ARGENTINA’S POLITICAL ODYSSEY: Navigating the Rise of Milei

Guest Commentary by Banura Nandathilake

In the wake of Argentina’s 40^th anniversary of uninterrupted democracy, a disconcerting shift in the political landscape has unfolded with the ascent of Javier Milei. Once a right-wing populist, provocative television personality and rock singer with a mop of disheveled hair, Milei's meteoric rise has catapulted him from the realm of unrestrained outbursts against the perceived political elite to assuming the presidency. Garnering comparisons to Trump and embracing a libertarian ethos, Milei, with vows to extricate Argentina from what he deems decades of “decadence and decline,” now holds the reins of power. However, his ascendance is marked by an air of ambiguity towards democratic norms, as evidenced by his questioning of democratic efficacy citing Arrow's theorem, and unrestrained outbursts against a “political caste” he blamed for Argentina’s perennial economic woes. Argentina finds itself at a crossroads, navigating both a prolonged economic crisis and the potential implications of a leader whose rhetoric reflects an authoritarian strain.

The Unconventional Agenda

As Argentina stands at the precipice of a political transition, the election promises articulated by President Javier Milei, have ignited both intrigue and skepticism. Often labeled ‘El Loco’ by critics, Milei’s ambitious agenda encompasses radical economic, social, and institutional transformations. Foremost among his pledges is the abandonment of the national currency, the peso, in favor of the US dollar, a move he asserts will curb inflation by dismantling the central bank’s capacity to print more money. The flamboyant economist, known for his unorthodox campaign tactics, symbolically brandished a chainsaw to underscore his commitment to slashing expenditures, a visual metaphor for his intent to ‘dynamite’ the central bank and embrace dollarization.

Milei’s promise to privatize state-owned enterprises, including the energy giant YPF and public broadcasters, echoes the neoliberal playbook. This commitment, however, comes with a caveat, as he emphasizes the need to first ‘rebuild’ YPF before its privatization - an aspect that raises questions about the timeline and feasibility of such an endeavour. Concurrently, his vow to disband ministries deemed redundant has stirred controversy, with a categorical dismissal of the Culture Ministry, Environment Ministry, Ministry of Women and Gender Diversity, among others. In a stark departure from conventional governance, Milei has advocated for substantial cuts in welfare payments, a move that raises concerns in a nation where millions depend on government assistance and subsidies.

Socially, Milei's agenda takes a conservative turn, advocating for the relaxation of gun laws, a stance juxtaposed against his intention to reverse the legalization of abortion in Argentina. His call to permit the sale and purchase of human organs further underscores the ideological departure from prevailing norms. Milei’s critique of what he terms a “system of state indoctrination” extends to his promise to abolish sex education in schools, indicative of a broader challenge to established societal norms. Additionally, he has suggested a transformative shift in Argentina’s education system, proposing the replacement of free public education with a “voucher” system, while hinting at the potential termination of obligatory primary schooling.

At the core of Milei's promises lies an overarching commitment to austerity, embodied by a proposed five percent reduction in government spending as a percentage of gross domestic product. This pledge, in a nation grappling with a severe economic crisis marked by staggering inflation and widespread poverty, raises questions about its social impact and the potential for exacerbating existing hardships. As he navigates the complex terrain of translating campaign rhetoric into policy action, Argentina watches with a mixture of anticipation and trepidation, acutely aware that the promises made during this critical juncture may shape the nation's trajectory for years to come.

A Political Upheaval

As Argentina underwent a seismic political shift, Javier Milei’s resounding victory in the presidential election marked an unexpected turn of events. Pre-election polls, though indicating Milei's slight lead over Sergio Massa, failed to anticipate the substantial margin of his win—more than 11%, according to provisional results. Milei's inaugural speech echoed the populist fervor reminiscent of Donald Trump’s 2017 inauguration, with a commitment to ending what he termed an era of “Argentina has become a bloodbath.” With strong rhetoric, he vowed to combat drug traffickers and swiftly address the nation's pressing challenges. The victory, dedicated in his customary fashion to his deceased dog, Conan and three surviving dogs, positioned Milei as the outsider who successfully navigated the political spectrum between Peronism and the followers of former President Mauricio Macri.

The election on November 19, 2023 saw Milei securing 55.9% of the votes in a runoff against Sergio Massa, the finance minister, who garnered 44%. He wasted no time in outlining his vision for Argentina, promising deep spending cuts to reverse what he described as “decades of decadence” by the political elite. His radical reforms, including dollarization and austerity measures, gained national attention and positioned Argentina on a path potentially unfamiliar to a country of its size. Notably, Milei has already engaged with top U.S. officials in Washington and collaborated with IMF officers, signaling an intent to reshape Argentina's foreign policy and tackle its economic challenges head-on. The inauguration ceremony, attended by far-right associates such as Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro and Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán, marked the official transfer of power. Milei, in his first speech as president, pledged sweeping changes and acknowledged the overwhelming public desire for irreversible change. The symbolic swearing-in, held before the nation's congress in Buenos Aires, showcased the president's distinctive style, complete with a personalized presidential sash and baton featuring engravings of his five dogs.

As Milei assumes the highest office, his presidency raises concerns about the potential impact on Argentina's democratic institutions. The blend of authoritarian ideas and unconventional styles, epitomized by the chainsaw-wielding campaign rallies, adds complexity to the nation's political discourse, urging democratic forces to navigate and redefine the social contract in the face of a president with a distinctive and unorthodox approach. While Milei assured that the proposed adjustments would primarily impact the state rather than the private sector, he acknowledged the short-term challenges, emphasizing the long-term vision of solid and sustainable growth. His commitment to ending “decades of decadence” left by overspending predecessors marked a central theme, emphasizing the urgency of addressing Argentina's economic woes.

Man of Eccentric Counter-Intuitiveness 

Javier Milei, a 53-year-old economist, has emerged as a central figure in Argentine politics, captivating the nation with his unorthodox ascent from television provocateur to the highest office. Described as the “anarcho-capitalist” and the “king of the jungle,” Milei's rise has defied conventional expectations, signaling a departure from established political norms.

The self-proclaimed ‘tantric sex instructor’ and former rock singer has championed an anti-establishment narrative, rallying against what he terms the “political caste.” His unapologetic tirades and flamboyant campaign appearances, where he has been seen wielding a chainsaw and donning outlandish outfits, have left an indelible mark on Argentina's political landscape. Milei’s eccentricities extend to his personal beliefs, where he has declared himself anti-abortion and dismissed global heating as a “socialist lie.” His triumph in the presidential primary elections, underscores his successful navigation between the Peronist and Macrista political spheres. Milei’s electoral win not only signals a shift in leadership but also reflects the widespread discontent with the political status quo.

