TAKE COURAGE SRI LANKA, WE ARE A DEMOCRACY!

- George I. H. Cooke

When the going gets tough, we Sri Lankans have been known to rise to the occasion, deal with the situation to the best of our ability, endure the problem, overcome the challenge, and move forward. Unfortunately, we forget. The most important thing we forget is that we have those qualities - of resilience, of tenacity, and that we definitely possess the spirit to survive. Instead, we fear, and what we fear most is change.

A trek back in time, shows that we feared many things but we were always courageous, dealt with the eventuality, and moved on. In 1931, when the British held sway in the island nation, and decided to test universal franchise, there was general fear. Many leaders of that era were against it. The British did not have the most cordial of relations from the time of their arrival, with the natives of the land, yet that change that was feared then is our biggest strength today. We became a democracy and have stayed one, truly embracing all aspects of the democratic system.

Every person who has come to power from independence onwards has faced opposition, owing to the fear of what he or she would do with the country. Yet they won through democratic means, governed to the best of their ability, had strengths and weaknesses, and then had to leave. Yes, they had an effect on this country's journey, which was both positive and negative, and yes, we had to endure hardships at times, yet we survived.

It is we, the voters, who had choices at those elections, we voted, and democracy prevailed. We might have liked those in power or not liked them, but what is crucial is that democracy prevailed. The will of the people, above all else - that's true democracy.

We are the oldest democracy in this part of the world, and undoubtedly a country with people who are bold to expect change, work for change, and bold enough to sustain the ethos of change. We thankfully have such people, and it appears that the number is growing.

In September 2024, the need once again is courage, as it has been on numerous occasions in the past. We have voted in leaders, we have defeated leaders, and we have joined together to oust leaders too. This is the richness of the democratic tapestry that has been woven on this beautiful island for more than seven decades. We now need courage to vote again, and not abstain or spoil our votes. It is our right as citizens to decide on the destiny of our country, and also because there are millions around the world who do have the opportunity to vote, we must cherish this right we possess. 

When there is a glimmer of hope to end corruption, to ensure justice and fair play, to stop nepotism, and bring about equality, why are we afraid? Is it because corruption is good? Are injustices and the unfairness in society, fine? Is nepotism wonderful? Is equality bad? Why then, do some fear?  

Interestingly for some this fear stems from select memories of parts of the past, specific moments in a very subjective manner. Yet we do not want to remember everything or everyone who contributed to all that we have endured from independence onwards, on every side of every divide. If we are keen to open the chest of history, let us do so collectively and genuinely look at all aspects of history and not be subjective in our choice of moments and persons. 

In 2024, our biggest problems revolve around the economy, but how did we get here? Poor decisions led to wrong policies and very importantly, corruption at every level contributed to our crisis. The lack of action against those responsible has been the icing on the cake. We are living in a bubble at present, wherein we owe outside entities so much yet we live as though all is fine. Let us realise the reality and be bold, once again. 

A quarter of the 21st century is almost over. We can either harp on the past, complain about the misgivings of some of those moments and selectively remember only parts of history, OR we can look forward, understand the reality of the country, realise the need for justice, fair play and vision, comprehend the vicious role that corruption has played throughout history, and vote wisely. 

Going forward, if we find corruption rampant, misdemeanours of various forms, and mistakes being made, we can and will change leaders. It has been done in the past, it can be done again. Yet fearing change should not be part of our national psyche, especially in the 21st century, because that is not who we really are. 

We Sri Lankans are made of tougher stuff and possess the resilience and strength to face the future. We need to march ahead with confidence and trust. We need to be bold, we need to take courage, we need to embrace change and not forget that we are a democracy!

Let’s exercise our democratic right, and ensure that above all else, democracy prevails in Sri Lanka. 

THE DEMOCRACY THAT IS INDIA: INTRIGUING, EVOLVING AND INSPIRING

Marking 75 years of Indian Independence

By George I. H. Cooke

Preserving democratic values, ensuring the maintenance of democratic standards and strengthening the process of democratization, are formidable measures for any country. When a country with a population of nearly one and a half billion embraces democracy as its political ideology, continuously champions this system for more than seven decades and implements it across the entirety of its length and breadth and at all levels of its political being, it is clear that democracy has been able to withstand much. India is today the largest democracy on the planet, and with its position comes much responsibility.

The democratization of India, whereby the world saw the abandoning of hereditary monarchical systems, and the dismantling of the privileged structure that had existed even through colonialism, was to set India on a pedestal. Yet this pedestal was not one of natural influence and ability. It did not occur accidentally either. It was to be one on which and from which India, her leaders and people would be called upon to formulate and implement policies that would sustain democracy, nurture its values and ensure that all - irrespective of their communities, religions and castes - who identified as Indian, would be beneficiaries. The journey was not without its challenges, but it is the journey itself that remains remarkable.

The Intrigue - Lessons of the Past

At Independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, was at pains to ensure that India remained a secular nation, which rallied around the Indian flag and identified primarily as Indians, before all else. Undoubtedly it was a firm foundation that gave the Indian nation a strong start. His presence at the helm for seventeen years till 1964 guaranteed that the seeds he sowed would have the opportunity to grow unhindered for nearly two decades. In many neighbouring countries of South Asia, leaders at independence did not survive for even a decade thereafter to see the results of their pre-independence struggles or to fully implement policies they deemed fit for their emerging countries.

India thus received an advantageous commencement on a journey, that has seemed more like a race, with neighbours, with the Cold War, with non-alignment, and with economic liberalization among other entities and concepts, but most importantly with internal challenges of keeping a country as diverse, as different, and as divided as India, together. This diversity is upheld today as a great boost for image and publicity in the international community. Yet arriving at the present involved much cohabitation, compromise and cooperation, that was, is and continues to be unparalleled in the world.

The Evolution – Overcoming Challenges

While it is argued that the holding of elections at regular intervals and electing leaders are not the totality of democracy, they are key components. In the last 75 years Indians have elected leaders and political parties and in so doing removed others, who were subsequently bought back at later times. Leaders have resigned, died in office, been assassinated, Parliament has been attacked, the fundamentals of democracy have come under siege, but despite all of these occurrences and much more, the Republic remains strong. Presiding over a federal system that aims to embrace the diversity and overcome the differences is a complex task. In reflecting upon that which has been, it is evident that the complexity has been comprehended. If not, the Republic would have disintegrated quite some time ago.

