The 2025 visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Mauritius made headlines in global news. Modi received Mauritius' highest honour, the Grand Commander of the Order of the Star and Key of the Indian Ocean, suggesting a strong connection. This visit by a prime minister to another country raises questions about why the PM traveled to Mauritius, an island with little influence in world politics. Analyzing the relationship between these two countries will provide an answer to that question.
The Historic Connection
Mauritius is a subtropical island country in the Indian Ocean, just over 1,130 kilometers east of Madagascar, off the southeastern coast of Africa. Its outlying territories include Rodrigues Island and other smaller islands (The Commonwealth, n.d.). Conversely, India is a rising global power in the Asian region with more than 1.4 billion populations. Mauritius and India may not share the same status in the global arena. However, these two countries share a strong bond, rooted for ages. According to Sinha (2024),
after Mauritius became an English colony in 1810, approximately 470,000 Indians were sent to Mauritius as indentured labourers between 1834 and 1920 and this significantly impacted the sugar plantations. The human cargo was carried from Bihar, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. The people who migrated to Mauritius embarked on their new journey in Mauritius with a new identity but retained Indian values and cultures. As a result, out of the 1.2 million population in the country, 70% are of Indian origin.
In addition, in 1901, while traveling to South Africa, Mahatma Gandhi landed in Mauritius and advised the people to educate themselves and reclaim their identity. This message stayed with them and because of it, they celebrated their national day on the day Gandhi started his Dandi March also known as the Salt March on March 12.
After becoming an independent state in 1968, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam became the first prime minister of Mauritius, and his son, Navin Ramgoolam is the current prime minister. The connection between the two countries has not been reduced but expanded in many ways. This expansion has occurred in different sectors; Defense, Military and Strategy, Economy, Technology, and Capacity Building.
a. Defense, Military and Strategic Partnership
In 1974, the two countries signed a defense agreement, making India and Mauritius strategic partners. To date, India guarantees Mauritius’ security showcasing a powerful bond. The backing of India has been evident on several occasions. In 1983, there was a rumour about a coup by the MMM (Mauritius Military Movement), and even though it never occurred, it was believed that the then PM, Indira Gandhi wanted to send Indian troops to the country. In 2024, India welcomed the UK-Mauritius agreement for Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, which houses a US-UK military base, and Modi reiterated India’s “firm support” for Mauritius on this issue (Parashar, 2025).
In his recent visit to Mauritius, Modi again confirmed that India will support Mauritius’ sovereignty over the Chagos Island following the statement made by US President Trump that he would support a deal between Mauritius and Great Britain over the future of the United States-United Kingdom base in the Islands. It can thus be understood how India has always been a country that supports Mauritius in protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity proving to be a friend in need.
Additionally, the Indian Prime Minister also unveiled "Vision MAHASAGAR – Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions” for the Global South which vision builds upon the foundation of the earlier "Vision SAGAR" (Security and Growth for All in the Region) that encompasses principles of trade for development, capacity building for sustainable growth, and mutual security for a shared future (Laskar, 2024).
Furthermore, since 2009, the Indian Navy has been deploying ships to Mauritius bi-annually to assist in patrolling the vast EEZ of the island country. The joint patrolling focuses on preventing piracy and illegal fishing and helps reinforce maritime security in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Mauritius (Padmaja, 2017). As reported in Firstpost (2024), since the EEZ in Mauritius extends up to 2.3 million square kilometers and is difficult to monitor, India built an airstrip costing $250 million in Agalega Islands after signing a memorandum in 2015. The airstrip is 3km long and is suitable for Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare (LRMR-ASW) aircraft which are used for maritime surveillance and strike, electronic warfare missions, and search and rescue missions. This will ultimately assist them with their goal to combat contemporary non-traditional security threats such as piracy, drug trafficking, and terrorism.
In this manner, Mauritius has the security and defense backing from one of the rising global powers in the world. From India’s side, they are capable of protecting Mauritius as well as countering any non-traditional security threats and constructing the influence from China coming into the country.
b. Economic Partnership
Mauritius being an island nation, has grown to be a nation with significant status after its independence in 1968. Being a small state, the country mainly depends on many sectors such as tourism, manufacturing, construction, financial services, and agriculture. Due to the shared history, India has been supporting Mauritius to achieve their targeted economic goals, and is one of the major players and drivers of Mauritius’ economy.
India’s support in successfully implementing several infrastructure projects, such as India-Mauritius Metro Express Project, New Supreme Court Building, New ENT Hospital, 956 Social Housing Units, and Educational Tablets, showcases the bond between the two countries developed over time and India has overall invested $1.1 billion in Mauritian projects (Government of India, 2025).
As Singh (2023) points out, Mauritius has emerged as a significant source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India, and with the Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) India aims to streamline taxation, reduce complexity, and gradually eliminate tax exemptions. By enhancing the taxation framework, India aims to create a fair and conducive environment for foreign investors while promoting economic growth and investment in the country. It is apparent that this has contributed to Mauritius' emergence as a significant financial hub in the global market.
Further strengthening bilateral economic ties, the two countries have also signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA). The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA), signed in 2021, marked India’s first trade agreement with an African country. This agreement further solidified the bilateral relationship and paved the way for increased trade between the two nations. In the fiscal year 2021-2022, the total trade between India and Mauritius amounted to $ 786.72 million, with significant growth witnessed over the past 15 years (Singh, 2023). The CECPA encompasses a wide variety of areas, including Trade in Goods and Services, Rules of Origin, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, Dispute Settlement, Movement of Natural Persons, Telecom, Financial services and Custom procedures.