The president’s counterintuitive vision is characterized by radical proposals that challenge traditional economic and social norms. Milei plans to adopt the U.S. dollar as Argentina's national currency, a move unprecedented for a country of its size. Additionally, he advocates for the abolition of Argentina's central bank, a drastic measure aimed at addressing the nation's economic challenges, including 116% inflation and a cost-of-living crisis that has left a significant portion of the population in poverty. Milei’s ideological blend of libertarian conservatism and economic radicalism extends to his alliances with far-right figures such as Jair Bolsonaro and Viktor Orbán. His inauguration, attended by a cadre of international leaders, signifies a potential reorientation of Argentina's foreign policy, positioning the country as a key ally to Ukraine and distancing itself from authoritarian leaders like Nicolás Maduro and Daniel Ortega.

As Milei assumes the presidency, the contradictions within his persona and political platform raise questions about the future trajectory of Argentina. His authoritarian style, unconventional beliefs, and promises of sweeping changes challenge the democratic foundations of the nation. From dedicating his victory to his dogs, cloned from the cells of a beloved mastiff, to vowing to end “decades of decadence,” Milei’s presidency introduces a complex chapter in Argentina's political narrative. The challenges ahead, coupled with his unorthodox approach, will undoubtedly shape the nation's political discourse, prompting a critical examination of the delicate balance between populism and democratic governance.

The Electoral Paradox 

The electoral dynamics underscore a demand for change, with Milei positioned as the figure capable of channeling the frustrations of a populace eager to break free from the perceived failures of the past. His aggressive style and promises to dismantle the entrenched political establishment resonated with voters fed up with the country's economic decline under the center-left Peronist government. The overwhelming support for Milei signals a profound discontent with the status quo, as Argentina grapples with staggering inflation, soaring poverty rates, and a pervasive disillusionment with its political class.

Milei's victory speech, wherein he declared the end of a “model of decadence,” encapsulates the sentiment that propelled him to power - tapping into the frustration of Argentines who have witnessed their nation fall from prosperity to a ranking of 130^th in global economic standings. His promise of a Libertarian model and a return to global power struck a chord with those disillusioned by decades of economic mismanagement and a perceived stagnation in national progress.

The core of Milei's appeal lies in his ability to channel the collective anger against the ruling class, particularly among the younger demographic experiencing the brunt of the economic downturn. A significant portion of the population no longer identifies with the narratives presented by both Kirchnerism and Macrism, having witnessed little positive change under either government. Milei's capacity to tap into this discontent, especially among the youth, positions him as a figure capable of expressing the frustrations of a society seeking change.

The electoral success of Milei reflects a broader trend where voters, disillusioned with establishment parties, turn to unconventional candidates who promise radical solutions. Milei's Trump-like rallies and social media presence played a pivotal role in engaging a demographic dissatisfied with the economic crisis and job uncertainty. The perception that establishment parties failed to address these pressing issues fueled Milei’s popularity, positioning him as the least worst alternative in the eyes of many voters.

As Argentina grapples with economic challenges, Milei’s promise of “shock treatment” and the acknowledgment that short-term hardships are inevitable has resonated with those eager for change, regardless of its immediate consequences. The economic outlook for Argentina, marked by high inflation rates and looming fiscal deficits, sets the stage for Milei’s presidency as a critical juncture in the nation's history, where the electorate opted for a radical departure from the established political order.

Navigating the Slippery Slope 

The concerns surrounding President Javier Milei's leadership extend beyond his unorthodox promises and electoral triumph. As the political landscape in Argentina undergoes a seismic shift with Milei's ascent to power, a growing chorus of critics points to worrisome signs of authoritarian tendencies. Milei’s response to the attempted assassination of former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, treating it merely as a criminal act, and his praise for repressive acts during Argentina’s dark dictatorship era raise red flags. More alarming is his apparent readiness to curtail freedoms, evident in threats of legal action against journalists and political adversaries. This trend towards stifling dissent and criticism is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes. The tolerance or endorsement of violence, coupled with Milei’s defense of Argentina’s military dictatorship and proposals to loosen gun laws and legalize the sale of human organs, paints a concerning picture.

The appointment of Victoria Villarruel, who has defended military officers involved in human rights abuses during the dictatorship, adds another layer of controversy. Critics argue that Milei’s presidency poses a threat to democratic freedom and human rights, with concerns amplified by derogatory references to opponents and a disregard for political opponents’ legitimacy. While Milei’s radical plans to dismantle the state persist, including the elimination of various ministries, the absence of concrete checks and balances raises questions about the potential unchecked slide towards authoritarianism. As Argentina grapples with economic challenges and widespread disillusionment with established parties, the lack of viable alternatives may inadvertently provide tacit support to Milei's unconventional governance, with implications for the nation's democratic institutions.

Navigating Pragmatism

As Javier Milei assumes the presidency in Argentina, a complex tapestry of expectations, contradictions, and pragmatic shifts unfolds. While Milei’s campaign brimmed with anti-establishment fervor, his actual governance navigates a more nuanced landscape. Economists emphasize the practical constraints imposed by the limited representation of Milei's party in Congress, highlighting the necessity for negotiations with the very politicians he once disparaged.

The president’s adeptness at political realignment became apparent post-election, as he forged alliances with figures like Patricia Bullrich and Mauricio Macri, thanking them in his victory speech. However, concerns linger about the potential implications of his leadership for Argentine society, particularly with controversial appointments like Victoria Villarruel, known for defending officers involved in human rights abuses during the military dictatorship. Critics worry that Milei’s victory may compromise constitutional freedoms, yet the question arises: which version of Milei will govern? Will it be the chainsaw-wielding, anti-establishment crusader or the more moderate leader who emerged in the weeks following his win?

Pragmatism, it seems, is dawning as the president faces the monumental task of steering Argentina through economic challenges, political complexities, and the need for broader support in Congress. Despite earlier pledges to purge corruption and eliminate the Central Bank, recent developments indicate a shift toward moderation. Milei, once a vocal critic of global socialism, now engages in diplomatic overtures, sending a climate negotiator to the COP28 conference and backtracking on plans to scrap the health ministry.

His moderation, seen by some as a pragmatic response to political realities, includes appointing experienced politicians like Patricia Bullrich to key positions. While hints of moderation and backtracking on extreme proposals raise questions about consistency, the core narrative remains one of adaptability to the demands of governance. The preservation of democratic principles amid these shifts is underscored by Milei’s commitment during his inaugural address not to “persecute anyone or settle old vendettas.” The balancing act between campaign rhetoric and pragmatic governance, evident in Milei’s alliances and policy adjustments, sheds light on the intricate dynamics of leading a nation.

