CHINA – SRI LANKA RELATIONS: A New Chapter Opened in 2025

By Tharushika Peelikumbura and Yohan Soyza

In September 2024, Sri Lankans experienced a significant political shift in the country. 76 years of governance led by the United National Party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and its alliance, and later the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, were rejected by the public. The National People’s Power won the presidential and parliamentary elections within two months. With that a new era of Sri Lankan politics began, and this article attempts to focus on a new era in China-Sri Lanka bilateral relations.

Newly elected Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake paid a four-day state visit to the People’s Republic of China from 14 to 17 January 2025. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment, and Tourism, Vijitha Herath, the Minister of Transport, Highways, Ports, and Civil Aviation, Bimal Rathnayake and the Director General of Government Information, H. S. K. J. Bandara were seen joining the visit with Dissanayake. The four-day state visit included meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China Zhao Leji and others. The visit was significant for the relations between the two countries as the Sri Lankan delegation met high-ranking members from the Chinese Communist Party, signaling increased cooperation in the future.

Key Diplomatic Objectives

1. Reaffirmation of the One China Policy

During his visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), President Dissanayake reaffirmed Sri Lanka’s continuous support for the One China Policy, recognizing the PRC as the only legitimate China that exists. He also assured his commitment not to allow Sri Lanka’s territory to be used for any anti-Chinese activities. This stance is aligned with Sri Lanka’s strong diplomatic relations with China since the 1950s (Kuruwita, 2025), and stronger than ever before since President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s time in the office from 2005 to 2015.

2. Strengthening Economic and Strategic Ties

This state visit aimed to strengthen strategic and economic ties between the two nations. Several agreements were signed to advance the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, strengthen trade and investment, and promote cooperation in areas such as education, climate action and agriculture. China also pledged to support Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring efforts and encourage investments in areas such as green development and logistics (Kuruwita, 2025; Xinhua, 2025).

Both parties emphasized the importance of the cultural ties as mentioned in the joint statement between China and Sri Lanka, released in January 2025. Education and research were seen as significant opportunities to enhance cultural ties, as both parties promised to encourage more exchanges of students, teachers and researchers. China stated they welcome committed Sri Lankan students to pursue higher studies in China by providing them government scholarships, which will be a great chance for Sri Lankan students who wish to pursue their higher studies in a foreign university. China will also work with Sri Lanka to implement the Luban Workshop to create more professionals through vocational and technical training in Sri Lanka (Joint Statement between China and Sri Lanka, 2025)

3. Positioning within Global South multilateral frameworks

China and Sri Lanka emphasized global development initiatives and multilateralism. Both countries agreed to support each other by strengthening coordination and cooperation within large multilateral bodies like the United Nations Organization (UNO), and also to give focus on global issues such as climate change (Xinhua, 2025). Sri Lanka also seeks to leverage China’s BRI for development purposes and navigate risks in debt and regional power dynamics. The BRI is a great opportunity for Sri Lanka to enhance its network and connect with other partnering countries of the BRI.

Strategic Cooperation Areas

1. Development in Infrastructure

A major area of cooperation between the two countries includes infrastructure development, which is mainly led by the BRI. Notable projects in Sri Lanka include the Colombo Port City project and Hambantota Port. These projects can play a crucial role in Sri Lanka’s economic development and turn the island nation into a regional hub of business, transportation and maritime logistics if managed properly (Kuruwita, 2025; Xinhua, 2025). Table 1 provides an overview of the current ongoing Chinese projects in Sri Lanka.

2. BRI Project Advancement

The state visit also highlighted the importance of continuing BRI projects in Sri Lanka. China promised strong support for Sri Lanka’s economic development, sovereignty, and independence. Both countries also signed 15 new agreements covering areas including economic development, education, media, culture, infrastructure, agriculture, digital economy, and marine economy. President Xi emphasized the importance of fostering new highlights and high-quality cooperation within the BRI while building a community of shared future with Sri Lanka. In response, Sri Lanka pledged to further deepen regional connectivity and welcome more Chinese investments. This collaboration also includes infrastructure development and other forms of multilateral cooperation addressing climate change, demonstrating the expanding scope and depth of bilateral relations (Desheng, 2025).