The initiatives demonstrate the effort by both countries to foster mutually beneficial economic cooperation. They also highlight how strategic partnerships like India and Mauritius can drive sustainable economic growth in their respective nations.
c. Technology Partnership
Within the technological parameters, India assists Mauritius in many ways, especially in people-centric digitalization. India has supported the implementation of the e-judiciary system, and digitization of archives and records at the Mahatma Gandhi Institute, strengthening cooperation in the field of ICT including cyber security, Digital Public Infrastructure, and capacity building for the same, and explore the implementation of successful digital tools developed by India, such as PM Gati Shakti digital platform, as per Mauritius’ requirements.
Similarly, since 1986, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India's national space agency, has operated a satellite tracking system in Mauritius which helps India guide its missions in space. The press release by the High Commission of India, in Port Louis, Mauritius (2009), states that ‘The Government of India may assist in the training of scientists and technicians, upon request from Mauritius, at various facilities under the Department of Space in the use of remote sensing data in applications relevant to Mauritius. Moreover, the Government of India may also provide, upon request, technical assistance for the establishment of a remote sensing cell or unit in Mauritius, selection of equipment and training of staff, and operationalization of the Station, and that a Mauritian scientist shall be attached to the TTC Station.’ This exhibits Indian presence in Mauritius for a considerable period. Thus, it can be noted that both countries share a genuine connection that expands in many areas.
d. Capacity Building
Strengthening bilateral relationships between the two countries, capacity building is one aspect that both these countries focus on. Capacity building encompasses many actors. For instance, Public Service and Administration, Diplomacy, Trade and Commerce, Finance, Infrastructure, and Health.
As reported by the India News Network (2024), during the visit to India in 2024, officials from both sides discussed opportunities for collaboration, particularly focusing on enhancing the administrative capabilities of Mauritian public officers through capacity-building programs and faculty development initiatives. Moreover, out of the 8 agreements that were exchanged between Mauritius and India in the recent visit in 2025, the two countries focused on other important aspects such as diplomacy, commerce, and trade. According to the Government of Mauritius (2025), an MoU was signed between the Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service in New Delhi, India, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade of the Republic of Mauritius, for the exchange of information on the structure and content of training program for diplomats and another MoU between the Ministry of Industry, SME and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic of India was signed to develop micro, small and medium enterprises in the respective countries.
In addition, the launching of India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) can be considered as one of the key steps in strengthening the banking and finance systems in Mauritius and it will also create not only a connection between the two countries but also trust. This new payment infrastructure will enable customers of participating banks to make seamless and secure payments both in Mauritius and in India. RuPay cards issued in Mauritius will be accepted at ATM and Point of Sales (POS) terminals in India, and Indians will be able to make UPI QR transactions at participating merchants in Mauritius. Commenting on this new payment service, the Governor of the Bank of Mauritius, Harvesh Kumar Seegolam, stated that "the launch of the RuPay and UPI linkage between Mauritius and India marks a significant milestone in our efforts to enhance financial connectivity and promote digital transactions. This collaboration will not only facilitate seamless and secure cost-effective payments for our customers but also strengthen the economic ties between our two nations." (Bank of Mauritius, 2024)
In terms of infrastructure, India has assisted in contributing to the implementation of several development projects in Mauritius. During the recent visit to Mauritius, both leaders agreed to work towards timely delivery of 100-electric buses and the associated charging infrastructure, implement Phase II of High Impact Community Development Projects, finalize discussions on the new Parliament building on a site to be identified by Mauritius, and conclude framework understanding to implement this project with India’s grant assistance, finalize discussion on the redevelopment of the Ganga Talao Spiritual Sanctuary and conclude framework understanding to implement this project with India’s grant assistance and explore new areas of development cooperation, as per the needs and priorities of Mauritius.
Apart from the above initiatives, the two countries have collaborated in the health sector as well. As reported by the Economic Times (2024), India launched their first overseas Jan Aushadi Kendra in Mauritius. Chandna (2024) noted that the scheme is promoted as an affordable medicines scheme by the Modi government where they offer generic drugs priced 50-90% lower than their branded counterparts in the market and Mauritius has shared a list of 16 therapeutic areas based on which the stock of drugs is being prepared such as cancer, anti-diabetic, antibiotics, nervous system, urology, painkillers, antifungal drugs, and supplements.
Conclusion
The connection between India and Mauritius dates back many decades, and from the examples mentioned, we can see how these two countries have developed and expanded their ties across many sectors. Like any other relationship, the connection between these two countries encounters challenges. For instance, there is a rise in geopolitical influence in the region, and balancing the interests of superpowers like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and China is an important and challenging task not only for Mauritius but also for India. Consequently, maritime security threats and challenges will increase due to the region's importance and the strategic location of Mauritius.
Furthermore, there is a rise in non-traditional security threats globally, such as climate change and cybersecurity threats, that could jeopardize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries. Additionally, balancing ethnic engagement within Mauritius, given its significant population of Indian origin, will affect decision-making by the government of Mauritius. Such challenges will arise from rapid regional and global changes, but it is the responsibility of both countries to reach a common agreement and work toward a shared vision for the future that brings mutually beneficial outcomes for both nations.
