China's Rising Status as a Mediator

 By Trivan Annakkarage

A mediator is often a neutral and respected third-party that aims to resolve prolonged disputes. In the context of International Relations, these prolonged disputes are usually associated between governments (of either two or more nation-states) or it may even be internal disputes within a nation-state, between its government and non-state actors such as secessionist movements, drug cartels, trade unions or even fundamentalist organizations. In all these instances, it is the public that suffer, and prolonged disputes would result in conflicts where the suffering is passed down to future generations thus fueling more resentment and complications. Hence, mediators are vital to bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table to agree on peaceful solutions.  

In China, mediation has a strong connection to the country’s three main religious philosophies namely Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism. Mediation is a practice that is considered as a means to preserve social harmony and relationships thus leading to social stability and inclusive development of societies. During its imperial period, China intervened as a mediator in international disputes. Examples include the Tang Dynasty (618-907) resolving disputes between nomadic groups in Central Asia to prevent potential disruptions to the Silk Route and during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) where Admiral Zheng He intervened to resolve internal disputes in the Malacca Sultanate. However, as technologically advanced European colonial powers and Imperial Japan overpowered Imperial China, Beijing gradually lost its leverage to act as a decisive mediator in international conflicts. With China entering its Century of Humiliation (1839-1945), its status as an international mediator gradually diminished.                     

During the Cold War (1947-1991), the United States and the Soviet Union intervened as mediators in several international disputes. Examples include United States’ role as a mediator in the Camp David Accords of 1978 that resulted in the normalization of Israel-Egypt relations and the Tashkent Declaration of 1965 which was mediated by the Soviet Union that marked the end of the Indo-Pakistani War which broke-out that year. However, the role of a mediator was not solely limited to the superpowers at the time because countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also acted as decisive mediators. The Algiers Accords of 1981 mediated by Algeria saw the United States and Iran amicably ending the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981. Notably, the Colombo Proposals of 1962 which were jointly mediated by six NAM countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic) paved the way to end the Sino-Indian War which took place that year.     

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party maintained a non-interventionist foreign policy into the affairs of other nation-states. It could be argued that this policy was beneficial because in 1971, the majority of countries voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) that recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the UN.

However, China did directly intervene in the affairs of other neighbouring countries only when there was a perceived threat to its sovereignty. Examples include direct intervention on the North Korean side in the Korean War of 1950-1953 and providing intelligence to North Vietnam in the Vietnam War of 1955-1975. These actions were a result of China’s determination to limit the influence of foreign powers in its neighbourhood – a key factor that would determine China’s rise as a mediator in the 21^st century.  

After the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 (between America’s Nixon Administration and Mao’s Government in China) followed by Beijing adopting the reform and opening up policy in 1978, China was on its path to becoming the factory of the world. As China reaped financial benefits from these initiatives it was vital for Beijing to develop and maintain strong economic links with many countries that invested and imported Chinese manufactured goods. This strong focus on economic development distanced China being involved in geopolitical tensions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. 

As the 21^st century unfolded, and with China overtaking Japan as the second largest economy in the world in 2010 (during the Presidency of Hu Jintao) followed by President Xi Jinping unveiling China’s monumental vision to resurrect the Silk Route via the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) three years later, it was evident that China was on its path to becoming a prospective global power. Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, it was a necessity for China to expand its footprint around the world. Nevertheless, for Beijing, it is paramount that China’s global image is not tarnished in the process as a positive force in the world. Hence it could be assessed that the relatively lesser negative historical baggage (associated with colonizing countries), and being a vital country in the global value chain, has benefitted China because its growing influence is both acknowledged and respected at the same time by many state and non-state actors. Hence, such a global standing permits China to engage in the affairs of mediating international disputes – complimenting Beijing’s commitment to preserve China’s image as a positive force in the world.    

However, as revealed by political scientist, Niklas Swanström (Executive Director, Sweden’s Institute for Security Development & Policy), mediation was an area that the People’s Republic of China had lack of knowledge and experience. Hence, before venturing into this space, China acted with caution. As highlighted by Helena Lagarda (Lead Analyst, Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies) China has engaged in low-key mediation in the Korean peninsula (since 2003) and in the conflict between Sudan-South Sudan (from 2008-2011). Although these mediation efforts have not resulted in successes, it was a testing ground for China to familiarise the art of mediation and learn how to secure its interest while maintaining its public image in the process.

These harbinger efforts to China’s rise as a mediator could be elaborated as follows. Facilitating between the United States (including its allies in the region - Japan and South Korea) and North Korea (about its nuclear weapons programme) placed China as a crucial stakeholder in this dispute. Hence as noted by Swanström, China’s mediation has prevented North Korea from reaching out to Russia for security guarantees that would have undermined China’s status in the region. With regard to Sudan and South Sudan, by intervening in the conflict, China has been able to secure its oil and mining contracts in both countries along with maintaining amicable relations – despite prevailing diplomatic tensions between Sudan and South Sudan over oil revenue.    

