the Sendai Framework (2015-2030), aim to establish common information systems to track disasters within the region and exchange best practices. (Bose, 2023) Capacity building was a spotlight in discussions redefining the bounds of environmental governance and disaster response. Measures such as Disaster Management Exercises (DMXI), Field Training Exercises, and After-Action Reviews were introduced in this regard, finding creative ways to address the rapid changes of climate change. The first BIMSTEC DMXI exercise was held in India in 2017, while the initiative’s latest workshop involved five member states. (Cook & Chen, 2021)

Moreover, the importance of the Indian Ocean sea lanes was identified while discovering potential paths for integration in transportation in trade, and managing diverse security interests. While the strategic importance within the region increases daily with China’s presence in the Indian Ocean, with initiatives such as the BRI, BIMSTEC has a pivotal role in strengthening integration and capacities of disaster prevention measures.

When considering the present-day context, many measures, such as capacity-building initiatives and strengthening mechanisms, are followed within the organization. These were suggested through the joint declaration issued by BIMSTEC leaders who gathered at the 6th BIMSTEC summit on 4th April 2025. Collaborating with the Indian Ocean Rim Association and encouraging maritime transport cooperation within the littoral states further creates opportunities. Such collaboration in preventing natural hazards and common measures will address the economic losses and infrastructure damage while creating a secure environment for people, ensuring their safety and medication.

Future of Disaster Management within the Organization

The responsibility to prevent future disasters within the region is undoubtedly bestowed upon regional organizations such as BIMSTEC, as the solutions for these should be institutionalized and implemented sustainably and practically. While the organization has gained commendable progress in building a stable foundation for disaster management, growing intensities of natural hazards within the region demand immediate action while encouraging integration in collective disaster prevention methods.

Thereby, maintaining consistency in disaster prevention methods and maintaining coordination between disaster management centres within littoral states and authorities are crucial in efficient disaster management. India’s 2025 proposal to establish a BIMSTEC Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management Secretariat would be an active measure to create disaster readiness in the region. This centre would act as the central point of contact for managing disaster-related data, conducting risk assessments, and coordinating cross-border disaster response (Bhatt & Garge, 2023). In order to address the existing gaps in financial emergencies, the centre needs to have sufficient funding from a regional disaster relief fund and the authority to make its own decisions (Chaudhary, 2023).

Moreover, it is crucial to develop climate surveillance technologies and transboundary early warning systems. Initiatives like the BIMSTEC Centre for Weather and Climate (BCWC) offer an essential platform, but they need to be expanded and technologically improved in cooperation with regional and international partners like the United Nations, WMO, and ADPC (Cook & Chen, 2021; Bose, 2023). The European Meteoalarm system is an example of a real-time, shared warning protocol that BIMSTEC could use.

Measures should be followed to reach the grassroots of society in creating disaster awareness, bridging the gap between policy formulation, institutionalisation and practical implementation of disaster management methods. Frequent trends of climate catastrophes should be identified in preserving danger-prone environments such as the Sundarbans (Jabir et al., 2021) while ensuring an inclusive space for all nations. The importance of the Indian Ocean as a strategic hub should be rediscovered while promoting inter-organizational endeavours for disaster prevention.

Thus, it is crucial to strengthen regional cooperation through BIMSTEC because the Bay of Bengal region is becoming increasingly vulnerable to climate-related disasters. The growing frequency and severity of natural hazards—ranging from cyclones and floods to earthquakes—have not only exposed ecological fragility but also tested the social and economic resilience of millions. Even though the organization has advanced significantly since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, its framework for disaster management still needs strong institutionalization, funding, and inclusivity to keep up with new threats.

BIMSTEC has the potential to become a key player in regional disaster governance through improved cooperation, scientific innovation, and people-centred policies. BIMSTEC can genuinely fortify the ties by integrating disaster preparedness into the larger framework of economic and humanitarian integration.

