TRADING SMART: Strengthening Sri Lanka–New Zealand Economic Relations in a Shifting Global Economy

By Githmi Silva

Trade is a powerful diplomatic tool in a heavily interconnected world. While exports and imports often dominate the conversation about trade, it is important to note that trade is far more complex than that. Trade is not a stand-alone activity; it contributes to a country’s economic resilience, national security, strategic positioning, and several other aspects. Given its ability to shape global power dynamics, even minor policy shifts can trigger far-reaching consequences. The tariff measures imposed by the Trump administration, for example, sparked intense debate about how quickly shifts in major economies can ripple across the world.

In such scenarios, smaller states that depend heavily on support and access to markets in the West become the ones who bear the highest portion of the burden. This reminds the necessity for smaller states to cultivate diverse trade relations rather than relying on singular markets. As a developing nation, Sri Lanka depends significantly on exports to sustain economic growth. While the country has a far-reaching history of exporting goods, it became more prominent towards the latter part of the 1970s with economic liberalization. Although current export flows are diverse, they disproportionately rely on a few key markets like the United States, the United Kingdom, and India. This concentration may cause potential risk due to economic vulnerabilities; therefore, Sri Lanka must tap into alternative markets. In this regard, New Zealand stands out as a promising alternative market offering multiple avenues to strengthen bilateral trade relations.

Overview of Sri Lanka-New Zealand Trade Relations

Since joining the Colombo Plan, both Sri Lanka and New Zealand have demonstrated a shared commitment to promoting economic and social development. With the introduction of economic liberalization under President J. R. Jayewardene in 1977, Sri Lanka adopted an open-market model that facilitated growth in export-oriented ventures. While New Zealand was not among the top markets for Sri Lankan goods, the two nations developed a steady bilateral trade relationship ever since. Over the years, New Zealand began exporting more dairy products, while Sri Lanka continued to export tea, rubber, and garments.

While the trade relations grew at a modest pace, they marked some notable milestones after 2010, following the signing of the Dairy Cooperation Agreement in 2013. The agreement was signed as a result of bilateral talks between President Maithripala Sirisena and the New Zealand Prime Minister, John Key, whose visit to Sri Lanka also served to revitalize trade relations between the two countries (Eurasia Review, 2016). This agreement set the tone to uplift sectoral engagement between the two countries, specifically in the dairy and agricultural sectors. When bilateral trade commenced to indicate an increased diversification into areas like education services, machinery, and processed foods, the two countries came into discussion for a Free Trade Agreement in 2016. This agreement was proposed following the discussions between New Zealand Trade Minister Todd McClay and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe; the officials considered a framework to boost economic ties, considering the complementary economies between New Zealand and Sri Lanka (Reuters, 2017). While these discussions paved the way to potential opportunities to strengthen bilateral trade relations, the FTA did not come to force. There is no precise reason why the FTA did not come into reality, but the asymmetry in trade volumes, less need for strategic lobbying, and Sri Lanka’s occasional domestic instability could be considered as possible causes.

Potential to strengthen the bilateral trade relations between Sri Lanka and New Zealand

Certain trade initiatives between the two countries did not materialize; nevertheless, there is still room to enhance them. In fact, the countries have not completely cut off trade relations, and gradual improvements are underway. For instance, Sri Lanka’s exports to New Zealand have increased by 12.85% in 2024 compared to 2023 (Sri Lanka Export Board, n.d). According to the Sri Lanka Export Board (2024), in terms of exporting goods, Sri Lanka mostly exports tea, made-up textiles, gloves, mittens, undergarments, pneumatic and retreaded rubber tyres, coco peat, fiber pith, and moulded products to New Zealand. On the other hand, Sri Lanka’s main imported products from New Zealand in 2024 include meat, fish and dairy produce, wood and wooden products, live animals, fruits, products of base metal, sugar confectionery, and bakery products. Although current exports are mostly conventional, there are several other products and even services that hold potential for trade between Sri Lanka and New Zealand.