Lincoln observed that people remain at the core of any democracy. Whether the ones who are elected, or the ones who elect, it is people who are the direct beneficiaries of any democratic society. Thus, people must never leave the equation nor allow themselves to be excluded from it. If any attempt has been made or is being made to restrict that which a democracy affords, all effort needs to be exerted to rein in the constrictions and permit instead the prevalence and proliferation of all that a democracy stands for.

In neighbouring Sri Lanka, the oldest democracy in this part of the world having gained universal franchise in 1931, when efforts were underway to undermine people, with ill-advised policies, erroneous decisions, incompetent leadership and heightened corruption, that collectively misled a nation of 21 million, people rose up. In proof that democracies are constantly evolving, the people forced leaders out of office due to the aforementioned reasons, and demanded change. While mandates are given at elections, mandates can also be withdrawn especially through mass protests that signify the displeasure of the people and their desire to safeguard the democratic standards that are enshrined in the constitution and which must be preserved in a democracy.

The Inspiration - Strategizing for the Future

Democracy with all its complexities and connotations is still the optimal governance system for any country. Giving people the freedom to elect their representatives who in turn are called upon to formulate sound policies which would have a positive impact on the entirety of the polity, is by far the accepted form of governance, and is widely practiced. India, as the world’s largest democracy has a bigger burden. This is not confined to the implementation of proactive democratic principles within the country alone. It extends to the immediate sub region, the greater Asian region, and the international community. The Indian model, despite its complications and conundrums experienced within, is still the largest working model in the world today. With the growth in population, this position is not likely to be changed for the rest of the 21^st century, and would only be further strengthened in the decades to come.

The onus is thus on India. Indian leaders have an obligation to their people, which extends beyond. The first obligation is to the people of the vast country to be able to live in a society that enshrines basics freedoms, guarantees equality in all respects, and promotes understanding amid diversity. At no time must the citizenry of a country that occupies this primal position be forced to compromise on their freedoms, have their voices silenced, find themselves bereft of recourse to justice, encounter an erosion of democratic institutions, or have any form of ideology foisted upon them. The liberal nature of democracy can create space for such challenges to thrive, but it is the people who remain at the core, and who must be able to thwart any weakening or destabilizing of the democratic norms upon which their nation has been built.

The second obligation is to countries that adhere to the democratic form of governance. If a country the size of India falters, the repercussions would be widespread. Thus far the country has survived in close geographic proximity to two of the largest countries, that advocate different policies of governance. Whilst their preferred policies have been implemented for decades, and would prove effective for them as a means of governance, the larger Asian neighbourhood has adopted democratic norms, as has most of the world. Any faltering or failure to remain the strong, representative democracy that India was envisioned to be at independence, would prove detrimental to many.

Given the challenging global environment in which democracy attempts to thrive, with a skew of ‘isms’ disrupting countries and their courses, India has a third obligation to the democratic tradition as a whole. The concept was first coined in the middle of the 5^th century to denote the system of governance in Greek city states, which had populations of several thousands. Thereafter it survived millennia, and is today practiced in a single country that possesses a population of nearly one and a half billion. This is testimony to the fundamental importance of the system, its traits and what it proffers its adherents. Therein India remains an inspiration to all, from fledgling states to well-founded ones, and cannot renounce its role.

As India surges ahead towards further milestones, it is the action taken at present, that would see the country emerge as a global giant or remain a regional power. Whether through partnerships with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) or membership in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) or even Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), through intensified performance in larger multilateral bodies like the United Nations and its affiliated agencies and organizations, or even in its bilateral relations in South Asia and the world, India can readily rely on two key features, democracy and diplomacy. Both have been strategically implemented and have stood the country in good stead. However as with all key characteristics, no lapses can be encountered, no slips allowed and no mistakes permitted.

India’s place in the world, and also in history has been guaranteed to a large extent by its democratic credentials, which have been bolstered by an effective diplomatic apparatus. In its engagement with the people of India, the people of the region, and those of the world, the Indian leadership has and must continue to safeguard democratic ideals, and guarantee their implementation. A strategized foreign policy administered by an effective and efficient diplomatic structure will see the country raise its stakes for global leadership, realize that which was envisaged more than seven decades ago, and reinforce the enormity of potential and opportunity of the country and her people.

 

 

 

 

 

SHINZO ABE: PRESERVING HIS LEGACY

Guest Commentary by Banura Nandathilake

Subscribers to international relations often come to a junction between theories: Realism, which posits a zero sum world where external circumstances such as hard power and anarchy that are beyond any individual define the ways in which states do what they do, and constructivism which understands an interdependent society of states where leaders truly have an tangible impact on inter-state relations through social mechanisms. The case for the latter seems to outweigh the former in the analysis of Shinzo Abe however, who left an ineffaceable mark on Japanese foreign policy, by guiding a largely pacifist Japan to one that actively moulds and shapes the security, economic and diplomatic architecture of the Indo Pacific and beyond.

As the heir of a distinguished political family, Abe entered politics in the 1990s where he sought to largely continue the policies of his grandfather, the former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi: Regain the ability to exert Japanese power on the regional and world stage by removing the shackles imposed by the US and a faction of the then Japanese political class. As such, Abe went on to become Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister with four terms (2006-7, 2012-14, 2014-17, 2017-20). On 8 July 2022 however, in an event that stunned the heavily gun restricted Japan, the former Japanese Prime Minister was shot and killed during his campaigning run for his party in the Japanese city of Nara. Despite the untimely passing of the "shadow shogun", the direction of Japan's future may be influenced by, thereby correlate with Abe's "vision" to a great extent (Green, CSIS 2022). Japan has built a full-fledged national security establishment, an estimated 1.7% growth in GDP in 2022, and is a bastion of neo liberal democratic policies in the Indo pacific. Below is an obituary for a man who had a heavy hand in reawakening Japan, wherein his effect on domestic and foreign policies will be appreciated.

