NEUTRAL GROUND: Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Test amid Indo-Pak Tensions

By L. M. Sachini Navodya

The Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025 reignited the nuclear-tinged historical rivalry between India and Pakistan, raising concerns about regional stability. If the situation escalates into armed conflict, Sri Lanka, as a regional actor with historical and current ties to both countries, could face significant geopolitical, economic, and security repercussions. This article thus explores the implications of a possible inter-state conflict on South Asia and particularly on Sri Lanka, drawing on the complex history of the India-Pakistan conflict and Sri Lanka’s evolving role in South Asian geopolitics.

History of India-Pakistan Conflict

Looking back at the history of this rivalry, since independence from Britain in 1947, India and Pakistan have engaged in four major wars and numerous skirmishes, with the disputed territory of Kashmir at the heart of their rivalry. Key milestones include the: First Kashmir war (1947-1948), triggered by Pakistan-backed tribal incursions into Kashmir, leading to the Maharaja’s accession of the region to India and the establishment of the Line of Control (LoC) following a UN-brokered ceasefire; Second Kashmir war in 1965 sparked by border clashes and Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir, ending in a military stalemate and the Tashkent Agreement; Third Kashmir war in 1971 centered on the Bangladesh Liberation movement, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh and a decisive Indian victory and Kargil war in 1999 marked by Pakistani infiltration in Kargil, Ladakh, and intense fighting at high altitudes, with India regaining lost ground and Pakistan facing diplomatic isolation. These conflicts have thus entrenched a legacy of distrust, militarization, and nuclear brinkmanship in South Asia.

Impact on South Asia: A Region at Crossroads

The 21st century has been hailed as the ‘Century of Asia’, with South Asia poised to leverage its demographic dividend and economic potential. However, an India-Pakistan conflict could shatter this vision, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. The nuclear brinkmanship with both nations possessing nuclear arsenals, and heightened tensions risk accidental escalation, as seen during the 1999 Kargil War and 2019 Balakot crisis.

A potential crisis could also spur economic disruption in the region risking South Asia’s intra-regional trade (less than 5% of total trade) to collapse further, particularly if India-Pakistan border closures and airspace restrictions persist. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which traverses disputed Kashmir, could become a flashpoint, drawing China deeper into the conflict. It could also lead to humanitarian crises such as the triggering of refugee flows, straining of resources, and the revival of ethnic tensions, particularly affecting marginalized communities in Kashmir and border regions.

The potential rivalry could also result in an institutional paralysis leading regional organizations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), already weakened by the clash of the two, to face irrelevance, stalling initiatives like the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).

Sri Lanka’s Role in the Prolonged Conflict

Sri Lanka has historically played a nuanced and pragmatic role throughout the rivalry between its two neighbours, often leveraging its position to maintain autonomy and serve its national interests while navigating the sensitivities of both regional powers. In the 1971 India-Pakistan war, under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Sri Lanka notably allowed Pakistani civilian and military aircraft to refuel and use Colombo as a stopover, after India denied Pakistan overflight rights. This was a significant move since it enabled Pakistan to maintain air links with its eastern territory (now Bangladesh) while underscoring Sri Lanka’s willingness to assert its sovereignty and its non-aligned foreign policy —even at the risk of displeasing India, its much larger neighbour. The balancing act was furthermore visible with Sri Lanka maintaining strong diplomatic and economic ties with India despite providing Pakistan with logistical support.

What a Renewed Conflict could mean to Sri Lanka?

Thus, predicting what impact a possible conflict could have on Sri Lanka, as a fragile small power, a renewed conflict could force Colombo into a precarious diplomatic balancing act. It would compel Sri Lanka to avoid overt alignment, risking alienation from either power or both.

● Security and Strategic Autonomy

An India-Pakistan war would heighten regional insecurity, potentially drawing Sri Lanka into the conflict’s periphery. The island’s proximity to India and its reliance on Indian goodwill for security and economic stability would limit its foreign policy flexibility. Sri Lanka might face pressure to align with India, risking its defense ties with Pakistan and complicating its non-aligned stance. Furthermore, worsening the crisis, such a conflict could invite greater involvement from external powers (China, the US), with Sri Lanka potentially becoming a site for strategic competition, especially given its ports and location along key maritime routes. This potential involvement would also make the country’s act of balancing even complicated, with Sri Lanka’s increased alignment with India economically and diplomatically, particularly given China’s entrenched support for Pakistan and its footprint in Sri Lanka in terms of debt and investments.