By the time BRI was formally announced in 2013, China had reasonably been exposed to the art of mediation. Since peaceful and stable nation-states and regions are vital to BRI’s success, the need to resolve conflicts in various regions along the land and maritime routes soon became a necessity if China wished to realise BRI. Therefore, BRI could be argued as a reason for China’s rising status as a mediator.    

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or commonly referred to as the Iranian Nuclear Deal) could be argued as a notable commitment by China in a multilateral mediation effort. Despite the United States withdrawing from the agreement in 2018 (during the first Trump Administration), China together with Russia stood firm with Iran. Regardless of repudiating the conditions under JCPOA, this resulted in Iran continuing cordial relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and not acting in isolation – a result that would have been detrimental to the stability of West Asia and ongoing BRI projects in the region.  

Given how difficult it is for the two nuclear-armed South Asian countries to agree on being part of a regional security body, China played a crucial mediating role to admit both India and Pakistan as members to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2018. As argued by Samuel Ramani (Associate Fellow, Britain’s Royal United Services Institute) in spite of close ties with Islamabad, Beijing is aware that for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC; a land route part of BRI) to bear fruit, it is essential to have New Delhi on its side because the proposed corridor cuts through the disputed region of Kashmir.

In 2022, Xi announced China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Boao Forum held that year. GSI is inspired by the concept of ‘indivisible security’. This rejects the idea of isolating national security of one country and emphasizes that one country’s national security is linked to other countries. Therefore, mutual dependence on security is the best way forward to create peace and stability in the world.    

With GSI now being part of the Chinese Communist Party’s policy, China’s most recent successful mediation effort was restoring diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023. According to Amrita Jash (Assistant Professor, India’s Manipal Academy of High Education), this achievement by China is as significant as the US-led mediation triumphs such as the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Abraham Accords of 2020. Regardless of being the present super-power, it is unfortunate that the United States was unable to amend relations between these two countries. It could be argued that it is primarily due to Washington’s interest in fostering tensions so that Saudi Arabia remains a market that imports American state-of-the art weapons to defend its borders and immediate neighbourhood from Iran. On the other hand, China’s goal to enhance international trade in general via BRI makes inclusivity easier hence delivery of mediation efforts.

As stated by Wang Huiyao (Founder, Centre for China & Globalization), China is able to leverage itself as a mediator due to its strong economic relations. China is the largest trading partner for India, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. This makes it relatively easier to project its soft power on disputing parties. China’s ongoing efforts include mediating conflicts between Russia versus Ukraine and Israel versus Palestine. Even among these countries China emerges as one of their largest (or even largest) trading partners. In 2023, taking note of China’s rising status as a mediator, French President Emmanuel Macron urged Xi to convince President Vladimir Putin to end its conflict with Ukraine. According Galia Lavi and Oded Eran (senior research personnel, Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies) the US-Israel bond would be challenged if the people of West Asia (including Israelis) begin to increasingly view China positively via its infrastructure projects in the region.     

As revealed by the British academic Hugo Slim, unlike the United States and its European allies, China does not impose liberal ideologies when mediating conflicts. What gives the Chinese Government leverage as a mediator is its deep understanding of the historic context of the dispute and being able to respect and work with governments that have different ideologies.       

As much as it seems that China focuses on fostering trade via BRI as means to resolve conflicts, in the process Beijing is also trying to gradually balance Washington’s influence. Moreover, with the United States shifting its focus to domestic affairs, there is opportunity for China to fill the vacancy of a mediator. In the process and in the words of Slim, China wishes to “de-occidentalise” the approach to mediation. According to Samir Bhattacharya (Associate Fellow, India’s Observer Research Foundation), China’s mediation follows a careful mix of three 3Is – interference, influence and intervention from which creative involvement is developed.

The following map depicts China’s past and current efforts in the world. 

Source: Taken from Helena Legarda’s article titled, China wades into the Israel-Palestine conflict once more https://merics.org/en/comment/china-wades-israel-palestine-conflict-once-more

Nevertheless, there are several factors that challenge China’s rising status as a mediator. They include China’s dispute over the South China Sea, China’s attempts to incorporate Taiwan into its sovereign territory and China’s border disputes with India. As pointed out by the Brazilian Journalist, Fábio Galão, major criticism about China’s mediation is the lack of concern to hold conflicting parties accountable on human rights.