3. Investment in Maritime Infrastructure

Sri Lanka and China have multiple agreements on developing maritime infrastructure under the BRI projects. These projects include Hambantota International Port (HPI), aiming to make Sri Lanka a major maritime hub in the Indian Ocean Region by providing services such as port, energy, marine and port investment (Hambantota International Port Group, n.d.). The project also aims to create job opportunities that are estimated at around 50,000. However, since 2017, Sri Lanka has leased the port for 99 years to China Merchants Ports Holding Company (CMPort) in a debt-for-equity swap deal. Therefore, Sri Lankan decision-makers should work carefully and maintain high standards to maximize the benefits currently earning.

The Colombo Port City Project is another key project located on reclaimed land from the sea. The project is handled by the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) (CHEC Port City Colombo (Pvt) Ltd - Sri Lanka, n.d.). The China Merchants Ports Holding Company (CMPH) operates the Colombo International Container Terminals (CICT) as a joint venture company with the Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA). The CICT is the only deep-water port in South Asia at the moment, and they also aim to increase the capacity of the terminal and manage the container traffic (Details Business Areas, 2018).

4. Economic Collaboration

This includes increasing trade and investment, promoting agricultural cooperation, and developing digital economy partnerships, as it is one of the fastest-developing sectors globally, contributing over 15% to global GDP (Wignaraja and De Zylva, 2018). China has also agreed to assist Sri Lanka in debt restructuring, education, tourism development, logistics and green development (Kuruwita, 2025). China is also focusing on a free trade agreement (FTA) with Sri Lanka, as they already reached one recently with the Maldives (Shivamurthy, 2025).

5. $3.7 billion Sinopec Oil Refinery Project in Hambantota

As a major point of President Dissanayake’s 2025 visit to China, both nations agreed to a $3.7 billion oil refinery project in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. Sinopec will lead this project as decided after a bidding process. This step indicates a shift towards partnerships based on investment rather than financial loans (Moramudali and Chen, 2025).

6. Renewal of Currency Swap Agreement

During the state visit two nations agreed on a currency swap renewal. This is a pivotal point of Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring and economic stabilizing process, and it will also enhance economic cooperation between the two old friends (Kuruwita, 2025).

7. Expanding Trade and Investment

Both countries are highly focused on expanding trade and investment to provide a more friendly business atmosphere for Chinese enterprises in Sri Lanka. Digital transformation, green development, and logistics are the main aspects to be focused on (Kuruwita, 2025; Xinhua, 2025)

Table 1 above indicates that China’s main focus on infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka was mainly on roads, airports, seaports, energy, the telecommunication sector and water supply projects. By investing in such infrastructure projects, China created interdependencies and leveraged them significantly. Sri Lanka, as a strategic point in the Indian Ocean, could be pivotal for China to ensure its regional power balance in South Asia. But during the civil war times, China emerged as a major donor and development partner (Shivamurthy, 2025), proving China’s caring role for Global South partners. The authors assume that providing development assistance is not just a strategic step, it is also a significant priority of uplifting the global south partners while developing itself, as China is doing. If the public could understand this with an open mind, this might be seen as a positive opportunity to develop the country.

What is important is that the Sri Lankan policymakers need to carefully manage Chinese development loans to gain the maximum benefits. In this case, transparency is very important as the government officials are responsible for every decision they take on behalf of the public, and the decisions need to be transparent to the public. Evaluating and reporting each project is also crucial as they can be used to plan future projects carefully.

Geopolitical Context

As President Anura Kumara Dissanayake sets out on a strategic partnership with China, the geopolitical context surrounding this initiative cannot be overlooked. The Indian Ocean remains significant for international relations, and Sri Lanka's geographical position makes it a critical player in the balance of power among regional powers. Sri Lanka must therefore navigate its aspirations cautiously, serving both its national interests and the demands of powerful neighbouring countries.