The escalation of the potential conflict could also lead to possible dilemmas for Sri Lanka. If China intensifies military support to Pakistan, India might pressure Sri Lanka to restrict Chinese naval access to Hambantota emphasizing the threat to India’s security, testing Colombo’s diplomatic agility. Given the potential support of the US to India, enhanced Quad cooperation could offer Sri Lanka alternative investments, reducing reliance on China but requiring alignment with Western strategic interests on the other hand.

● Economic Vulnerabilities

Sri Lanka’s economy, still recovering from its 2022 debt crisis, remains fragile. A regional conflict could disrupt maritime trade routes in the Indian Ocean, affecting Sri Lanka’s ports, which handle transshipment for both India and global markets. Furthermore, tourism—a critical revenue source—could suffer due to perceived instability, echoing declines seen during the country's civil war. Additionally, rising oil prices from conflict-driven market volatility would strain Sri Lanka’s import-dependent economy further.

● Humanitarian and Diplomatic Fallout

A protracted conflict could exacerbate refugee flows to Tamil Nadu, indirectly affecting Sri Lanka through heightened sensitivities around Tamil minority rights. Colombo might also face pressure to condemn cross-border terrorism, aligning with India’s stance, while avoiding actions that could legitimize Pakistan’s position.

Sri Lanka’s Tightrope: Navigating Indo-Pak Conflict

At an hour of a renewed rivalry between India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka’s best strategy is to maintain a pragmatic, balanced, and non-aligned foreign policy, leveraging its geostrategic location to attract investment and security cooperation from multiple powers without becoming a proxy or flashpoint in their rivalries.

At an hour of foreign policy dilemma, it is vital that Sri Lanka emphasizes balanced engagement and sovereignty. Sri Lanka’s leadership has repeatedly articulated a desire to remain neutral and avoid entanglement in great power rivalries, as reflected in statements emphasizing non-alignment and the prioritization of national sovereignty. This approach allows Sri Lanka to maintain flexibility and avoid being drawn into the strategic competition between India and China, both of whom have substantial interests in the island—India as a regional hegemon and China as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The country could reinforce its neutrality through proactive diplomacy. It could publicize its non-aligned stance by issuing immediate statements emphasizing Sri Lanka’s neutrality, drawing from its historical non-aligned movement roots. Declare Colombo as a potential venue for peace talks, leveraging its 1971 precedent of facilitating dialogue during crises.

Sri Lanka could also activate regional platforms by using the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) or SAARC forums to advocate de-escalation, positioning Sri Lanka as a mediator while highlighting shared regional interests in maritime security and economic stability to rally consensus.

The strengthening of ties with regional organizations like SAARC and BIMSTEC would also aid in ensuring economic safety and trade continuity for Sri Lanka. This “concentric circles” approach places geographic neighbours at the center of engagement, which helps assuage Indian security concerns while still allowing space for economic cooperation with China and others.

The country could also leverage its strategic location for multilateralism at an hour of crisis. Sri Lanka’s position at the crossroads of major maritime routes gives it leverage to act as a hub for trade, logistics, and regional connectivity. By promoting itself as a neutral venue for dialogue, maritime cooperation, and disaster response, Sri Lanka can attract investment and security partnerships from a range of actors, including the US, Japan, and the EU, in addition to India and China. This multilateral approach reduces overdependence on any single power and increases Colombo’s diplomatic capital.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, the India-Pakistan conflict, amplified by external power rivalries, threatens to fracture South Asia’s fragile cohesion. For Sri Lanka, the crisis underscores the perils of multipolarity: economic dependencies and strategic alignments leave little room for autonomy. Its survival in an India-Pakistan war hinges on active neutrality, economic pragmatism, and multilateral hedging. By leveraging its geostrategic location, historical non-alignment, and partnerships with extra-regional powers, Sri Lanka can insulate itself from direct fallout while positioning itself as a facilitator of regional stability. The goal must be to emerge as an indispensable intermediary rather than a collateral casualty. Thus, unless regional leaders prioritize dialogue over brinkmanship, the promise of an Asian Century risks being eclipsed by perennial conflict and geopolitical fragmentation.

INDIA - MAURITIUS RELATIONS: A Multifaceted Analysis of Bilateral Cooperation

By Nishali Ranasinghe

The 2025 visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Mauritius made headlines in global news. Modi received Mauritius' highest honour, the Grand Commander of the Order of the Star and Key of the Indian Ocean, suggesting a strong connection. This visit by a prime minister to another country raises questions about why the PM traveled to Mauritius, an island with little influence in world politics. Analyzing the relationship between these two countries will provide an answer to that question.

