BOER WARS: Comprehending the strengths of South Africa

By Githmi Koralage

Rainbow Nation, a country popularized as the Republic of South Africa (RSA) is located at the southernmost end of the Eurasian-African landmass. A unitary, parliamentary republic with an executive president, South Africa is often considered a middle power in the region. Despite the beauty of its landscape, and diversity in the society, culture, as well as environment, the world acknowledges the country as one that was once home to gruesome systemic racial-segregation; and apartheid. It garnered a negative perception, leading the general public all over the world to view them as a developing nation at the end of the spectrum. However, when observing its history, especially the creation of RSA, it is evident that South Africa is a country with strong, courageous, determined, warriors who cannot be toppled easily. It is specifically understood when studying the Boer War. Accordingly, this article discusses the Boer War, and what it says about the reality of South Africa.

Time Before the Boer War

The indigenous San and Khoikhoi people who lived in the modern-day South African region were joined by settlers from the North African continent from the 4^th century onwards. The continent and region were introduced to the Europeans with the Portuguese navigator Bartholomeu Dias traveling around the tip of Southern Africa in the 1480s. The first European to land on African soil was however Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama when he landed on Natal coast in 1497. In 1652, the Cape colony at Table Bay was founded by Jan Van Riebeeck, a representative from the Dutch East India Company. (BBC News, 2022) It was established to provide refreshments to the ships voyaging between the Netherlands and the East Indies (modern-day Indonesian region). With time a population of “free Burghers” emerged, and expanded the settlements northwards and eastwards from the Cape colony. These Burghers were known as “Trekboers” and increasingly became independent from the Dutch East India Company. (Williams-Wynn, 2021)

In 1795, the British invaded and captured the Cape colony. The occupation did not last for a long time, because of the signing of the short-lived Treaty of Amiens in 1803, which resulted in the British returning the Cape colony to the Netherlands. In 1806, the British reoccupied the colony as a strategic move, due to Emperor Napolean Bonaparte including the Netherlands as a part of his empire. Meanwhile, another fighting force, the Zulu kingdom, which lasted from 1816 to 1826, was expanding in the Eastern part of the Southern African region. (Williams-Wynn, 2021)

The Trekboers increasingly became dissatisfied with the British authority in the Cape colony. It was especially because 80% of those who had farms did not receive titles for their lands (Williams-Wynn, 2021). This resulted in them migrating further north, which became popularized as the “Great Trek”. The migrated communities established Orange Free State and Transvaal. The British granted the Transvaal limited self-governance in 1852, which was followed by a republic being established in Transvaal in the late 1850s. (BBC News, 2022)

The Indian population which comprised the South African population today also migrated to the region from 1860-1911, as laborers (BBC News, 2022).

The First Boer War

The Transvaal Rebellion/ the First Boer War spanned from 1880 to 1881. In 1867, diamonds were discovered in the Transvaal region. The year 1875 saw a surge in neo-imperialism. According to that, the British annexed Transvaal in 1877 and defeated the Zulus in Natal. The annexation of the Transvaal was met with passive resistance. It turned into armed resistance with time, and on December 16, 1880, the first fight of the war broke out between the British garrison in Potchefstroom and a 'commando' under General Piet Cronjé. The Boers turned out to be experienced marksmen. Their knowledge of the territory of the region also contributed significantly to their success. Further, the “commando” system that was established contributed to getting the upper hand for the Boers in the fight. The final battle of the war occurred in Majuba Hill, where the Boers emerged as the victors. On August 03, 1881, the Pretoria Convention was signed and the Transvaal was given independence with the British having its suzerainty. Accordingly, the British had control over Transvaal’s foreign affairs and internal rules related to the black community.  It was on February 27, 1884, that Transvaal finally earned its full internal independence, until the Second Boer War. (BBC - History - the Boer Wars, 2011)

The Second Boer War

The discovery of goldfields in Witwatersrand in 1886 was a watershed moment in South African history. It made the struggling Boer Republic a potential political and economic threat to British supremacy. The failed scheme of Prime Minister of the Cape colony Cecil Rhodes to overthrow President Kruger of the Transvaal government during the Jamesson Raid ten years later flared up Afrikaner nationalism. The British colonial secretary Sir Joseph Chamberlain and the British High Commissioner in South Africa Alfred Milner were anxious that Kruger would unite South Africa under Afrikaners, which led to them being interested in getting involved in the domestic affairs of Transvaal. Milner agitated the English-speaking migrant workers for franchise rights, which President Kruger refused to grant. Instead, he gave ultimatums; disputes between the two states should be resolved through arbitration, British soldiers in the borders should be withdrawn, and troops bound for South Africa by ship should not disembark. British however rejected the ultimatum, which resulted in the breakout of the Second Boer War on October 11, 1899. (BBC - History - the Boer Wars, 2011) The war was marked as the bloodiest, longest, and most expensive war the British engaged in between 1815 and 1915 (History | South African Government, n.d.).