Domestic Political Legacy

While for many, Abe’s career was one of dramatic and unlikely turns which spanned 14 years and saw him into extraordinary power to influence the direction of Japanese domestic policy, Sheila Smith of Council on Foreign Relations and others understand that a revised domestic constitution may be Abe's major legacy.

Just two days after Abe’s assassination, the Japanese voted in the Upper House election, awarding the government led by the current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida their anticipated victory. Interestingly, Smith notes that the assassination had no credible change in the election environment. The voter turnout was on par with previous years, and Abe’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a structural advantage as the smaller opposition parties did not form a united front thus further dividing the vote. As such, an Upper House win by the LDP could open an avenue for a Constitutional revision, once an ambition of the former Prime Minister. While factors that may postpone an immediate revision do exist, she notes that a revision could have a lasting impact on Abe’s legacy.

Abenomics

Abe’s vision was of regaining the ability to exercise Japanese power, by losing her shackles imposed by low domestic economic power and capital, which can then be turned into military might and diplomatic currency. However, Japanese capabilities were idling, due to the lack of opportunities as per legal and international constraints in the post WW2 era. In the understanding that securing Japan’s future would require an economy with a new foundation for growth, the economic programme “Abenomics” was born. The programme was an attempt to kickstart Japan’s dormant capabilities through expansionary monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, and a long list of industrial, labour, and regulatory policies to incentivise endogenous development. Abenomics aimed to shift production from agrarian or low value sectors to high income productive sectors to slow the decline of Japan’s labour force, in an “serious, sustained, and flexible attempt to grapple with Japan’s growth challenges” (Harris, FP 2022).

Abenomics was instrumental in reviving the Japanese economy, as well as supercharging Abe’s political career. The programme reversed years of stagnation, boosted corporate profits and state tax revenues, thereby reducing unemployment and crime. As such, Abe was able to coast past domestic elections, pausing the tradition of short-lived premierships in Japan. The resulting political durability allowed him to pursue long term ambitions, such as creating a National Security Council which distilled the defence apparatus through the Prime Minister’s office. Such a creation then allowed for a more active foreign policy over the existing passive structure, which sought to strengthen regional ties while balancing against regional hegemons. 

Japan-India Relations

Relations between Cold war Japan and India were one of polite distance: Japan was a US ally, while India was procedurally non-aligned with some overlap of interests with the USSR. Despite the deterioration of the said relations during the 1988 Indian nuclear missile test and the Japanese economic sanctions that followed, the two states were quick to repair and rebuild a “global partnership’’, proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro a few years later during his visit to India. However, it was Abe that built the stage for a more cohesive and interdependent Japanese-Indian relationship, such as the “India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership’’ (2007). Bilateral relations were further strengthened during Abe’s third term in 2014 through a “special and strategic partnership,” which encompassed diplomatic, security and economic sectors. Trade between Japan and India increased exponentially from 2007, while Japan and India cooperated on security issues in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad.

Moreover, it could be understood that Abe's 2007 visit to India was not only significant for the Japan-India relationship, but also India’s perception of itself and its role in the region (Miller, CFR 2022). Miller understands that it was Japan that influenced India, ‘a notoriously reluctant and cautious actor in global politics’ to join Abe’s Indo-Pacific vision, which now serves as an ideological, economic and military buffer to the rise of China. This vision of the “confluence of the two seas” - Pacific and Indian, were first outlined by Abe in his speech during his first visit to India in 2007, and laid the foundation for the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept which was later adopted by the United States.

China and the Quad

China’s rise in the contemporary era has been unprecedented. An authoritarian political system combined with a quasi-capitalist economic system has allowed China to gain regional hegemony and a global great power ranking, allowing its influential military, economic and diplomatic alliances. Such a rise presents a growing threat and demands a balance of power between China and the US and Allies. Of those allies, Abe represented a significant one: Japan.

While Abe was central in expanding India's position in the Indo-Pacific, his pragmatic approach to relations with China demanded a closer look. Abe could be considered a soft liner on Sino-Japan relations, so much so that he was called a "traitor" by many Japanese patriots. This may be so since the uneven economic balance of power weighed more towards China than Japan: Japan needed China for trade and manufacturing, than vice versa. However, as Mireya Solís, the director of the Centre for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution understood, despite his efforts to maintain closer relations with China “Abe felt very strongly that Japan could not live in an Asia where China had hegemony”. As such, Abe’s pragmatism recognised that despite interdependence and globalisation, China represented a challenge on all fronts, diplomatic, economic and military. Ergo, Abe may have been instrumental in setting the tone for the Japanese defence apparatus. Furthermore, Abe subscribed to right leaning nationalist policies domestically, as he helped coax a pacifist Japanese public to oppose China’s meteoric and bullish rise, further laying the groundwork for the direction of Japanese foreign policy.

However, his vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific may have trumped all else. His influence soon superseded national and regional boundaries, as President Joe Biden, who once worked with Abe as the vice president during the Obama administration, put it “He (Abe) was a champion of the Alliance between our nations and the friendship between our people”, and promised to continue Abe’s “vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific” (2022). The US and Japan, along with India and Australia, form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which represents a bulwark against China in the Indo-Pacific. While the US had more economic and military might than Japan, Abe was still paramount in laying the rhetorical groundwork for the Quad, “providing structural, conceptual ideas to things that needed to be provided at a time when it seemed like it was crumbling.” (Hornung, 2022).

On Taiwan

A great power conflict in East Asia appears to brew over the Island of Taiwan which stands a stone's throw away from the shores of China. While the ideological divide stems from the great powers US and China, US allies such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are not passive watchers either.

Japanese leaders before Abe were uncomfortable with using force to defend Taiwan, as implications of such a move for Japanese security, and how Japan's responses to such scenarios were heavily debated. But it was Abe that argued in 2021, “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance. President Xi Jinping in particular, should never have a misunderstanding in recognizing this”. Abe was thus paramount in transforming Japan’s relationship with Taiwan to counter threats from China, for he recognised a hegemonic China posed a risk not just to the security of the liberal democratic states of East Asia, but their economic and sociological institutions as well. As such, Prime Minister Abe emphasised shared economic, political and ideological values between Japan and Taiwan, where he referred to Taiwan as a “precious friend,” an angle the incoming governments adopted thereafter. Abe was an advocate of stronger relations with Taiwan so much so that he went on to argue that the US policy of strategic ambiguity was “fostering instability in the Indo-Pacific region” as he called out the US to “make clear that it will defend Taiwan against any attempted Chinese invasion.”

