From Estrangement to Re-engagement: Charting the Evolution of US-Syria Relations (1971-Present)

By Nishali Ranasinghe

Introduction

The year 2025 has been a year of significant geopolitical changes. President Trump’s recent visit to West Asia stands out as an event that could alter the course of American history. Of all the incidents that occurred during his first foreign trip after being elected president for the second time, the announcement of dropping sanctions on Syria took the world by surprise. This is because the relationship between these two countries has never been peaceful. Several factors can help us understand why this is so. Thus, this article focuses on the history between the two countries during different regimes, the current status of their relationship, and the reaction from the international community.

The Evolution of US-Syria Relations: A Historical Overview of the Presidential Policies

Syria gained independence from the French on April 17, 1946, after World War II. Thereafter, Syria faced widespread instability in its political, economic, social, and religious sectors, resulting in a fragmented country with little progress. Amidst this chaos, Hafez al-Assad became President of Syria and ruled the country from 1971 to 2000. Assad set about building up the Syrian military with Soviet aid and gaining the loyalty of the Syrian populace with public works funded by Arab donors and international lending institutions (Britannica, n.d.). It was stated that he carried an authoritarian rule, yet some people praised him for bringing stability to the country. However, during this single presidency in Syria, there were several U.S. presidents who were at the helm in America.

From 1970 to 1974, during Richard Nixon's presidency, Assad tried to get closer to the Soviet Union instead of the U.S., which strained relations between the two countries. However, despite the lack of a positive relationship with the U.S., the U.S. still backed the disengagement agreement negotiated between Syria and Israel after their conflict.

During Gerald Ford’s tenure, there were no specific interactions with the Assad Regime. Similarly, during the tenure of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), there were major changes in the relationship between the USA and Syria.

According to Wright (2017), when Jimmy Carter met Assad in Geneva in 1977, to explore prospects for a U.S.-Soviet conference on Middle East peace, Assad had demanded the return of territory seized by Israel and strategic parity for the Arab world. The disagreements over the expectations and policies of the two countries made their connection stale, and as a result, in the year of 1979, Syria was added to the list of states sponsoring terrorism as the country was believed to support the Palestinian militant groups. According to Uddin (2025), a number of financial restrictions, a ban on US foreign aid, and an arms embargo were included as sanctions.

During Ronald Reagan’s tenure (1981-1989), the relationship between the two countries worsened. Tensions between Reagan and Assad turned openly hostile after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, where Syria had thousands of troops deployed (Wright, 2017). Additionally, further restrictions were imposed by the Reagan administration in 1986, including the banning of Syrian aircraft from landing in the US (Uddin, 2025).

From 1989 to 1993, during the regime of George H. W. Bush, the relationship between the two countries changed positively, mainly due to the Gulf War. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 allowed Syria to join the US-led coalition to free Kuwait from the invasion. During this period, there were a few notable changes that improved Syria's image.

At the same time, Syria's doors were flung open to Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, whose governments had been unhappy with Syria's support of Iran. This was a significant step toward broadening Syria's focus on regional diplomacy, building a new alliance system, and opening up to the United States and the West following the retrenchment of the former Soviet Union. Most significantly, these moves led to Syria's entry, for the first time ever, into face-to-face negotiations with Israel. Not only did Syria drop its insistence on an international peace conference under UN sponsorship, but it also contributed to creating the psychological prerequisites for successful bilateral negotiations with Israel (Muslih, 1998).

Even during Bill Clinton's presidency (1993-2001), Syria continued to participate in the Middle East peace process. His motive was to keep Syria out of trouble. This helped Syria stay on good terms with the U.S. and Arab nations, making it a defensive strategy of his time. However, in the year 2000, Hafez al-Assad passed away, resulting in his son, Bashar al-Assad, ruling the country for the next 24 years (2000-2024). During his tenure, Bill Clinton was in his final years, and Bashar al-Assad managed to have a cordial relationship with the US. Nevertheless, the relationship between George W. Bush (2001-2009) and Bashar al-Assad can be described as gradually strained.

Initially, both regimes cooperated and worked towards ‘war on terror’ after the 9/11 attacks. Zisser (2003) stated that the Syrian intelligence cooperated with the United States in pursuit of cells from al-Qaeda and offered to assist the United States in its investigations. Bashar made a special effort to guarantee that no suspicion fell on Syria for involvement in the September 11 attacks, and because of this move, the Americans expressed gratitude to the Syrians for their assistance, and President Bush even called Bashar al-Assad to thank him. However, in 2004, the George W. Bush administration accused Syria of possessing weapons of mass destruction, supporting militant groups in the region (including Hezbollah and Hamas), and destabilizing Iraq and Lebanon (Uddin, 2025). This could be proved by the following statement made by President Bush on the Assad regime: "My patience ran out on President Assad a long time ago," Bush said. "The reason why is because he houses Hamas, he facilitates Hezbollah, suiciders go from his country into Iraq, and he destabilizes Lebanon," Bush said (Spetalnick, 2007).

Additionally, Syria also continued to conduct business as usual in granting aid and safe haven to Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Ramadan Shallah, Islamic Jihad’s Damascus-based leader, continued to take responsibility for attacks on Israel in statements issued from Damascus. And of course, Syria continued to foster its strategic alliance with Iran and also its ties with North Korea. These two countries continued to provide Syria with assistance in equipping itself with advanced technologies and weaponry (Zisser, 2003).