References
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Bank of Mauritius. (2024, February 12). Media Release: Mauritius and India Launch RuPay and Unified Payments Interface Linkage. https://www.bom.mu/media/media-releases/media-release-mauritius-and-india-launch-rupay-and-unified-payments-interface-linkage
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Firstpost. (2025, March 11). PM Modi in Mauritius: Why the Island Nation is Crucial to India | Vantage with Palki Sharma. [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/902Tl5MIeco?si=oCYcxgavlcfl0mpi
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High Commission of India, Port Louis, Mauritius. (2009, July 29). Signing of the Agreement on Co-operation for the Establishment of Telemetry, Tracking and Telecommand Station for Satellites and Launch Vehicles and for Co-operation in the Fields of Space Research, Science and Applications between India and Mauritius. 1 [Press release]. High Commission of India, Port Louis, Mauritius. Retrieved from https://hcimauritius.gov.in/press?id=zbq2d
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Thursday, April 24, 2025
INDIA - MAURITIUS RELATIONS: A Multifaceted Analysis of Bilateral Cooperation
Sunday, September 26, 2021
BANDARANAIKE - CHOU VISION: The consolidation of Sino-Lanka relations
by George I. H. Cooke
The rationale and spirit in which diplomacy is embarked upon, determines the nature, fruitful or otherwise, of the connectivity and collaboration that is to follow. Its usage spanning centuries, provides the student and practitioner with a sphere that has evolved, remained relevant and continues to flourish as a common language in International Relations. Identified by G. R. Berridge as ‘an essentially political activity and, well-resourced and skillful, a major ingredient of power’ diplomacy today provides a platform from which states are able to improve their political acumen thus promoting that which is at the core - national interest.Irrespective of the state, each looks to improve its position,
accrue much and foster a healthy, dynamic and vibrant role in global politics. Given
the challenges, within the domestic political milieu and that with which states
contend globally, diplomacy comes to the forefront of interactions, especially
with regard to the latter.
Small countries like Sri Lanka rely most heavily on diplomacy in
global engagement. It is not hard power in the form of military might or
economic prowess that may be nuanced through soft power that determines the
longevity or success of small states, but their reliance on engagement with all,
which is paramount.
Large countries, such as China, which Martin Jacques claims is
“not just a nation-state, it is also a civilization-state” given the gigantic size, the magnitude of population and
the propensity to effect change, have much at their disposal. While diplomacy
is a key tool, it is complimented with a variety of other embellishments. Such
continent-like countries strategize on equivalent terms but they too realize
that in the global community the need exists to cooperate with all.
Therefore from a bilateral perspective the engagement in
diplomacy by two countries, vastly different when considering Sri Lanka and
China, provides an example of collaboration and continuity which has been
mutually beneficial. The nexus created more than sixty years ago through the
rapport that was nurtured by Ceylon’s fourth Prime Minister S. W. R. D.
Bandaranaike and China’s first Premier Chou en Lai led to the establishment and
consolidation of diplomatic relations. Thus the question is asked about the
nature and impact of this profound friendship on their respective countries’
bilateral relations with the other, which continued to grow in a colossal way over
the succeeding decades. The degree of bilateralism enjoyed today between China
and Sri Lanka can be used as an example of a Major power-Small power
relationship.
The current Chinese global policy direction through the
amalgamated Belt and Road Initiative which in turn brings Sri Lanka closer to
China through trade, investment and economic cooperation, is yet another key
milestone. The China of 1949 and the China of 2021 are in complete contrast in
relation to many factors yet the country continues to preserve its primary
identity and basic character. The same could be said about Sri Lanka, although
it could also be argued that whilst the former strove to make progress the
latter has faltered. Yet it the degree of interaction between the two countries
that have seen a drastic change from 1950 to date with the leadership of the
two countries engaging in differing manner, yet maintaining sound relations.
The relationship between Bandaranaike and Chou in formulating a
firm foundation enabled successive leaders on both sides to build the sound
strategic partnership that exists today. Being examined is the initial foray
into engagement and the determined steps being taken by two persons to solidify
that which was present and strategize for that which was to come. Chou’s visit
to Ceylon in February 1957 may be termed the catalyst in the bonding between
the two leaders and countries, who enjoyed relatively similar upbringings, making
them resolute and trustworthy of the other.
While Bandaranaike had his Oxford-educated persona complimenting
his nationalistic outlook, Chou, who had been born into a genteel family in
Jiangsu Province, had struggled through the Revolution. Chou returned to China from
Europe in 1924 as a leader in the Communist Party, while Bandaranaike too
travelled home from Britain a year later and entered the political arena. Each
found in the other a comrade and it is their vision, it is argued, that stands testimony
to tangible and intangible aspects of Sino-Lanka relations from then to date.
China – Sri Lanka
relations
The travels of Fa Hien, the Chinese Buddhist monk and Zheng He,
the Chinese Admiral and navigator form but part of a vivid collection of references
in a rich tapestry which spans centuries of Sino-Lanka ties that have been
documented in detail in ancient manuscripts. Vernon Mendis notes that the
presence of Fa Hien at the funeral of the Arahat Mahinda during the reign of
Uttiya, successor to Devanampiyatissa, the role played by Zheng He during the time
of Vira Alakeshwara, and the civilizational contribution of China and Sri Lanka
along with India as three of the ‘foremost civilizations of Asia...linked by
ties of Buddhism and forming a kind of Buddhist commonwealth,’ are indicative
of the engagement that existed.
Mendis claims that the ‘establishment by Sri Lanka of these
relations with China at this early period was a significant initiative the full
characteristics of which and implications have not been sufficiently examined.’