References

Bhatt, R., & Deepali Mohan Garge. (2023). Unifying in Crisis: An Exploratory Analysis of Organizational Structures for a Regional Disaster Framework in BIMSTEC. The Journal Institute of Public Enterprise, 46(1), 49–68. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375003509_Unifying_in_Crisis_An_Exploratory_Analysis_of_Organizational_Structures_for_a_Regional_Disaster_Framework_in_BIMSTEC/download

Bose, S. (2023, May 24). BIMSTEC and Disaster Management: Future Prospects for Regional Cooperation. Orfonline.org; OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION ( ORF ). https://www.orfonline.org/research/bimstec-and-disaster-management-future-prospects-for-regional-cooperation

Chaudhury, R. (2023, June). Disasters without borders: Strengthening BIMSTEC cooperation in humanitarian assistance. Orfonline.org; OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION (ORF). https://www.orfonline.org/research/disasters-without-borders-strengthening-bimstec-cooperation-in-humanitarian-assistance?amp

Cook, A. D. B., & Chen, C. (2021). Disaster Governance in the Asia-Pacific: Future Pathways to South and Southeast Asia (pp. 4–16). Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and S Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Death toll climbs as torrential rains pound Nepal - Nepal. (2024, September 30). Relief Web. https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/death-toll-climbs-torrential-rains-pound-nepal

Dhruba, B. (2023). The Solar Influence on Tropical Cyclones Occurring over the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. ECAS 2023, 37. https://doi.org/10.3390/ecas2023-15123

Jabir, A.-A., Hasan, G. M. J., & Anam, Md. M. (2021). Correlation between temperature, sea level rise and land loss: An assessment along the Sundarbans coast. Journal of King Saud University - Engineering Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jksues.2021.07.012 Mahida, R. (2024). BIMSTEC: BAY OF BENGAL INITIATIVE FOR MULTI-SECTORAL TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION: SWOT ANALYSIS FROM INDIAN PERSPECTIVES. International Journal of Management, Public Policy and Research, 3(4), 7–15. https://doi.org/10.55829/ijmpr.v3i4.247 OCHA. (2019). Relief Web - Informing humanitarians worldwide. Relief Web. https://reliefweb.int/

UNICEF Myanmar Earthquake Flash Update No. 6 - 09 April 2025 - Myanmar. (2025, April 9). Relief Web. https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/unicef-myanmar-earthquake-flash-update-no-6-09-april-2025

NEUTRAL GROUND: Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Test amid Indo-Pak Tensions

By L. M. Sachini Navodya

The Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025 reignited the nuclear-tinged historical rivalry between India and Pakistan, raising concerns about regional stability. If the situation escalates into armed conflict, Sri Lanka, as a regional actor with historical and current ties to both countries, could face significant geopolitical, economic, and security repercussions. This article thus explores the implications of a possible inter-state conflict on South Asia and particularly on Sri Lanka, drawing on the complex history of the India-Pakistan conflict and Sri Lanka’s evolving role in South Asian geopolitics.

History of India-Pakistan Conflict

Looking back at the history of this rivalry, since independence from Britain in 1947, India and Pakistan have engaged in four major wars and numerous skirmishes, with the disputed territory of Kashmir at the heart of their rivalry. Key milestones include the: First Kashmir war (1947-1948), triggered by Pakistan-backed tribal incursions into Kashmir, leading to the Maharaja’s accession of the region to India and the establishment of the Line of Control (LoC) following a UN-brokered ceasefire; Second Kashmir war in 1965 sparked by border clashes and Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir, ending in a military stalemate and the Tashkent Agreement; Third Kashmir war in 1971 centered on the Bangladesh Liberation movement, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh and a decisive Indian victory and Kargil war in 1999 marked by Pakistani infiltration in Kargil, Ladakh, and intense fighting at high altitudes, with India regaining lost ground and Pakistan facing diplomatic isolation. These conflicts have thus entrenched a legacy of distrust, militarization, and nuclear brinkmanship in South Asia.

Impact on South Asia: A Region at Crossroads

The 21st century has been hailed as the ‘Century of Asia’, with South Asia poised to leverage its demographic dividend and economic potential. However, an India-Pakistan conflict could shatter this vision, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. The nuclear brinkmanship with both nations possessing nuclear arsenals, and heightened tensions risk accidental escalation, as seen during the 1999 Kargil War and 2019 Balakot crisis.

A potential crisis could also spur economic disruption in the region risking South Asia’s intra-regional trade (less than 5% of total trade) to collapse further, particularly if India-Pakistan border closures and airspace restrictions persist. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which traverses disputed Kashmir, could become a flashpoint, drawing China deeper into the conflict. It could also lead to humanitarian crises such as the triggering of refugee flows, straining of resources, and the revival of ethnic tensions, particularly affecting marginalized communities in Kashmir and border regions.