The Historic Connection

Mauritius is a subtropical island country in the Indian Ocean, just over 1,130 kilometers east of Madagascar, off the southeastern coast of Africa. Its outlying territories include Rodrigues Island and other smaller islands (The Commonwealth, n.d.). Conversely, India is a rising global power in the Asian region with more than 1.4 billion populations. Mauritius and India may not share the same status in the global arena. However, these two countries share a strong bond, rooted for ages. According to Sinha (2024), after Mauritius became an English colony in 1810, approximately 470,000 Indians were sent to Mauritius as indentured labourers between 1834 and 1920 and this significantly impacted the sugar plantations. The human cargo was carried from Bihar, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. The people who migrated to Mauritius embarked on their new journey in Mauritius with a new identity but retained Indian values and cultures. As a result, out of the 1.2 million population in the country, 70% are of Indian origin.

In addition, in 1901, while traveling to South Africa, Mahatma Gandhi landed in Mauritius and advised the people to educate themselves and reclaim their identity. This message stayed with them and because of it, they celebrated their national day on the day Gandhi started his Dandi March also known as the Salt March on March 12.

After becoming an independent state in 1968, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam became the first prime minister of Mauritius, and his son, Navin Ramgoolam is the current prime minister. The connection between the two countries has not been reduced but expanded in many ways. This expansion has occurred in different sectors; Defense, Military and Strategy, Economy, Technology, and Capacity Building.

a. Defense, Military and Strategic Partnership

In 1974, the two countries signed a defense agreement, making India and Mauritius strategic partners. To date, India guarantees Mauritius’ security showcasing a powerful bond. The backing of India has been evident on several occasions. In 1983, there was a rumour about a coup by the MMM (Mauritius Military Movement), and even though it never occurred, it was believed that the then PM, Indira Gandhi wanted to send Indian troops to the country. In 2024, India welcomed the UK-Mauritius agreement for Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, which houses a US-UK military base, and Modi reiterated India’s “firm support” for Mauritius on this issue (Parashar, 2025).

In his recent visit to Mauritius, Modi again confirmed that India will support Mauritius’ sovereignty over the Chagos Island following the statement made by US President Trump that he would support a deal between Mauritius and Great Britain over the future of the United States-United Kingdom base in the Islands. It can thus be understood how India has always been a country that supports Mauritius in protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity proving to be a friend in need.

Additionally, the Indian Prime Minister also unveiled "Vision MAHASAGAR – Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions” for the Global South which vision builds upon the foundation of the earlier "Vision SAGAR" (Security and Growth for All in the Region) that encompasses principles of trade for development, capacity building for sustainable growth, and mutual security for a shared future (Laskar, 2024).

Furthermore, since 2009, the Indian Navy has been deploying ships to Mauritius bi-annually to assist in patrolling the vast EEZ of the island country. The joint patrolling focuses on preventing piracy and illegal fishing and helps reinforce maritime security in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Mauritius (Padmaja, 2017). As reported in Firstpost (2024), since the EEZ in Mauritius extends up to 2.3 million square kilometers and is difficult to monitor, India built an airstrip costing $250 million in Agalega Islands after signing a memorandum in 2015. The airstrip is 3km long and is suitable for Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare (LRMR-ASW) aircraft which are used for maritime surveillance and strike, electronic warfare missions, and search and rescue missions. This will ultimately assist them with their goal to combat contemporary non-traditional security threats such as piracy, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

In this manner, Mauritius has the security and defense backing from one of the rising global powers in the world. From India’s side, they are capable of protecting Mauritius as well as countering any non-traditional security threats and constructing the influence from China coming into the country.

b. Economic Partnership

Mauritius being an island nation, has grown to be a nation with significant status after its independence in 1968. Being a small state, the country mainly depends on many sectors such as tourism, manufacturing, construction, financial services, and agriculture. Due to the shared history, India has been supporting Mauritius to achieve their targeted economic goals, and is one of the major players and drivers of Mauritius’ economy.

India’s support in successfully implementing several infrastructure projects, such as India-Mauritius Metro Express Project, New Supreme Court Building, New ENT Hospital, 956 Social Housing Units, and Educational Tablets, showcases the bond between the two countries developed over time and India has overall invested $1.1 billion in Mauritian projects (Government of India, 2025).

As Singh (2023) points out, Mauritius has emerged as a significant source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India, and with the Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) India aims to streamline taxation, reduce complexity, and gradually eliminate tax exemptions. By enhancing the taxation framework, India aims to create a fair and conducive environment for foreign investors while promoting economic growth and investment in the country. It is apparent that this has contributed to Mauritius' emergence as a significant financial hub in the global market.