It is high time for the two countries to explore ways to diversify the options. Speaking of trade diversification, this can be pursued by finding innovative uses for goods already being traded and exploring untapped opportunities. To elaborate, tea remains one of Sri Lanka’s in-demand exports in New Zealand. It ranks among the top Sri Lankan products exported to New Zealand, with strong demand driving continued trade, making it essential to maintain and strengthen supply efforts. Dilmah Ceylon Tea Company, for instance, has adopted innovative strategies to meet consumer demands by specifically tailoring its offerings to the preferences of the New Zealand market. Going beyond its traditional gourmet Ceylon tea, Dilmah has identified emerging trends and consumer insights to develop a new range of iced teas, low-sugar carbonated tea sodas, and premium tea mixers exclusively available to New Zealand (Estate, 2023). Thanks to the customer-focused approach, Dilmah has been voted New Zealand’s most trusted tea brand for five straight years in the People’s Choice awards, and generates significant revenue via the New Zealand market (Dilmah News, n.d).

While optimizing current exports remains important, unlocking new trade opportunities is also vital. Several unexplored goods and services present a chance to diversify trade between Sri Lanka and New Zealand. In terms of goods, food products (processed or preserved), spices, and synthetic textiles have been identified as promising export options from Sri Lanka to New Zealand (Export Development Board Sri Lanka, 2025). However, exports are no longer confined to goods alone. Due to changes in global trade patterns, service exports, particularly those rooted in knowledge-based production, play a notable role in deepening economic ties.

Countries transitioning from resource-based economies to competitive knowledge-driven models are seeing more resilient and diverse exports; advances in IT, digital systems, and R&D have transformed sectors like logistics, business operations, and education, making knowledge-intensive services a growing force in international trade (Seneviratne, 2025). Sri Lanka holds strong potential to expand its knowledge-based exports, specifically in IT, Software, and BPO sectors. With a skilled talent pool and a rapidly growing IT sector, Sri Lanka can provide services such as cloud solutions to the New Zealand market. This is a win-win situation for both countries, delivering a strong revenue stream for Sri Lanka and cost-effective solutions for New Zealand. In addition, Sri Lanka can further diversify its service export base by developing niche markets such as wellness tourism, maritime logistics, and shipping-related services into broader, sustainable sectors.

The establishment of the New Zealand High Commission in Sri Lanka in 2021 significantly advanced bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors, including trade. Reflecting this growing partnership, Sri Lanka opened a High Commission in New Zealand and the first resident High Commissioner presented credentials at the beginning of 2025. These steps indicate that Sri Lanka and New Zealand have great potential to strengthen and maximize their trade relations. While New Zealand may not currently be Sri Lanka’s top export destination, or vice versa, there remains significant potential and multiple avenues to deepen and diversify bilateral economic engagement.

Importance of strengthening the bilateral trade relations between Sri Lanka and New Zealand

Trade is a volatile factor, and primarily engaging with larger economies often carries complexities. Given that global trade faces increasing threats from geopolitical instability, bilateral economic partnerships should not be limited to the West or traditional major markets. Expanding trade ties to regional and nontraditional markets significantly provide diversified options, helping to reduce exposure to external trade shocks. At present, Sri Lanka’s export strategy is concentrated on a handful of markets that are particularly susceptible to global disruptions. Recent data shows that 23% of Sri Lanka’s exports, valued at $2.79 billion, go to the United States, standing as Sri Lanka’s largest export market; the United Kingdom and India take the second and third spots (Trend Economy, 2023). While the United States remains Sri Lanka's top export destination, Sri Lanka's shipment data for 2024 has recognized India and China as the biggest import partners; The Central Bank noted growth in exports, especially food, coconut-based, and manufactured items alongside a moderate rise in imports, helping reduce the trade deficit (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2024).

To avoid the bottlenecks and economic strains, Sri Lanka must adopt broader trade strategies that do not heavily depend on one market. Global economic fluctuations inevitably impact smaller nations like Sri Lanka, and this underpins the need to seek opportunities in emerging markets. Sri Lanka’s economic growth notably depends on the export sector. Strengthening the export sector is key for Sri Lanka’s economic recovery and future resilience. Efforts must focus on diversifying products, improving quality, supporting small and medium enterprises, exploring new markets, and forming trade partnerships that contribute to reducing tariffs, improving market access, and enhancing trade relations (Ceylon Public Affairs, 2024).