The potential rivalry could also result in an institutional paralysis leading regional organizations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), already weakened by the clash of the two, to face irrelevance, stalling initiatives like the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).

Sri Lanka’s Role in the Prolonged Conflict

Sri Lanka has historically played a nuanced and pragmatic role throughout the rivalry between its two neighbours, often leveraging its position to maintain autonomy and serve its national interests while navigating the sensitivities of both regional powers. In the 1971 India-Pakistan war, under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Sri Lanka notably allowed Pakistani civilian and military aircraft to refuel and use Colombo as a stopover, after India denied Pakistan overflight rights. This was a significant move since it enabled Pakistan to maintain air links with its eastern territory (now Bangladesh) while underscoring Sri Lanka’s willingness to assert its sovereignty and its non-aligned foreign policy —even at the risk of displeasing India, its much larger neighbour. The balancing act was furthermore visible with Sri Lanka maintaining strong diplomatic and economic ties with India despite providing Pakistan with logistical support.

What a Renewed Conflict could mean to Sri Lanka?

Thus, predicting what impact a possible conflict could have on Sri Lanka, as a fragile small power, a renewed conflict could force Colombo into a precarious diplomatic balancing act. It would compel Sri Lanka to avoid overt alignment, risking alienation from either power or both.

● Security and Strategic Autonomy

An India-Pakistan war would heighten regional insecurity, potentially drawing Sri Lanka into the conflict’s periphery. The island’s proximity to India and its reliance on Indian goodwill for security and economic stability would limit its foreign policy flexibility. Sri Lanka might face pressure to align with India, risking its defense ties with Pakistan and complicating its non-aligned stance. Furthermore, worsening the crisis, such a conflict could invite greater involvement from external powers (China, the US), with Sri Lanka potentially becoming a site for strategic competition, especially given its ports and location along key maritime routes. This potential involvement would also make the country’s act of balancing even complicated, with Sri Lanka’s increased alignment with India economically and diplomatically, particularly given China’s entrenched support for Pakistan and its footprint in Sri Lanka in terms of debt and investments.

The escalation of the potential conflict could also lead to possible dilemmas for Sri Lanka. If China intensifies military support to Pakistan, India might pressure Sri Lanka to restrict Chinese naval access to Hambantota emphasizing the threat to India’s security, testing Colombo’s diplomatic agility. Given the potential support of the US to India, enhanced Quad cooperation could offer Sri Lanka alternative investments, reducing reliance on China but requiring alignment with Western strategic interests on the other hand.

● Economic Vulnerabilities

Sri Lanka’s economy, still recovering from its 2022 debt crisis, remains fragile. A regional conflict could disrupt maritime trade routes in the Indian Ocean, affecting Sri Lanka’s ports, which handle transshipment for both India and global markets. Furthermore, tourism—a critical revenue source—could suffer due to perceived instability, echoing declines seen during the country's civil war. Additionally, rising oil prices from conflict-driven market volatility would strain Sri Lanka’s import-dependent economy further.

● Humanitarian and Diplomatic Fallout

A protracted conflict could exacerbate refugee flows to Tamil Nadu, indirectly affecting Sri Lanka through heightened sensitivities around Tamil minority rights. Colombo might also face pressure to condemn cross-border terrorism, aligning with India’s stance, while avoiding actions that could legitimize Pakistan’s position.

Sri Lanka’s Tightrope: Navigating Indo-Pak Conflict

At an hour of a renewed rivalry between India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka’s best strategy is to maintain a pragmatic, balanced, and non-aligned foreign policy, leveraging its geostrategic location to attract investment and security cooperation from multiple powers without becoming a proxy or flashpoint in their rivalries.

At an hour of foreign policy dilemma, it is vital that Sri Lanka emphasizes balanced engagement and sovereignty. Sri Lanka’s leadership has repeatedly articulated a desire to remain neutral and avoid entanglement in great power rivalries, as reflected in statements emphasizing non-alignment and the prioritization of national sovereignty. This approach allows Sri Lanka to maintain flexibility and avoid being drawn into the strategic competition between India and China, both of whom have substantial interests in the island—India as a regional hegemon and China as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The country could reinforce its neutrality through proactive diplomacy. It could publicize its non-aligned stance by issuing immediate statements emphasizing Sri Lanka’s neutrality, drawing from its historical non-aligned movement roots. Declare Colombo as a potential venue for peace talks, leveraging its 1971 precedent of facilitating dialogue during crises.