Religion formed an integral part of connectivity while trade played a crucial
role with shipments of ‘…cotton goods, gold and silver filigree work and Buddha
images (sent) to ancient China’ as identified by S. F. De Silva, and other
material including silk were received in return. These interactions were taking
place at a time when travel was restricted to maritime excursions, perilous as
they may have been, yet Mendis maintains ‘the missions sent by Sri Lanka rulers
from the 5th to the 8th centuries [amount to] about 16
missions… in all.’ He also notes that ‘these missions ended abruptly in the 8th
century and after that there is no evidence of contacts with China until the
visit of Admiral Zheng He in the 15th century.’
Five centuries later on 06th January 1950, ‘the
Government of Ceylon (has) decided to recognize the new Government of China’
marking the first official recognition of the People’s Republic of China that
was being made by post-independent Ceylon. This saw a revival, although to a
negligible scale, of ancient ties that had existed. Berty Gajameragedara opines
that this recognition ‘established the fundamental juridical condition for the
eventual establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.’
The gesture though considered symbolic at the time was to prove
politically expedient as it laid the foundation for trade negotiation that took
place in mid-1952. Faced with a Hobson’s choice scenario owing to a fall in
rice purchases from East Asia and the dollar issue, Gajameragedara observes
that Ceylon decided to ‘turn to China, which after the embargo of May 1951 came
into effect, had repeatedly offered rice in exchange of Ceylonese rubber.’ The
negotiation and subsequent signing of the Agreement between Yeh Chi-Chuang and R.
G. Senanayake in Peking on 04th October 1952 was yet another
milestone in bilateral relations. Despite differences in political ideologies,
R. G. Senanayake justified the stance adopted arguing that they ‘should not
stand in the way of countries trading with each other, if that trade is to
their mutual benefit.’ Senanayake observed that in relation to China, ‘the late
Prime Minister even went so far as to protest against the imposing of bans on
the export of rubber from Malaya to China,’ attempting to dispel the often
construed pro-West stance of D. S. Senanayake and his sentiments towards
communism which had been articulated on earlier occasions.
Chinese Premier Chou en Lai’s first direct interaction with a
Ceylonese Prime Minister was to be with Sir John Kotelawala in Bandung on the sidelines
of the Afro-Asian Conference in April 1955. Yet in January that year, Chou had
extended an invitation to Kotelawala to visit China and in February ‘making yet
another gesture of friendship towards the Ceylonese Government, on the occasion
of the seventh anniversary of independence, sent a message of greetings,’ which Gajameragedara states was the first of its kind from a Chinese leader to Ceylon. Calling
for ‘Sino-Ceylonese relations to grow increasingly in the cause of maintaining
peace in Asia and the world,’ Chou’s gesture strengthened cordiality and sowed
the seeds for future interactions.
The precursor to Bandung having been the Colombo Conference of
April/May 1954 saw Kotelawala one of the hosts along with the leaders of Burma,
India, Indonesia and Pakistan. In addition to dispelling
misgivings and assuaging prejudice, the Chinese Premier led China into the
global arena with his own savoir-flair style of diplomacy. Mendis
claims that the highlight of Bandung
‘was no doubt the image of Chou en Lai as an apostle of sweet reasonableness,
disarming his critics and allaying fears and stealing the thunder.’
Of
the twenty nine countries convening in Bandung, only seven had established
relations with China. The tone set in Bandung, in announcing that China had
arrived on the world stage once again, this time as a nation-state, resulted in
what Mendis claims was ‘a parallel trend in
China where after Bandung it acquired a new and benign image thanks to the
diplomacy of Chou en Lai which allayed fears of its expansionist ambitions and
gave the impression of peace and goodwill and the desire to co-exist with all
states and cooperate with them meaningfully.’
Even before the nexus was forged between Bandaranaike and Chou,
it was the Chinese Premier who was making a continuous effort to engage with
Ceylon. Whether the repeated offers to trade rice for rubber before the Rubber–Rice pact was actually initialed, the attempts to send a delegation to Ceylon
to strengthen relations, the invitation to Kotelawala, the liberal attitude
adopted in renewing the pact, the Independence greeting, among others, may be understood
as diplomatic gestures aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation.
The Bandaranaike –
Chou vision
S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s election in 1956 signaled a distinct
change in Ceylon’s foreign policy, particularly in relations with China. His notion
of foreign policy expanded across divides of ideology and political leaning. In
the early 40’s Bandaranaike had actively supported and led a bid to establish
an Asian United Nations Organisation, based on suggestions made by Tagore and
other Indian leaders. He envisioned it ‘would be of substantial value to all
Asian countries at a moment in human history like the present when the world is
moving so rapidly towards a new age.’ This enthusiasm, although shared by Nehru was not unanimously
accepted, yet Bandaranaike was appointed, with George E. de Silva, to a
committee tasked with reporting on the proposal to the next Asian Conference that
was due to be held in China in 1949. The possibility of forging unity ‘not
merely within the various Asian countries but unity among the peoples of the
continent of Asia,’ was of great interest to Bandaranaike.
Bandaranaike’s pre-independence desire to forge Asian solidarity
and safeguard the interests of a region that was emerging from its colonial
period, resulted in him seizing the opportunity upon his election in 1956. His
was the view that Asia’s collegiality was paramount for facing the challenges
of the changing times. In this regard he understood that China’s presence and
potential needed to be an integral part of any equation determining the future
of Asia. The Ambassador to the UN, R. S. S. Gunewardena outlined this relevance
recalling that ‘at the Conference of the Colombo Powers of India, Pakistan,
Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia – a resolution was adopted unanimously to the
effect that the non-recognition of Communist China increased the tension in the
Far East and as a constant threat to peace.’