1. Balancing Relations with Regional Powers

By reaffirming its ties with China, Sri Lanka finds itself seeking a delicate balance between India and China, two strong neighbours. Sri Lankan leadership often emphasizes the need for a non-aligned foreign policy, which allows it to engage with both nations without compromising its sovereignty. A diplomatic quote that describes this approach is from Dissanayake himself in which he notes that "We thrive best when our partnerships create opportunities for all parties involved." (Deccan Herald, 2025).

2. Strategic Positioning in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is becoming increasingly significant for trade routes and military presence. Sri Lanka's decision to strengthen ties with China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will likely enhance its strategic location in the region. China’s investments in maritime infrastructure aim to secure its maritime silk route, while Sri Lanka benefits from development and trade opportunities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2025). The growth in maritime infrastructure could lead to increased ship traffic through the Colombo harbour, thereby significantly boosting the Sri Lankan economy (Global Times, 2025).

3. Diplomatic Support in International Forums

In the face of global challenges, Sri Lanka's collaboration with China also opens avenues for diplomatic backing in international forums. China's weight in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations provides an opportunity for Sri Lanka to express its interests more clearly (Sunday Times, 2021). This collaboration may come in the form of backing during discussions related to climate change, economic development, and regional security matters, aligning with China's global objectives while benefiting Sri Lanka’s international standing.

Recommended Policy Actions

For Sri Lanka to fully gain the benefits of its deepening relationship with China, several policy actions have been highlighted by scholars and policy institutes. Firstly, diversifying economic partnerships is essential. While Chinese collaborations offer significant opportunities, overdependence poses long-term risks. Strengthening ties with ASEAN countries, the European Union, and India can enhance economic resilience and geopolitical balance (Observer Research Foundation, 2025). Secondly, leveraging Chinese investments strategically can catalyze broader development. Beyond infrastructure, Sri Lanka can use these investments to expand sectors like energy, technology, and manufacturing, provided the projects are managed with transparency and long-term sustainability in mind (Global Times, 2025). Thirdly, maintaining diplomatic flexibility is crucial. A dynamic foreign policy that balances relations with both China and India, while promoting regional multilateralism, can help Sri Lanka navigate shifting geopolitical dynamics (Gateway House, 2025).

Amidst these high-level strategies, several modest yet impactful actions remain underutilized. One such initiative is the formation of an independent Foreign Investment Impact Assessment Taskforce, including members from civil society, academia, and business, to review and publicly brief on major bilateral projects, thereby increasing transparency and public trust. Additionally, bilingual digital dashboards that track project progress, financial flows, and social outcomes could facilitate data-driven adjustments and citizen engagement. The government could also embed policy nudges into contracts, such as local hiring quotas, incentives for technology transfer, and environmental safeguards, all achievable without extensive legislative overhaul. Finally, introducing foreign policy literacy modules in secondary education would help cultivate a more informed and globally aware generation. These grassroots-oriented actions are low-cost, culturally resonant, and politically feasible, yet they often remain sidelined in favor of grand diplomatic visions.

Potential Challenges

While the prospects of deepening relations with China appear promising, several well-documented challenges must be carefully managed. First, navigating regional power dynamics is crucial, as tensions between China and India over territorial disputes continue to escalate. Sri Lanka must tread carefully to avoid being drawn into broader geopolitical rivalries (Foreign Policy, 2024). Second, ensuring balanced international relations is vital. Strengthening ties with China should not come at the expense of alienating other key international partners, and a nuanced foreign policy is required to maintain this equilibrium (Deccan Herald, 2025). Third, the issue of maintaining economic sovereignty remains pressing. The influx of Chinese investments, while beneficial in the short term, may compromise Sri Lanka’s long-term control over strategic sectors unless protective mechanisms are in place (Chatham House, 2020).