These actions from Syria damaged the connection between the two countries. During President Barack Obama’s presidency (2009-2017), tensions between the two countries rose, and things became extremely volatile. This occurred due to several reasons. One factor was the Syrian civil war, where Assad cracked down on civilians. This violated their human rights and led to widespread backlash from the international community. Britannica (2025) stated that improvised explosives, also known as “barrel bombs,” were dropped from helicopters and airplanes against military and civilian targets in rebel-held areas, even though human rights groups insisted that the use of such indiscriminate weapons constituted a war crime.

Houeix (2018) stated that Assad’s government had admitted to possessing chemical weapons in July 2012, and a month later, Obama stated that the use of such weapons is a “red line” and that crossing it would entail “enormous consequences”. Nevertheless, even though there was much evidence that proved that Syria had used chemical weapons on its civilians, this “red line” threat became an empty threat that did not impact Syria or Assad in any way. This could be one of the pivotal moments in American history, as they lost their credibility in front of the international community. This could have happened as the USA did not want to get involved in another Middle Eastern war.

During President Joe Biden’s era, it could be stated that there was a continuation of the previous regime. There are a few notable incidents that occurred during his time. For instance, countering ISIS terrorism involved supporting local partners like the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), humanitarian aid for the civilians in distress, and passing the Captagon Act to disrupt the illicit drug trade. Adib (2024) stated that the world's leader in Captagon trade has been Syria, generating an estimated $10 billion for the country an estimated $2.4 billion a year directly for the Assad regime, according to a 2023 study conducted by the Observatory of Political and Economic Networks, a nonprofit that conducts research on organized crime and corruption in Syria. With these incidents unfolding one by one, the relationship between the two countries could not be mended, and with the political instability, poor economy, and slow development in the country, Bashar al-Assad’s government was toppled, and he fled to Russia which gave the space to Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda insurgent who led the rebel that toppled the Assad regime in 2024, to become the president of Syria.

After this incident, President Biden, envisaging future connectivity with Syria observed that: “It’s a moment of historic opportunity for the long-suffering people of Syria to build a better future for their proud country,” Biden said from the Roosevelt Room. “It’s also a moment of risk and uncertainty. As we all turn to the question of what comes next, the United States will work with our partners and the stakeholders in Syria to help them seize an opportunity to manage the risk.” (Klein et al., 2024).

The Post-Assad Era and the Restructuring of US-Syria Relations

The year 2025 can be named as one of the years that is full of surprises, even in the world of geopolitics. After Donald Trump was elected the 47th president of the USA, world affairs drastically changed due to some of his policies. However, even though he was previously elected president from 2017-2021, we can now see a distinct approach to Syria this time. Like all previous presidents, Trump maintained a similar stance on Syria during his first term, that is to be hostile and impose sanctions. As a consequence, Trump signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (the Caesar Act), which can be described as follows, Executive Order 13894 includes menu-based sanctions, including travel restrictions to the United States and isolation from the United States’ financial system for foreign persons who engage in or finance the obstruction, prevention, or disruption of a ceasefire or political solution to the conflict in Syria and members of their family, among other actions… Mandatory sanctions under the Caesar Act target foreign persons who facilitate the Assad regime’s acquisition of goods, services, or technologies that support the regime’s military activities as well as its aviation and oil and gas production industries… The Caesar Act also mandates sanctions on those profiting off the Syrian conflict by engaging in reconstruction activities (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

Trump continued to target ISIS in Syria, and the relationship between the two countries remained unchanged, with no improvements. Nevertheless, soon after Trump was elected for the second time in the latter part of 2024, the relationship between the two countries began to shift in the opposite direction.

On May 2025, President Donald Trump met with Ahmed al-Sharaa, which became a historic moment for both the countries and the middle east which paved the way to normalize relations between the two countries. The meeting, described by Syria as “historic,” was the first between a US and Syrian president in 25 years, taking place during Trump's Middle East tour, the first set of state visits of his second term (Salem, 2025).

Soon after the historic meeting, Trump announced he would lift the crippling U.S. sanctions against Syria and urged al-Sharaa to meet specified conditions in hopes that it will stabilize the country (Hutchinson, 2025). According to Firstpost (2025), the USA is expecting the following conditions to be met in return for dropping the sanctions which are – Syria coming to terms with Israel; deporting Palestinians and foreign terrorists; helping the USA fight ISIS; and taking control of the ISIS detention centers in Syria.

Sanctions Relief in Post-Assad Syria: International Debates

This move was categorized as both new and surprising to the world for many reasons. Firstly, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was known to have led the rebel offensive that toppled the Assad regime in 2024, was also a former al-Qaeda insurgent who fought against the U.S. in Iraq. The second factor is that a U.S. president is taking a different stance on Syria, ignoring the actions taken by previous administrations, including his first term as president. This could be seen as a new development in the relationship between the USA and Syria after many decades of hostility. This move can also change Syria's perspective within the international community and perhaps lead Syria towards a better future. As a result, the European Union has lifted select sanctions on Syria as part of an effort to support democratic development during the country’s political transition (Al Jazeera, 2025). This suggests that the European Union is accepting the new leader of Syria and hence willing to help the country improve its current situation.