Under Annex 1 of the Country Reciprocal Tariffs (2025), the US has imposed a 44% tariff on Sri Lankan exports, which is a far higher tariff rate in comparison to other competing countries, and this largely diminishes the value of Sri Lankan exports in the US market. With the US as Sri Lanka’s primary export market, this shift, driven by the ‘America First’ policy, presents a major long-term risk to the nation's economy. Cost competitiveness was a challenge for Sri Lanka even before the Trump tariffs, and the added uncertainty is likely to reduce buyer confidence and investment activity; moreover, as tariff policies continue to shift in response to both US and foreign actions, global trade tensions are likely to arise (Abeysinghe & Arangala, 2025).

Under these circumstances, Sri Lanka must move beyond traditional markets and pursue diversified trade avenues. New Zealand, as noted in this article, presents a strong opportunity. Although it may sound challenging initially, expanding solid trade partnerships with new markets helps reduce reliance on limited markets and drive initiatives such as product diversification, quality improvement, and the formation of strategic trade partnerships. Despite limited strategic leverage, Sri Lanka and New Zealand remain vital players in the Indo-Pacific region. Given their complementary economies, there is significant potential to pursue a bilateral trade agreement. While improving primary exports, there’s room to tap into specific sectors such as agriculture, which can mutually benefit both countries, particularly as New Zealand seeks high-standard, reliable agricultural imports (Economy Next, 2025). These diverse and strong trade relations often spill into other areas like education, tourism, and cultural exchange, which support a deeper economic partnership in the long run.

Expanding trade ties between Sri Lanka and New Zealand present a valuable opportunity to enhance regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. As a region often shaped by strategic tensions due to the presence of major powers like China and India, strengthening relations among smaller and middle powers offers a more balanced dynamic. Cooperation between countries like Sri Lanka and New Zealand helps to minimize overdependence, reducing the risk of dominance by any single power. Theoretically speaking, to avoid external trade shocks or any geopolitical tensions for that matter, smaller states opt to use hedging as a Foreign Policy strategy. Simply put, hedging refers to an insurance-seeking behavior that reflects a rational calculation, maintaining diversified partnerships as a safeguard against future geopolitical shifts (Kuik, 2021). In comparison to major powers within and beyond the region, neither Sri Lanka nor New Zealand can pick one side or can afford to be drawn too deeply into great power rivalries. Applying this to the trade aspect, it helps both countries to reach out to diverse trade options while maintaining their independent foreign policy under minimum risks.

Way Forward

While entering new markets poses challenges, it remains crucial in a shifting global environment. Relying on singular markets in terms of trade comes with great risks. Sri Lanka has been experiencing it, and taking action has become more important than ever. Taking proactive steps to diversify trade has become a must to avoid future threats and sustain national economies. Despite hurdles, building strong trade relations between Sri Lanka and New Zealand continue to be optimistic. Such a partnership supports a rules-based economic cooperation and contributes to sustainable, inclusive economic development.

References

Annex 1 - Reciprocal Tariff Adjusted. (n.d.). In whitehouse.gov. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Annex-I.pdf

Central Bank of Sri Lanka. (2022). _External_sector_performance_September_2024_. https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/press/pr/press_20241030_external_sector_performance_september_2024_e.pdf

Dilmah is voted by New Zealand as their most trusted tea brand for the 5th year in a row.| Dilmah PRESSROOM | Dilmah News. (n.d.). Dilmah News. https://www.dilmah.co.nz/news-about-dilmah/dilmah-is-voted-by-new-zealand-as-their-most-trusted-tea-brand-for-the-5th-year-in-a-row--567--glb.html#:~:text=Dilmah%20is%20voted%20by%20New,5th%20year%20in%20a%20row.