Beyond these widely acknowledged strategic concerns, Sri Lanka also faces a set of more localized, systemic challenges that could quietly erode the benefits of foreign engagement. Entrenched bureaucratic inefficiencies often stall the implementation of large-scale agreements, regardless of high-level diplomatic progress. Additionally, the politicization of foreign investments, where projects become mired in domestic party politics, can cause mismanagement, public opposition, or abandonment. Another underappreciated challenge is the limited institutional capacity to enforce environmental, labor, and transparency standards in megaprojects funded by foreign entities. This gap can lead to exploitation, unequal benefits, and environmental harm. Furthermore, low levels of public awareness regarding the long-term implications of international partnerships hinder civic engagement and accountability. If left unaddressed, these domestic vulnerabilities risk undermining even the most strategically sound bilateral initiatives.

Conclusion

The strategic visit of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to China marked a significant milestone in the evolution of China-Sri Lanka relations. By deepening cooperation across multiple areas, reaffirming key diplomatic objectives, and maintaining a proactive diplomatic stance, Sri Lanka is poised to enhance its standing in the regional and global arena.

The evolving partnership between Sri Lanka and China presents a landscape rich with opportunity, but not without complexity. As strategic initiatives continue to deepen bilateral ties, Sri Lanka must remain vigilant in safeguarding its economic sovereignty, institutional integrity, and regional balance. The recent political transition signals a willingness to reset foreign policy priorities, but genuine success will depend not only on high-level diplomacy but also on transparent governance, inclusive development, and civic accountability.

In this significant chapter of its international engagement, Sri Lanka has the chance to reshape its role in the Indo-Pacific and the Global South. Whether it emerges as a strategic bridge or becomes strategically bridged over will depend on how well it can balance cooperation with caution, vision with vigilance. And here’s something to think about. If foreign partnerships are designed to build the nation’s future, should the people of that nation not be more actively involved in shaping how those partnerships unfold?

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A PAUSED PARTNERSHIP? Sri Lanka’s Incomplete Integration into the SCO

By Abheetha Kodikara

The ‘Shanghai Five’ organization was renamed in 2001 as the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ with the inclusion of Uzbekistan. The next large expansion was the inclusion of India and Pakistan in 2017. The organization also has categories such as observer states and dialogue partners, which bring together many countries. Sri Lanka obtained dialogue partnership in 2009 and still remains in that position today. This article attempts to understand why Sri Lanka has remained a dialogue partner for sixteen years.

Many countries that joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after Sri Lanka, have already progressed beyond observer status to full membership. Against this background Sri Lanka’s limited interest or awareness of the SCO has become questionable. Did Sri Lanka ever want to go beyond dialogue partner status? Does Sri Lanka lack enthusiasm to seize opportunities through engagement with the SCO? Are there strategic planning gaps?

These aspects require analytical scrutiny. Since its establishment, the SCO has evolved into a powerful institution. It has expanded its network from Eurasia to South Asia, and further into West Asia. The attraction however is likely dependent on whether the goals of the partner countries have been met through the organization. The goals of the organization affect the engagement of the relevant countries, with the organization. The SCO is no longer limited to addressing terrorism, extremism and separatism. It also focuses on enhancing economic prosperity, trade among member states and energy cooperation.

In such a context, Sri Lanka’s prolonged status as a dialogue partner since 2009 indicates a lack of enthusiasm towards achieving more substantial goals. It must be questioned whether this is due to the country being trapped in significant debt dependency on China, or whether Sri Lanka is struggling to gain tangible benefits in trade, investment, and energy while maintaining a steady non-aligned foreign policy.

In 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding to create an Energy Club was signed among the SCO member states, observers, and dialogue partners. Yet, there remains a lack of awareness and knowledge of the steps taken by Sri Lanka to engage closely in the Energy Club.