In an interview in 2024, al-Sharaa stated that the sanctions should be lifted as the civil war had ended. "Now, after all that has happened, sanctions must be lifted because they were targeted at the old regime. The victim and the oppressor should not be treated in the same way" (Bowen, 2024).

This statement by the current president of Syria shows that the country desires recognition and participation in the international community. His positive remarks also indicate a wish to distinguish himself from previous Syrian presidents and show a willingness to cooperate with Western allies. This could help the country get back on the right track and assist in combating terrorism in West Asia.

However, despite the positive reactions and factors surrounding this move, this particular act is also debated in the international system. According to VOA News (2025), al-Sharaa was the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or HTS, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, that spearheaded the campaign in December to take control of Damascus. Since he was recognized as a terrorist, the US has placed a bounty of $10 million on al-Sharaa, but it was removed recently because of the recent events. Moreover, Trump has described the Syrian president as “Good and an attractive guy,” a statement that gained worldwide attention. All these incidents and statements could make the USA appear opportunistic and unreliable due to this move. Additionally, given the past few events revealed by the USA, this particular move can also be interpreted as Trump seeing world affairs only as opportunities and deals.

Nonetheless, the main question that arises next is: why is the USA taking such a risk by trusting Syria and al-Sharaa? John Cohen, a former Department of Homeland Security undersecretary of intelligence, remarked the following, which shows the motive of the USA in dropping the sanctions.

“The United States has no choice but to engage with al-Sharaa, explaining that a stable Syria is vital to the entire Middle East region…"We have to engage," Cohen said. "There are other powers, like China and Russia, who would be more than happy to assert geopolitical control over the region. So, it's in our interest not to have that occur" (Hutchinson, 2025).

Additionally, this move will create a balance in the West Asian region, and it can be stated that in the 21st century, the West Asian region is one of the developing and important areas impacting world affairs. Some say that his admiration for the Saudi prince, Mohammad Bin Salman, also known as MBS, could be a potential reason why Trump agreed to lift sanctions on Syria. Thus, President Trump is in the process of rewriting US foreign policy with and of this region.

Conclusion

The relationship between the USA and Syria has been a rollercoaster ride. By analyzing the different regimes and global contexts during each one, we can see that their relationship has mostly been hostile and negative. However, recently the shift in the foreign policy of both the USA and Syria. Unlike previous regimes and administrations in both countries, it can be seen that they have now found a middle ground and are on the same page. This is a green light for their relationship and could even change the destinies of both countries, leading them out of decades of violence and hostility.

References

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A PARADOX OF POWER: Trump’s Aggressive Foreign Policy Without War

By L. M. S. Navodya

Donald J. Trump, the 45th President of the United States of America, has turned out to be one of the most polarizing figures in modern political history. His foreign policy, in particular, has been criticized as erratic, aggressive, and dangerously unilateral. From launching trade wars to walking out of international agreements, Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine fundamentally restructured the U.S. approach to world affairs.

In spite of his combative rhetoric and diplomatic actions, Trump notably avoided traditional military conflicts and even attempted to de-escalate rising tensions, including an unexpected intervention in the recent India-Pakistan conflict following the Pahalgam attack. This paradox, however, deserves closer examination amid the flurry of criticisms.

Whitewashing Trump’s larger foreign policy legacy is not the goal of this article. Rather, it draws attention to a crucial, little-discussed trait: Trump’s unwillingness to involve the U.S. in new conflicts, despite his significant influence on the global order.

Economic nationalism, preference for bilateralism over multilateralism, and contempt for conventional diplomacy were the main tenets of Trump’s foreign policy philosophy. He withdrew from historic international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), imposed high tariffs on China, and started trade disputes with allies. Trump also criticised organisations like the World Health Organisation (WHO) and questioned mutual defence pledges, endangering North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) unity.

These actions painted a picture of a leader who was eager for conflict. However, in contrast to a number of his predecessors, Trump did not initiate any new wars. In fact, he emphasised returning American troops home and frequently voiced his disinterest in lengthy military conflicts. Thus, this strategy questions the widely held belief that an assertive foreign policy invariably results in war.

Trump’s handling of the rising tensions between India and Pakistan after the Pahalgam terrorist attack is a clear illustration of his strategy. India and Pakistan, two neighbours with nuclear weapons, were on the brink of war after the incident. Given Trump’s tough stance on terrorism and the strengthening U.S.-Indian relationship, international observers anticipated strong U.S. support for India’s military response.

Surprisingly, Trump played a more measured role. Rather than inflaming the situation, his administration engaged diplomatically with both New Delhi and Islamabad. Reports indicated that the U.S. had quietly but effectively urged restraint and encouraged backdoor talks between the two nations. Ultimately, a full-scale war was averted.

This response stood in contrast to Trump’s usual hyperbole. While the media spotlight remained on his tweets and trade tariffs, behind the scenes his administration was performing a classic de-escalation play—something reminiscent of traditional diplomacy. It was a subtle, unexpected pivot in a presidency marked by brashness and unpredictability.

Trump’s approach to the India-Pakistan crisis was not an isolated event. He consistently showed a dislike for military escalation during his presidencies. In the case of North Korea, Trump pursued diplomacy in the end, even holding historic summits with Kim Jong-un, despite engaging in a risky verbal sparring match.