Economy Next. (2025, May 23). Sri Lanka EDB, New Zealand high commission share insights on export market access. EconomyNext. https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-edb-new-zealand-high-commission-share-insights-on-export-market-access-222258/

Editor. (2024, July 29). Sri Lanka's Global Reach Trade and Export Growth Strategies. Ceylon Public Affairs. https://ceylonpublicaffairs.com/sri-lankas-global-reach-trade/

Editor & Ceylon Public Affairs. (2024, July 29). Sri Lanka's Global Reach Trade and Export Growth Strategies. Ceylon Public Affairs. https://ceylonpublicaffairs.com/sri-lankas-global-reach-trade/

Estate, D. T. (2023, October 24). Millions of “cups of comfort.” NZ Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/sponsored-stories/millions-of-cups-of-comfort/4OZRJ2MQ6ZE4XAFR2VPTY6OM4E/

Kuik, C. (2021). Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective. China International Strategy Review, 3(2), 300–315. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-021-00089-5

Research, V., Abeysinghe, S., & Arangala, M. (2025, April 8). Trump tariffs: How can Sri Lanka mitigate the pain? https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trump-tariffs-how-can-sri-lanka-mitigate-pain-verit%C3%A9-research-hbmgc/

Reuters. (2020, January 17). New Zealand and Sri Lanka to consider free trade agreement. https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/new-zealand-and-sri-lanka-to-consider-free-trade-agreement-idUSKBN153364/

Review, E. (2016, February 25). New Zealand, Sri Lanka sign agreement to strengthen dairy cooperation. Eurasia Review. https://www.eurasiareview.com/25022016-new-zealand-sri-lanka-sign-agreement-to-strengthen-dairy-cooperation/

Seneviratne, A. S. (2025, May 14). AKD/NPP Government: Ways & Means of absorbing the external shock in international trade - Colombo Telegraph. Colombo Telegraph. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/akd-npp-government-ways-means-of-absorbing-the-external-shock-in-international-trade/

Sri Lanka Export Board. (n.d.). Market profiles and briefs related to New Zealand. https://www.srilankabusiness.com/exporters/market-profiles/new-zealand.html#:~:text=The%20total%20export%20value%20from,compared%20to%20the%20year%202023

Sri Lanka Export Development Board. (2025). MARKET AND COUNTRY BRIEF ON New Zealand 2024. In Srilankabusiness.com. https://www.srilankabusiness.com/pdfs/market-profiles/2025/new-zealand-2025.pdf

Trend Economy. (n.d.). Sri Lanka | Imports and Exports | World | ALL COMMODITIES | Value (US$) and Value Growth, YOY (%) | 2011 - 2023. https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/SriLanka/TOTAL

New Zealand’s Defense Diplomacy and Its Role in the Indo-Pacific

By Githmi Silva

In the discourse of International Relations, the Indo-Pacific has drawn plenty of attention for inevitable reasons. From its strategic location to thriving economies, the region holds significance in numerous ways. However, discussions about the Indo-Pacific often revolve around a handful of major players, such as India, China, Japan, and the United States. While these states undoubtedly shape the region’s political, economic and security landscapes, their dominance in the common narrative tends to overshadow the role of middle powers. New Zealand is one such middle power in the Indo-Pacific; a country despite its relatively small size, playing an active role in shaping regional politics. New Zealand’s commitment to security cooperation may not always be the focal point of regional security dialogues; still, it plays a crucial role in influencing the security outlook for smaller Indo-Pacific states. This article aims to explore how New Zealand’s defense diplomacy contributes to regional stability and influences the security dynamics of smaller nations in the region.

New Zealand’s Defense Policy

National security today is multifaceted. It goes beyond conventional threats and encompasses various non-traditional challenges, including climate change, mass migrations, pandemics, and counterterrorism. These issues not only directly impact national security but also create ripple effects that influence the broader region. In response, a country’s defense policy is shaped to tackle these evolving challenges, ultimately safeguarding both the state and its people while taking the broader picture into consideration.

Since gaining legal independence in 1947, New Zealand’s defense and security interests have expanded significantly, leading to ongoing adaptations and developments in its defense policy. According to the New Zealand Ministry of Defense (2023), New Zealand’s new defense strategy emphasizes three mutually reinforcing themes: understand, partner, and act. Defense Policy and Strategy Statement issued by the New Zealand Government in 2023, comprehensively taps the above themes; articulating how the country’s defense strategy is built on New Zealand defense’s professionalism as well as New Zealand’s relationship with the world.