The analysis of Milei's evolving approach becomes crucial in understanding the trajectory of the nation. The chainsaw may be set aside, and the pledge to replace the peso with the dollar deferred, yet the essence of Milei’s presidency emerges as a study in adaptation, prompting a broader reflection on the resilience of democratic principles within the Argentine political landscape.

Javier Milei's Economic Revolution

In the aftermath of Javier Milei’s swift ascent to the presidency, the economic landscape of Argentina underwent a radical transformation. Within 48 hours of taking office, Economy Minister Luis Caputo announced a series of measures aimed at cutting public spending, devaluing the peso, and implementing various reforms. This ambitious agenda, an attempt to steer the country's economy toward surplus amidst a severe crisis, garnered international attention and earned praise from institutions like the IMF. However, as Milei moved to dismantle what he termed “the caste” – a network of political, business, and media elites – resistance emerged from various quarters.

An omnibus bill sent to Congress outlined Milei’s intent to rule by decree, reshape Argentina's electoral system, and impose stringent penalties for protest-related disruptions. The ensuing weeks witnessed a cacophony of dissent from different sectors – lawyers, doctors, artists, fishermen, and more – each expressing discontent over specific policy changes affecting their domains. Perhaps most vehement was the opposition from trade unions, central to Milei's target for systemic overhaul. His proposed labor reforms, which included making union membership opt-in and not automatic, triggered nationwide protests and a swift response from major unions.

While initially welcomed by financial markets, doubts arose concerning the political viability of Milei's transformative agenda. Challenges include the need for congressional approval on key fiscal measures, a shrinking economy, and rising inflation. The 2% monthly devaluation of the peso, aimed at boosting foreign reserves, faces skepticism, and there are concerns about the feasibility of tax hikes without legislative backing. Analysts are questioning whether the proposed changes will bring the anticipated economic revival or exacerbate existing challenges.

Beyond the Horizon

The nation finds itself at a critical juncture where the promises of radical reform meet the complexities of political reality. As ramifications of its decision to elect Javier Milei, a figure who personifies political unpredictability, the sustainability of Milei's vision and the extent of its impact on Argentina's deeply entrenched economic structures remain subjects of intense scrutiny and debate. From his flamboyant entrance into politics, marked by a whirlwind campaign that seized attention both nationally and globally, to his unexpected ascent to the presidency, Milei embodies a departure from conventional political norms. The nuances of his leadership style, from fiery rhetoric to signs of moderation post-election, underscore the complex landscape of Argentine politics.

While Milei’s victory raises concerns about authoritarian inclinations and potential challenges to democratic institutions, the enduring strength of Argentina's democracy persists. The very system that allowed a political outsider to ascend to power also carries within it the capacity for resilience and adaptation. The global community, too, has a stake in this unfolding narrative, as the fate of democracy in Argentina reverberates beyond its borders. Supporting Argentina’s democratic journey is not merely a national obligation; it is a shared responsibility that transcends regional boundaries, reflecting a broader imperative to safeguard democratic principles on a global scale.

SHINZO ABE: PRESERVING HIS LEGACY

Guest Commentary by Banura Nandathilake

Subscribers to international relations often come to a junction between theories: Realism, which posits a zero sum world where external circumstances such as hard power and anarchy that are beyond any individual define the ways in which states do what they do, and constructivism which understands an interdependent society of states where leaders truly have an tangible impact on inter-state relations through social mechanisms. The case for the latter seems to outweigh the former in the analysis of Shinzo Abe however, who left an ineffaceable mark on Japanese foreign policy, by guiding a largely pacifist Japan to one that actively moulds and shapes the security, economic and diplomatic architecture of the Indo Pacific and beyond.

As the heir of a distinguished political family, Abe entered politics in the 1990s where he sought to largely continue the policies of his grandfather, the former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi: Regain the ability to exert Japanese power on the regional and world stage by removing the shackles imposed by the US and a faction of the then Japanese political class. As such, Abe went on to become Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister with four terms (2006-7, 2012-14, 2014-17, 2017-20). On 8 July 2022 however, in an event that stunned the heavily gun restricted Japan, the former Japanese Prime Minister was shot and killed during his campaigning run for his party in the Japanese city of Nara. Despite the untimely passing of the "shadow shogun", the direction of Japan's future may be influenced by, thereby correlate with Abe's "vision" to a great extent (Green, CSIS 2022). Japan has built a full-fledged national security establishment, an estimated 1.7% growth in GDP in 2022, and is a bastion of neo liberal democratic policies in the Indo pacific. Below is an obituary for a man who had a heavy hand in reawakening Japan, wherein his effect on domestic and foreign policies will be appreciated.

Domestic Political Legacy

While for many, Abe’s career was one of dramatic and unlikely turns which spanned 14 years and saw him into extraordinary power to influence the direction of Japanese domestic policy, Sheila Smith of Council on Foreign Relations and others understand that a revised domestic constitution may be Abe's major legacy.

Just two days after Abe’s assassination, the Japanese voted in the Upper House election, awarding the government led by the current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida their anticipated victory. Interestingly, Smith notes that the assassination had no credible change in the election environment. The voter turnout was on par with previous years, and Abe’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a structural advantage as the smaller opposition parties did not form a united front thus further dividing the vote. As such, an Upper House win by the LDP could open an avenue for a Constitutional revision, once an ambition of the former Prime Minister. While factors that may postpone an immediate revision do exist, she notes that a revision could have a lasting impact on Abe’s legacy.

Abenomics

Abe’s vision was of regaining the ability to exercise Japanese power, by losing her shackles imposed by low domestic economic power and capital, which can then be turned into military might and diplomatic currency. However, Japanese capabilities were idling, due to the lack of opportunities as per legal and international constraints in the post WW2 era. In the understanding that securing Japan’s future would require an economy with a new foundation for growth, the economic programme “Abenomics” was born. The programme was an attempt to kickstart Japan’s dormant capabilities through expansionary monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, and a long list of industrial, labour, and regulatory policies to incentivise endogenous development. Abenomics aimed to shift production from agrarian or low value sectors to high income productive sectors to slow the decline of Japan’s labour force, in an “serious, sustained, and flexible attempt to grapple with Japan’s growth challenges” (Harris, FP 2022).

Abenomics was instrumental in reviving the Japanese economy, as well as supercharging Abe’s political career. The programme reversed years of stagnation, boosted corporate profits and state tax revenues, thereby reducing unemployment and crime. As such, Abe was able to coast past domestic elections, pausing the tradition of short-lived premierships in Japan. The resulting political durability allowed him to pursue long term ambitions, such as creating a National Security Council which distilled the defence apparatus through the Prime Minister’s office. Such a creation then allowed for a more active foreign policy over the existing passive structure, which sought to strengthen regional ties while balancing against regional hegemons. 