A full-scale conflict with Iran was feared by many following the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani. Trump, however, favoured sanctions and rhetorical deterrence over more extensive military action.

Trump’s administration began negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, setting the stage for the eventual U.S. withdrawal, which his successor carried out. Additionally, Trump mostly avoided more extensive military engagement in Syria while launching limited missile strikes in response to the use of chemical weapons.

These incidents all reveal a leader who was remarkably reluctant to increase America’s military presence overseas, even though his tone and tactics were confrontational. It could be argued that Trump’s hesitation to go to war stemmed more from a political calculation related to his domestic base than from pacifism or humanitarian concerns. He was sceptical of ‘endless wars’ that had depleted American resources and morale as part of his ‘America First’ philosophy. Trump was able to appeal to war-weary voters while saving political capital for internal and economic conflicts by avoiding military involvement.

Moreover, his preference for economic leverage—like sanctions and tariffs—offered him tools of coercion without triggering armed conflict. According to this perspective, Trump’s foreign policy was opportunistically restrained rather than dovish: aggressive in appearance but restrained in content. For years to come, Donald Trump’s foreign policy will be examined and debated. It was distinguished by an unreservedly nationalist mindset, an embrace of unpredictability, and a break from conventional U.S. diplomacy. Nonetheless, there was a constant refrain from going to war within this combative, frequently disruptive framework.

Along with other international hotspots, the post-Pahalgam mediation between India and Pakistan revealed an unexpected propensity for de-escalation and peace—at least militarily. This is not to say that Trump’s foreign policy was peaceful or conducive to world peace because most of his choices increased tensions and undermined international alliances. But to overlook the nuances of his anti-war stance is to overlook a crucial aspect of the Trump administration. Recognising contradictions is crucial to comprehending world leaders and their policies.

In many respects, Trump exemplified one: an aggressive foreign policy strategist who, in spite of his bombast, has thus far avoided involving the U.S. in new conflicts.

China's Rising Status as a Mediator

 By Trivan Annakkarage

A mediator is often a neutral and respected third-party that aims to resolve prolonged disputes. In the context of International Relations, these prolonged disputes are usually associated between governments (of either two or more nation-states) or it may even be internal disputes within a nation-state, between its government and non-state actors such as secessionist movements, drug cartels, trade unions or even fundamentalist organizations. In all these instances, it is the public that suffer, and prolonged disputes would result in conflicts where the suffering is passed down to future generations thus fueling more resentment and complications. Hence, mediators are vital to bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table to agree on peaceful solutions.  

In China, mediation has a strong connection to the country’s three main religious philosophies namely Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism. Mediation is a practice that is considered as a means to preserve social harmony and relationships thus leading to social stability and inclusive development of societies. During its imperial period, China intervened as a mediator in international disputes. Examples include the Tang Dynasty (618-907) resolving disputes between nomadic groups in Central Asia to prevent potential disruptions to the Silk Route and during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) where Admiral Zheng He intervened to resolve internal disputes in the Malacca Sultanate. However, as technologically advanced European colonial powers and Imperial Japan overpowered Imperial China, Beijing gradually lost its leverage to act as a decisive mediator in international conflicts. With China entering its Century of Humiliation (1839-1945), its status as an international mediator gradually diminished.                     

During the Cold War (1947-1991), the United States and the Soviet Union intervened as mediators in several international disputes. Examples include United States’ role as a mediator in the Camp David Accords of 1978 that resulted in the normalization of Israel-Egypt relations and the Tashkent Declaration of 1965 which was mediated by the Soviet Union that marked the end of the Indo-Pakistani War which broke-out that year. However, the role of a mediator was not solely limited to the superpowers at the time because countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also acted as decisive mediators. The Algiers Accords of 1981 mediated by Algeria saw the United States and Iran amicably ending the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981. Notably, the Colombo Proposals of 1962 which were jointly mediated by six NAM countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic) paved the way to end the Sino-Indian War which took place that year.     

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party maintained a non-interventionist foreign policy into the affairs of other nation-states. It could be argued that this policy was beneficial because in 1971, the majority of countries voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) that recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the UN.

However, China did directly intervene in the affairs of other neighbouring countries only when there was a perceived threat to its sovereignty. Examples include direct intervention on the North Korean side in the Korean War of 1950-1953 and providing intelligence to North Vietnam in the Vietnam War of 1955-1975. These actions were a result of China’s determination to limit the influence of foreign powers in its neighbourhood – a key factor that would determine China’s rise as a mediator in the 21^st century.  

After the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 (between America’s Nixon Administration and Mao’s Government in China) followed by Beijing adopting the reform and opening up policy in 1978, China was on its path to becoming the factory of the world. As China reaped financial benefits from these initiatives it was vital for Beijing to develop and maintain strong economic links with many countries that invested and imported Chinese manufactured goods. This strong focus on economic development distanced China being involved in geopolitical tensions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. 

As the 21^st century unfolded, and with China overtaking Japan as the second largest economy in the world in 2010 (during the Presidency of Hu Jintao) followed by President Xi Jinping unveiling China’s monumental vision to resurrect the Silk Route via the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) three years later, it was evident that China was on its path to becoming a prospective global power. Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, it was a necessity for China to expand its footprint around the world. Nevertheless, for Beijing, it is paramount that China’s global image is not tarnished in the process as a positive force in the world. Hence it could be assessed that the relatively lesser negative historical baggage (associated with colonizing countries), and being a vital country in the global value chain, has benefitted China because its growing influence is both acknowledged and respected at the same time by many state and non-state actors. Hence, such a global standing permits China to engage in the affairs of mediating international disputes – complimenting Beijing’s commitment to preserve China’s image as a positive force in the world.    