In order to understand New Zealand’s approach to defense diplomacy, it is first necessary to decode the term itself. Although relatively new, defense diplomacy has become a pivotal tool for states in pursuing their security interests. There is no universally accepted definition of the term; however, it emerged in the post-Cold War era as a response to the political need to define the expanding roles of institutions under national defense ministries and to clarify their objectives in a newly "demilitarized" international environment. Thus, its origins lie in politics rather than academia; broadly serving as a means to support the implementation of national interests and to advance foreign and security policy objectives (Security and Defense Quarterly).

The term defense is often associated with military strength and rigid strategies, but the core of defense diplomacy is nonviolent. It serves as a form of soft power, allowing governments to advance their security interests through cooperation rather than coercion. In International Relations, the concept of power is generally classified into three categories: hard power, which relies on force and coercion to achieve national interests, soft power, in contrast, which uses diplomacy, culture, and partnerships to influence others, and smart power, a combination of both, leveraging military capabilities alongside diplomatic and other noncoercive strategies.

New Zealand is known for its rules-based order and modest stance in foreign relations. The New Zealand Defense Force plays a key role in peacekeeping, logistics, maritime security, and humanitarian efforts, demonstrating a strong soft power approach (Espia, 2024). However, New Zealand also employs more sophisticated strategies that go beyond traditional soft power. Despite not having a large military, New Zealand is part of strategic alliances with major global powers. This allows the country to contribute to international security while maintaining an independent foreign policy. New Zealand’s defense diplomacy is not just about maintaining peace but also about using strategic engagement and preventive measures to uphold stability in the region and beyond. Therefore in New Zealand’s case, defense diplomacy reflects characteristics of smart power; a balanced strategy that integrates persuasion with strategic military engagement.

New Zealand’s Role in Regional Security Frameworks

Although New Zealand maintains a modest and independent approach to foreign relations, it remains actively engaged in several major regional and global security frameworks. While the country is directly involved in certain security and military alliances, it also participates indirectly in others, even without formal membership.

●        New Zealand and ANZUS

Entered into force in 1952, ANZUS is a security treaty signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. In a turbulent geopolitical atmosphere during the Cold War, the ANZUS treaty was signed to strengthen regional security, particularly to avoid Japan’s resurgence and the spread of communism in the region. Signatories of the treaty believed that an armed attack in the Pacific area on one member would endanger the peace and safety of the others; thus, the parties agreed to sustain and expand their military forces to counter threats and to consult each other if their security in the Pacific was threatened (New Zealand History, 1952).

This tripartite security alliance contributed to stabilizing the Pacific's security during the Cold War period and strengthening defense capabilities; however, ANZUS took a detour towards the 1980s with New Zealand’s adherence to anti-nuclear policies. When New Zealand’s Labour Party came to power in 1984, the Government was committed to making New Zealand a nuclear-free country. As per New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy, the U.S. Navy could only visit New Zealand if it provided the New Zealand government with a clear assurance that its ships were nuclear-free, and this requirement conflicted with the U.S. Navy’s longstanding policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard its vessels (Catalina, 2010). The contradictions, gradually made New Zealand withdraw from the ANZUS treaty, which makes a compelling case, considering it is the small and less powerful member of the treaty.

However, New Zealand’s move is not purely moral, it is also political and strategic. New Zealand's abandoning ANZUS did spark some tensions between the signatories; one could evidently argue it strained New Zealand - USA relations and reduced New Zealand’s influence in global security. Nevertheless given New Zealand’s geographical; and historical proximity with its neighbor Australia, geographic separation from the regions of potential conflict between the great powers, and its lack of any apparent direct threat to its territory prove that New Zealand did not make a wrong choice parting from ANZUS, but a strategic one (Jamieson, 1991). As a whole ANZUS did not evolve into a large-scale military alliance like NATO; regardless of pulling back from the treaty, up to date, Wellington does maintain security ties with both Canberra and Washington while not compromising its commitment to a nuclear-free Pacific.