Japan-India Relations

Relations between Cold war Japan and India were one of polite distance: Japan was a US ally, while India was procedurally non-aligned with some overlap of interests with the USSR. Despite the deterioration of the said relations during the 1988 Indian nuclear missile test and the Japanese economic sanctions that followed, the two states were quick to repair and rebuild a “global partnership’’, proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro a few years later during his visit to India. However, it was Abe that built the stage for a more cohesive and interdependent Japanese-Indian relationship, such as the “India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership’’ (2007). Bilateral relations were further strengthened during Abe’s third term in 2014 through a “special and strategic partnership,” which encompassed diplomatic, security and economic sectors. Trade between Japan and India increased exponentially from 2007, while Japan and India cooperated on security issues in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad.

Moreover, it could be understood that Abe's 2007 visit to India was not only significant for the Japan-India relationship, but also India’s perception of itself and its role in the region (Miller, CFR 2022). Miller understands that it was Japan that influenced India, ‘a notoriously reluctant and cautious actor in global politics’ to join Abe’s Indo-Pacific vision, which now serves as an ideological, economic and military buffer to the rise of China. This vision of the “confluence of the two seas” - Pacific and Indian, were first outlined by Abe in his speech during his first visit to India in 2007, and laid the foundation for the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept which was later adopted by the United States.

China and the Quad

China’s rise in the contemporary era has been unprecedented. An authoritarian political system combined with a quasi-capitalist economic system has allowed China to gain regional hegemony and a global great power ranking, allowing its influential military, economic and diplomatic alliances. Such a rise presents a growing threat and demands a balance of power between China and the US and Allies. Of those allies, Abe represented a significant one: Japan.

While Abe was central in expanding India's position in the Indo-Pacific, his pragmatic approach to relations with China demanded a closer look. Abe could be considered a soft liner on Sino-Japan relations, so much so that he was called a "traitor" by many Japanese patriots. This may be so since the uneven economic balance of power weighed more towards China than Japan: Japan needed China for trade and manufacturing, than vice versa. However, as Mireya Solís, the director of the Centre for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution understood, despite his efforts to maintain closer relations with China “Abe felt very strongly that Japan could not live in an Asia where China had hegemony”. As such, Abe’s pragmatism recognised that despite interdependence and globalisation, China represented a challenge on all fronts, diplomatic, economic and military. Ergo, Abe may have been instrumental in setting the tone for the Japanese defence apparatus. Furthermore, Abe subscribed to right leaning nationalist policies domestically, as he helped coax a pacifist Japanese public to oppose China’s meteoric and bullish rise, further laying the groundwork for the direction of Japanese foreign policy.

However, his vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific may have trumped all else. His influence soon superseded national and regional boundaries, as President Joe Biden, who once worked with Abe as the vice president during the Obama administration, put it “He (Abe) was a champion of the Alliance between our nations and the friendship between our people”, and promised to continue Abe’s “vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific” (2022). The US and Japan, along with India and Australia, form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which represents a bulwark against China in the Indo-Pacific. While the US had more economic and military might than Japan, Abe was still paramount in laying the rhetorical groundwork for the Quad, “providing structural, conceptual ideas to things that needed to be provided at a time when it seemed like it was crumbling.” (Hornung, 2022).

On Taiwan

A great power conflict in East Asia appears to brew over the Island of Taiwan which stands a stone's throw away from the shores of China. While the ideological divide stems from the great powers US and China, US allies such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are not passive watchers either.

Japanese leaders before Abe were uncomfortable with using force to defend Taiwan, as implications of such a move for Japanese security, and how Japan's responses to such scenarios were heavily debated. But it was Abe that argued in 2021, “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance. President Xi Jinping in particular, should never have a misunderstanding in recognizing this”. Abe was thus paramount in transforming Japan’s relationship with Taiwan to counter threats from China, for he recognised a hegemonic China posed a risk not just to the security of the liberal democratic states of East Asia, but their economic and sociological institutions as well. As such, Prime Minister Abe emphasised shared economic, political and ideological values between Japan and Taiwan, where he referred to Taiwan as a “precious friend,” an angle the incoming governments adopted thereafter. Abe was an advocate of stronger relations with Taiwan so much so that he went on to argue that the US policy of strategic ambiguity was “fostering instability in the Indo-Pacific region” as he called out the US to “make clear that it will defend Taiwan against any attempted Chinese invasion.”

Furthermore, it was during Mr. Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister that one of the major sore points in the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Japan were resolved. After 17 years of negotiations, in 2013 Japan and Taiwan concluded Japanese recognition of Taiwanese Fishing rights in the East China Sea. As such, affection for Abe and Japan in Taiwan have reached record highs. Thus, after the news of Abe’s passing had reached Taiwan, President Tsai Ing-wen honoured “Taiwan’s most loyal best friend” with the national flag flown at half-mast.

Shinzo Abe could be called a realist, for he understood that despite diplomacy and the multilateral handshaking, states with different value systems and interests must communicate through hard power and deterrence. But to call him a pragmatist through the constructivist lens could be more apt, as he understood that despite anarchy and hard power considerations, leaders are still able to make a difference in the domestic and foreign policies of a state, thereby keeping up with an evolving world stage. As the world honours him in his passing, it is now up to his successors to carry his legacy forward.

 

SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE 2022: DEEPENING DIPLOMACY AND DEFENCE

GUEST COMMENTARY by Banura Nandathilake

On 12^th June, Asia Pacific’s leading forum for defence diplomacy - the Shangri-La Dialogue ended after a pandemic-induced three-year hiatus. While the Dialogue is procedurally focused on cultivating a sense of security community within the Asia Pacific, which it solely lacks, this year’s event concluded under the uncertain shadow of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the increasingly tenuous US-Sino relations.

The Shangri-La Dialogue is an intergovernmental security conference held in Singapore, by the London based think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in collaboration with the government of Singapore. The Dialogue is chiefly attended by state actors such as Military chiefs, Defence and Foreign Ministers. However, non-state participants too, such as legislators, academic experts, distinguished journalists and business delegates attend the summit. Named after the host venue since 2002, the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore, the forum serves as a platform for debate, expression of views and discussion on specific issues through bilateral meetings. However, off the record meetings are also held, chaired by IISS, to advance policy goals more freely.

Apart from the host nation, participating countries for the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue included Australia, Cambodia, Brunei, Chile, France, Canada, China, India, Germany, Japan, Indonesia, Laos, South Korea, Myanmar, Mongolia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Thailand, Vietnam, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Dialogue was attended by about 500 delegates from more than 40 countries.