Furthermore, it was during Mr. Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister that one of the major sore points in the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Japan were resolved. After 17 years of negotiations, in 2013 Japan and Taiwan concluded Japanese recognition of Taiwanese Fishing rights in the East China Sea. As such, affection for Abe and Japan in Taiwan have reached record highs. Thus, after the news of Abe’s passing had reached Taiwan, President Tsai Ing-wen honoured “Taiwan’s most loyal best friend” with the national flag flown at half-mast.

Shinzo Abe could be called a realist, for he understood that despite diplomacy and the multilateral handshaking, states with different value systems and interests must communicate through hard power and deterrence. But to call him a pragmatist through the constructivist lens could be more apt, as he understood that despite anarchy and hard power considerations, leaders are still able to make a difference in the domestic and foreign policies of a state, thereby keeping up with an evolving world stage. As the world honours him in his passing, it is now up to his successors to carry his legacy forward.

 

MARCOS JR.: THE PRODIGAL SON RETURNS

Guest Commentary by Banura Nandathilake

The Philippines is in its Fifth Republic. The First was established when the US acquired it from the Spanish. The Second by the Japanese, the Third by the Americans after WW2, which lasted until Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s martial rule. The Fourth was created when he lifted martial law, and survived until the revolution which toppled the Marcos Government, thereby starting the Fifth republic. On June 30^th 2022, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. became the seventeenth president.

Despite being the son of the former brutal kleptocratic President Ferdinand Marcos Sr, he succeeded Rodrigo Duterte in a landslide election victory. With doubt, scepticism and demands for accountability surrounding him, Marcos Jr. is largely expected to continue the policy course pursued by the Duterte administration. However, the capability for his incoming government to curb rising domestic inflation, while steering the Philippines through a great power conflict happening a stone's throw away from its shores, thereby restoring the Marcos name remains to be seen.

Like Father, Like Son?

Ferdinand Marcos Sr. may be considered as one of the most controversial statesmen of the 20th century, with trademarks of unparalleled corruption, extravagance and state sponsored violence. During the 20 years he spent as the President of the Philippines, his first term was about socio-economic growth. It was a facade however, as the budding kleptocrat had financed domestic infrastructure and public projects through unsustainable debt. Such practices culminated in extreme poverty, inflation and gross inequality during his second and third terms. In 1986, the “people power” revolution resulted in him, his family and his wife Imelda having to flee into exile in Hawaii, with their amassed fortune. While Mrs Marcos left behind her infamous shoe collection, her husband brought with him jewellery, gold bricks and freshly printed Philippine currency, collectively worth around $15 Million. During his time in office, they had plundered more than $10 billion from the Philippine state, most ever recorded in the world. They in fact held an official Guinness world record for largest-ever theft from a government, until Guinness took the record down before his son’s 2022 election. During his time in power, thousands of innocents, including Muslims, alleged communists, dissidents, suspected opposition actors and media figures were tortured, jailed without due process or murdered by the regime’s cronies.

Ferdinand Marcos is the second child and only son of the former president, aged 64 as of 2022. He began his journey in politics at 23, as the Vice Governor of Ilocos Norte (1980–1983) during the years of his father’s reign, until his family’s political exile to Honolulu. Imelda Marcos and family were allowed to return to the Philippines after the death of Marcos Sr. in 1989. While procedurally it was to face charges for misallocation of state resources and corruption, stagnant politics allowed the Marcos’ re-entry into politics. Ferdinand Jr. returned back to the historical Marcos stronghold of Ilocos Norte as its Governor in 1998 for 3 consecutive terms. In 2007, Marcos ran unopposed for the congressional seat, and was appointed deputy minority leader of the House of Representatives of Philippines. In 2010, Marcos Jr. made a second attempt for the Senate in 2010, and entered office on June 30, 2010. Despite multiple scams wherein Marcos Jr. had diverted state funds totalling upwards of ₱305 million to his own account, he contested in the 2016 vice presidential campaign, albeit unsuccessfully. In the 2022 Presidential election however, Marcos Jr. along with his running mate and Vice-President Sara Duterte won 59% of all votes casted. Duterte is the daughter of Rodrigo Duterte - the outgoing president, who campaigned with Marcos Jr. following a split with her father, thereby resolidifying the Marcos hold on office in a system dominated by dynasties.

For all but a minority of mostly older Filipinos, the prospect of another Ferdinand Marcos in the presidential palace is horrifying. For them, Bongbong’s presidency can only result in a return to kleptocracy, as they intone: those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it. The following questions thus arise: Did the Philippines forget history?  Was history rewritten by tools of the future? Or was it desperation, a new ruler following the inability of the previous to rule?

The Rise of Marcos Jr.

Marcos Jr’s rise to political power, from exile with his father to an apparent rightful throne of political apex, maybe analysed as the result of four main factors: drawn out multiyear effort to whitewash the Marcos name, skillful alliance building and political manoeuvring, the penchant of Philippine voters for political dynasties, and the inability of those already in power to govern.

History Forgotten or Rewritten?

Marcos Jr's popularity was kept afloat in his voter base through an aggressive social media campaign, aptly using the tools of the future to rewrite the narrative of history. YouTube and social media were jammed with constructed campaigns pushing a revisionist view of history as the Marcos era being one of crime-free prosperity, not of human rights abuses, extravagant corruption and near-economic collapse. Such a campaign proved appealing to voters who were not only too young to experience the Sr’s dictatorship but had experienced years of relative economic growth and prosperity. If analysed statistically, of the 110 million citizens of the Philippines, the share of population in extreme poverty has decreased by almost 20% since the death of Marcos Sr. in 1989 and the poverty gap has reduced by almost a billion However, the old-age dependency ratio has increased by almost 3% while the age dependency ratio has decreased by about 20%. The median age in the Philippines is 26 years (Ourworldindata.org). Fact checking of the Marcos campaign found that it was 92% disinformation in favour of the Marcos, and 96% opposing his main rival (Tsek.ph). As such, it could be understood that there exists a wide generation gap, and most of the population thereby voters are likely to be younger than older. Furthermore, due to the gap in ages, there exists a gap in memories of the tormented and children of the tormented, which is being exploited to restore the Marcos name.