An attempt is made to understand the lack of progress of membership from a theoretical perspective of regional cooperation. Starting with realism, it focuses on power dynamics, self-interest and survival strategies of states within an archaic global system. Why then has there been no attempt to increase power dynamics or self-interest? When considering regime theory and liberalism, the focus is on how institutions can enhance international and regional cooperation by working together. In the current world, it is increasingly important that states work together to achieve peace, security, prosperity, poverty reduction, and equality among other priorities. Thus, relatively small states like Sri Lanka would benefit economically, in fulfilling the nation’s needs.

In discussing the topic further, it is understood that policy reforms were not taken seriously or enthusiastically, by considering the benefits of cooperation. In addition, the lack of domestic awareness and institutional capacity are key arguments when it comes to Sri Lanka remaining at the same level on the SCO’s membership portal.

In fact, the awareness about the SCO among Sri Lanka’s policymakers, scholars, media and civil society is minimal. The absence of a national policy on SCO engagement and the minimal attention or sustainability of a dedicated SCO unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underlines this weakness. The critique here is that for any multilateral partnership, whether it is SCO or any other regional alliance, in order to yield a meaningful process, there must be domestic institutional readiness and proper awareness. Without an official framework and policy structures, the partnership cannot evolve beyond symbolic affiliation.

What is also relevant for this study is the absence of bilateral follow-up mechanisms between Sri Lanka and Central Asian states. This is a key challenge as, unlike the other dialogue partners such as Türkiye or Egypt which have leveraged bilateral ties with SCO members, Sri Lanka lacks the structural bilateral dialogue or economic corridors. Sri Lanka also lacks free trade agreements or largescale diplomatic missions in several SCO countries. The absence of high-level political visits to and from key Central Asian States also further limits influence.

When examining these reasons, it is clear that improving dialogue partnership status would only be possible with parallel bilateral cooperation. Yet a point to urgently note is that Sri Lanka has not proactively engaged in such follow-up initiatives through SCO platforms.

Therefore, in conclusion, Sri Lanka must develop a National SCO engagement strategy, strengthen relations with Central Asian states, through trade, diplomacy and academic exchanges while managing India-China dynamics within the organization carefully to build institutional awareness about the potential of the SCO. Using the dialogue partnership platform to foster strategic trust would gradually strengthen the partnership and result in observer status.

The presence of Sri Lanka in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is mostly ceremonial. What should be realised is that cooperation would ensure economic benefits which Sri Lanka needs at this time.

STRENGTHENING INTEGRATION: BIMSTEC as a Regional Pivot in Disaster Management

By Amasha Fernando

Disaster Management and Mitigation have become an essential concern within the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal, as many states face a rapid increase in climate catastrophes in the region. From powerful cyclones such as Fani (2019) and Fengal (2024) to the 7.7 magnitude earthquake in March 2025, which resulted in the loss of more than 3000 lives up to date in Myanmar, the region has faced alarming natural disasters, significantly, in the post-COVID-19 era since 2020. This has not only challenged the ecological balance of the region but also paved the way for massive damage to the regular lives of people.

These adversities, which escalate day by day, are a prominent concern addressed at national and regional levels within organizations such as ASEAN, BIMSTEC, and international coalitions like the G20. However, the frequency of the occurrence of natural hazards and their rising intensities calls for the need for practical and sustainable solutions at the national, regional, and international level.

In this context, the role of BIMSTEC in disaster management has increased considerably, as the changes in natural weather systems, particularly in the Bay of Bengal, create a significantly adverse impact on economic growth within the region. This article aims to discuss the latest developments of the climate catastrophes while exploring the effectiveness of current disaster mitigation mechanisms and offering suggestions to enhance the quality of assistance and humanitarian aid provided.