Further strengthening bilateral economic ties, the two countries have also signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA). The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA), signed in 2021, marked India’s first trade agreement with an African country. This agreement further solidified the bilateral relationship and paved the way for increased trade between the two nations. In the fiscal year 2021-2022, the total trade between India and Mauritius amounted to $ 786.72 million, with significant growth witnessed over the past 15 years (Singh, 2023). The CECPA encompasses a wide variety of areas, including Trade in Goods and Services, Rules of Origin, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, Dispute Settlement, Movement of Natural Persons, Telecom, Financial services and Custom procedures.

The initiatives demonstrate the effort by both countries to foster mutually beneficial economic cooperation. They also highlight how strategic partnerships like India and Mauritius can drive sustainable economic growth in their respective nations.

c. Technology Partnership

Within the technological parameters, India assists Mauritius in many ways, especially in people-centric digitalization. India has supported the implementation of the e-judiciary system, and digitization of archives and records at the Mahatma Gandhi Institute, strengthening cooperation in the field of ICT including cyber security, Digital Public Infrastructure, and capacity building for the same, and explore the implementation of successful digital tools developed by India, such as PM Gati Shakti digital platform, as per Mauritius’ requirements.

Similarly, since 1986, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India's national space agency, has operated a satellite tracking system in Mauritius which helps India guide its missions in space. The press release by the High Commission of India, in Port Louis, Mauritius (2009), states that ‘The Government of India may assist in the training of scientists and technicians, upon request from Mauritius, at various facilities under the Department of Space in the use of remote sensing data in applications relevant to Mauritius. Moreover, the Government of India may also provide, upon request, technical assistance for the establishment of a remote sensing cell or unit in Mauritius, selection of equipment and training of staff, and operationalization of the Station, and that a Mauritian scientist shall be attached to the TTC Station.’ This exhibits Indian presence in Mauritius for a considerable period. Thus, it can be noted that both countries share a genuine connection that expands in many areas.

d. Capacity Building

Strengthening bilateral relationships between the two countries, capacity building is one aspect that both these countries focus on. Capacity building encompasses many actors. For instance, Public Service and Administration, Diplomacy, Trade and Commerce, Finance, Infrastructure, and Health.

As reported by the India News Network (2024), during the visit to India in 2024, officials from both sides discussed opportunities for collaboration, particularly focusing on enhancing the administrative capabilities of Mauritian public officers through capacity-building programs and faculty development initiatives. Moreover, out of the 8 agreements that were exchanged between Mauritius and India in the recent visit in 2025, the two countries focused on other important aspects such as diplomacy, commerce, and trade. According to the Government of Mauritius (2025), an MoU was signed between the Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service in New Delhi, India, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade of the Republic of Mauritius, for the exchange of information on the structure and content of training program for diplomats and another MoU between the Ministry of Industry, SME and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic of India was signed to develop micro, small and medium enterprises in the respective countries.

In addition, the launching of India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) can be considered as one of the key steps in strengthening the banking and finance systems in Mauritius and it will also create not only a connection between the two countries but also trust. This new payment infrastructure will enable customers of participating banks to make seamless and secure payments both in Mauritius and in India. RuPay cards issued in Mauritius will be accepted at ATM and Point of Sales (POS) terminals in India, and Indians will be able to make UPI QR transactions at participating merchants in Mauritius. Commenting on this new payment service, the Governor of the Bank of Mauritius, Harvesh Kumar Seegolam, stated that "the launch of the RuPay and UPI linkage between Mauritius and India marks a significant milestone in our efforts to enhance financial connectivity and promote digital transactions. This collaboration will not only facilitate seamless and secure cost-effective payments for our customers but also strengthen the economic ties between our two nations." (Bank of Mauritius, 2024)

In terms of infrastructure, India has assisted in contributing to the implementation of several development projects in Mauritius. During the recent visit to Mauritius, both leaders agreed to work towards timely delivery of 100-electric buses and the associated charging infrastructure, implement Phase II of High Impact Community Development Projects, finalize discussions on the new Parliament building on a site to be identified by Mauritius, and conclude framework understanding to implement this project with India’s grant assistance, finalize discussion on the redevelopment of the Ganga Talao Spiritual Sanctuary and conclude framework understanding to implement this project with India’s grant assistance and explore new areas of development cooperation, as per the needs and priorities of Mauritius.