Traditionally, the country focuses strongly on working with state-actors rather than with non-state actors such as civil society organizations. This could be the reason why human rights and other similar concerns take a back-seat in the mediation agenda. Moreover, as the 21^st century unravels, mediation on topics such as climate change, migration and tariffs seem to take centre stage along with geopolitical tensions. This would further complicate mediation efforts. How well China navigates these issues and developments would depend on the Chinese Communist Party’s commitment to GSI and its creative involvement in mediation.        

References

Bhattacharya, S. (2024, August 7). China's conflict resolution mechanism in Africa: Mediation with Chinese characteristics. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-s-conflict-resolution-mechanism-in-africa-mediation-with-chinese-characteristics

Galão, F. (2023, May 9). How China has become the new mediator in global geopolitics. The Rio Times. https://www.riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/new-multipolar-world-order/how-china-has-become-the-new-mediator-in-global-geopolitics/

Huiyao, W. (2024, August 16). Why China is becoming a top choice mediator for global conflicts. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3274330/why-china-becoming-top-choice-mediator-global-conflicts

Jash, A. (2023, June 23). Saudi-Iran deal: A test case of China’s role as an international mediator. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/

Lavi, G., & Eran, O. (2023, April 4). Could China serve as an international mediator? Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48747

Legarda, H. (2018, August 22). China as a conflict mediator. MERICS. https://merics.org/en/comment/china-conflict-mediator

Ramani, S. (2018, July 9). Can China mediate between Pakistan and India? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/can-china-mediate-between-pakistan-and-india/

Slim, H. (2024). Mediation in the world and wars of the 2020s. Still Time to Talk. Conciliation Resources. https://www.c-r.org/accord/still-time-talk/mediation-world-and-wars-2020s

Swanström, N. (2024, June 5). China as a mediator in North Korea: Facilitating dialogues or mediating conflicts? The Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2024/china-as-a-mediator-in-north-korea-facilitating-dialogues-or-mediating-conflicts/

 

SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE 2022: DEEPENING DIPLOMACY AND DEFENCE

GUEST COMMENTARY by Banura Nandathilake

On 12^th June, Asia Pacific’s leading forum for defence diplomacy - the Shangri-La Dialogue ended after a pandemic-induced three-year hiatus. While the Dialogue is procedurally focused on cultivating a sense of security community within the Asia Pacific, which it solely lacks, this year’s event concluded under the uncertain shadow of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the increasingly tenuous US-Sino relations.

The Shangri-La Dialogue is an intergovernmental security conference held in Singapore, by the London based think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in collaboration with the government of Singapore. The Dialogue is chiefly attended by state actors such as Military chiefs, Defence and Foreign Ministers. However, non-state participants too, such as legislators, academic experts, distinguished journalists and business delegates attend the summit. Named after the host venue since 2002, the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore, the forum serves as a platform for debate, expression of views and discussion on specific issues through bilateral meetings. However, off the record meetings are also held, chaired by IISS, to advance policy goals more freely.

Apart from the host nation, participating countries for the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue included Australia, Cambodia, Brunei, Chile, France, Canada, China, India, Germany, Japan, Indonesia, Laos, South Korea, Myanmar, Mongolia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Thailand, Vietnam, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Dialogue was attended by about 500 delegates from more than 40 countries.

Forum Proceedings

The 2022 Dialogue, as all previous sessions, was commenced by Dr John Chipman, the Director-General and Chief Executive of the IISS. This year’s keynote address was given by Fumio Kishida, the Prime Minister of Japan, who set the overall tone for the dialogue - the need for security cooperation and collective action between state and non-state actors in the Asia pacific to counter growing threats in the region and beyond. Broad topics such as the US Indo-Pacific Strategy - a significant shift of resources from the Middle eastern theatre, Competition in a Multipolar world, Military Modernisation, Prescriptions for Myanmar and China’s vision for Regional Order were covered. 

US-China Relations - a String Pulled Taut

The 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue was a significant milestone in contemporary US-China relations. The forum facilitated a meeting between the U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and the Chinese Defence Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe, the first face-to-face encounter since President Biden's inauguration in January 2021. Any hope or reassuring signs of reinstalling lines of direct communication were dispelled by the increasingly sparring headline speeches and subsequent conversations between the two nations, on topics ranging from the status of Taiwan, proceedings within the South China Sea and questions and concerns surrounding grave human rights violations within China.

The US primary criticism of China’s international conduct centred around the latter’s coercive and aggressive actions in the disputed South China Sea, wherein China has constructed man made islands within the shared seaway in an attempt to solidify its claim to the areas enclosed by a ‘9-dash line’ which is claimed by Beijing to grant it exclusive rights, despite non-recognition by international law. “Indo-Pacific countries shouldn’t face political intimidation, economic coercion, or harassment by maritime militias,” Secretary Austin asserted, as “the PRC’s moves threaten to undermine security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.” He further reaffirmed the US position to defend its interests and those of its allies despite increased Chinese movement, mobilisation and pressure.