However, as revealed by political scientist, Niklas Swanström (Executive Director, Sweden’s Institute for Security Development & Policy), mediation was an area that the People’s Republic of China had lack of knowledge and experience. Hence, before venturing into this space, China acted with caution. As highlighted by Helena Lagarda (Lead Analyst, Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies) China has engaged in low-key mediation in the Korean peninsula (since 2003) and in the conflict between Sudan-South Sudan (from 2008-2011). Although these mediation efforts have not resulted in successes, it was a testing ground for China to familiarise the art of mediation and learn how to secure its interest while maintaining its public image in the process.

These harbinger efforts to China’s rise as a mediator could be elaborated as follows. Facilitating between the United States (including its allies in the region - Japan and South Korea) and North Korea (about its nuclear weapons programme) placed China as a crucial stakeholder in this dispute. Hence as noted by Swanström, China’s mediation has prevented North Korea from reaching out to Russia for security guarantees that would have undermined China’s status in the region. With regard to Sudan and South Sudan, by intervening in the conflict, China has been able to secure its oil and mining contracts in both countries along with maintaining amicable relations – despite prevailing diplomatic tensions between Sudan and South Sudan over oil revenue.    

By the time BRI was formally announced in 2013, China had reasonably been exposed to the art of mediation. Since peaceful and stable nation-states and regions are vital to BRI’s success, the need to resolve conflicts in various regions along the land and maritime routes soon became a necessity if China wished to realise BRI. Therefore, BRI could be argued as a reason for China’s rising status as a mediator.    

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or commonly referred to as the Iranian Nuclear Deal) could be argued as a notable commitment by China in a multilateral mediation effort. Despite the United States withdrawing from the agreement in 2018 (during the first Trump Administration), China together with Russia stood firm with Iran. Regardless of repudiating the conditions under JCPOA, this resulted in Iran continuing cordial relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and not acting in isolation – a result that would have been detrimental to the stability of West Asia and ongoing BRI projects in the region.  

Given how difficult it is for the two nuclear-armed South Asian countries to agree on being part of a regional security body, China played a crucial mediating role to admit both India and Pakistan as members to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2018. As argued by Samuel Ramani (Associate Fellow, Britain’s Royal United Services Institute) in spite of close ties with Islamabad, Beijing is aware that for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC; a land route part of BRI) to bear fruit, it is essential to have New Delhi on its side because the proposed corridor cuts through the disputed region of Kashmir.

In 2022, Xi announced China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Boao Forum held that year. GSI is inspired by the concept of ‘indivisible security’. This rejects the idea of isolating national security of one country and emphasizes that one country’s national security is linked to other countries. Therefore, mutual dependence on security is the best way forward to create peace and stability in the world.    

With GSI now being part of the Chinese Communist Party’s policy, China’s most recent successful mediation effort was restoring diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023. According to Amrita Jash (Assistant Professor, India’s Manipal Academy of High Education), this achievement by China is as significant as the US-led mediation triumphs such as the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Abraham Accords of 2020. Regardless of being the present super-power, it is unfortunate that the United States was unable to amend relations between these two countries. It could be argued that it is primarily due to Washington’s interest in fostering tensions so that Saudi Arabia remains a market that imports American state-of-the art weapons to defend its borders and immediate neighbourhood from Iran. On the other hand, China’s goal to enhance international trade in general via BRI makes inclusivity easier hence delivery of mediation efforts.

As stated by Wang Huiyao (Founder, Centre for China & Globalization), China is able to leverage itself as a mediator due to its strong economic relations. China is the largest trading partner for India, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. This makes it relatively easier to project its soft power on disputing parties. China’s ongoing efforts include mediating conflicts between Russia versus Ukraine and Israel versus Palestine. Even among these countries China emerges as one of their largest (or even largest) trading partners. In 2023, taking note of China’s rising status as a mediator, French President Emmanuel Macron urged Xi to convince President Vladimir Putin to end its conflict with Ukraine. According Galia Lavi and Oded Eran (senior research personnel, Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies) the US-Israel bond would be challenged if the people of West Asia (including Israelis) begin to increasingly view China positively via its infrastructure projects in the region.     

As revealed by the British academic Hugo Slim, unlike the United States and its European allies, China does not impose liberal ideologies when mediating conflicts. What gives the Chinese Government leverage as a mediator is its deep understanding of the historic context of the dispute and being able to respect and work with governments that have different ideologies.       

As much as it seems that China focuses on fostering trade via BRI as means to resolve conflicts, in the process Beijing is also trying to gradually balance Washington’s influence. Moreover, with the United States shifting its focus to domestic affairs, there is opportunity for China to fill the vacancy of a mediator. In the process and in the words of Slim, China wishes to “de-occidentalise” the approach to mediation. According to Samir Bhattacharya (Associate Fellow, India’s Observer Research Foundation), China’s mediation follows a careful mix of three 3Is – interference, influence and intervention from which creative involvement is developed.

The following map depicts China’s past and current efforts in the world. 