Apart from the above initiatives, the two countries have collaborated in the health sector as well. As reported by the Economic Times (2024), India launched their first overseas Jan Aushadi Kendra in Mauritius. Chandna (2024) noted that the scheme is promoted as an affordable medicines scheme by the Modi government where they offer generic drugs priced 50-90% lower than their branded counterparts in the market and Mauritius has shared a list of 16 therapeutic areas based on which the stock of drugs is being prepared such as cancer, anti-diabetic, antibiotics, nervous system, urology, painkillers, antifungal drugs, and supplements.

Conclusion

The connection between India and Mauritius dates back many decades, and from the examples mentioned, we can see how these two countries have developed and expanded their ties across many sectors. Like any other relationship, the connection between these two countries encounters challenges. For instance, there is a rise in geopolitical influence in the region, and balancing the interests of superpowers like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and China is an important and challenging task not only for Mauritius but also for India. Consequently, maritime security threats and challenges will increase due to the region's importance and the strategic location of Mauritius.

Furthermore, there is a rise in non-traditional security threats globally, such as climate change and cybersecurity threats, that could jeopardize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries. Additionally, balancing ethnic engagement within Mauritius, given its significant population of Indian origin, will affect decision-making by the government of Mauritius. Such challenges will arise from rapid regional and global changes, but it is the responsibility of both countries to reach a common agreement and work toward a shared vision for the future that brings mutually beneficial outcomes for both nations.

References

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DIPLOMACY WITH A DIFFERENCE: Chile’s Bold Feminist Foreign Policy

By L. M. Sachini Navodya

Having begun with Sweden’s introduction of the world’s first explicit feminist foreign policy (FFP), which was initially met with “giggles” and doubt, FFPs have gained significant traction in contemporary global affairs. A foreign policy of a country is generally how a country conducts its relations with other countries in the world. ‘Feminist’ derived from the theory of feminism refers to the stance of advocating for political, economic and social equality of all genders. An ideal working definition for an FFP would thus be a:

...policy of a state that defines its interactions with other states and movements in a manner that prioritizes gender equality and enshrines the human rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups, allocates significant resources to achieve that vision and seeks through its implementation to disrupt patriarchal and male-dominated power structures across all of its levels of influence (aid, trade, defense and diplomacy), informed by the voices of feminist activists, groups and movements.” (Clement & Thompson, n.d., p. 7)

This article thus offers an overview of the Chilean FFP.

Chile’s Feminist Foreign Policy Framework

In March 2022, the government of Gabriel Boric announced its shift towards adopting a feminist foreign policy. This was followed by the official presentation of Chile’s FFP by Minister Alberto van Klaveren, the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Gloria de la Fuente and the Under Secretary of International Economic Relations, Claudia Sanhueza.

As an extension of the government’s emphatic focus on human rights, the novel policy attempts to establish gender equality as a guiding principle in the work arena of the Foreign Affairs Ministry instead of merely relegating the responsibility to smaller departments. Often known as a ‘living document’, the FFP was portrayed by the Gloria de la Fuente “as a strategy of international insertion in accordance with the challenges posed by the global agenda” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 2023, para. 2).

With progressive track record of gender mainstreaming with initiatives such as: the inclusion of gender related clauses in trade agreements; establishment of a feminist government with 14 ministers, out of the 24, being women, and the 2020 Global Trade and Gender Agreement (GTAGA) between Chile, Canada, New Zealand, Columbia, Mexico and Peru, as depicted in Figure 01, the policy promotes participation, inclusion, transversality and intersectionality under the 8 priority themes of: Strengthening Democracy; Empowerment and Representation; Women, Peace and Security (WPS); Trade and Gender; Climate Change; Science; Technology and Innovation; and Healthcare (The Gender Security Project, n.d.):

Figure 01 Chilean Feminist Foreign Policy Framework

Note. The image is an AI generated image portraying the four areas promoted by the Chilean FFP and the 8 priority themes.

According to the Gender Security Project (n.d.), the policy becomes participatory and inclusive since it recognizes that gender gaps are obstacles for democracies and therefore should be designed in a way that it benefits each and everyone. It becomes transversal since it aims to make the approach to gender equality a norm that would lead all areas of work and engagement of the Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, it becomes intersectional, since it recognizes the structural violence and the impact of overlapping identities that exist in the interactions between various genders in varying contexts.

What measures have been taken to put the policy into practice?

Various measures have been initiated at the institutional level to ensure that the benefits of the gender-sensitive framework would extend from the local institutional level to the international level. Portraying progressive signals of a successful policy implementation, it established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to weigh the outcomes of the measures taken. Having recognized the flaws of predecessors who had adopted feminist foreign policies without follow-up mechanisms, a Gender Affairs Division was established by the Foreign Ministry to oversee the implementation of the policy.