Forum Proceedings

The 2022 Dialogue, as all previous sessions, was commenced by Dr John Chipman, the Director-General and Chief Executive of the IISS. This year’s keynote address was given by Fumio Kishida, the Prime Minister of Japan, who set the overall tone for the dialogue - the need for security cooperation and collective action between state and non-state actors in the Asia pacific to counter growing threats in the region and beyond. Broad topics such as the US Indo-Pacific Strategy - a significant shift of resources from the Middle eastern theatre, Competition in a Multipolar world, Military Modernisation, Prescriptions for Myanmar and China’s vision for Regional Order were covered. 

US-China Relations - a String Pulled Taut

The 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue was a significant milestone in contemporary US-China relations. The forum facilitated a meeting between the U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and the Chinese Defence Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe, the first face-to-face encounter since President Biden's inauguration in January 2021. Any hope or reassuring signs of reinstalling lines of direct communication were dispelled by the increasingly sparring headline speeches and subsequent conversations between the two nations, on topics ranging from the status of Taiwan, proceedings within the South China Sea and questions and concerns surrounding grave human rights violations within China.

The US primary criticism of China’s international conduct centred around the latter’s coercive and aggressive actions in the disputed South China Sea, wherein China has constructed man made islands within the shared seaway in an attempt to solidify its claim to the areas enclosed by a ‘9-dash line’ which is claimed by Beijing to grant it exclusive rights, despite non-recognition by international law. “Indo-Pacific countries shouldn’t face political intimidation, economic coercion, or harassment by maritime militias,” Secretary Austin asserted, as “the PRC’s moves threaten to undermine security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.” He further reaffirmed the US position to defend its interests and those of its allies despite increased Chinese movement, mobilisation and pressure.

Secretary Austin’s Chinese counterpart's response was as headline jarring as his. Minister Wei Fenghe described his country’s position as one of self-defence in a global world of zero-sum, self-interested actors. Wei acknowledged his country’s increased nuclear and naval capabilities, in a speech peppered with warnings to tread carefully and avoid Chinese provocation. He further reaffirmed China’s strong stance of a rising great power, one of self-defence but also a crave for international legitimacy through recognition as a peaceful actor. Wei stressed that “It is a historic and strategic mistake to take China as a threat or enemy”. To ensure global peace and development, by virtue of China now being a great power, Wei called for a stop in attempts to “contain China, to stop interfering in China’s internal affairs, and stop harming China’s interests,” signalling that peace was conditional on China’s free reign. His speech further contained a stronger reiteration of the Chinese position on the disputed island of Taiwan - “If anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China – let me be clear – we will not hesitate to fight. We will fight at all costs and we will fight to the very end.”

Shared Ukrainian Costs

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy participated in this year’s Dialogue for the first time through a video link teleconference. Highlighting the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he urged the attendees of primarily Asian states to “remember that support and attention is not only for Ukraine but for (the greater Asia) as well, to ensure that our and your future is safe’’ in the contemporary globalised world. Despite Ukraine’s geographical distance from Asia, Russia’s invasion of his country has global implications, as the political, social and economic distance between countries are much shorter in the present than they ever were. Thus, the costs of war are shared between states, through trade interdependence, geopolitical institutions, and have direct effects such as rising global inflation.

Mr Zelenskyy further stressed that there are ideological costs, as “it is on the Ukrainian battlefield that the future rules of this world are being decided along with the boundaries of the possible.” His position drew clear parallels and a not-so-subtle nod to China's desire for Taiwanese reunification. The political alignments and the ideological divides of the attendee states were made abundantly clear as Prime Minister of Japan Kishida noted that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” further adding to the underlying tension of the Dialogue.

Collective Concerns of the Divided

Despite the lack of collective action on political qualms and tensions owing to non alignment of political compasses, the attendee states of the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue remained receptive to prescriptions for collective concerns. The Dialogue served as a platform to tackle contemporary issues such as global underdevelopment and need of environmental security as a response to climate change, and the green defence agenda wherein the low-lying nations of Maldives, Polynesia and Micronesia were focused upon. The scope of prescriptions for global development and climate degradation are far beyond a single state, and collective action of all nations has shared global benefits. However, talks of nuclear disarmament were pushed by Prime Minister Kishida, who raised the potential for nuclear weapons of China, Russia and North Korea, to cause devastation more than that which was experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite such a statement representing a significant change in the security environment, as it differed from the zero-sum, negative peace structure of the past, it was not well received possibly as one nation may seek to gain more from the said action than the other.

Why They Do What They Do

Security forums such as the Shangri-La Dialogue would be those where one is likely to hear more bad news than good. However, the 2022 forum was not so much a “glass half empty but more of a vessel placed precariously close to the edge of a table, one small slip away from smashing to pieces” (Sachdeva, 2022). As New Zealand Defence Minister Henare noted, there existed “an underlying tension”.

Borrowing from the English School of International Relations (Buzan et al 2002, Bull 1977) would contribute to an apt analysis of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Great power interests define international aspirations and ambitions, even in regional institutions. The Dialogue subscribed to the broad tensions of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the US-China hostilities. Military diplomacy and international institutions which are dominated by great power interests, and smaller developing states are more rule takers than agenda setters. Further, international and weak regional institutions would have little sway in changing great power behaviour and are platforms for great power machinations. Weak regional institutions and forums would have less stringent rules, and less enforcement of such rules which would serve as checks and balances to the power of larger states. Fora such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, as opposed to stronger institutions such as NATO do “not provide much in the way of reassurance about the future trajectory of the relationship (between states) and only reinforces the sense that competition between the two powers is likely to linger thereafter” (Parameswaran 2019).

The fact that the sour relations between US and China continued on since the 2019 Dialogue, which was dominated by the subject of heightened U.S.-China competition serves to solidify the aforementioned understanding.

Despite such dire notions for international cooperation and mitigating global anarchy, the Shangri-La Dialogue represents a necessary, albeit insufficient platform for diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of differences between states. Institutions are only as strong as the rules that states are willing to enforce on themselves. However, institutions and fora such as the Shangri-La Dialogue are still important platforms which aim to resolve statist tensions through negotiated compromise and diffused reciprocity over hard power coercion and war (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The contemporary world is interconnected, with the space and time between events and reactions to such decreasing at an exponential rate. The contemporary world cannot afford to disregard the power of diplomacy for in the words of Henry Kissinger, despite animosities of history, diplomacy serves as means of restraining power.

 

FAREWELL, FRAU MERKEL!