Secretary Austin’s Chinese counterpart's response was as headline jarring as his. Minister Wei Fenghe described his country’s position as one of self-defence in a global world of zero-sum, self-interested actors. Wei acknowledged his country’s increased nuclear and naval capabilities, in a speech peppered with warnings to tread carefully and avoid Chinese provocation. He further reaffirmed China’s strong stance of a rising great power, one of self-defence but also a crave for international legitimacy through recognition as a peaceful actor. Wei stressed that “It is a historic and strategic mistake to take China as a threat or enemy”. To ensure global peace and development, by virtue of China now being a great power, Wei called for a stop in attempts to “contain China, to stop interfering in China’s internal affairs, and stop harming China’s interests,” signalling that peace was conditional on China’s free reign. His speech further contained a stronger reiteration of the Chinese position on the disputed island of Taiwan - “If anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China – let me be clear – we will not hesitate to fight. We will fight at all costs and we will fight to the very end.”

Shared Ukrainian Costs

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy participated in this year’s Dialogue for the first time through a video link teleconference. Highlighting the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he urged the attendees of primarily Asian states to “remember that support and attention is not only for Ukraine but for (the greater Asia) as well, to ensure that our and your future is safe’’ in the contemporary globalised world. Despite Ukraine’s geographical distance from Asia, Russia’s invasion of his country has global implications, as the political, social and economic distance between countries are much shorter in the present than they ever were. Thus, the costs of war are shared between states, through trade interdependence, geopolitical institutions, and have direct effects such as rising global inflation.

Mr Zelenskyy further stressed that there are ideological costs, as “it is on the Ukrainian battlefield that the future rules of this world are being decided along with the boundaries of the possible.” His position drew clear parallels and a not-so-subtle nod to China's desire for Taiwanese reunification. The political alignments and the ideological divides of the attendee states were made abundantly clear as Prime Minister of Japan Kishida noted that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” further adding to the underlying tension of the Dialogue.

Collective Concerns of the Divided

Despite the lack of collective action on political qualms and tensions owing to non alignment of political compasses, the attendee states of the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue remained receptive to prescriptions for collective concerns. The Dialogue served as a platform to tackle contemporary issues such as global underdevelopment and need of environmental security as a response to climate change, and the green defence agenda wherein the low-lying nations of Maldives, Polynesia and Micronesia were focused upon. The scope of prescriptions for global development and climate degradation are far beyond a single state, and collective action of all nations has shared global benefits. However, talks of nuclear disarmament were pushed by Prime Minister Kishida, who raised the potential for nuclear weapons of China, Russia and North Korea, to cause devastation more than that which was experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite such a statement representing a significant change in the security environment, as it differed from the zero-sum, negative peace structure of the past, it was not well received possibly as one nation may seek to gain more from the said action than the other.

Why They Do What They Do

Security forums such as the Shangri-La Dialogue would be those where one is likely to hear more bad news than good. However, the 2022 forum was not so much a “glass half empty but more of a vessel placed precariously close to the edge of a table, one small slip away from smashing to pieces” (Sachdeva, 2022). As New Zealand Defence Minister Henare noted, there existed “an underlying tension”.

Borrowing from the English School of International Relations (Buzan et al 2002, Bull 1977) would contribute to an apt analysis of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Great power interests define international aspirations and ambitions, even in regional institutions. The Dialogue subscribed to the broad tensions of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the US-China hostilities. Military diplomacy and international institutions which are dominated by great power interests, and smaller developing states are more rule takers than agenda setters. Further, international and weak regional institutions would have little sway in changing great power behaviour and are platforms for great power machinations. Weak regional institutions and forums would have less stringent rules, and less enforcement of such rules which would serve as checks and balances to the power of larger states. Fora such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, as opposed to stronger institutions such as NATO do “not provide much in the way of reassurance about the future trajectory of the relationship (between states) and only reinforces the sense that competition between the two powers is likely to linger thereafter” (Parameswaran 2019).

The fact that the sour relations between US and China continued on since the 2019 Dialogue, which was dominated by the subject of heightened U.S.-China competition serves to solidify the aforementioned understanding.

Despite such dire notions for international cooperation and mitigating global anarchy, the Shangri-La Dialogue represents a necessary, albeit insufficient platform for diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of differences between states. Institutions are only as strong as the rules that states are willing to enforce on themselves. However, institutions and fora such as the Shangri-La Dialogue are still important platforms which aim to resolve statist tensions through negotiated compromise and diffused reciprocity over hard power coercion and war (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The contemporary world is interconnected, with the space and time between events and reactions to such decreasing at an exponential rate. The contemporary world cannot afford to disregard the power of diplomacy for in the words of Henry Kissinger, despite animosities of history, diplomacy serves as means of restraining power.