In addition, Chile also dedicated a website to track the progress while ensuring regularly updated information and explanatory materials and clearly communicated monitoring mechanisms.

The Minister further signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Gender Equality Seal for Public Institutions of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which seeks to establish a framework for collaboration in this area. As a part of this cooperation the action plan would be resumed following the identification of the gender gaps existing within the institution. As the final phase of the program, a certification will be issued after the final evaluation recognizing the Under Secretariat as one conforming with the gender equality standards which acts as a cornerstone for the success of the FFP.

Efforts have also been extended to increase the count of women in embassies while acknowledging that the feminist foreign policy agenda extends beyond numbers (Winter, 2023). Furthermore, for the purpose of ensuring the continuity of the policy while promoting greater women’s participation in decision-making spaces, the policy has also proposed the establishment of an Advisory Committee of Experts which will provide strategic advice to the authorities to reach progress on parity by 2030.

Why is the Chilean FFP significant?

With its feminist policy, Chile has become the first South American country to have adopted an FFP. Apart from this, several historical and structural factors portray the significance of the policy. With a history of being governed by conservative and centrist parties which resisted progressive gender policies and even left-leaning administrations often contesting such policies and its history of authoritarianism with the military dictatorship of Pinochet that involved severe suppression of women, it is surprising for a left-wing government to push for gender mainstreaming at an international level.

The FFP is also a significant departure from the country's conservative backdrop with the Catholic church having a strong influence on Chilean politics and society, particularly on abortion and reproductive rights. It is also a departure from the strong machismo culture in Chilean society with the persistence of gender-based violence, wage gaps and limited political representation of women.

The adoption of the feminist policy is also a shift from Chile’s traditionally pragmatic and trade focused foreign policy which prioritized economic interests over social justice. This shift thus suggests a redefinition of national priorities, emphasizing human rights and gender justice alongside trade and diplomacy.

What challenges lie ahead for the Chilean FFP?

Despite the progressive efforts, the Chilean FFP also faces certain obstacles. Chile would have to face challenges in the implementation of the policy when conducting its trade and diplomacy with non-feminist regimes like China and West Asian nations with which it has strong economic ties.

Furthermore, given Chile’s unsatisfactory gender equality status in the domestic arena especially in relation to high rates of femicide, wage gaps and lack of comprehensive reproductive rights, there lies a possibility of the creation of a policy paradox when advocating for feminist principles in its foreign policy. This scenario is furthermore highlighted with the statement of the Under Secretary Gloria de la Fuente which emphasized that despite the progress achieved overtime, the rate of women ambassadors in 2023 was only 30% (Winter, 2023), far from reaching parity.

The policy could also face backlash from conservative segments ranging from the opposition parties to businesses to the general public who believe feminist policies to be ideological rather than strategic.

In addition, given the inconsistency of many global FFPs which were criticized for being symbolic rather than substantive, Chile has the challenge of proving its commitment, ensuring that its foreign policy is not just a statement but a long-term actionable strategy supported by resources and institutional reforms.

Chile’s FFP thus marks a bold redefinition of national priorities, positioning gender equality as a fundamental pillar of diplomacy. By embedding feminist principles into international engagement, Chile is not only challenging its own historical and structural constraints but also setting a precedent for other nations. However, the success of this policy depends on its resilience against both domestic and international resistance. Its true impact will be measured by its ability to sustain long-term institutional change, bridge the gap between rhetoric and action, and navigate global complexities while maintaining its commitment to gender justice. If Chile succeeds, it will not only transform its own diplomatic landscape but also inspire a new global standard for inclusive and equitable international relations.

References

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. (2024, March 4). Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents Chile’s feminist foreign policy and announces new ambassadors. https://www.minrel.gob.cl/news/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-presents-chile-s-feminist-foreign-policy-and

The Gender Security Project. (n.d.). Feminist foreign policy – Chile. https://www.gendersecurityproject.com/feminist-foreign-policy-countries/chile

Thompson, L., & Clement, R. (2019). Defining feminist foreign policy. International Center for Research on Women. https://www.icrw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICRW_DefiningFeministForeignPolicy_Brief_Revised_v5_WebReady.pdf

Winter, B. (2023, December 19). A spotlight on Chile’s feminist foreign policy. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/a-spotlight-on-chiles-feminist-foreign-policy/

A Glimpse into Sri Lanka-United Kingdom Relations

By J. K. Janith Prabashwara Perera

University of Leeds, United Kingdom

Introduction

With Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) under British rule for 133 years, the ties between Sri Lanka and United Kingdom extend across colonial history, trade, diplomacy, and cultural exchange. From its past as a British colony to its present as a sovereign state, Sri Lanka maintains a complex yet dynamic relationship with United Kingdom—marked by strong bilateral cooperation and a trilateral connection through the Commonwealth of Nations. This article provides an overview of these relationships, offering insights to further strengthen the foreign policies of both nations for mutual growth and collaboration.