GUEST COMMENTARY by Sisaru Chithrasiri

Throughout the course of history, only a few democratically elected leaders enjoyed approval ratings with a median approval rate of 62% (Reinhart 2020). In fact, in some European countries such as in The Netherlands and Finland ‘Mutti’, as she is known in Germany, has enjoyed over 80% approval ratings (Reinhart 2020). The aim herein is to explore the legacy of Merkalism: the pragmatic politics of the center-right marked by managing alliances and eliminating rivals; pro Europeanism – the woman who steered her nation and a continent through tough times and bona fide her way from hardship to stardom as Europe’s de- facto leader.

Born Angela Dorothea Kasner, she was raised in the German Democratic Republic, commonly known as East Germany, by a pastor and his wife, who was a teacher. She obtained a doctorate in quantum chemistry and worked as a research scientist prior to her days in politics.

The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in Merkel’s political career securing a seat at the Bundestag (Federal German Parliament) in 1990. Elected Chancellor in 2005, Merkel is the first woman and the first East German to hold her nation’s highest elective office. As she steps down in 2021, she will be Germany’s second-longest-serving leader of the modern era, after her former mentor, Helmut Kohl. Over the years, her critics and supporters made comparisons between her and Kohl, who led Germany through reunification during the time after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This writer believes that it is not a fair comparison to make because the Kohl and Merkel eras share little in common. Over the past 16 years, Germany and Europe have needed a mediative and flexible problem-solver to guide the region through a debt emergency (the Euro crisis), the refugee influx from the Middle East and a once in a century pandemic – none of which Helmut Kohl had to face. However, this is not to belittle the achievements of the Kohl era.

Arguably, the Euro crisis was the litmus test for European unity since World War 2 and in the process, Merkel helped save the European Union – an achievement that deserves long lasting respect. Convinced that a strong EU is the only way forward for the European continent, the German Chancellor worked tirelessly to work for the best deal. Merkel once observed that “if the Euro fails, then Europe fails”, with that Merkel embarked on an austerity programme for the indebted countries of Southern Europe, particularly Greece along with loans and aid programmes for struggling economies of the EU. Furthermore, Merkel backed the European Central Bank in the purchase of large-scale government bonds and bringing interest rates down thereby fast tracking the recovery of the EU economies.

When hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers and refugees knocked on Europe’s borders following the collapse of the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya and other sub-Saharan and Sahel region states, Merkel opened Germany’s gates when most of Europe kept theirs closed. While Merkel received standing ovations from multilateral organizations and human rights groups, critics say this was a short-sighted move - gambling with European unity as it fueled tensions with other EU states such as Hungary, Poland, Austria, Greece, Italy, and Spain. Speaking to the VOA (2017), Robert Terrel a scholar on modern Germany at the Syracuse University New York, says Merkel was not cautious enough as this fueled the rise of populist nationalist parties and sentiments across Europe. He further goes on to say that this decision in fact divided Germany including Merkel supporters in the center-right of politics. Other critics accuse Merkel of encouraging hundreds of thousands of people to make the daunting and perilous journey through the Mediterranean Sea onto mainland Europe. But for now, in Merkel’s own words ‘wir schaffen das’ or ‘we will manage this’ remains.

Another field in which the Chancellor exemplified ‘Merkelism’ was in Foreign Affairs – not to mention that the Euro Crisis and the Middle Eastern refugee crisis were a crisis of international scale. Nonetheless, it is how Merkel manoeuvered through the precarious road of foreign affairs which makes her stand out from other world leaders; The US- China strategic competition, The Trump era, Russia’s President, and an increasingly nationalist Balkans region. Some criticize Merkel for making Germany dependent on Russian gas, particularly with the advent of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. However, unlike American and other Western leaders, Merkel maintained a working relationship with President Putin; enough to secure uninterrupted and cheap gas effectively keeping Germany warm during winter. Merkel has however not shied away from criticizing Russia on its poor human rights record, and she convinced the EU to impose sanctions on Moscow for the annexation of Crimea – all the while being cautious of the consequences if she steps out of line. All in all, a well-played game.

Towards China, the Chancellor has also taken a pragmatic approach. Merkel was among the few western leaders to give the green light to the Chinese telecommunications firms Huawei to build Germany’s 5G infrastructure, subject to safeguards. The Chancellor also played a key role encouraging EU-China investment, despite criticism from allies such as the United States. Knowing all too well that Germany’s automobile industry, which accounts for a mammoth share of the German economy continues to make profits in mainland China, Merkel worked tirelessly to have a cordial bilateral relationship with China thereby benefiting the everyday German worker as well German corporates.

It is an open secret that the Trump era ushered in an awkward phase of transatlantic relations. Trump was seen as rather undiplomatic in the way he accused his European counterparts of not contributing enough to NATO and cozying up to Russia while repeatedly making open remarks on how Germany is a ‘free rider ‘on American power. Unlike Macron of France, Trudeau of Canada, and the European Union at large, Merkel managed to navigate her way through the Trump era relatively better. Understanding the importance of the transatlantic alliance and the fact that US Presidents come and go but the alliance does not, Merkel endeavoured to keep it together for the greater good. In the case of Victor Orbán of Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński of Poland, Merkel adopted a less hands-on approach. It was, it may be argued, owing to Merkel’s understanding of the nationalist half of Europe and the liberal half: a compromise for European unity. Although not ideal, it was a pragmatic approach that kept the union from further friction.

Dedicated to making space for future generations, Merkel is standing down on her own terms. Critics are of the opinion that the outgoing Chancellor missed on important opportunities to, in the words of some critics, ‘tame’ the nationalist camp both in Germany and across Europe. Nevertheless, in her sixteen years as Chancellor, Merkel has seen many western counterparts come and go; four French Presidents, four US Presidents, five British PMs, seven Italian PMs, eight Japanese PMs and not to mention six Australian PMs. Merkel was able to manoeuver through tough times not just in Germany but the entire free world with grace. Her time was seen as liberal, pro-European and reformist thereby ushering a new era of conservative politics in Germany and Western Europe.

Merkel did not fail to be a role model for reliability, responsibility, and the impact of female leadership. Thus, it is obvious that whoever succeeds as Chancellor of Germany will have a massive void to fill.

References

Dettmer, J 2021, What Did Merkel Achieve? viewed 30 September 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/what-did-merkel-achieve/6225780.html

Nevett,J 2021, Angela Merkel: Four expert verdicts on a contested legacy, viewed 30 September 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58570507

Matthijs, M 2021, Merkel’s Legacy and the Future of Germany, viewed 30 October 2021,< https://www-cfr-org.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.cfr.org/in-brief/merkels-legacy-and-future-germany?amp>

Reinhart, RJ 2020, Merkel Set to Leave Office With Germany on Top of the World, viewed 29 September 2021, https://news.gallup.com/poll/327701/merkel-set-leave-office-germany-top-world.aspx

The Federal Chancellor, Biography – Angela Merkel, viewed 30 September 2021, https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-en/angela-merkel/biography

POLITICO, 2021, In Pictures: Angela Merkel’s G7 history, viewed 30 October 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-germany-g7-summit-history/

 

 

 

FRANCE: A force to be reckoned with in the Indian Ocean

GUEST COMMENTARY 

by Sisaru Chithrasiri

With the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), much of the west has struggled to stay relevant in the Indian Ocean region in the recent past. This is, for the most part, driven by the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative; a grand Marshall Plan-like program for the 21^st century. 