Thereafter heightening the call for inclusion of China not only
at the regional level but on the global stage, Bandaranaike used the maiden
speech of a Ceylonese Prime Minister at the UNGA to express regret ‘that there
are still some countries which are awaiting admission, countries whose claims
to such admission appear to many of us to be unquestioned, and whose admission
will undoubtedly make more fully representative the membership of this great
world Organisation for peace. Amongst them I wish to mention in particular such
countries as the People’s Republic of China.’
The Claude Corea Mission to explore the possibility of establishing
diplomatic relations in September 1956 resulted in the exchange of Ambassadors in
1957 and the signing of agreements on trade and payment, and economic aid. The
forthright manner in which Ceylon was reversing an earlier policy orientation
and venturing into hitherto unchartered territory was to be one of the most
prudent foreign policy decisions undertaken by Bandaranaike.
1957 thus ushered in a new era, for Ceylon and China, in which
policy expanded, relations were reformulated, global dynamics were understood
and new efforts were undertaken to traverse further down the path of
bilateralism. Chou’s visit to Colombo in February 1957 and their
interactions consolidated a bond of friendship that extended far beyond the two
individuals, and remains the foundation upon which diplomatic connectivity has
flourished ever since. Bandaranaike saw potential in the relationship. The
like-mindedness of these two leaders brought to fruition two visions;
Bandaranaike’s intention to engage across the ideological divide, especially
with a leader in Asia and Chou’s keenness to collaborate with Ceylon.
An aligning of vision occurs during the historic visit in 1957. Having
understood the opportunity afforded in intensifying cooperation with the East,
Bandaranaike welcomed Chou as special guest at the eighth Independence Day
celebrations, noting that ‘we in Ceylon and the countries of Asia look upon the
contribution which the People’s Republic of China is making in shaping the new
world as perhaps the greatest contribution any country has made.’ His choice of
words ‘perhaps the greatest contribution’ identified the potential Bandaranaike
saw in China, who was an ally and Asian neighbour.
The Chinese Premier, no less generous and equally
thought-provokingly pointed out that ‘the Chinese and Ceylonese people have more
or less the same destiny.’ He articulated the desire of both to ‘shake off our
legacies of backwardness and poverty from the past and build new happiness’ and
the determination ‘to safeguard everlasting world peace.’ The joint statement issued
at the end of Chou’s visit reflected their shared understanding of the period
as one of transition and that ‘in eras such as these, it is not unusual to find
divergent outlooks and varying conceptions of societies. But we believe that
nations can live in peace with each other despite these divergences and
different social systems.’
His observation of relations with Ceylon may be translated
further to encapsulate China’s view of Asia as the leaders reiterated that
‘while recognizing and respecting differences of outlook that may exist between
us, we are determined to strengthen those ties, develop our economic
cooperation and cultural exchanges and foster cooperation to our mutual
benefit.’ Alluding to their varied political ideologies, Chou characteristically
displayed his enthusiasm to ensure that relations would reach their zenith, irrespective
of their stances.
Chou’s visit Kandy and his paying homage at the Temple of the
Tooth Relic in addition to making a personal contribution to its building fund,
is seen as a revival of the ancient linkage of Buddhism. In the wake of the
1958 floods China granted loan assistance worth Rs, 50,000,000 for flood relief
and rehabilitation work. Similarly the 1959 Agreement on air transport and
Protocol on the exchange of commodities of the same year did much to nurture
bilateral relations. Yet the lasting nature of diplomatic connectivity was dependent
on the rapport built up by the two leaders.
Anticipating much potential in their respective countries which had
both emerged as players on the international stage less than a decade earlier,
the Bandaranaike–Chou visionary outlook included an essence of convergence with
a mutually beneficial impact on interactions. Premier Chou having stridden
the world stage just two years earlier at Bandung had taken the message of what
China was and would be, to the world. Bandaranaike provided undivided support
as the paths of the two countries became intertwined to a greater degree in the
decades to follow.
Belt and Road
Initiative
Xi Jinping’s 2013 initiative to revive the ancient Silk Road and
optimize on the potential of it as a vehicle of fostering connectivity was
received as yet another prudent measure adopted by the Chinese leadership.
Already yielding results, the Belt and Road initiative has crossed the
continents of Asia, Europe and Africa and even reached out to Latin America.
The potential of linking vibrant East Asian economies with those of Africa, and
more developed economies of Europe generate much needed certainty and promote
potential.
Following Xi’s unveiling of it in Kazakhstan, the mega-project
sought to include Central Asia in building a Silk Road Economic Belt which
expanded to the ASEAN community in constructing the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) ‘to finance infrastructure
construction and promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration” Xi’s strategic vision saw an
acceleration of the linkage among neighbouring countries even including Russia
connecting the initiative to the latter’s Euro-Asia Railways. Deeper
cooperative mechanisms such as the Economic Corridors encompassing
China-Pakistan and China-India-Myanmar brought the initiative to South Asia as
other countries including Sri Lanka were to be made integral partners.
Jacques Martin has outlined that ‘Today China’s diplomacy with
Asia has morphed from a rigid state-guided scheme into an eclectic array of
initiatives from many stakeholders: the state, the Party, the military, the
provinces, cities, companies, [and] thinks tanks.’ Resonating that which was
projected by Chou in Bandung more than sixty years ago, the current leadership
has utilised an array of resources, a gamut of policies and most importantly
the ancient tool of diplomacy to effect change.