The course of the war, which was in favour of the Boers changed in February of 1900. After the British captured significant landmarks, Kimberly and Ladysmith, almost all Boer fronts collapsed, and the men were divided as some of the Boers joined the British. However, in August 1900, the military effort of Boer was revived under General Louis Botha. This revival lasted for two years and was known as the guerilla phase because of the application of the tactic of gathering swiftly to attack and dispersing quickly. (BBC - History - the Boer Wars, 2011)

End of the Boer War

Ending the Boer war with a clear-cut victory was not an easy task for the British. After the failure of the military methods, the British had to resolve to a different approach laced with strategy, tactics, brutality, and manipulation. In 1900, Lord Herbert Kitchener became Commander of the British Garrison, he integrated a three-fold strategy to end the Boer war. The first stage included the “scorched earth” policy, which deprived the guerillas of access to food and shelter. (BBC - History - the Boer Wars, 2011)

The second stage was expanding “concentration camps”. These camps sheltered the families of the guerillas especially the women and children whose houses were burnt during the first phase. Black people were also confined to the concentration camps to prevent the guerillas from accessing food and to get free labour for the gold mines. The terrible conditions and bad administration of these camps led to the demise of 28,000 Boer women and children and at least 20,000 Black people. (BBC - History - the Boer Wars, 2011)

The third stage included building blockhouses and barbed wire defenses. These blockhouses known as the Kitchener Maginot Line contributed to stopping the disruption of railway lines and bridges. Further, it prevented the Boer commanders from reuniting their units for coordinated action. (Blockhouses of the Boer War, n.d.)

The strategies were successful. By 1902, the Second Boer War formally came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging.  As a result, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were made self-governing colonies under the British Empire. (BBC News, 2022)

Revelations about South Africa

Boer wars reveal a deeper narrative about South Africa and its people than what is popularized. Even though Boers were of Dutch ancestry and white, we could say they have much ownership of the land of South Africa as the Black natives, because of the contributions they made to lay the foundation of South Africa.

The African continent is deemed a war-torn, underdeveloped, and less civilized continent. As a part of the continent, South Africa is viewed through the same lens by the masses. However, the Boer Wars challenge this perception by revealing qualities such as unity, pride, a sense of unique identity, intelligence, courage, perseverance, and resilience of the ancestors of the nation, the Afrikaners, and the native African clans. It was the reason why apart from using military capabilities, the British had to take measures to crush the soul of the Boer fighters, through policies such as scorched earth and concentration camps. Further, the victories of the Boers revealed their tactical intelligence and combat capabilities.

The advanced military weapons the Boers used were facilitated by Germany and France (Pom Poms in the Boer War, n.d.). This reveals that the Boers had the skill and ability to conduct stable foreign relations. During the war, both factions decided not to involve the Black community. However, the British started employing the Black community as soldiers. (BBC - History - the Boer Wars, 2011) Arguably this also played a part in deepening the racist attitude of the Boers, which shaped the policies of early South African governments and ultimately contributed to the establishment of apartheid.

Conclusion

The Boer Wars are more than just a conflict over territory. It is a testimony to how strong, courageous, and intelligent South Africans were and are. The legacy of these wars has impacted every aspect of the country. The most significant aspect of history is that South Africa is not a country that is easy to conquer. The strength displayed by its people, then and now, has made it stand firm against every adversity it has faced.