Source: Taken from Helena Legarda’s article titled, China wades into the Israel-Palestine conflict once more https://merics.org/en/comment/china-wades-israel-palestine-conflict-once-more

Nevertheless, there are several factors that challenge China’s rising status as a mediator. They include China’s dispute over the South China Sea, China’s attempts to incorporate Taiwan into its sovereign territory and China’s border disputes with India. As pointed out by the Brazilian Journalist, Fábio Galão, major criticism about China’s mediation is the lack of concern to hold conflicting parties accountable on human rights.

Traditionally, the country focuses strongly on working with state-actors rather than with non-state actors such as civil society organizations. This could be the reason why human rights and other similar concerns take a back-seat in the mediation agenda. Moreover, as the 21^st century unravels, mediation on topics such as climate change, migration and tariffs seem to take centre stage along with geopolitical tensions. This would further complicate mediation efforts. How well China navigates these issues and developments would depend on the Chinese Communist Party’s commitment to GSI and its creative involvement in mediation.        

References

Bhattacharya, S. (2024, August 7). China's conflict resolution mechanism in Africa: Mediation with Chinese characteristics. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-s-conflict-resolution-mechanism-in-africa-mediation-with-chinese-characteristics

Galão, F. (2023, May 9). How China has become the new mediator in global geopolitics. The Rio Times. https://www.riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/new-multipolar-world-order/how-china-has-become-the-new-mediator-in-global-geopolitics/

Huiyao, W. (2024, August 16). Why China is becoming a top choice mediator for global conflicts. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3274330/why-china-becoming-top-choice-mediator-global-conflicts

Jash, A. (2023, June 23). Saudi-Iran deal: A test case of China’s role as an international mediator. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/

Lavi, G., & Eran, O. (2023, April 4). Could China serve as an international mediator? Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48747

Legarda, H. (2018, August 22). China as a conflict mediator. MERICS. https://merics.org/en/comment/china-conflict-mediator

Ramani, S. (2018, July 9). Can China mediate between Pakistan and India? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/can-china-mediate-between-pakistan-and-india/

Slim, H. (2024). Mediation in the world and wars of the 2020s. Still Time to Talk. Conciliation Resources. https://www.c-r.org/accord/still-time-talk/mediation-world-and-wars-2020s

Swanström, N. (2024, June 5). China as a mediator in North Korea: Facilitating dialogues or mediating conflicts? The Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2024/china-as-a-mediator-in-north-korea-facilitating-dialogues-or-mediating-conflicts/

 

AMERICAN POLICY FORMULATION, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND REPERCUSSIONS FOR SRI LANKA

By Indoosan Shanthakumaran

Sri Lanka has experienced substantial consequences as a result of President Trump's executive orders, particularly in the realms of foreign aid, trade, and geopolitical dynamics. This article attempts to examine some of these critical factors.

1.     Reduction in Foreign Aid 

           ·         Ceasing Operations of USAID

Financial Impact: The termination of USAID operations has led to a considerable financial deficit for Sri Lanka. USAID has served as a pivotal source of financial support for a multitude of development initiatives, encompassing infrastructure, education, healthcare, and economic advancement.

Project Disruption: The sudden loss of funding has resulted in the cessation or reduction of numerous ongoing initiatives. For example, initiatives designed to enhance the resilience of communities to disasters, agricultural productivity, and water and sanitation have encountered substantial obstacles.

Capacity Building: USAID has been instrumental in the development of local institutions and communities' capacity. The absence of this support may impede development in areas such as institutional strengthening, transparency, and governance.

·         Impact on Humanitarian Efforts

Health and Education: USAID has played a critical role in the support of health and education initiatives in Sri Lanka. Particularly in rural and underserved regions, the withdrawal of this aid could result in a decrease in the caliber of healthcare services and educational opportunities.

Economic Development: By providing vocational training, promoting entrepreneurship, and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), USAID-funded programs have contributed to economic development. The cessation of these programs may result in a reduction in economic growth and job creation.

2.       Trade and Economic Policies

     ·         America First Agenda

Tariff Increases: Challenges have arisen for Sri Lankan exporters as a result of Trump's protectionist trade policies, which include increases in import tariffs. The US market is less competitive for Sri Lankan products due to the increased tariffs, which have a significant impact on key export sectors such as textiles, apparel, and tea.

Supply Chain Disruptions: Sri Lanka's trade relationships have been affected by the global supply chains that have resulted from the trade war between the United States and China. Increased costs and delays may result for Sri Lankan enterprises due to disruptions in the supply chain.

·         Impact on Foreign Exchange Inflows

Export Earnings: Sri Lanka's export revenues, which are a critical source of foreign exchange, may be diminished by the implementation of tariffs and trade barriers. The country's capacity to import essential products and services can be impacted by a decrease in export earnings, which can also strain its foreign reserves.

Investment Climate: Foreign investors may be discouraged from investing in Sri Lanka due to the unfavourable investment climate that can result from uncertainty in trade policies. Economic growth and development opportunities may be restricted by diminished foreign direct investment (FDI).

3.       Geopolitical Dynamics

     ·         Shift in US-Asia Relations

Strategic Rebalancing: Sri Lanka's geopolitical position has been influenced by Trump's strategy for Asia, which emphasizes strategic rebalancing and the utilization of military and economic capabilities. While maintaining its strategic autonomy, Sri Lanka must navigate these shifts.