Having reached out and
strengthened relations in Asia and in Africa over the last several decades,
China’s venture even further into Latin America has proved noteworthy. Amidst
such progress, China’s desire in dealing with Sri Lanka, in accordance almost with
Chou’s vision that ‘the Chinese and Ceylonese
people have more or less the same destiny,’ has seen the further strengthening and deeper
consolidation of engagement to a level of strategic partnership. The many
projects completed and others being implemented and still more in the pipeline,
whilst being indicative of the concretized partnership between two vastly
different countries, augurs well for Sri Lanka, if the island nation makes the
most out of every single project. Providing much needed capital for development
in the wake of the devastating conflict, China has proven to be an
‘all-weather’ friend cooperating across the spectrum from guaranteeing
political support, to providing economic aid.
The Major power – Small power relationship in play in this
instance portends much potential. As China rides into the Asian century at the
helm, Sri Lanka is guaranteed a ringside seat. Thus the impact of the BRI on
Sri Lanka would, in time to come, prove monumental. It can therefore be argued
that it is testimony to the visionary leadership of two leaders of yesteryear,
who, unknowing of the future, sought to reach out to each other and undertake a
journey together.
Auguring well for South-South cooperation, the fast changing tide with
which China gradually assumes a higher, if not the highest role in the
international hierarchy, augurs well for Sri Lanka. It stands testimony to the
fruit of the Bandaranaike-Chou vision that is being reaped today. It needs to
be understood in the Asian context and then the region as a whole can share the
success of an Asian neighbour.
Tuesday, March 2, 2021
AN AIR DIPLOMACY POLICY FOR SRI LANKA: Sri Lanka Air Force reaches its 70th anniversary
By George I. H. Cooke
On the eve of the 20th century the Wright Brothers tested their wing-warping control concept of a flying device which revolutionized travel. Their invention in July 1899 set the pace for advancements in aviation that saw humans not only flying around the world but venturing further, into outer space and even landing on the moon 70 years later in 1969. To date, many other aspects of air travel have intensified with the space race playing a key role.
The intrinsic patterns of history which resulted in the rise and fall of states have seen a significant development throughout the twentieth century as air travel intensified to its current level of operation. The ability to cross regions and continents in shorter periods of time altered the practice of diplomacy itself. Whilst diplomats played a critical role for centuries as the emissaries of leaders, who rarely or never met, increased air travel has enabled connectivity at the highest level, resulting in the diplomat needing to evolve and for the practice of diplomacy to become more indepth and specialized.
Amidst these vast strides in diplomacy and transportation, the Air Power of states has grown significantly allowing for its use in times of emergency and need, as well as during conflict. Air Diplomacy and its usage, is of paramount relevance for an island nation, such as Sri Lanka. Given that connectivity and defence are the basic tenants upon which states like Sri Lanka have survived for millennia, the rationale for Air Diplomacy is imperative. An Air Diplomacy policy would generate new opportunities for Sri Lanka and Foreign policy, while increasing the potential of the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF).
An innovative Air Diplomacy policy needs to be rationalized on two levels, bilateral and multilateral. Identifying critical areas of governance and incorporation of strategy to achieve overarching objectives ensures the creation of a state which can harness opportunities, develop industry, prosper people and equally importantly, increase its presence and influence on the world stage. All nation states, irrespective of their size, location or resources, look to enhance their potential and power. A comprehensive Air Diplomacy Policy augurs well for defence, strengthens foreign policy, boosts diplomacy and increases connectivity.
Developed countries race into the future with the latest innovations and modern technology, with immense power and intense influence. The advancements are spread across private and public sectors, with states improving infrastructure, enhancing air capabilities and incorporating this dimension into diplomacy to increase connectivity. Developing countries heavy reliance on diplomatic engagement to remain formidable players on the world’s stage often lack sufficient infrastructure and budgetary constraints.
It is thus necessary for such countries, including Sri Lanka to explore areas of cooperation through which the synergy of joint collaboration would yield positive results. A concerted policy of Air Diplomacy would result in a plethora of opportunities which portend well for the betterment of the SLAF as one of the key implementing agencies. It would be a venture into a hitherto untapped area of expertise that would advance diplomatic engagement and strengthen foreign policy tools at the disposal of the state.
BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT
Sri Lanka has numerous missions which are accredited to more countries. Continuous interactions with these countries form the first tier from which an Air Diplomacy policy could be activated. This could be established by the SLAF, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Sri Lanka Missions as well as resident missions in Sri Lanka and Honorary Consuls. Reaching out to as many countries as possible conveys a strong message of interest and seriousness while raising awareness towards the national initiative.
Of the countries with which Sri Lanka engages, many are those from which purchases of ammunition, equipment, aircraft, vessels have been made. Given their importance and the rationale for closer relations, it would be prudent to propose solid cooperation such as structured joint sessions between the militaries, and joint drills, with foreign Air Forces. This interface would lead to deeper understanding, better cooperation and stronger connectivity, especially at times of need. As leaders in the aviation sector, these countries have the capacity and capability to extend cooperation in the technology sharing sphere.
RESEARCH AND TRAINING
Research remains a crucial factor for policy formulation. Efforts have to be made to understand the nature and potential of Air Diplomacy, through collaboration among academia, the SLAF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs if the endeavour is to succeed. A thorough study would reveal areas in which strengths exist, weaknesses persist, opportunities abound and threats maybe perceived. Equally important are case studies of other countries, their Air Forces, the nature of collaboration therein and the means through which such policies have been formulated and implemented. Countries look to increase Air Power and what appears as sole Air Power strategies would possess critical processes in which Air Diplomacy has been incorporated.