Sri Lanka could also activate regional platforms by using the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) or SAARC forums to advocate de-escalation, positioning Sri Lanka as a mediator while highlighting shared regional interests in maritime security and economic stability to rally consensus.

The strengthening of ties with regional organizations like SAARC and BIMSTEC would also aid in ensuring economic safety and trade continuity for Sri Lanka. This “concentric circles” approach places geographic neighbours at the center of engagement, which helps assuage Indian security concerns while still allowing space for economic cooperation with China and others.

The country could also leverage its strategic location for multilateralism at an hour of crisis. Sri Lanka’s position at the crossroads of major maritime routes gives it leverage to act as a hub for trade, logistics, and regional connectivity. By promoting itself as a neutral venue for dialogue, maritime cooperation, and disaster response, Sri Lanka can attract investment and security partnerships from a range of actors, including the US, Japan, and the EU, in addition to India and China. This multilateral approach reduces overdependence on any single power and increases Colombo’s diplomatic capital.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, the India-Pakistan conflict, amplified by external power rivalries, threatens to fracture South Asia’s fragile cohesion. For Sri Lanka, the crisis underscores the perils of multipolarity: economic dependencies and strategic alignments leave little room for autonomy. Its survival in an India-Pakistan war hinges on active neutrality, economic pragmatism, and multilateral hedging. By leveraging its geostrategic location, historical non-alignment, and partnerships with extra-regional powers, Sri Lanka can insulate itself from direct fallout while positioning itself as a facilitator of regional stability. The goal must be to emerge as an indispensable intermediary rather than a collateral casualty. Thus, unless regional leaders prioritize dialogue over brinkmanship, the promise of an Asian Century risks being eclipsed by perennial conflict and geopolitical fragmentation.

INDIA - MAURITIUS RELATIONS: A Multifaceted Analysis of Bilateral Cooperation

By Nishali Ranasinghe

The 2025 visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Mauritius made headlines in global news. Modi received Mauritius' highest honour, the Grand Commander of the Order of the Star and Key of the Indian Ocean, suggesting a strong connection. This visit by a prime minister to another country raises questions about why the PM traveled to Mauritius, an island with little influence in world politics. Analyzing the relationship between these two countries will provide an answer to that question.

The Historic Connection

Mauritius is a subtropical island country in the Indian Ocean, just over 1,130 kilometers east of Madagascar, off the southeastern coast of Africa. Its outlying territories include Rodrigues Island and other smaller islands (The Commonwealth, n.d.). Conversely, India is a rising global power in the Asian region with more than 1.4 billion populations. Mauritius and India may not share the same status in the global arena. However, these two countries share a strong bond, rooted for ages. According to Sinha (2024), after Mauritius became an English colony in 1810, approximately 470,000 Indians were sent to Mauritius as indentured labourers between 1834 and 1920 and this significantly impacted the sugar plantations. The human cargo was carried from Bihar, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. The people who migrated to Mauritius embarked on their new journey in Mauritius with a new identity but retained Indian values and cultures. As a result, out of the 1.2 million population in the country, 70% are of Indian origin.

In addition, in 1901, while traveling to South Africa, Mahatma Gandhi landed in Mauritius and advised the people to educate themselves and reclaim their identity. This message stayed with them and because of it, they celebrated their national day on the day Gandhi started his Dandi March also known as the Salt March on March 12.

After becoming an independent state in 1968, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam became the first prime minister of Mauritius, and his son, Navin Ramgoolam is the current prime minister. The connection between the two countries has not been reduced but expanded in many ways. This expansion has occurred in different sectors; Defense, Military and Strategy, Economy, Technology, and Capacity Building.

a. Defense, Military and Strategic Partnership

In 1974, the two countries signed a defense agreement, making India and Mauritius strategic partners. To date, India guarantees Mauritius’ security showcasing a powerful bond. The backing of India has been evident on several occasions. In 1983, there was a rumour about a coup by the MMM (Mauritius Military Movement), and even though it never occurred, it was believed that the then PM, Indira Gandhi wanted to send Indian troops to the country. In 2024, India welcomed the UK-Mauritius agreement for Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, which houses a US-UK military base, and Modi reiterated India’s “firm support” for Mauritius on this issue (Parashar, 2025).