Pre-Colonial Era

In Pliny, the Elder's Naturalis Historia, Sri Lanka (then referred to as Taprobane) is described as an exotic and wealthy island renowned for its pearls, gems, and spices, which were highly prized in the Roman Empire. This led to the establishment of trade connections between the two regions. Pliny also mentions an embassy from Sri Lanka to Roman Emperor Claudius (41–54 CE), highlighting the early diplomatic and trade relations between them (Murphy, 2004). It is noteworthy that, during this period, Britain was part of the Roman Empire, known as Roman Britain.

Colonial Era (1796–1948)

The coastal areas of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) came under British control in 1796, when the Dutch ceded power during the Napoleonic Wars (Sivasundaram, 2007). This presented an opportune moment for the British Empire to extend its dominance, especially considering the island’s strategic maritime position and the wealth of precious stones and spices it possessed. However, it was not until 1815, following the signing of the Kandyan Convention, that the British gained control over the entire island (Amarasinghe and Rajhans, 2020). With this consolidation of power, Ceylon officially became a British colony. During this period, the British introduced plantation agriculture, infrastructure development, educational reforms, and an administrative and judicial system—many of which have left a lasting legacy on the country today.

The introduction of plantation crops such as tea, rubber, and coffee, which became vital to Sri Lanka's export economy, was one of the most significant legacies of British rule. Tea and rubber remain two of Sri Lanka’s primary exports, providing essential foreign income. In 2022, the United Kingdom was Sri Lanka’s second-largest export partner, accounting for 7.44% of the total export share (World Integrated Trade Solution, 2025). In terms of infrastructure, the railway system, established during British rule, remains one of the main forms of public transportation. Despite ongoing modernisation efforts, much of the original infrastructure is still in use and maintained.

The administrative and democratic reforms implemented by the British also left a lasting impact. Although local representation was limited, the establishment of the Legislative Council in 1833 marked a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s move toward democratic governance (Jayasinghe and Welikala, 2013). However, communal representation in the Legislative Council has been criticised for deepening ethnic divisions, which later contributed to the rise of Tamil nationalism and ultimately plunged the country into nearly three decades of ethnic conflict (Soherwordi, 2010). In 1931, the Donoughmore Reforms introduced universal suffrage, paving the way for a more representative government. These changes eventually led to the Soulbury Constitution in 1947, which set the stage for Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948. However, Sri Lanka remained a dominion until 1972, with the British Queen as the head of state (Abeyratne, 2019). The parliamentary system, based on the British Westminster model, remained in effect until 1978, when an Executive Presidential system was introduced through the second Republican constitution. Today, Sri Lanka operates under a semi-presidential hybrid presidential-parliamentary system, with the Prime Minister also playing a significant role in governance.

The judicial and education systems in Sri Lanka are also deeply influenced by British practices. English Common Law, based on legal precedents and judicial decisions, which was adopted during the colonial era, continues to govern Sri Lanka's legal framework (University of Minnesota, 2018).  Similarly, Sri Lanka’s education system has been heavily influenced by British models, with remnants of its colonial legacy still evident. For example, the university system follows the British higher education structure (Jayasuriya, 2001), while gender-segregated schools—established during British rule—continue to function today, reflecting the enduring impact of coloniality (Albrecht, 2024).

Post Independence (After 1948)

On 4 February 1948, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) became a self-governing independent state with a Westminster-style parliamentary system (Abeyratne,2019). D. S. Senanayake, the first Prime Minister of independent Ceylon, also assumed the roles of Minister of External Affairs and Defence, maintaining close ties with the United Kingdom. In 1949, Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake signed the London Declaration, officially making Ceylon a founding member of the Commonwealth of Nations, a voluntary association of independent states that preserved Ceylon’s sovereignty while maintaining strong diplomatic and historical connections with Britain. However, the British monarch remained the Head of State, British military forces continued to operate in Ceylon for few years even after independence, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the UK remained the highest court of appeal. As a result, Ceylon functioned as a Dominion until 22 May 1972, when it became a republic and was renamed the Republic of Sri Lanka (Abeyratne, 2019).