References

BBC - History - The Boer Wars. (2011, March 29). https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/boer_wars_01.shtml

BBC News. (2022, December 19). South Africa profile - Timeline. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094918

Blockhouses of the Boer War. (n.d.). https://www.bwm.org.au/blockhouses.php

History | South African Government. (n.d.). https://www.gov.za/about-sa/history

Pom poms in the Boer War. (n.d.). https://www.bwm.org.au/pom_poms.php

Williams-Wynn, C. (2021). The Boers of Dutch Descent Under British Rule in South Africa [Review of The Boers of Dutch Descent Under British Rule in South Africa]. In Smart Surveyors for Land and Water Management - Challenges in a New Reality Virtually in the Netherlands. FIG e-Working Week 2021. https://www.fig.net/resources/proceedings/fig_proceedings/fig2021/papers/ts_his/TS_HIS_williams-wynn_11143.pdf

RUSSIA OVERSHADOWS G7 2022 SUMMIT

GUEST COMMENTARY by Banura Nandathilake

Despite being an informal collective of ‘advanced economic’ liberal democratic states, the Group of 7 (G7) bringing together Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom and the United States have fervent goals. Held from 26 to 28 June 2022, the summit was in response to a global society capsized by division and shocks, as a call to unite and join to defend ‘universal human rights and democratic values, the rules-based multilateral order, and the resilience of democratic societies’ (G7, 2022). The viability of such remains to be seen.

Formed in 1975, leading states in a world of global economic recession induced by the OPEC oil embargo understood it may be in their mutual interest to coordinate on macroeconomic interdependencies. While it was first a forum for Finance ministers to hold annual meetings, the G7 developed into a round-table between leaders of the Western World. In 1988, Russia joined the G7, which was then named the G8 albeit temporarily until Russia’s dismissal for its annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.

The G7 states in the contemporary, with an aggregate that represents 45 percent of the global economy in nominal terms and 10% of the world’s population, hold annual summits to coordinate economic policy goals, facilitate collective action on transnational issues and propagate neo liberal norms, in conjunction with the European Union and other invitees. All 7 member states are identified as mature and advanced democracies with a Human Development Index score of 0.800 or higher.

Unlike international organisations and groups such as NATO, the G7 group has no formal legal existence, no permanent secretariat or official members. It thus has no legally binding rules that abide by or ratify states to uphold decisions and commitments made at G7 meetings. As such, while compliance with G7 norms is procedurally voluntary, they are impacted by social norms of persuasion, influence, mutual accountability and reputation. Topics of conversation between member states have encompassed growing challenges such as counterterrorism, development, education, health, human rights and climate change.

The 2022 Summit

From 26-28 June 2022, the leaders of G7 States met in Elmau, Germany joined by the leaders of Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal and South Africa, as well as Ukraine. Representatives included German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, US President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, French President Emmanuel Macron, European Council President Charles Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen,

The summit focused on the Covid-19 crisis, climate change, the Russian Ukrainian conflict, and China. 

Climate Change

The shared concerns of climate change were a major topic of discussion during the 2022 Summit. The group endorsed the goals of an open and cooperative international Climate Club, in alignment with the 1.5°C pathways and hastened the implementation of the Paris agreement. The group further pledged to commit to a decarbonised transportation sector by 2030, a fully or predominantly decarbonised power sector by 2035. However, the latter may have been incentivised by political concerns of Western states to a major degree.

Liberal Democracies of the West

Liberal democracies may be understood to exist where the state subscribes to a liberal economic system and a democratic political system. A concise summary of such is as a liberal economic system proscribes significant political control over an decentralised, capitalistic, market driven economic system, as it is understood that the market mechanism is the most efficient means of linking demand to supply, market to consumer. A democracy may be understood as a domestic political model which, in conjunction with an impartial judiciary, free media and others, elected representatives aim to promote a decentralised representative governance through accountable, transparent and inclusive institutions.

By virtue of being a liberal democracy, all member states find common ground, parallel norms, alignment of macro foreign policy goals and understanding with each other. This allows the informal G7 to coordinate hard power security and economic interdependence in addition to cooperating with civil society groups to promote human rights, and uphold a democratic zone of peace in the face of non-democratic powers. A strong culture of mutual accountability exists between G7 states. Accountability may be through internal processors of the forum, where social norms allow for persuasion and disincentivize coercion. Coercion may not at all be necessary, as liberal democratic states would all be of a positive sum world view. Furthermore, the level of trade interdependence between states would act as means of checks and balances, as every state is needed by the other, thus it is in every G7 state’s interest to be in their good books.