State of Nature Hazards within the Bay of Bengal littorals

The Bay of Bengal region, comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, has experienced multiple climate-related disasters in recent years, including cyclones, earthquakes, floods, and landslides. Renowned as the ‘Kalapani’ or the Black turbulent waters (Bose, 2023), the Bay of Bengal region faces at least 5 to 6 cyclones per year, while annual floods in states such as Bangladesh and India affect millions of lives. These directly result in deaths, infrastructure damage, and displacement while affecting livelihoods and economic functions of the region on a broad scale. According to National Cyclone Risk Mitigation Project (NCRMP) reports, 7, 516 km of India and 716 km of Bangladesh are exposed to nearly 10% of the world’s tropical cyclones. (Dhruba, 2023)

In comparison with the West, these cyclones possess unique characteristics and effects of wind speeds and rough seas, mainly affecting the weather conditions of states such as India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. An often-highlighted event among these is the Indian Ocean Tsunami, which occurred in 2004, resulting in over 30,000 fatalities, along with a US$1.5 billion economic loss in Sri Lanka alone, marking the most devastating natural disaster the island nation has faced to date. Simultaneously, over 10, 000 lives were lost within India due to this, followed by deaths in Myanmar and Thailand, and economies in all these states were affected as well, with the damage caused to agrarian lands. (Bose, 2023)

Many cyclones, such as Komen (2015), Roanu (2016), Amphan (2020), and Fengal (2024), which occurred during the past few years, affected communities largely in Myanmar and Bangladesh, in the following years marking a series of cyclones in between. These resulted in floods, rough seas, and torrential downpours, which worsen situations in the nations in the Bay of Bengal. As a result, floods become a frequent occurrence in these nations annually. According to government reports, floods in Kathmandu, Nepal, in September 2024 have killed more than 60 people, while 66 have gone missing. (OCHA, 2019) Moreover, scientists predict that Bangladesh, India, and China will be among the top 10 nations with the highest risks of facing the highest rainfall changes by 2100. (OCHA, 2024)

The latest alarming disaster occurred in March 2025 with the 6.4 and 7.7 magnitude earthquakes, which devastated Myanmar, affecting nearly 9 million people who belong to 58 townships. The disaster resulted in nearly 3, 600 deaths, while 4, 800 people are reported to have suffered injuries. (UNICEF, 2025) Severe infrastructure damage, which includes 2, 311 schools and 193 healthcare facilities, has been reported, while vulnerable groups such as women and children face shortages of medication and other essential items.

In addition, states in the Bay of Bengal are prone to the novel developments of climate change, such as rising sea levels, extreme heatwaves, and loss of land, with coastal erosion. World Heritage sites such as the Sundarbans Mangrove Forest, the Sinharaja tropical rainforest, and their ecosystems are significantly affected by such conditions, worsening the ecological balance within the region. According to World Bank reports in 2000, the rise of sea levels by one metre tends to destroy the whole Sundarbans region. (Jabir et al., 2021) Meanwhile, island nations in the Indian Ocean, such as the Maldives, are at risk of being completely submerged by the rising ocean levels.

Climate Actions Taken as a Regional Hub

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was the primary catalyst that sparked discussions on disaster management within the region at the BIMSTEC level, shifting the irregular patterns of disaster mitigation from occasional aid provision for disasters such as cyclones. Following the 1994 Oslo guidelines on “The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief”, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) was introduced to the region, creating action plans at state and BIMTEC levels. The evolution of participation in disaster management comprises several stages. (Bose, 2023) They can be identified as follows. 1. Passive Phase (1997-2005) 2. Provisionally Responsive Phase (2005-2006) 3. Phase of Dormancy (2007-2014) 4. Proactive Phase (2015 to the present)

The passive phase consisted of the initial level agreements within the organization, where the groundwork for natural disaster mitigation and management was introduced. However, disaster management within the region was not considered a prominent concern at that juncture until the Tsunami of 2004 became the wake-up call to cooperate in disaster management. In the aftermath of the Tsunami, ‘Environment and Disaster Management’ was considered a fundamental area of concern within the region through the introduction of many collaborative efforts, with other organizations such as the SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC) and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) were pivotal in creating institutional solutions in disaster response.