While the United States of America has historically found this region relatively difficult to influence, the United Kingdom and France has had some luck in the region, mainly due to their colonial past. However, Britain’s influence did not stand the test of times in her former colonies. Out of the main colonial powers, France remains dominant in the region; culturally and politically with French overseas territories (La France d’outre-mer) – La Réunion and Mayotte whilst Madagascar and the Seychelles being former French colonies. This article will examine how France is working to exert its influence in the region and how it’s allies in the west may use it to deter China’s rise.

As of lately, France’s concerns in the region have been defense focused as evidenced by the presence of several military bases in La Réunion and a 270 strong legion detachment in Mayotte. The French have also committed to opening a military base in the United Arab Emirates – Camp de la Paix as well as another in Djibouti: a former French colony in the horn of Africa (Bouchard & Crumplin 2011). Since the beginning of this century, France and India enjoy warm bilateral relations.  As stated by Saint-Mézard (2015), France’s military exercises with India began in 2001 in the areas of, civilian nuclear technology, space programs and counterterrorism initiatives. Thus, one can assume that the relationship between India and France is strategic, particularly when it comes to deterring China’s influence in the region. In fact, one may even conclude that India is desperate for closer ties with the EU and its powerful member states. France, in this regard, understands that it is crucial to have important strategic allies and partners in the Indian Ocean.

In comes Australia – a country that has enjoyed a significant trade relationship with China and a western democracy in the Asian region, bordering the Indian Ocean to its west and the Pacific Ocean to its east. Australia’s relationship with China has turned relatively sour with its Prime Minister Scott Morrison calling for an independent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic (Karp 2020). France, like its allies, sees Australia as a key strategic partner in the region. To reiterate, France sees Australia as a like-minded country and one of the very few regional states capable of contributing substantively to regional stability. The Royal Australian Navy joined the United States, India and Japan for military exercises in the Indian Ocean between October and November 2020 in what is known as the “quad” (Greene, Dziedzic & Oaten 2020) – a hostile, yet subtle message to China; all of whom are allies and partners of France. In such a case scenario, France with its territories and defense forces scattered across the Indian Ocean might provide vital logistical and technical support.

France’s cultural ties and military capabilities may further influence the rhetoric in countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Madagascar and other Indian Ocean region countries to France’s benefit. Given the increasing involvement of China in the affairs of many countries in Asia, France may look to increase its own regional involvement as a way of staying relevant in the Indian Ocean region and its efforts may be backed up by traditional allies such as Australia and the United States. For France, forging much closer political, economic and security ties with these democracies should be an opening for the Europeans to establish a deterrent force against Chinese influence in the region. The D10 – a group of democracies that comprises Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the U.S and the E.U provides a platform for like-minded countries to adjust the wind from tilting towards China in the region and will establish a solid stance for France to exercise their will in the region (The Economist 2018).

The possibility of the western powers making use of French influence and power in the region is becoming a reality in order to deter China’s ever-growing influence. Smaller states such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and the Seychelles must be aware of this realistic possibility and chose to construct, if not mend their foreign policies to the more realistic possibilities that may send shockwaves in the near future or risk being another pawn in the great power rivalry.

References

Bouchard, C & Crumplin, W 2011, ‘Two faces of France: France of the Indian ocean / France in the Indian Ocean’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, vol.7, no.2, pp.161-182.

‘Fatwin V MAGA’ 2018, The Economist, vol.428, iss.9103, pp.51-52.

Greene, A , Dziedzic, S & Oaten, J 2020, Australia to rejoin quad naval exercises in move certain to infuriate Beijing, viewed 28 December 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-20/australia-rejoins-naval-exercise-in-move-certain-to-anger-china/12784186

Karp, P 2020, China bristles at Australia’s call for investigation into coronavirus origin, viewed 28December 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/australia-defends-plan-to-investigate-china-over-covid-19-outbreak-as-row-deepens

Saint – Mézard, I 2015, ‘The French Strategy in the Indian Ocean and the Potential for Indo-French Cooperation’, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PR150312_French-Strategy.pdf

REALISING THE BRI: Will China emerge as a Panda or Dragon?

GUEST COMMENTARY 

by Trivan Annakkarage

The Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) of China is a widely discussed topic today since its concept is unique to the discipline of global geo-politics. This is because the latter is the study of how one powerful nation-state applies a grand strategy (it may be argued) to gain control over most of the world’s population and its resources. Grand strategies implemented by current and former world super-powers (such as the United States of America, Soviet Union, British Empire, Dutch Empire etc.) focused on exerting their power of influence either on land or sea through political and military might. However, BRI envisioned by China focuses on spreading its influence on both land and sea through mutually benefiting economic collaborations with other nation-states. Thus, the political leadership of China proclaims BRI as a revival of the ancient Silk Route.

The Belt and Road Initiative is China’s grand strategy to make its mark on the global geopolitical stage (Clarke, 2017; Ploberger, 2016). Curran (2016) states that the magnitude of this project is even larger than Marshall Plan which was USA’s initiative to financially aid Western, Central, Northern and Southern European countries to rebuild their economies after WWII. However, Shen and Chan (2018) object to this argument because they believe it is too early to make such a comment.

From 1948 to 1951 the Marshall Plan donated US$13billion to war-torn nation-states which are now part of the collective defence agreement, NATO (Shen & Chan, 2018). The present value of the Marshal Plan is estimated above US$135billion (Steil & Rocca, 2018). Contrastingly, BRI is estimated to spend over US$900billion to fulfil the infrastructure gap in more than 68 developing countries (Bruce-Lockhart, 2017). Therefore, if China’s Belt and Road Initiative comes into full realization it will be seven times larger than USA’s Marshall Plan.

President Xi Jinping first announced China’s ambitious project of reincarnating the ancient silk road and maritime silk routes at the Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan and at the People’s Representative Council of Indonesia in 2013 (Cai, 2017; Phillips, 2017). According to The State Council: The Peoples Republic of China (2018), this road and maritime silk route was officially termed ‘Belt & Road Initiative’, and part of its mission is determined to lend a hand to those developing economies that require capital investment to boost their exports and logistic facilities.