The Illiberal Rest

Russia and China, in addition to states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are understood by the West to be illiberal states. Both major powers, albeit one a receding power, have capitalist and liberal economic systems where the state’s political machine exerts a heavy pressure on the market mechanism. While the state may be able to provide a higher quality safety net to its citizens by restraining the destructive forces of capitalism to better allocate scarce resources amongst the vulnerable, significant barriers to such exist. China’s GDP has grown at a surprising rate vis a vis other developing states, which has allowed the CCP significant geopolitical leverage. However, China’s domestic political model is authoritarian, whereby citizens do not have much say in how they are governed. Exclusive political institutions have no means of accountability or transparency, which leads to significant corruption. As Wedeman (2004) analyses, corruption is a feature of the Chinese system, thereby stifling economic and social growth. Corruption and lack of domestic checks and balances to those in power may be more apparent in Russia than China, where the control of the Kremlin and the Oligarchs have poignant effects on not just its citizens but also its neighbours; as the lack of domestic accountability may mean the lack of stringent checks balances, which then mean lesser shackles on the zero-sum ambitions.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The Russia-Ukraine conflict may be interpreted as a conflict between the forces of liberal democratic values of positive peace, pluralism and self-determination versus a one man’s nostalgic dreams of a ‘Neo’ USSR. Being at complete odds, the reaffirmed condemnation of Russia’s ‘’illegal and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine’’ by the liberal democratic G7 states is hardly a surprise. Nor is their promise of ‘’needed financial, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support’’ for Ukraine in its defence of its sovereignty, during its path on a free and democratic society.

The Sanctions Regime

Sanctions and more sanctions were promised by the group of seven advanced economies, who vowed to “align and expand targeted sanctions to further restrict Russia’’ in its access to key technological industrial imports and services. Such a move would severely restrict the ability to sustain their war machine thereby adhering to security commitments to Ukraine. The G7 Leaders pledged new sanctions on Russians who had committed war crimes in Ukraine, and are contributing to exacerbating “global food insecurity” by “stealing and exporting Ukrainian grain”. New penalties on Russian gold exports were further proposed, as well as a cap on the oil price to phase out global dependency on Russian energy.

However, a complete restriction of the import of Russian energy may be an ambitious task. European nations such as France get a quarter of their oil and 40% of their gas from Russia. While Germany has halted the progress of the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the EU has currently agreed to reduce its Russian gas imports by only two-thirds. President Biden however is banning all Russian oil and gas imports to the US, and the UK is ready to phase out Russian oil by the end of the year. The US, UK and Ukrainian Leaders are keen for other G7 nations to follow suit.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who joined in on a trio of meetings via Videolink, stated that the summit will show "who is our friend, who is our partner and who sold us out and betrayed us". He reiterated his calls for fresh deliveries of weaponry, as he believes Russia will want to extend the war until winter wherein they could make new territorial gains to consolidate power. The financial support of G7 allies in 2022 already amounts to more than USD 2.8 billion in humanitarian aid, and a further USD 29.5 billion is pledged in supporting Ukrainian reconstruction.

China and the BRI

A growing China poses a “threefold threat” to G7 countries — economically, ideologically, and geopolitically. China’s GDP is second only to the US and it is fast catching up. China’s growing state-overseen tech industry, fuelled by globalisation and interdependence, is fast spreading a culture of surveillance and censorship, which act as means for the globalisation of authoritarianism. Said authoritarian ideals are further spread through Chinese geopolitical projects and alliances such as the BRI, which usually focus on developing, quasi democratic states with little to no accountability such as those in Africa and Central Asia. Furthermore, China’s action with regard to the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and its influence in Hong Kong have drawn condemnation from G7 members. China’s growing trade and defence ties with Russia have also caused concerns.

A Western Counter to the BRI

A Western counter to the BRI emerged during the G7 summit, aptly named Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. The BRI is a global infrastructure development strategy which was developed as per Chinese leader Xi Jinping's vision in 2013, as a means for China to assume a greater role in global politics by easing access to China and its capabilities and boosting global GDP. Dubbed the Belt and Road Initiative and with over 145 countries signed up, the BRI is currently constructing a network of overland routes, rail transportation, sea lanes and energy pipelines to connect China to Southeast Asia, Central and South Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa. However, the project has been criticised as a tool to increase China’s political leverage in developing countries. Thereby, the BRI has been criticised for neocolonialism, economic imperialism.

In such a context, the G7 had launched a $600bn Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative infrastructure plan to counter China, in private and public funds to finance infrastructure in developing low and middle-income countries over five years. By working to narrow the global investment gap, the B3W would create new Just Energy Transition Partnerships with Indonesia, India, Senegal and Vietnam, building on existing partnerships with South Africa.