Mechanisms such as conducting workshops, knowledge sharing, emergency response and the establishment of early warning systems were done, with the aid of foreign nations and international bodies such as the United Nations. Creation of the BIMSTEC Centre on Weather and Climate Change was prominent in this regard, as it nurtured frameworks to sign agreements at bilateral and multilateral levels, creating room for discussions in the sectors of multinational cooperation in managing disasters. (Cook & Chen, 2021) Predominantly, India led these initiatives as a regional powerhouse, in creating relevant policy frameworks and responsible institutions.

However, with the absence of substantial financial cooperation within the region, BIMSTEC’s unity in disaster management was largely dormant from 2007-2014. (Bose, 2023) Disaster management was limited to emergencies and early warning mechanisms during this time, while documentation efforts such as approving a Memorandum of Association to establish a Centre of Weather and Climate Response were made in strengthening preventive measures. Reasons such as the impending change of chairmanship in the organization, the need to establish a permanent secretariat in Dhaka, and the change of India’s maritime cooperation doctrine, paving the way for a prolonged era of inaction.

The change of political leadership after the election of 2014 marked a positive change in the activities of BIMSTEC. The Modi government focused on fostering cooperation through multilateral collaborations, establishing India’s role as the “net security provider” in the region. (Cook & Chen, 2021) However, the significance of India within the BIMTEC as a regional power and an emerging world power has created points to ponder, as the power imbalance may create a situation where climate issues of small nations are rejected.

The unity of BIMSTEC nations was further strengthened with the introduction of India’s “Act East policy.” Disaster risk prevention policies, such as the Sendai Framework (2015-2030), aim to establish common information systems to track disasters within the region and exchange best practices. (Bose, 2023) Capacity building was a spotlight in discussions redefining the bounds of environmental governance and disaster response. Measures such as Disaster Management Exercises (DMXI), Field Training Exercises, and After-Action Reviews were introduced in this regard, finding creative ways to address the rapid changes of climate change. The first BIMSTEC DMXI exercise was held in India in 2017, while the initiative’s latest workshop involved five member states. (Cook & Chen, 2021)

Moreover, the importance of the Indian Ocean sea lanes was identified while discovering potential paths for integration in transportation in trade, and managing diverse security interests. While the strategic importance within the region increases daily with China’s presence in the Indian Ocean, with initiatives such as the BRI, BIMSTEC has a pivotal role in strengthening integration and capacities of disaster prevention measures.

When considering the present-day context, many measures, such as capacity-building initiatives and strengthening mechanisms, are followed within the organization. These were suggested through the joint declaration issued by BIMSTEC leaders who gathered at the 6th BIMSTEC summit on 4th April 2025. Collaborating with the Indian Ocean Rim Association and encouraging maritime transport cooperation within the littoral states further creates opportunities. Such collaboration in preventing natural hazards and common measures will address the economic losses and infrastructure damage while creating a secure environment for people, ensuring their safety and medication.

Future of Disaster Management within the Organization

The responsibility to prevent future disasters within the region is undoubtedly bestowed upon regional organizations such as BIMSTEC, as the solutions for these should be institutionalized and implemented sustainably and practically. While the organization has gained commendable progress in building a stable foundation for disaster management, growing intensities of natural hazards within the region demand immediate action while encouraging integration in collective disaster prevention methods.

Thereby, maintaining consistency in disaster prevention methods and maintaining coordination between disaster management centres within littoral states and authorities are crucial in efficient disaster management. India’s 2025 proposal to establish a BIMSTEC Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management Secretariat would be an active measure to create disaster readiness in the region. This centre would act as the central point of contact for managing disaster-related data, conducting risk assessments, and coordinating cross-border disaster response (Bhatt & Garge, 2023). In order to address the existing gaps in financial emergencies, the centre needs to have sufficient funding from a regional disaster relief fund and the authority to make its own decisions (Chaudhary, 2023).