In his recent visit to Mauritius, Modi again confirmed that India will support Mauritius’ sovereignty over the Chagos Island following the statement made by US President Trump that he would support a deal between Mauritius and Great Britain over the future of the United States-United Kingdom base in the Islands. It can thus be understood how India has always been a country that supports Mauritius in protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity proving to be a friend in need.

Additionally, the Indian Prime Minister also unveiled "Vision MAHASAGAR – Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions” for the Global South which vision builds upon the foundation of the earlier "Vision SAGAR" (Security and Growth for All in the Region) that encompasses principles of trade for development, capacity building for sustainable growth, and mutual security for a shared future (Laskar, 2024).

Furthermore, since 2009, the Indian Navy has been deploying ships to Mauritius bi-annually to assist in patrolling the vast EEZ of the island country. The joint patrolling focuses on preventing piracy and illegal fishing and helps reinforce maritime security in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Mauritius (Padmaja, 2017). As reported in Firstpost (2024), since the EEZ in Mauritius extends up to 2.3 million square kilometers and is difficult to monitor, India built an airstrip costing $250 million in Agalega Islands after signing a memorandum in 2015. The airstrip is 3km long and is suitable for Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare (LRMR-ASW) aircraft which are used for maritime surveillance and strike, electronic warfare missions, and search and rescue missions. This will ultimately assist them with their goal to combat contemporary non-traditional security threats such as piracy, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

In this manner, Mauritius has the security and defense backing from one of the rising global powers in the world. From India’s side, they are capable of protecting Mauritius as well as countering any non-traditional security threats and constructing the influence from China coming into the country.

b. Economic Partnership

Mauritius being an island nation, has grown to be a nation with significant status after its independence in 1968. Being a small state, the country mainly depends on many sectors such as tourism, manufacturing, construction, financial services, and agriculture. Due to the shared history, India has been supporting Mauritius to achieve their targeted economic goals, and is one of the major players and drivers of Mauritius’ economy.

India’s support in successfully implementing several infrastructure projects, such as India-Mauritius Metro Express Project, New Supreme Court Building, New ENT Hospital, 956 Social Housing Units, and Educational Tablets, showcases the bond between the two countries developed over time and India has overall invested $1.1 billion in Mauritian projects (Government of India, 2025).

As Singh (2023) points out, Mauritius has emerged as a significant source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India, and with the Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) India aims to streamline taxation, reduce complexity, and gradually eliminate tax exemptions. By enhancing the taxation framework, India aims to create a fair and conducive environment for foreign investors while promoting economic growth and investment in the country. It is apparent that this has contributed to Mauritius' emergence as a significant financial hub in the global market.

Further strengthening bilateral economic ties, the two countries have also signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA). The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA), signed in 2021, marked India’s first trade agreement with an African country. This agreement further solidified the bilateral relationship and paved the way for increased trade between the two nations. In the fiscal year 2021-2022, the total trade between India and Mauritius amounted to $ 786.72 million, with significant growth witnessed over the past 15 years (Singh, 2023). The CECPA encompasses a wide variety of areas, including Trade in Goods and Services, Rules of Origin, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, Dispute Settlement, Movement of Natural Persons, Telecom, Financial services and Custom procedures.

The initiatives demonstrate the effort by both countries to foster mutually beneficial economic cooperation. They also highlight how strategic partnerships like India and Mauritius can drive sustainable economic growth in their respective nations.

c. Technology Partnership

Within the technological parameters, India assists Mauritius in many ways, especially in people-centric digitalization. India has supported the implementation of the e-judiciary system, and digitization of archives and records at the Mahatma Gandhi Institute, strengthening cooperation in the field of ICT including cyber security, Digital Public Infrastructure, and capacity building for the same, and explore the implementation of successful digital tools developed by India, such as PM Gati Shakti digital platform, as per Mauritius’ requirements.