●        New Zealand and Five Eyes Intelligence

Five Eyes Intelligence is a security alliance formed in 1946, between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. For New Zealand, a nation with comparatively limited military power, being part of such a formidable intelligence network carries significant stakes. New Zealand’s role in Five Eyes up to date remains controversial. Its role has not been deeply analyzed in the academic discourse, nevertheless, debatable. New Zealand in some researchers' perspectives is the “phantom eye” of the group; its presence may not be as noticeable as the counterparts, yet it is there. Its relevance become much more crucial given its proximity to Australia and Southeast Asia, and New Zealand’s role in the group has made an impact on other parties.

For instance, during the 1987 Fiji coups, New Zealand failed to provide intelligence on the coup's likelihood or its aftermath, marking a significant setback for the alliance. Over the next two decades, New Zealand’s absence deprived Five Eyes of crucial intelligence in Southeast Asia, leaving gaps that the remaining members had to compensate for (Batter and Balls, 2023). New Zealand’s location in the South Pacific continues to be important for intelligence gathering; especially given the nature of contemporary security threats ranging from counter-terrorism to cyber threats. On the other hand, membership in Five Eyes is essential for New Zealand due to access to high intelligence, geopolitical leverage, and maintaining strong ties with Western allies to ensure regional stability.

●        New Zealand and ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Regional Forum is a multilateral security dialogue in the Asia Pacific Region. This initiative was established in 1994 and it encompasses ASEAN Member states and 17 non-ASEAN members. The main objectives of the ASEAN Regional Forum (2023) include fostering constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and making significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region; considering these objectives New Zealand’s involvement once again is pivotal. Being part of the ASEAN Regional Forum, New Zealand contributes in sustaining ASEAN security centrality while providing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms among others. The Foreign Policy standing of Wellington is different from ASEAN’s; nevertheless, given the complexity and importance of the Asia Pacific region, it is a must for Wellington to maintain a solid relationship with ASEAN. Under these circumstances, New Zealand continues to engage with ASEAN in the security pillar for mutual benefits.

How can New Zealand’s Defense Policy impact small Indo-Pacific States?

Determining whether New Zealand is a small power or a big power is certainly not straightforward. It can be understood and explained from various angles. In comparison to conventional major powers such as the USA, the UK, and China, New Zealand lacks key attributes to compete globally.  In terms of military and defense, it does not possess a strong military force and faces no direct security threats. However, it plays a crucial role in regional security by closely collaborating with larger states. This brings up the question: What distinguishes New Zealand, and what implications does this have for other small states in the region?

As mentioned earlier, New Zealand’s Defense Policy is carefully crafted to cater to the country’s national interest while also addressing broader regional interests. Despite not facing direct military threats, New Zealand is located in a region marked by political tensions, such as the South China Sea disputes. While New Zealand maintains an independent approach to foreign policy, it must also be prepared to navigate evolving security challenges in an increasingly uncertain world. New Zealand’s current defense policy acknowledges these unprecedented foreign policy challenges and implements a comprehensive, holistic approach to address them.

The Indo-Pacific region remains a battleground for Power competition among states, with China and India steadily expanding their influence while Western powers including the USA counterbalancing the power competition. Against this backdrop, Wellington attempts to play their game safe but at the same time, smart, following a nuanced approach with the USA, China, India, and its neighbour Australia; this mechanism allows New Zealand to strengthen their security ties with the Pacific neighbours ultimately. How exactly? This can be explained in several ways. As explained New Zealand is a part of many regional and international security alliances. Although New Zealand’s role in them can be controversial at certain points, involvement does leverage the country's geopolitical importance and contribute to strengthening regional security cooperation.

With the support of major powers, New Zealand engages actively in defense collaborations, training programs, and joint military exercises. In this regard, the role of the New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF) should be emphasized since it functions as the main instrument of New Zealand’s defense diplomacy. The New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF) primarily conducts offshore operations, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), search and rescue (SAR), defense and diplomatic exercises, support for Antarctica, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) initiatives, surveillance and interception, counterpiracy efforts, and participation in UN peacekeeping missions (Espia, 2024). These actions have been effective in addressing both traditional and nontraditional security threats in the Indo-Pacific.