But the recent events were not all social-media magic. A survey conducted in 1986, three months after the revolution, found that 41% thought he had been “true to the duties of a patriotic president”, which increased to 56% in 1995. In 1986, 44% agreed that he was a “severe, brutal or oppressive president”, while 60 % disagreed in 1995. Such a phenomenon could be aptly summed up by the quote, “Not many of us would care to hold a grudge against someone long dead, not even someone like Ferdinand Marcos'' (Social Weather Stations, 1986, 95).

A Squid game

Since Marcos Sr. died in exile in 1989 and the family returned to the Philippines, the Marcos family have manoeuvred around provincial and national offices from their base in Ilocos Norte, in the north of the country. They have since portrayed the dictatorship as a "golden period" of political stability, economic prosperity and lawfulness, which resonated with many Filipinos mired in poverty, violence and years of corruption.  As Marcos Jr. said, “My father built more and better roads, produced more rice than all administrations before his”. While his critics have accused his social media campaign of misinformation attempting to tone down or whitewash the atrocities under his father's rule, Marcos Jr. further propelled his election campaign by having Sara Duterte as his running mate.

Apart from political games, Marcos Jr. represents a political dynasty, and such a move allowed him to expand his voter base island wide by merging two political dynasties and their strongholds: Marcos of the northern Philippines and the Dutertes of the southern Mindanao island. Furthermore, the new Marcos cabinet relies on technocrats, such as the former Central Bank Governor Diokno, the Transport Minister is the former head of the national airlines, and the Defence Chief is the former Army General, following on the established norm of his predecessor.

New Ruler due to the inability of the Old?

Marcos Jr succeeds Rodrigo Duterte, who as most other elected presidents in the Philippines, started off strong with a popularity boost, but then nosedived. Duterte, unlike Marcos, rose to power as an outsider, as a defender of the ordinary, but lacked apt political governance, resulting in economic stagnation and an air of judicial impunity. His “war on drugs'', which saw at least 30,000 people dead as a result of extra-judicial killings, has attracted international condemnation. His alliance with China has bought little investment and has not curtailed Chinese incursions in the shared South China Sea. His administration of the Pandemic resulted in the economy shrinking by 6% and less than half of Filipinos are fully vaccinated. Such events raise the question however: does the Philippines not elect its Presidents for their proven ability to govern, but instead for the inability of those still in power to do so? A pick between the lesser evil, not between the better of the two? If so, it would not be unlike most other democratic, developing states in Asia.

An Opaque Domestic Policy

Marcos Jr. comes to office at a time of a post pandemic stagnant economy. The Philippine peso is one of Asia’s poorest performing this year, and global recession and inflation is on the horizon. While Marcos has promised to promote self-sufficiency in food due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, his campaign speech was shrewd, devoid of policy details or platform wherein it promised to leave the middle class largely alone as he fulfils the common expectations of Presidents. While he did promise a “comprehensive infrastructure plan” however, in which “no part of the Philippines will be neglected”, he left out any hope for accountability for the sins of his father, or the theft. Nevertheless, he is expected to largely continue the policies of his predecessor, along with his aforementioned technocrats.

Marcos' presidency may not be a means of transforming Filipino society, or addressing structural issues. It is instead the end in itself, a culmination of attempts to whitewash history, and re-solidify the Marcos name to its apparent throne. A significant portion of the population however, almost 40%, may not accept the result. Attempts to disqualify Mr Marcos are underway. Concerns of patronage politics incentivising monopolistic or oligopolistic practices have mounted, adding to the climate of impunity that rules the country.

Diverting from Sr. in Foreign Policy?

A Marcos-headed Philippines remains on the tightrope between the US, its traditional and treaty ally, and the regional hegemon China, whom it has a costly territorial dispute with. Adding on is its distance to Taiwan, wherein it could be on the front line in any conflict between the great powers.

While Marcos has indicated he wants better alliances with the US than Duterte did, who steered Philippines’ foreign policy toward China and Russia, signalling that Washington may have wooed Marcos Jr. just like Sr. This may not mean Philippine-US ties would trump Philippine-China ties however, as Marcos Jr., has long had a close relationship with Beijing. Marcos Jr. is said to be China’s preferred candidate, and has already declared China to be Philippines’ “strongest partner” despite the former’s growing encroachment of the latter’s territorial waters, thereby echoing sentiments of his predecessor. Marcos may still be susceptible to the same anti-Beijing swells of the public however, which limited Duterte’s options in the latter part of his presidency, but such may be conditional on how much more infrastructure funding he is able to draw. Of course, in the age of great power rivalry, the question remains of the cost.

While the Marcos name may have risen, analysts have deemed Mr Marcos’s administration to be likely marked by protests and instability. While that may result in economic stagnation and political roadblocks, along with an opportunity for both the US and China, how long will the Marcos name stay afloat? It may be entirely feasible for Ms Duterte and Mrs Arroyo, a past president, to provide a balance of power in the government, while his technocrats do most of the policymaking. While his congressional record does not suggest he has many big ideas, at least not ones associated with a strongman, they do not suggest he's big on righting the wrongs of history either.

 

SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE 2022: DEEPENING DIPLOMACY AND DEFENCE

GUEST COMMENTARY by Banura Nandathilake

On 12^th June, Asia Pacific’s leading forum for defence diplomacy - the Shangri-La Dialogue ended after a pandemic-induced three-year hiatus. While the Dialogue is procedurally focused on cultivating a sense of security community within the Asia Pacific, which it solely lacks, this year’s event concluded under the uncertain shadow of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the increasingly tenuous US-Sino relations.