BRI thus focuses heavily on addressing the infrastructure gap in many developing nation-states which are members of this initiative (Cai, 2017). The governments of these nation-states have welcomed China and BRI with open arms (Xuequan, 2016). When this geopolitical grand strategy is fully realised, BRI will enable China to connect with the world through five routes. These include West & Central Europe through Central Asia and East Europe, West Asia through Central Asia, South Asia through South East Asia, Southern Europe through South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Suez Canal and Mediterranean Sea followed by South Pacific Ocean through South China Sea (HKTDC, 2018). The map below illustrates the above routes.

 

Through BRI China anticipates to fulfill four objectives. The first is to mitigate the over-dependency on existing sea lanes (Brady, 2017; Ploberger, 2016). This is because most of China’s trade flows through sea routes. As an ocean-based super-power, the United States has a strong presence in the Yellow, East China and South China Seas. This is a major concern for China because the security and uninterrupted journey of its shipping lines that pass through these waters depend on its relationship with USA. Since China is a potential rival for USA’s world dominance, the Government of China is wary of any strategic motive by its rival that can incapacitate China’s smooth flow of imports and exports (Harper, 2017). The second is to bridge the inconsistent economic disparity within China’s western and eastern populations.

Most of the wealthiest population resides in the metropolitan eastern coastline while the poorest live in the rural western interior. This growing disparity is considered a threat to China’s sovereignty because separatist movements in provinces such as Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang-Uyghur blame the Government of China for the impoverishment of their people and justifies it as their cause for self-determination (Armstrong, 2012; Rao, Spoor, Ma & Shi, 2017; Reuters, 2015). The third is to provide employment opportunities to its growing working class (Shen & Chan, 2018) and the fourth is to exert its political, economic, cultural and technological influence on those 68 nation-states which are part of BRI (Albert, 2018).

It must be noted that China was well into implementing strategic solutions to curtail the above four issues through the Belt & Road Initiative before the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted all economic activity around the globe and it is rather poignant that the source of this virus was also from China. Since the beginning of 2020 BRI has experienced hostility from people round the world who criticize it as a sinister plan for China’s world dominance more so now than ever before. Taking this concern into account Beijing has decided to revamp BRI to meet present day demands.

COVID-19 highlighted the vitality of developing medical infrastructure facilities and not only focusing on commercial structures in order for its member nation-states to prosper economically. Beijing has therefore, captured this deficiency in BRI as an opportunity to re-invigorate the importance of their geopolitical super-mega project to give it a new meaning. To emphasize China’s concern in medical welfare, Beijing has introduced and incorporated the Health Silk Road concept into BRI in 2020. Furthermore, since the world is moving towards an internet based ‘working from home’ culture due to COVID-19, Beijing is focusing more on the Digital Silk Route in parallel.

The Health Silk Road is associated with providing medical supplies and medical teams from China (free-of-charge) to countries that are extremely vulnerable to COVID-19. According to Beijing this is done as a symbol of goodwill. The many countries benefitting from the Health Silk Road such as Italy, Iran and South Korea have embraced this initiative. However Beijing has not been clear on how the Health Silk Road would continue to operate if COVID-19 is fully eradicated. The Digital Silk Road on the other hand is a more ambitious project that was introduced in 2015(two years after BRI was introduced in 2013) by an official Chinese white paper. It deals with connecting BRI member states with China on a digital platform. The implementation of 5G through Huawei Technologies Group Co., Ltd. is just the beginning of Beijing’s vision to overpower USA’s dominance in the entire World Wide Web.

The Business Reporting Desk (2020) of the Belt & Road News site has stated several updates and changes Beijing wishes to incorporate in BRI so that this geopolitical endeavour better address present day requirements of developing and developed nation-states. Due to member states being adversely affected by the economic crisis caused as a result of COVID-19, China has announced it will cancel interest-free loans to countries in the African continent amounting to US$ 3.4 billion. These funds may be directed towards the Health Silk Road. However, Beijing has no intention to write-off commercial and concessional loans but to re-structure them on a case-by-case basis. This is a possible solution because BRI is largely bilateral than multilateral. However, this is a clear indication of China’s debt trap diplomacy. Nevertheless, it unreasonable to accuse China and its state run finance companies alone for such a devious strategy because Washington backed IMF and World Bank do not act any different.

Due to the logistical constraints imposed by COVID-19, there are discussions within the political elite in Beijing to re-think their current method of deploying Chinese boots, construction material and machinery in foreign infrastructure projects financed by Chinese loans. This system is known as EPC+F (Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Financing). The possible solution that Beijing might introduce is to contract public/private companies in those host countries to partner with BRI projects.This may be owing to BRI being criticized for limiting direct employment of local labour and expertise of the host nation. Therefore, this will provide opportunities for either public or private firms of the host nation to benefit thus providing a level playing field and countering various other accusations regarding the EPC+F model which is viewed as being only advantageous to China.

Buckley (2000), states that COVID-19 has further exacerbated the existent concerns regarding the necessity, feasibility and transparency of the infrastructure projects in member nation-states. Even before the pandemic there were cracks emerging between China and some host countries when executing projects. These were largely due to the debt burden related to asset seizures (such as the deep sea port in Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Khorgos Dry-Portin Kazakhstan; and Bar-Boljare Highway in Montenegro infamously referred to as the ‘highway to nowhere’). Learning from these experiences some countries have become sceptical of prospective BRI projects. Examples include Myanmar deciding to involve other international partners for its US$ 800 million Yangong City project and Sierra Leone cancelling the US$ 400 million worth Mamamah Airport project.

In addition to issues faced from BRI, China is being severely accused of intellectual property disputes and assertions of non-transparency in the disclosure of the origin and spread of the virus. During 2020 however, the latter has been highlighted more than the previous allegation. Hence Japan has extended loans to its companies operating in China to relocate back to Japan or to another country. This can be viewed as a strong diplomatic message to China.

In conclusion, the Belt and Road Initiative despite it being shrouded in ambiguity and lack of transparency will one day be fully realised even if it does not match up to the magnitude President Xi Jinping wishes it to be, due to his vision being overwhelmingly hampered by COVID-19. It is inevitable that China will one day defeat the existing American hegemony. Therefore Beijing will be the creator of a new world in the 21^st century like what Washington did back in the 20^th.The issue however is that although BRI would genuinely uplift the living the conditions of the people of its member nation-states, will the latter have to pay the heavy price of giving up their civic rights (such as free speech, public franchise etc.) and cultural identity which they currently enjoy, to the Communist Party of China? Therefore, let us hope this next super-power from the east would not turn out to be ruthless like a dragon but as compassionate as a panda.