In June 2019, the integral air partnership between France and Singapore came in for praise. Singapore’s Senior Minister of State for Defence Heng Chee How speaking at the Cazauz Air Base in France noted that the opportunity to train alongside a very professional Air Force, such as the French Air Force spoke volumes of the practical value of the bilateral collaboration. He observed that a strong and capable defence must include a strong Air Force, which has the ability to train its pilots well. The collaboration was good for both countries as Singapore gained the latest technique and precision, while France deepened ties with an Asian ally.
In July 2019 military cooperation was enhanced through joint air patrols as Russia and China negotiated an agreement for deeper cooperation and conducted their first joint patrol mission over the Sea of Japan. The agreement was an extension of one that was agreed in 1993 which focused on conditions for cooperation in military technology. It also detailed training, learning and information exchanges, mutual assistance in servicing weapons and military equipment and conducting joint research and commemorative military events.
These are unique platform for countries to consolidate their relations and strategize collectively. The depth of the partnerships would be felt in situations of tension as these strategic partners bolster each other. Sri Lanka would do well to attempt deepening such partnerships for research and training thereby widening existing opportunities afforded from foreign Air Forces. The exposure that SLAF officers would receive would enable them to gain knowledge and insight into the latest innovations and technology whilst also equipping them with deeper understanding of countries and their policies.
Programmes at the Junior Command and Staff Course could see more foreign participants, who would understand Sri Lanka better, and comprehend the trajectory of the country. Their presence in increased numbers would in turn allow Sri Lankan officers to grasp subtleties of foreign forces through interactions and this would yield vital results in the long term as these officers progress in seniority in their respective forces and retain a unique connection to Sri Lanka. A senior level programme would also be beneficial in yielding such results and be a supplementary platform for interaction. Similarly a concerted effort is required to obtain reciprocal placements in foreign Air Force Academies. From the sporting arena, through friendly aircraft visits, bilateral drills and air shows at periodic stages through which an interest is generated among the general public connectivity would be deepened between the two Forces and countries. Avenues for engagement remain limitless. An Air Diplomacy policy would contribute towards Sri Lanka’s overall bilateral engagement.
MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT
The second tier of multilateral engagement could see regional conclaves through existing regional mechanisms or through new structures. While South Asian cooperation seems too early, Sri Lanka could play a catalytic role of bringing Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) countries together to implement a policy of Air Diplomacy and enhance security cooperation.
Sri Lanka currently chairs the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) with leadership delegated in the area of technology. BIMSTEC is an ideal platform from which military cooperation can be promoted with an Air Diplomacy Policy. This position of leadership gives Sri Lanka the possibility of reaching out to other member states and embarking on a new initiative. Air connectivity remains pivotal for states and the incorporation of such a policy would bode well to strengthen regional ties, and serve as a platform for increased development of the Air Forces of each member state.
Furthermore, within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), wherein Sri Lanka is a dialogue partner, the country could seek deeper engagement, even actively campaigning for full membership, while articulating the contribution, especially in the area of counter terrorism that the country would be able to make, and gain through collaboration with other member states, observers and dialogue partners. Having identified the three evils of separatism, terrorism and extremism, the SCO undertakes numerous initiatives which include military drills at the All-SCO level. Awareness of the impact of such exercises is not widely discussed but the presence of the political leadership at the drills denotes the growing significance of the organisation. Inclusion of India and Pakistan in 2017 increased the importance of the grouping as its area of coverage reaches across South Asia. 2021 marks two decades of the SCO and it would be prudent for Sri Lanka to increase its membership even at this stage.
Of the member states, China has constructed and utilizes special warehouses and other infrastructure to carry out simulations for military exercises as part of training. This is done to recreate the environment and provide for varied terrain which is required for complete training purposes. Sri Lanka, possessing different forms of natural terrain within the country, as well as the vast territory, in which the conflict was waged, and the ideal temperature and topography to simulate tropical environments, would be able to offer a complete option to China and SCO. These conditions are not curtailed to the land and extend further throughout the diversity found with regard to the sea and especially in relation to the air space over varied forms of land, and the sea.
Sri Lanka and Russia have enjoyed close diplomatic relations since 1957. In contemporary times, Sri Lanka has experienced the wholehearted support of Russia, especially in international fora. Sri Lanka needs to reach out to Russia and seek support in expanding its membership in SCO. Sri Lanka should not merely seek membership to add yet another international grouping to its list of multilateral engagement bodies. Sri Lanka is more than a decade after ending a violent terrorist conflict on its soil and is in a position to share its experiences with the world. It is this experience that Sri Lanka needs to take to the SCO table, and for which Russia and other countries in the grouping would find the provision of full membership noteworthy. The platform exists, and it is up to Sri Lanka to make the initiative of interacting that much more.
While the aspect of terrain would augur well for overall military cooperation, a proposal based on Air Diplomacy creates a new platform for collaboration. Whilst the joint military drills are carried out in member states, the floating of a new initiative of this nature would give dialogue partners the opportunity of being included in such exercises.
Smaller countries stand to gain much from such groupings and questions are raised over their contribution in return. It is imperative that countries like Sri Lanka ‘bring to the table’ the decades of experience, especially in the fields of counter terrorism, and are identified as countries that have acted with determination and deserve due recognition for the contribution made in thwarting terror on its soil. The offer of fresh initiatives, expertise and territory – land, sea and air - translate into tangible aspects of cooperation which would be welcomed by the SCO and would bode well for Sri Lanka, if and when the country decides to seek full membership in the grouping.