While US President Biden understood that “Developing countries often lack the essential infrastructure to help navigate global shocks (thus) feel the impacts … and they have a harder time recovering,” he stressed that the B3W “isn’t aid or charity. It’s an investment that will deliver returns for everyone”. Despite being dwarfed in comparison to the multi-trillion-dollar BRI, the B3W offers means of accountability, transparency and mutual trust between the neo liberal developed states and the developing states. The initiative would, according to Biden, further allow developing states to “see the concrete benefits of partnering with democracies”. While a cynic may argue that the developed have no interest in the developing other than exploitation and/or self-interest, and such may be observed to be true, President Biden may have been right when he said that underdevelopment is “not just a humanitarian concern, but an economic and a security concern for all”.

Mutual gains depend on interdependence, and without developing countries, there cannot be any sustainable recovery of the world economy. However, the development of low-income states is necessary but insufficient for a holistic global economic recovery, which remains shadowed by the conflict of value systems: liberal and illiberal, democratic and authoritarian.

 

FRANCE: A force to be reckoned with in the Indian Ocean

GUEST COMMENTARY 

by Sisaru Chithrasiri

With the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), much of the west has struggled to stay relevant in the Indian Ocean region in the recent past. This is, for the most part, driven by the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative; a grand Marshall Plan-like program for the 21^st century. 

While the United States of America has historically found this region relatively difficult to influence, the United Kingdom and France has had some luck in the region, mainly due to their colonial past. However, Britain’s influence did not stand the test of times in her former colonies. Out of the main colonial powers, France remains dominant in the region; culturally and politically with French overseas territories (La France d’outre-mer) – La Réunion and Mayotte whilst Madagascar and the Seychelles being former French colonies. This article will examine how France is working to exert its influence in the region and how it’s allies in the west may use it to deter China’s rise.

As of lately, France’s concerns in the region have been defense focused as evidenced by the presence of several military bases in La Réunion and a 270 strong legion detachment in Mayotte. The French have also committed to opening a military base in the United Arab Emirates – Camp de la Paix as well as another in Djibouti: a former French colony in the horn of Africa (Bouchard & Crumplin 2011). Since the beginning of this century, France and India enjoy warm bilateral relations.  As stated by Saint-Mézard (2015), France’s military exercises with India began in 2001 in the areas of, civilian nuclear technology, space programs and counterterrorism initiatives. Thus, one can assume that the relationship between India and France is strategic, particularly when it comes to deterring China’s influence in the region. In fact, one may even conclude that India is desperate for closer ties with the EU and its powerful member states. France, in this regard, understands that it is crucial to have important strategic allies and partners in the Indian Ocean.

In comes Australia – a country that has enjoyed a significant trade relationship with China and a western democracy in the Asian region, bordering the Indian Ocean to its west and the Pacific Ocean to its east. Australia’s relationship with China has turned relatively sour with its Prime Minister Scott Morrison calling for an independent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic (Karp 2020). France, like its allies, sees Australia as a key strategic partner in the region. To reiterate, France sees Australia as a like-minded country and one of the very few regional states capable of contributing substantively to regional stability. The Royal Australian Navy joined the United States, India and Japan for military exercises in the Indian Ocean between October and November 2020 in what is known as the “quad” (Greene, Dziedzic & Oaten 2020) – a hostile, yet subtle message to China; all of whom are allies and partners of France. In such a case scenario, France with its territories and defense forces scattered across the Indian Ocean might provide vital logistical and technical support.

France’s cultural ties and military capabilities may further influence the rhetoric in countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Madagascar and other Indian Ocean region countries to France’s benefit. Given the increasing involvement of China in the affairs of many countries in Asia, France may look to increase its own regional involvement as a way of staying relevant in the Indian Ocean region and its efforts may be backed up by traditional allies such as Australia and the United States. For France, forging much closer political, economic and security ties with these democracies should be an opening for the Europeans to establish a deterrent force against Chinese influence in the region. The D10 – a group of democracies that comprises Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the U.S and the E.U provides a platform for like-minded countries to adjust the wind from tilting towards China in the region and will establish a solid stance for France to exercise their will in the region (The Economist 2018).

The possibility of the western powers making use of French influence and power in the region is becoming a reality in order to deter China’s ever-growing influence. Smaller states such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and the Seychelles must be aware of this realistic possibility and chose to construct, if not mend their foreign policies to the more realistic possibilities that may send shockwaves in the near future or risk being another pawn in the great power rivalry.

References

Bouchard, C & Crumplin, W 2011, ‘Two faces of France: France of the Indian ocean / France in the Indian Ocean’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, vol.7, no.2, pp.161-182.

‘Fatwin V MAGA’ 2018, The Economist, vol.428, iss.9103, pp.51-52.