In the decades following independence, Sri Lanka and the UK maintained strong relations centered around trade, education, and governance. Many Sri Lankan political leaders travelled to the United Kingdom for education and exposure to new ideas. At the time of independence, Sri Lanka was an open economy, with a tariff-based preference to products of the British Empire, before efforts to diversify trade with the rest of the world was focused (Jayawardena, 2018). The UK continued to be a major export market for Sri Lankan products, including tea, rubber, textiles, and coconut products. In the 1970s, when Sri Lanka attempted trade liberalisation and more open economic policies, the UK remained a key trade partner. Records from the UK Parliament (2000) confirm that since 1964 Sri Lanka has received formal development assistance through British government aid agencies. These aid and technical assistance have been invested in the development of public administration, healthcare, agriculture, and community development projects. Relations between the two countries took a significant turn during the years of the civil war and its immediate aftermath.  

Civil War and Post-War Diplomatic Challenges

Relations between Sri Lanka and the UK became strained during Sri Lanka’s civil war (1983-2009) due to the UK’s concerns over human rights violations by both the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The UK also became home to a significant Tamil diaspora, many of whom voiced concerns over the human rights abuses in Sri Lanka (Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010).

During the civil war and its aftermath, the UK provided humanitarian aid to displaced Tamil populations and civilian victims. British humanitarian organisations, including Oxfam GB, Save the Children UK, and the British Red Cross, played key roles in relief efforts despite significant access challenges (Goodhand, 1999; Harris and Lewer, 2002; Save the Children, 2024; Tran and Chamberlain, 2009). Additionally, the UK supported international peace efforts, particularly during the failed peace talks and the Ceasefire Agreement in 2002 (UK Parliament, 2002).

Although the UK became home to a large Tamil diaspora, the LTTE’s violent campaign for Tamil Eelam, employing tactics of terrorism, led the UK to designate the LTTE as a terrorist organization in 2001. Additionally, due to LTTE supporters in the UK engaging in fundraising and lobbying efforts, the UK viewed the LTTE as a threat to national security and banned it under the Terrorism Act 2000 (Curtis and Robinson, 2024). After the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, the UK advocated for justice and accountability, calling for an independent investigation into war crimes allegations (Mason, 2013). This created diplomatic tensions between the two countries, but the UK remained a key partner in Sri Lanka’s post-war reconstruction and reconciliation efforts, providing financial and technical aid for peacebuilding, human rights, and governance projects.

Contemporary Ties

In recent years, marked by Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, and political and economic instability in Sri Lanka, trade, development, and political relations between the two countries have demonstrated both cooperation and diplomatic concerns. The Department for Business and Trade (DBT) provides free international export sales leads to UK Businesses to facilitate trade between the two countries (UK Government, 2025a).

While the policies of former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa (2019-2022) were met with mixed reactions in the UK, particularly regarding concerns over freedom of speech, press freedom, and minority rights, the UK's assistance for economic reforms and humanitarian aid played a pivotal role in strengthening bilateral relations (Walker and Curtis, 2022). However, in 2023, British Minister for the Indo-Pacific, Anne-Marie Trevelyan visited Sri Lanka to further solidify ties, focusing on areas such as climate change, security, and human rights. During her visit, she travelled to both Colombo and Jaffna, where she met with then-President Ranil Wickremesinghe and other key government figures (Daily FT, 2023).

More recently, in January 2025, Minister for the Indo-Pacific, Catherine West visited Sri Lanka with a focus on boosting exports and economic growth, meeting with the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka (UK Government, 2025b). This signifies strong and continued diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Development assistance from the UK has played a crucial role in Sri Lanka's post-war recovery, as well as during the pandemic and the subsequent economic recovery phases. In particular, the UK provided lifesaving aid to Sri Lanka's most vulnerable populations, further strengthening diplomatic ties between the two nations (UK Government, 2022).

Today, Sri Lanka and the UK continue to engage in trade, investment, education, and sustainable development. The UK remains a top destination for Sri Lankan migrants, and British influence is still evident in almost every sector in Sri Lanka. Additionally, the two nations collaborate in areas such as climate change, security, and tourism.

Conclusion

From the colonial era to the present day, the two nations have maintained strong diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties. Sri Lanka’s trade with the UK, particularly in commodities like tea, rubber, and textiles, has remained a cornerstone of this relationship, while the UK continues to show interest in Sri Lanka's development, economic growth, and political stability. In conclusion, despite challenges, such as differing perspectives during Sri Lanka’s civil war, the diplomatic ties between the two nations have remained resilient. As Sri Lanka navigates its post-war reconstruction, development, and economic recovery, the partnership with the UK remains a vital pillar of progress, fostering growth, stability, and shared prosperity.

 

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