AIR DIPLOMACY DIALOGUE
Exploring new areas of air connectivity through the creation of a ‘Shangri la Dialogue’ model could be implemented for purposes of Air Diplomacy. This platform would generate immense opportunities for Air Chiefs, multiple stakeholders from the field and technical experts to converge each year in a bid to discuss military aviation issues, multilateral cooperation, enhance regional security as well as improve humanitarian assistance and relief efforts. The conference would also serve as a hub for the sharing of information on suspicious air activity, response to terror threats, and measures that could be adopted to thwart such activity and threats.
This ‘Air Diplomacy Dialogue’ structured to bring together the government, military and academia would converge vital sectors in securing the best possible opportunities for the countries concerned. With representation from the government hierarchy, military command and academicians, consensus could be sought and reached on regional and international issues in the field of air power. Sri Lanka’s hosting of such a venture, although financially intense would give the island an unparalleled niche in this sphere. This initiative would require a solid entrenchment in the sector first and it would be prudent to realize such a Dialogue in the long term. Realizing this initiative would make the island the centre of Air Diplomacy and the key node in the dialogue on Air Power in South Asia.
AIR CHIEF’S CONCLAVE
Whether through international groupings, or through an Air Diplomacy Dialogue, a primary step in promoting cooperation in the sphere of Air Diplomacy is the hosting of an Air Force Chief’s Conference. Given the pivotal role of Air Chiefs, and their role in formulating and implementing an Air Diplomacy policy, a conclave through which they would meet annually is paramount to set direction and ensure results.
Whether in the Americas, Africa or South East Asia, the apparatus in operation is one which identifies the overwhelming importance of guaranteeing and strengthening Air Power and adopting sound Air Diplomacy polices which augment other Foreign policy tools in boosting cooperation, providing security and developing a fresh platform for cooperation. Three case studies identified, from the Americas, Africa and South East Asia indicate commonalities which enable clear study of their modus operandi. The potential in bridging gaps in regional security, establishing policy to combat threats and improving preparedness displays their success, and highlights the importance of the platforms they have created.
The System of Cooperation among the American Air Forces (SICOFAA) was established to consolidate cooperation among the Air Forces of the American continent and for joint action if the need arises. SICOFAA focuses on simulated air operations, human resource enhancement, provision of education, training, scientific research, conducting search and rescue missions, preparing for disaster relief operations and weather related exercises, improving telecommunication and generating awareness on aerospace medicine. Air Chiefs of the 21 members meet annually at the Conference of the American Air Chiefs (CONJEFAMER).
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) established an ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference (AACC) in 2004. It functions as the key platform for their Air Forces to foster closer ties and increase cooperation in military aviation and multilateral air force collaboration to respond to issues concerning counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In 2018, the AACC strengthened the standard operating procedures for ASEAN Air Forces to respond faster to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HADR). These measures included a uniformed prefix in aircraft call signs for regional HADR operations, to ensure faster diplomatic clearance processes. They created the ASEAN Air Force Centre Counter-Terrorism Hotline to share information about suspicious air activities and terrorist threats, and supported the Guidelines for Air Encounters between Military Aircraft framework as a confidence building measure to increase aviation security.
The African Air Chiefs Symposium (AACS) comprise Chiefs from across the African continent meeting with their American counterparts to discuss continental defence issues. They identify their national capabilities and challenges and look for ways to resolve common issues, while guaranteeing training and force development. The AACS has evolved a Charter which outlines the fundamental areas to be air operations in relation to mobility; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); close air attack, provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, responding to transnational threats, improving human resources, education and training, guaranteeing supply, logistics and rapid response as well as prevention of air accidents and ensuring air domain safety.
CONCLUSION
Formulating a two - tier strategy would result in the consolidation of a network of strategic partners. Bilaterally the scope of engagement is vast given the potential of collective action to boost the aviation sector and earn the dividends of synergizing. From joint sessions at the highest and technical levels, improved research and sharing of technology, to international exposure through increased overseas training opportunities and increased domestic training courses for foreign officers, as well as bilateral air drills and friendly aircraft visits, all of which would consolidate the strategic partnership that Sri Lanka would enjoy with key partners in the international community.
At the multilateral level, the opportunities being harnessed bear testimony to the potential of joint efforts in maintaining peace and stability within, increasing regional security against outside threats, raising standards across the board and equally importantly fortifying Foreign policy. An Air Chiefs Conclave would see Sri Lanka being identified as a country with genuine interest in Air Diplomacy and create a new niche on the world’s stage, ensuring that image is built, and trust and confidence is boosted.
The adoption of the two – tier strategy would enhance connectivity and defence which are the basic tenants upon which states have survived for millennia. The rationale for Air Diplomacy remains paramount as the implementation of an Air Diplomacy Policy would generate new opportunities for Sri Lanka in general, while increasing the potential of the Sri Lanka Air Force which has made a decisive and overarching contribution to the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the island nation, and is today at its 70th anniversary.
120 years after the Wright Brothers revolutionized travel, humanity stands on the threshold of harnessing the vast strides made in the field of aviation. Whilst developed countries sprint into the future with the adoption of the latest technology and mutually beneficial collaboration, it is time that developing countries in general and Sri Lanka in particular, broadened the scope of diplomatic engagement, enhanced capacity to reach beyond the accepted, built strong and long lasting partnerships, while further strengthening ones that exist, and look to the future to rebrand, revitalize and revolutionize diplomacy.
An Air Diplomacy policy promises to lay the foundation for such an endeavour and needs to be pursued with vigour if Sri Lanka is to take her place amongst her contemporaries in the current age.