New Zealand's efforts in addressing non-traditional security threats have gained significant attention, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. The New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF) was initially called upon to deliver humanitarian aid to families in need but was soon drawn into their biggest active deployment since 1999 (Greener, 2022). While providing vaccinations and humanitarian assistance at home New Zealand also expanded humanitarian assistance to other Pacific states; for instance, Fiji’s 2021 COVID-19 Outbrake. In this case, New Zealand provided Fiji with medical personnel, 100,000 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine, other essential equipment, and economic support of 10 million New Zealand Dollars (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d). Speaking of nontraditional security threats New Zealand’s defense diplomacy also plays an active role in climate security and disaster response as well as cyber security and digital resilience. By being part of alliances like Five Eyes New Zealand contributes to tackling cyber security and related threats in the region.

While New Zealand’s military presence is not extensive, it maintains strong relationships with military-capable nations to promote capacity-building initiatives. These partnerships help strengthen the capacities of smaller Pacific states. Pacific Security Cooperation Program (PSCP), defense Training and Exchange Programs such as Exercise Milan in India, and Sri Lanka, and the Maldives Coast Guard Training Program can be noted as a few examples. New Zealand also pays careful attention to humanitarian assistance when it comes to maintaining security in the home and the region. The Mutual Assistance Programme is one of the key elements of Aotearoa New Zealand's contribution to peace and security in the region, significantly helping to foster strong and enduring people-to-people links over many decades (NZDF, n.d).

New Zealand’s defense policy and its role in regional security are not widely debated topics. As a smaller power, it lacks the impulse to assert dominance and tends to uphold a neutral foreign policy stance. However, its strategic importance in the region necessitates action to contribute to regional security when required. New Zealand’s actions in this regard have been subtle, yet influential. As mentioned in the article New Zealand follows a sophisticated approach to security. It is a part of several security alliances both directly and indirectly, however, Wellington is mindful not to take their core values of foreign policy such as the rule-based order for granted. Overall New Zealand has been consistently contributing to regional security cooperation, most importantly maneuvering the situations and acknowledging the geopolitical complexity in the region.

References

Batter, J., & Balls, M. (2023). The role of New Zealand in Five Eyes intelligence operations. Security Studies Journal. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2023.2212557#d1e200

Catalina, P. (2010). Nuclear-free New Zealand and ANZUS: Strategic implications in the Pacific. International Security Review, 15(3), 45-63. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/amycatalinac/files/catalinac_fpa.pdf

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). New Zealand’s response to Fiji’s COVID-19 outbreak. Government of New Zealand. Retrieved from https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-and-development/humanitarian-action/support-for-fijis-2021-covid-19-outbreak

Espia, J. (2024). New Zealand’s defense strategy and the evolution of soft power in the Indo-Pacific. Strategic Affairs Quarterly, 29(1), 67-82. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3971772/smart-power-or-strategic-apathy-the-new-zealand-defence-force-and-the-politics/

Greener, B. (2022). New Zealand’s humanitarian and defense operations during COVID-19: A case study of military response in a crisis. Global Security Review, 38(2), 102-118. https://www.thekcis.org/publications/insights/insight-22

Jamieson, S. (1991). New Zealand’s strategic withdrawal from ANZUS: Geopolitical consequences and regional security realignment. Pacific Affairs Review, 23(4), 87-109. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23427/mcnair12.pdf

New Zealand History. (1952). The origins and development of ANZUS. Ministry for Culture and Heritage. Retrieved from https://nzhistory.govt.nz/anzus-comes-into-force

New Zealand Ministry of Defence. (2023). Defence policy and strategy statement. New Zealand Government. Retrieved from https://www.defence.govt.nz/our-work/plan-and-assess/defence-policy-review/defence-strategy/#:~:text=Our%20strategy,-New%20Zealand%27s%20new&text=Act%20%E2%80%93%20Defence%20is%20more%20ready,humanitarian%20assistance%20through%20to%20combat

NZDF (n.d.). New Zealand Defence Force regional security initiatives. Retrieved from Security and Defence Quarterly. (2023). The emergence of defense diplomacy as a strategic tool in international relations. Defence and Strategy Studies, 14(2), 123-137.