The ‘Shanghai Five’ organization was renamed in 2001 as the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ with the inclusion of Uzbekistan. The next large expansion was the inclusion of India and Pakistan in 2017. The organization also has categories such as observer states and dialogue partners, which bring together many countries. Sri Lanka obtained dialogue partnership in 2009 and still remains in that position today. This article attempts to understand why Sri Lanka has remained a dialogue partner for sixteen years.
Many countries that joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after Sri Lanka, have already progressed beyond observer status to full membership. Against this background Sri Lanka’s limited interest or awareness of the SCO has become questionable. Did Sri Lanka ever want to go beyond dialogue partner status? Does Sri Lanka lack enthusiasm to seize opportunities through engagement with the SCO? Are there strategic planning gaps?
These aspects require analytical scrutiny. Since its establishment, the SCO has evolved into a powerful institution. It has expanded its network from Eurasia to South Asia, and further into West Asia. The attraction however is likely dependent on whether the goals of the partner countries have been met through the organization. The goals of the organization affect the engagement of the relevant countries, with the organization. The SCO is no longer limited to addressing terrorism, extremism and separatism. It also focuses on enhancing economic prosperity, trade among member states and energy cooperation.
In such a context, Sri Lanka’s prolonged status as a dialogue partner since 2009 indicates a lack of enthusiasm towards achieving more substantial goals. It must be questioned whether this is due to the country being trapped in significant debt dependency on China, or whether Sri Lanka is struggling to gain tangible benefits in trade, investment, and energy while maintaining a steady non-aligned foreign policy.
In 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding to create an Energy Club was signed among the SCO member states, observers, and dialogue partners. Yet, there remains a lack of awareness and knowledge of the steps taken by Sri Lanka to engage closely in the Energy Club.
An attempt is made to understand the lack of progress of membership from a theoretical perspective of regional cooperation. Starting with realism, it focuses on power dynamics, self-interest and survival strategies of states within an archaic global system. Why then has there been no attempt to increase power dynamics or self-interest? When considering regime theory and liberalism, the focus is on how institutions can enhance international and regional cooperation by working together. In the current world, it is increasingly important that states work together to achieve peace, security, prosperity, poverty reduction, and equality among other priorities. Thus, relatively small states like Sri Lanka would benefit economically, in fulfilling the nation’s needs.
In discussing the topic further, it is understood that policy reforms were not taken seriously or enthusiastically, by considering the benefits of cooperation. In addition, the lack of domestic awareness and institutional capacity are key arguments when it comes to Sri Lanka remaining at the same level on the SCO’s membership portal.
In fact, the awareness about the SCO among Sri Lanka’s policymakers, scholars, media and civil society is minimal. The absence of a national policy on SCO engagement and the minimal attention or sustainability of a dedicated SCO unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underlines this weakness. The critique here is that for any multilateral partnership, whether it is SCO or any other regional alliance, in order to yield a meaningful process, there must be domestic institutional readiness and proper awareness. Without an official framework and policy structures, the partnership cannot evolve beyond symbolic affiliation.
What is also relevant for this study is the absence of bilateral follow-up mechanisms between Sri Lanka and Central Asian states. This is a key challenge as, unlike the other dialogue partners such as Türkiye or Egypt which have leveraged bilateral ties with SCO members, Sri Lanka lacks the structural bilateral dialogue or economic corridors. Sri Lanka also lacks free trade agreements or largescale diplomatic missions in several SCO countries. The absence of high-level political visits to and from key Central Asian States also further limits influence.
When examining these reasons, it is clear that improving dialogue partnership status would only be possible with parallel bilateral cooperation. Yet a point to urgently note is that Sri Lanka has not proactively engaged in such follow-up initiatives through SCO platforms.
Therefore, in conclusion, Sri Lanka must develop a National SCO engagement strategy, strengthen relations with Central Asian states, through trade, diplomacy and academic exchanges while managing India-China dynamics within the organization carefully to build institutional awareness about the potential of the SCO. Using the dialogue partnership platform to foster strategic trust would gradually strengthen the partnership and result in observer status.
The presence of Sri Lanka in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is mostly ceremonial. What should be realised is that cooperation would ensure economic benefits which Sri Lanka needs at this time.