Greene, A , Dziedzic, S & Oaten, J 2020, Australia to rejoin quad naval exercises in move certain to infuriate Beijing, viewed 28 December 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-20/australia-rejoins-naval-exercise-in-move-certain-to-anger-china/12784186

Karp, P 2020, China bristles at Australia’s call for investigation into coronavirus origin, viewed 28December 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/australia-defends-plan-to-investigate-china-over-covid-19-outbreak-as-row-deepens

Saint – Mézard, I 2015, ‘The French Strategy in the Indian Ocean and the Potential for Indo-French Cooperation’, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PR150312_French-Strategy.pdf

EMMANUEL MACRON: A COURAGEOUS PRESIDENT OR COHABITING PARTNER?

Emmanuel Macron’s imminent French Presidential victory has resulted in a sigh of relief across Europe, and in fact globally, as the tide of nationalism is abating, at least for the foreseeable future. As the Awarelogue Editorial in March 2017 discussed Geert Wilders defeat in the Netherlands and questioned the ‘Patriotic Spring’ meeting its Waterloo, (https://awarelogue.blogspot.com/2017/03/wilders-patriotic-spring-meets-its.html) it is apparent that despite a significant rise in nationalism, the tide is not strong enough to overwhelm the political structure of Europe. For the moment. Yet in France, the actual strength of Macron and more importantly, En Marche, has not been put to the real test.

On the eve of the first round of voting, former US President Barack Obama tweeted ‘you never know, it might be that last day of campaigning that makes all the difference.’ As ominous as it may sound, his warning came just hours before a shooting on the Avenue des Champs-Élysées which, it was feared would scuttle floating votes and benefitting Le Pen. Yet the attack didn’t dissuade the French citizenry who gave former Economy Minister, Macron a decisive lead. Immigration and Europe have dominated matters on either side of the Channel, but the French have already learnt from the ‘mistakes’ of others. With a strong ally across the Atlantic reeling from divisive decisions and sporadic policies, and a neighbour undergoing the rigours of leaving the European Union, the French and Europe as a whole have understood the dangers of opting for brashness and instead sought to ensure stability.

Akin to Trump, Macron has managed to sideline veterans. Melenchon entered politics the year before Macron was born, Francois Fillon, served as Prime Minister under Sarkozy, and Marine Le Pen, the forthright leader of the far right, all presented stronger candidatures, yet the newcomer proved once more that the populace is willing to give change a chance. Macron served as Economy Minister under Hollande yet managed to shed all shadows of a period described as economically disastrous. The honeymoon is yet to begin but the questions and doubts will invariably arise. In 2012 the French wanted change. Electing Francois Hollande, the first leftwing leader in two decades, they expected wide ranging policy changes, but five years later he is set to leave the Élysées Palace with some of the lowest ratings of a French President. Sarkozy before him faced a similar fate.

2017 has seen the French opting for change again, but not willing to go to an extreme with Le Pen, instead trusting Macron to deliver on key promises and ensure a revival of the country and her economy. As more candidates and influential figures express their support for Macron, the unofficial coalition being built is more against Le Pen, than for Macron. Despite her stepping down from the leadership of the National Front seeking to be portrayed as a leader of the French, and not of a party, Le Pen, who has worked wonders for the far-right would see history repeat itself. In 2002, her father Jean-Marie Le Pen entered the second round of voting against President Jacques Chirac, only to have a grand coalition of opposition that ensured Chirac won a second term in the Élysées.

With legislative elections due in June 2017, and the need for his newly formed party to field candidates capable of winning, will Macron be able to deliver or will he suffer the same fate as his predecessors and be booted out in 2022? Minus a well-oiled mechanism across the country, he could well be forced to engage in a cohabitation arrangement, which would invariably derail his own plans and presidency. France is no stranger to such arrangements having seen President Francois Mitterrand cohabiting with Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister from 1986 to 1988 and thereafter with Édouard Balladur from 1993 to 1995; Chirac himself had to work with Prime Minister Lionel Jospin from 1997 to 2002.

Although a sigh of relief may have been exclaimed across Europe, En Marche needs to move forward, well and beyond May 2017, if that which was pledged is to be delivered and expectations lived up to. More than defeating the rise of nationalism or curtailing the far-right, the real test is for Macron to prove his potential and for En Marche to ride the victory wave in establishing a wide ranging support base, which although hopeful, appears illusive within such a short period. This is the real test.

• Awarelogue Editorial