Similarly, since 1986, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India's national space agency, has operated a satellite tracking system in Mauritius which helps India guide its missions in space. The press release by the High Commission of India, in Port Louis, Mauritius (2009), states that ‘The Government of India may assist in the training of scientists and technicians, upon request from Mauritius, at various facilities under the Department of Space in the use of remote sensing data in applications relevant to Mauritius. Moreover, the Government of India may also provide, upon request, technical assistance for the establishment of a remote sensing cell or unit in Mauritius, selection of equipment and training of staff, and operationalization of the Station, and that a Mauritian scientist shall be attached to the TTC Station.’ This exhibits Indian presence in Mauritius for a considerable period. Thus, it can be noted that both countries share a genuine connection that expands in many areas.

d. Capacity Building

Strengthening bilateral relationships between the two countries, capacity building is one aspect that both these countries focus on. Capacity building encompasses many actors. For instance, Public Service and Administration, Diplomacy, Trade and Commerce, Finance, Infrastructure, and Health.

As reported by the India News Network (2024), during the visit to India in 2024, officials from both sides discussed opportunities for collaboration, particularly focusing on enhancing the administrative capabilities of Mauritian public officers through capacity-building programs and faculty development initiatives. Moreover, out of the 8 agreements that were exchanged between Mauritius and India in the recent visit in 2025, the two countries focused on other important aspects such as diplomacy, commerce, and trade. According to the Government of Mauritius (2025), an MoU was signed between the Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service in New Delhi, India, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade of the Republic of Mauritius, for the exchange of information on the structure and content of training program for diplomats and another MoU between the Ministry of Industry, SME and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic of India was signed to develop micro, small and medium enterprises in the respective countries.

In addition, the launching of India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) can be considered as one of the key steps in strengthening the banking and finance systems in Mauritius and it will also create not only a connection between the two countries but also trust. This new payment infrastructure will enable customers of participating banks to make seamless and secure payments both in Mauritius and in India. RuPay cards issued in Mauritius will be accepted at ATM and Point of Sales (POS) terminals in India, and Indians will be able to make UPI QR transactions at participating merchants in Mauritius. Commenting on this new payment service, the Governor of the Bank of Mauritius, Harvesh Kumar Seegolam, stated that "the launch of the RuPay and UPI linkage between Mauritius and India marks a significant milestone in our efforts to enhance financial connectivity and promote digital transactions. This collaboration will not only facilitate seamless and secure cost-effective payments for our customers but also strengthen the economic ties between our two nations." (Bank of Mauritius, 2024)

In terms of infrastructure, India has assisted in contributing to the implementation of several development projects in Mauritius. During the recent visit to Mauritius, both leaders agreed to work towards timely delivery of 100-electric buses and the associated charging infrastructure, implement Phase II of High Impact Community Development Projects, finalize discussions on the new Parliament building on a site to be identified by Mauritius, and conclude framework understanding to implement this project with India’s grant assistance, finalize discussion on the redevelopment of the Ganga Talao Spiritual Sanctuary and conclude framework understanding to implement this project with India’s grant assistance and explore new areas of development cooperation, as per the needs and priorities of Mauritius.

Apart from the above initiatives, the two countries have collaborated in the health sector as well. As reported by the Economic Times (2024), India launched their first overseas Jan Aushadi Kendra in Mauritius. Chandna (2024) noted that the scheme is promoted as an affordable medicines scheme by the Modi government where they offer generic drugs priced 50-90% lower than their branded counterparts in the market and Mauritius has shared a list of 16 therapeutic areas based on which the stock of drugs is being prepared such as cancer, anti-diabetic, antibiotics, nervous system, urology, painkillers, antifungal drugs, and supplements.

Conclusion

The connection between India and Mauritius dates back many decades, and from the examples mentioned, we can see how these two countries have developed and expanded their ties across many sectors. Like any other relationship, the connection between these two countries encounters challenges. For instance, there is a rise in geopolitical influence in the region, and balancing the interests of superpowers like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and China is an important and challenging task not only for Mauritius but also for India. Consequently, maritime security threats and challenges will increase due to the region's importance and the strategic location of Mauritius.

Furthermore, there is a rise in non-traditional security threats globally, such as climate change and cybersecurity threats, that could jeopardize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries. Additionally, balancing ethnic engagement within Mauritius, given its significant population of Indian origin, will affect decision-making by the government of Mauritius. Such challenges will arise from rapid regional and global changes, but it is the responsibility of both countries to reach a common agreement and work toward a shared vision for the future that brings mutually beneficial outcomes for both nations.

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