The Shangri-La Dialogue is an intergovernmental security conference held in Singapore, by the London based think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in collaboration with the government of Singapore. The Dialogue is chiefly attended by state actors such as Military chiefs, Defence and Foreign Ministers. However, non-state participants too, such as legislators, academic experts, distinguished journalists and business delegates attend the summit. Named after the host venue since 2002, the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore, the forum serves as a platform for debate, expression of views and discussion on specific issues through bilateral meetings. However, off the record meetings are also held, chaired by IISS, to advance policy goals more freely.

Apart from the host nation, participating countries for the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue included Australia, Cambodia, Brunei, Chile, France, Canada, China, India, Germany, Japan, Indonesia, Laos, South Korea, Myanmar, Mongolia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Thailand, Vietnam, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Dialogue was attended by about 500 delegates from more than 40 countries.

Forum Proceedings

The 2022 Dialogue, as all previous sessions, was commenced by Dr John Chipman, the Director-General and Chief Executive of the IISS. This year’s keynote address was given by Fumio Kishida, the Prime Minister of Japan, who set the overall tone for the dialogue - the need for security cooperation and collective action between state and non-state actors in the Asia pacific to counter growing threats in the region and beyond. Broad topics such as the US Indo-Pacific Strategy - a significant shift of resources from the Middle eastern theatre, Competition in a Multipolar world, Military Modernisation, Prescriptions for Myanmar and China’s vision for Regional Order were covered. 

US-China Relations - a String Pulled Taut

The 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue was a significant milestone in contemporary US-China relations. The forum facilitated a meeting between the U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and the Chinese Defence Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe, the first face-to-face encounter since President Biden's inauguration in January 2021. Any hope or reassuring signs of reinstalling lines of direct communication were dispelled by the increasingly sparring headline speeches and subsequent conversations between the two nations, on topics ranging from the status of Taiwan, proceedings within the South China Sea and questions and concerns surrounding grave human rights violations within China.

The US primary criticism of China’s international conduct centred around the latter’s coercive and aggressive actions in the disputed South China Sea, wherein China has constructed man made islands within the shared seaway in an attempt to solidify its claim to the areas enclosed by a ‘9-dash line’ which is claimed by Beijing to grant it exclusive rights, despite non-recognition by international law. “Indo-Pacific countries shouldn’t face political intimidation, economic coercion, or harassment by maritime militias,” Secretary Austin asserted, as “the PRC’s moves threaten to undermine security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.” He further reaffirmed the US position to defend its interests and those of its allies despite increased Chinese movement, mobilisation and pressure.

Secretary Austin’s Chinese counterpart's response was as headline jarring as his. Minister Wei Fenghe described his country’s position as one of self-defence in a global world of zero-sum, self-interested actors. Wei acknowledged his country’s increased nuclear and naval capabilities, in a speech peppered with warnings to tread carefully and avoid Chinese provocation. He further reaffirmed China’s strong stance of a rising great power, one of self-defence but also a crave for international legitimacy through recognition as a peaceful actor. Wei stressed that “It is a historic and strategic mistake to take China as a threat or enemy”. To ensure global peace and development, by virtue of China now being a great power, Wei called for a stop in attempts to “contain China, to stop interfering in China’s internal affairs, and stop harming China’s interests,” signalling that peace was conditional on China’s free reign. His speech further contained a stronger reiteration of the Chinese position on the disputed island of Taiwan - “If anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China – let me be clear – we will not hesitate to fight. We will fight at all costs and we will fight to the very end.”

Shared Ukrainian Costs

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy participated in this year’s Dialogue for the first time through a video link teleconference. Highlighting the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he urged the attendees of primarily Asian states to “remember that support and attention is not only for Ukraine but for (the greater Asia) as well, to ensure that our and your future is safe’’ in the contemporary globalised world. Despite Ukraine’s geographical distance from Asia, Russia’s invasion of his country has global implications, as the political, social and economic distance between countries are much shorter in the present than they ever were. Thus, the costs of war are shared between states, through trade interdependence, geopolitical institutions, and have direct effects such as rising global inflation.

Mr Zelenskyy further stressed that there are ideological costs, as “it is on the Ukrainian battlefield that the future rules of this world are being decided along with the boundaries of the possible.” His position drew clear parallels and a not-so-subtle nod to China's desire for Taiwanese reunification. The political alignments and the ideological divides of the attendee states were made abundantly clear as Prime Minister of Japan Kishida noted that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” further adding to the underlying tension of the Dialogue.

Collective Concerns of the Divided

Despite the lack of collective action on political qualms and tensions owing to non alignment of political compasses, the attendee states of the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue remained receptive to prescriptions for collective concerns. The Dialogue served as a platform to tackle contemporary issues such as global underdevelopment and need of environmental security as a response to climate change, and the green defence agenda wherein the low-lying nations of Maldives, Polynesia and Micronesia were focused upon. The scope of prescriptions for global development and climate degradation are far beyond a single state, and collective action of all nations has shared global benefits. However, talks of nuclear disarmament were pushed by Prime Minister Kishida, who raised the potential for nuclear weapons of China, Russia and North Korea, to cause devastation more than that which was experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite such a statement representing a significant change in the security environment, as it differed from the zero-sum, negative peace structure of the past, it was not well received possibly as one nation may seek to gain more from the said action than the other.

Why They Do What They Do

Security forums such as the Shangri-La Dialogue would be those where one is likely to hear more bad news than good. However, the 2022 forum was not so much a “glass half empty but more of a vessel placed precariously close to the edge of a table, one small slip away from smashing to pieces” (Sachdeva, 2022). As New Zealand Defence Minister Henare noted, there existed “an underlying tension”.

Borrowing from the English School of International Relations (Buzan et al 2002, Bull 1977) would contribute to an apt analysis of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Great power interests define international aspirations and ambitions, even in regional institutions. The Dialogue subscribed to the broad tensions of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the US-China hostilities. Military diplomacy and international institutions which are dominated by great power interests, and smaller developing states are more rule takers than agenda setters. Further, international and weak regional institutions would have little sway in changing great power behaviour and are platforms for great power machinations. Weak regional institutions and forums would have less stringent rules, and less enforcement of such rules which would serve as checks and balances to the power of larger states. Fora such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, as opposed to stronger institutions such as NATO do “not provide much in the way of reassurance about the future trajectory of the relationship (between states) and only reinforces the sense that competition between the two powers is likely to linger thereafter” (Parameswaran 2019).