Moreover, it is crucial to develop climate surveillance technologies and transboundary early warning systems. Initiatives like the BIMSTEC Centre for Weather and Climate (BCWC) offer an essential platform, but they need to be expanded and technologically improved in cooperation with regional and international partners like the United Nations, WMO, and ADPC (Cook & Chen, 2021; Bose, 2023). The European Meteoalarm system is an example of a real-time, shared warning protocol that BIMSTEC could use.

Measures should be followed to reach the grassroots of society in creating disaster awareness, bridging the gap between policy formulation, institutionalisation and practical implementation of disaster management methods. Frequent trends of climate catastrophes should be identified in preserving danger-prone environments such as the Sundarbans (Jabir et al., 2021) while ensuring an inclusive space for all nations. The importance of the Indian Ocean as a strategic hub should be rediscovered while promoting inter-organizational endeavours for disaster prevention.

Thus, it is crucial to strengthen regional cooperation through BIMSTEC because the Bay of Bengal region is becoming increasingly vulnerable to climate-related disasters. The growing frequency and severity of natural hazards—ranging from cyclones and floods to earthquakes—have not only exposed ecological fragility but also tested the social and economic resilience of millions. Even though the organization has advanced significantly since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, its framework for disaster management still needs strong institutionalization, funding, and inclusivity to keep up with new threats.

BIMSTEC has the potential to become a key player in regional disaster governance through improved cooperation, scientific innovation, and people-centred policies. BIMSTEC can genuinely fortify the ties by integrating disaster preparedness into the larger framework of economic and humanitarian integration.

References

Bhatt, R., & Deepali Mohan Garge. (2023). Unifying in Crisis: An Exploratory Analysis of Organizational Structures for a Regional Disaster Framework in BIMSTEC. The Journal Institute of Public Enterprise, 46(1), 49–68. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375003509_Unifying_in_Crisis_An_Exploratory_Analysis_of_Organizational_Structures_for_a_Regional_Disaster_Framework_in_BIMSTEC/download

Bose, S. (2023, May 24). BIMSTEC and Disaster Management: Future Prospects for Regional Cooperation. Orfonline.org; OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION ( ORF ). https://www.orfonline.org/research/bimstec-and-disaster-management-future-prospects-for-regional-cooperation

Chaudhury, R. (2023, June). Disasters without borders: Strengthening BIMSTEC cooperation in humanitarian assistance. Orfonline.org; OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION (ORF). https://www.orfonline.org/research/disasters-without-borders-strengthening-bimstec-cooperation-in-humanitarian-assistance?amp

Cook, A. D. B., & Chen, C. (2021). Disaster Governance in the Asia-Pacific: Future Pathways to South and Southeast Asia (pp. 4–16). Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and S Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Death toll climbs as torrential rains pound Nepal - Nepal. (2024, September 30). Relief Web. https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/death-toll-climbs-torrential-rains-pound-nepal

Dhruba, B. (2023). The Solar Influence on Tropical Cyclones Occurring over the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. ECAS 2023, 37. https://doi.org/10.3390/ecas2023-15123

Jabir, A.-A., Hasan, G. M. J., & Anam, Md. M. (2021). Correlation between temperature, sea level rise and land loss: An assessment along the Sundarbans coast. Journal of King Saud University - Engineering Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jksues.2021.07.012 Mahida, R. (2024). BIMSTEC: BAY OF BENGAL INITIATIVE FOR MULTI-SECTORAL TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION: SWOT ANALYSIS FROM INDIAN PERSPECTIVES. International Journal of Management, Public Policy and Research, 3(4), 7–15. https://doi.org/10.55829/ijmpr.v3i4.247 OCHA. (2019). Relief Web - Informing humanitarians worldwide. Relief Web. https://reliefweb.int/

UNICEF Myanmar Earthquake Flash Update No. 6 - 09 April 2025 - Myanmar. (2025, April 9). Relief Web. https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/unicef-myanmar-earthquake-flash-update-no-6-09-april-2025