Regional Alliances: Sri Lanka should strengthen regional alliances with countries such as India, China, and Japan in response to changes in US-Asia relations. It is imperative to maintain stability and protect economic and security interests by balancing these relationships.

Geopolitical Tensions: Sri Lanka's security environment may be affected by geopolitical tensions between key powers, including the United States, China, and India. In order to prevent becoming a battleground for regional rivalries, Sri Lanka must maintain a balance in its relationships.

4.       Policy Opportunities and Challenges

      ·         Renegotiation of US Role

New Partnerships: Sri Lanka has the opportunity to investigate new partnerships and alliances as a result of the renegotiation of the United States' role in global affairs. The diversification of Sri Lanka's economic and strategic options can be achieved by engaging with emerging economies and regional powers.

Policy Adaptation: In order to remain consistent with the changing global landscape, Sri Lanka must modify its policies. This encompasses the development of strategies to fortify diplomatic relations with critical partners, attract investment, and improve trade.

To sum up, the country faces both challenges and opportunities as it navigates the changing global landscape. Sri Lanka must prioritize economic diversification in order to alleviate the effects of Trump's economic policies. This encompasses the development of new industries, the expansion of export markets, and the improvement of domestic production. In order to navigate the uncertainty generated by evolving global dynamics, it is imperative to establish a strong geopolitical strategy. Sri Lanka must capitalize on its strategic location and establish robust relationships with both regional and global powers. 

SHINZO ABE: PRESERVING HIS LEGACY

Guest Commentary by Banura Nandathilake

Subscribers to international relations often come to a junction between theories: Realism, which posits a zero sum world where external circumstances such as hard power and anarchy that are beyond any individual define the ways in which states do what they do, and constructivism which understands an interdependent society of states where leaders truly have an tangible impact on inter-state relations through social mechanisms. The case for the latter seems to outweigh the former in the analysis of Shinzo Abe however, who left an ineffaceable mark on Japanese foreign policy, by guiding a largely pacifist Japan to one that actively moulds and shapes the security, economic and diplomatic architecture of the Indo Pacific and beyond.

As the heir of a distinguished political family, Abe entered politics in the 1990s where he sought to largely continue the policies of his grandfather, the former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi: Regain the ability to exert Japanese power on the regional and world stage by removing the shackles imposed by the US and a faction of the then Japanese political class. As such, Abe went on to become Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister with four terms (2006-7, 2012-14, 2014-17, 2017-20). On 8 July 2022 however, in an event that stunned the heavily gun restricted Japan, the former Japanese Prime Minister was shot and killed during his campaigning run for his party in the Japanese city of Nara. Despite the untimely passing of the "shadow shogun", the direction of Japan's future may be influenced by, thereby correlate with Abe's "vision" to a great extent (Green, CSIS 2022). Japan has built a full-fledged national security establishment, an estimated 1.7% growth in GDP in 2022, and is a bastion of neo liberal democratic policies in the Indo pacific. Below is an obituary for a man who had a heavy hand in reawakening Japan, wherein his effect on domestic and foreign policies will be appreciated.

Domestic Political Legacy

While for many, Abe’s career was one of dramatic and unlikely turns which spanned 14 years and saw him into extraordinary power to influence the direction of Japanese domestic policy, Sheila Smith of Council on Foreign Relations and others understand that a revised domestic constitution may be Abe's major legacy.

Just two days after Abe’s assassination, the Japanese voted in the Upper House election, awarding the government led by the current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida their anticipated victory. Interestingly, Smith notes that the assassination had no credible change in the election environment. The voter turnout was on par with previous years, and Abe’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a structural advantage as the smaller opposition parties did not form a united front thus further dividing the vote. As such, an Upper House win by the LDP could open an avenue for a Constitutional revision, once an ambition of the former Prime Minister. While factors that may postpone an immediate revision do exist, she notes that a revision could have a lasting impact on Abe’s legacy.

Abenomics

Abe’s vision was of regaining the ability to exercise Japanese power, by losing her shackles imposed by low domestic economic power and capital, which can then be turned into military might and diplomatic currency. However, Japanese capabilities were idling, due to the lack of opportunities as per legal and international constraints in the post WW2 era. In the understanding that securing Japan’s future would require an economy with a new foundation for growth, the economic programme “Abenomics” was born. The programme was an attempt to kickstart Japan’s dormant capabilities through expansionary monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, and a long list of industrial, labour, and regulatory policies to incentivise endogenous development. Abenomics aimed to shift production from agrarian or low value sectors to high income productive sectors to slow the decline of Japan’s labour force, in an “serious, sustained, and flexible attempt to grapple with Japan’s growth challenges” (Harris, FP 2022).

Abenomics was instrumental in reviving the Japanese economy, as well as supercharging Abe’s political career. The programme reversed years of stagnation, boosted corporate profits and state tax revenues, thereby reducing unemployment and crime. As such, Abe was able to coast past domestic elections, pausing the tradition of short-lived premierships in Japan. The resulting political durability allowed him to pursue long term ambitions, such as creating a National Security Council which distilled the defence apparatus through the Prime Minister’s office. Such a creation then allowed for a more active foreign policy over the existing passive structure, which sought to strengthen regional ties while balancing against regional hegemons. 