The fact that the sour relations between US and China continued on since the 2019 Dialogue, which was dominated by the subject of heightened U.S.-China competition serves to solidify the aforementioned understanding.

Despite such dire notions for international cooperation and mitigating global anarchy, the Shangri-La Dialogue represents a necessary, albeit insufficient platform for diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of differences between states. Institutions are only as strong as the rules that states are willing to enforce on themselves. However, institutions and fora such as the Shangri-La Dialogue are still important platforms which aim to resolve statist tensions through negotiated compromise and diffused reciprocity over hard power coercion and war (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The contemporary world is interconnected, with the space and time between events and reactions to such decreasing at an exponential rate. The contemporary world cannot afford to disregard the power of diplomacy for in the words of Henry Kissinger, despite animosities of history, diplomacy serves as means of restraining power.

 

BANDARANAIKE - CHOU VISION: The consolidation of Sino-Lanka relations

by George I. H. Cooke

The rationale and spirit in which diplomacy is embarked upon, determines the nature, fruitful or otherwise, of the connectivity and collaboration that is to follow. Its usage spanning centuries, provides the student and practitioner with a sphere that has evolved, remained relevant and continues to flourish as a common language in International Relations. Identified by G. R. Berridge as ‘an essentially political activity and, well-resourced and skillful, a major ingredient of power’ diplomacy today provides a platform from which states are able to improve their political acumen thus promoting that which is at the core - national interest.

Irrespective of the state, each looks to improve its position, accrue much and foster a healthy, dynamic and vibrant role in global politics. Given the challenges, within the domestic political milieu and that with which states contend globally, diplomacy comes to the forefront of interactions, especially with regard to the latter.

Small countries like Sri Lanka rely most heavily on diplomacy in global engagement. It is not hard power in the form of military might or economic prowess that may be nuanced through soft power that determines the longevity or success of small states, but their reliance on engagement with all, which is paramount.

Large countries, such as China, which Martin Jacques claims is “not just a nation-state, it is also a civilization-state” given the gigantic size, the magnitude of population and the propensity to effect change, have much at their disposal. While diplomacy is a key tool, it is complimented with a variety of other embellishments. Such continent-like countries strategize on equivalent terms but they too realize that in the global community the need exists to cooperate with all.   

Therefore from a bilateral perspective the engagement in diplomacy by two countries, vastly different when considering Sri Lanka and China, provides an example of collaboration and continuity which has been mutually beneficial. The nexus created more than sixty years ago through the rapport that was nurtured by Ceylon’s fourth Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and China’s first Premier Chou en Lai led to the establishment and consolidation of diplomatic relations. Thus the question is asked about the nature and impact of this profound friendship on their respective countries’ bilateral relations with the other, which continued to grow in a colossal way over the succeeding decades. The degree of bilateralism enjoyed today between China and Sri Lanka can be used as an example of a Major power-Small power relationship.

The current Chinese global policy direction through the amalgamated Belt and Road Initiative which in turn brings Sri Lanka closer to China through trade, investment and economic cooperation, is yet another key milestone. The China of 1949 and the China of 2021 are in complete contrast in relation to many factors yet the country continues to preserve its primary identity and basic character. The same could be said about Sri Lanka, although it could also be argued that whilst the former strove to make progress the latter has faltered. Yet it the degree of interaction between the two countries that have seen a drastic change from 1950 to date with the leadership of the two countries engaging in differing manner, yet maintaining sound relations.

The relationship between Bandaranaike and Chou in formulating a firm foundation enabled successive leaders on both sides to build the sound strategic partnership that exists today. Being examined is the initial foray into engagement and the determined steps being taken by two persons to solidify that which was present and strategize for that which was to come. Chou’s visit to Ceylon in February 1957 may be termed the catalyst in the bonding between the two leaders and countries, who enjoyed relatively similar upbringings, making them resolute and trustworthy of the other.

While Bandaranaike had his Oxford-educated persona complimenting his nationalistic outlook, Chou, who had been born into a genteel family in Jiangsu Province, had struggled through the Revolution. Chou returned to China from Europe in 1924 as a leader in the Communist Party, while Bandaranaike too travelled home from Britain a year later and entered the political arena. Each found in the other a comrade and it is their vision, it is argued, that stands testimony to tangible and intangible aspects of Sino-Lanka relations from then to date.

China – Sri Lanka relations

The travels of Fa Hien, the Chinese Buddhist monk and Zheng He, the Chinese Admiral and navigator form but part of a vivid collection of references in a rich tapestry which spans centuries of Sino-Lanka ties that have been documented in detail in ancient manuscripts. Vernon Mendis notes that the presence of Fa Hien at the funeral of the Arahat Mahinda during the reign of Uttiya, successor to Devanampiyatissa, the role played by Zheng He during the time of Vira Alakeshwara, and the civilizational contribution of China and Sri Lanka along with India as three of the ‘foremost civilizations of Asia...linked by ties of Buddhism and forming a kind of Buddhist commonwealth,’ are indicative of the engagement that existed.

Mendis claims that the ‘establishment by Sri Lanka of these relations with China at this early period was a significant initiative the full characteristics of which and implications have not been sufficiently examined.’ Religion formed an integral part of connectivity while trade played a crucial role with shipments of ‘…cotton goods, gold and silver filigree work and Buddha images (sent) to ancient China’ as identified by S. F. De Silva, and other material including silk were received in return. These interactions were taking place at a time when travel was restricted to maritime excursions, perilous as they may have been, yet Mendis maintains ‘the missions sent by Sri Lanka rulers from the 5^th to the 8^th centuries [amount to] about 16 missions… in all.’ He also notes that ‘these missions ended abruptly in the 8^th century and after that there is no evidence of contacts with China until the visit of Admiral Zheng He in the 15^th century.’