Japan-India Relations

Relations between Cold war Japan and India were one of polite distance: Japan was a US ally, while India was procedurally non-aligned with some overlap of interests with the USSR. Despite the deterioration of the said relations during the 1988 Indian nuclear missile test and the Japanese economic sanctions that followed, the two states were quick to repair and rebuild a “global partnership’’, proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro a few years later during his visit to India. However, it was Abe that built the stage for a more cohesive and interdependent Japanese-Indian relationship, such as the “India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership’’ (2007). Bilateral relations were further strengthened during Abe’s third term in 2014 through a “special and strategic partnership,” which encompassed diplomatic, security and economic sectors. Trade between Japan and India increased exponentially from 2007, while Japan and India cooperated on security issues in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad.

Moreover, it could be understood that Abe's 2007 visit to India was not only significant for the Japan-India relationship, but also India’s perception of itself and its role in the region (Miller, CFR 2022). Miller understands that it was Japan that influenced India, ‘a notoriously reluctant and cautious actor in global politics’ to join Abe’s Indo-Pacific vision, which now serves as an ideological, economic and military buffer to the rise of China. This vision of the “confluence of the two seas” - Pacific and Indian, were first outlined by Abe in his speech during his first visit to India in 2007, and laid the foundation for the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept which was later adopted by the United States.

China and the Quad

China’s rise in the contemporary era has been unprecedented. An authoritarian political system combined with a quasi-capitalist economic system has allowed China to gain regional hegemony and a global great power ranking, allowing its influential military, economic and diplomatic alliances. Such a rise presents a growing threat and demands a balance of power between China and the US and Allies. Of those allies, Abe represented a significant one: Japan.

While Abe was central in expanding India's position in the Indo-Pacific, his pragmatic approach to relations with China demanded a closer look. Abe could be considered a soft liner on Sino-Japan relations, so much so that he was called a "traitor" by many Japanese patriots. This may be so since the uneven economic balance of power weighed more towards China than Japan: Japan needed China for trade and manufacturing, than vice versa. However, as Mireya Solís, the director of the Centre for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution understood, despite his efforts to maintain closer relations with China “Abe felt very strongly that Japan could not live in an Asia where China had hegemony”. As such, Abe’s pragmatism recognised that despite interdependence and globalisation, China represented a challenge on all fronts, diplomatic, economic and military. Ergo, Abe may have been instrumental in setting the tone for the Japanese defence apparatus. Furthermore, Abe subscribed to right leaning nationalist policies domestically, as he helped coax a pacifist Japanese public to oppose China’s meteoric and bullish rise, further laying the groundwork for the direction of Japanese foreign policy.

However, his vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific may have trumped all else. His influence soon superseded national and regional boundaries, as President Joe Biden, who once worked with Abe as the vice president during the Obama administration, put it “He (Abe) was a champion of the Alliance between our nations and the friendship between our people”, and promised to continue Abe’s “vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific” (2022). The US and Japan, along with India and Australia, form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which represents a bulwark against China in the Indo-Pacific. While the US had more economic and military might than Japan, Abe was still paramount in laying the rhetorical groundwork for the Quad, “providing structural, conceptual ideas to things that needed to be provided at a time when it seemed like it was crumbling.” (Hornung, 2022).

On Taiwan

A great power conflict in East Asia appears to brew over the Island of Taiwan which stands a stone's throw away from the shores of China. While the ideological divide stems from the great powers US and China, US allies such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are not passive watchers either.

Japanese leaders before Abe were uncomfortable with using force to defend Taiwan, as implications of such a move for Japanese security, and how Japan's responses to such scenarios were heavily debated. But it was Abe that argued in 2021, “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance. President Xi Jinping in particular, should never have a misunderstanding in recognizing this”. Abe was thus paramount in transforming Japan’s relationship with Taiwan to counter threats from China, for he recognised a hegemonic China posed a risk not just to the security of the liberal democratic states of East Asia, but their economic and sociological institutions as well. As such, Prime Minister Abe emphasised shared economic, political and ideological values between Japan and Taiwan, where he referred to Taiwan as a “precious friend,” an angle the incoming governments adopted thereafter. Abe was an advocate of stronger relations with Taiwan so much so that he went on to argue that the US policy of strategic ambiguity was “fostering instability in the Indo-Pacific region” as he called out the US to “make clear that it will defend Taiwan against any attempted Chinese invasion.”

Furthermore, it was during Mr. Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister that one of the major sore points in the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Japan were resolved. After 17 years of negotiations, in 2013 Japan and Taiwan concluded Japanese recognition of Taiwanese Fishing rights in the East China Sea. As such, affection for Abe and Japan in Taiwan have reached record highs. Thus, after the news of Abe’s passing had reached Taiwan, President Tsai Ing-wen honoured “Taiwan’s most loyal best friend” with the national flag flown at half-mast.

Shinzo Abe could be called a realist, for he understood that despite diplomacy and the multilateral handshaking, states with different value systems and interests must communicate through hard power and deterrence. But to call him a pragmatist through the constructivist lens could be more apt, as he understood that despite anarchy and hard power considerations, leaders are still able to make a difference in the domestic and foreign policies of a state, thereby keeping up with an evolving world stage. As the world honours him in his passing, it is now up to his successors to carry his legacy forward.