Five centuries later on 06^th January 1950, ‘the Government of Ceylon (has) decided to recognize the new Government of China’ marking the first official recognition of the People’s Republic of China that was being made by post-independent Ceylon. This saw a revival, although to a negligible scale, of ancient ties that had existed. Berty Gajameragedara opines that this recognition ‘established the fundamental juridical condition for the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.’

The gesture though considered symbolic at the time was to prove politically expedient as it laid the foundation for trade negotiation that took place in mid-1952. Faced with a Hobson’s choice scenario owing to a fall in rice purchases from East Asia and the dollar issue, Gajameragedara observes that Ceylon decided to ‘turn to China, which after the embargo of May 1951 came into effect, had repeatedly offered rice in exchange of Ceylonese rubber.’ The negotiation and subsequent signing of the Agreement between Yeh Chi-Chuang and R. G. Senanayake in Peking on 04^th October 1952 was yet another milestone in bilateral relations. Despite differences in political ideologies, R. G. Senanayake justified the stance adopted arguing that they ‘should not stand in the way of countries trading with each other, if that trade is to their mutual benefit.’ Senanayake observed that in relation to China, ‘the late Prime Minister even went so far as to protest against the imposing of bans on the export of rubber from Malaya to China,’ attempting to dispel the often construed pro-West stance of D. S. Senanayake and his sentiments towards communism which had been articulated on earlier occasions.

Chinese Premier Chou en Lai’s first direct interaction with a Ceylonese Prime Minister was to be with Sir John Kotelawala in Bandung on the sidelines of the Afro-Asian Conference in April 1955. Yet in January that year, Chou had extended an invitation to Kotelawala to visit China and in February ‘making yet another gesture of friendship towards the Ceylonese Government, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of independence, sent a message of greetings,’ which Gajameragedara states was the first of its kind from a Chinese leader to Ceylon. Calling for ‘Sino-Ceylonese relations to grow increasingly in the cause of maintaining peace in Asia and the world,’ Chou’s gesture strengthened cordiality and sowed the seeds for future interactions.

The precursor to Bandung having been the Colombo Conference of April/May 1954 saw Kotelawala one of the hosts along with the leaders of Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. In addition to dispelling misgivings and assuaging prejudice, the Chinese Premier led China into the global arena with his own savoir-flair style of diplomacy. Mendis claims that the highlight of Bandung ‘was no doubt the image of Chou en Lai as an apostle of sweet reasonableness, disarming his critics and allaying fears and stealing the thunder.’

Of the twenty nine countries convening in Bandung, only seven had established relations with China. The tone set in Bandung, in announcing that China had arrived on the world stage once again, this time as a nation-state, resulted in what Mendis claims was ‘a parallel trend in China where after Bandung it acquired a new and benign image thanks to the diplomacy of Chou en Lai which allayed fears of its expansionist ambitions and gave the impression of peace and goodwill and the desire to co-exist with all states and cooperate with them meaningfully.’

Even before the nexus was forged between Bandaranaike and Chou, it was the Chinese Premier who was making a continuous effort to engage with Ceylon. Whether the repeated offers to trade rice for rubber before the Rubber–Rice pact was actually initialed, the attempts to send a delegation to Ceylon to strengthen relations, the invitation to Kotelawala, the liberal attitude adopted in renewing the pact, the Independence greeting, among others, may be understood as diplomatic gestures aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation.  

The Bandaranaike – Chou vision

S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s election in 1956 signaled a distinct change in Ceylon’s foreign policy, particularly in relations with China. His notion of foreign policy expanded across divides of ideology and political leaning. In the early 40’s Bandaranaike had actively supported and led a bid to establish an Asian United Nations Organisation, based on suggestions made by Tagore and other Indian leaders. He envisioned it ‘would be of substantial value to all Asian countries at a moment in human history like the present when the world is moving so rapidly towards a new age.’ This enthusiasm, although shared by Nehru was not unanimously accepted, yet Bandaranaike was appointed, with George E. de Silva, to a committee tasked with reporting on the proposal to the next Asian Conference that was due to be held in China in 1949. The possibility of forging unity ‘not merely within the various Asian countries but unity among the peoples of the continent of Asia,’ was of great interest to Bandaranaike.

Bandaranaike’s pre-independence desire to forge Asian solidarity and safeguard the interests of a region that was emerging from its colonial period, resulted in him seizing the opportunity upon his election in 1956. His was the view that Asia’s collegiality was paramount for facing the challenges of the changing times. In this regard he understood that China’s presence and potential needed to be an integral part of any equation determining the future of Asia. The Ambassador to the UN, R. S. S. Gunewardena outlined this relevance recalling that ‘at the Conference of the Colombo Powers of India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia – a resolution was adopted unanimously to the effect that the non-recognition of Communist China increased the tension in the Far East and as a constant threat to peace.’

Thereafter heightening the call for inclusion of China not only at the regional level but on the global stage, Bandaranaike used the maiden speech of a Ceylonese Prime Minister at the UNGA to express regret ‘that there are still some countries which are awaiting admission, countries whose claims to such admission appear to many of us to be unquestioned, and whose admission will undoubtedly make more fully representative the membership of this great world Organisation for peace. Amongst them I wish to mention in particular such countries as the People’s Republic of China.’

The Claude Corea Mission to explore the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations in September 1956 resulted in the exchange of Ambassadors in 1957 and the signing of agreements on trade and payment, and economic aid. The forthright manner in which Ceylon was reversing an earlier policy orientation and venturing into hitherto unchartered territory was to be one of the most prudent foreign policy decisions undertaken by Bandaranaike.

1957 thus ushered in a new era, for Ceylon and China, in which policy expanded, relations were reformulated, global dynamics were understood and new efforts were undertaken to traverse further down the path of bilateralism. Chou’s visit to Colombo in February 1957 and their interactions consolidated a bond of friendship that extended far beyond the two individuals, and remains the foundation upon which diplomatic connectivity has flourished ever since. Bandaranaike saw potential in the relationship. The like-mindedness of these two leaders brought to fruition two visions; Bandaranaike’s intention to engage across the ideological divide, especially with a leader in Asia and Chou’s keenness to collaborate with Ceylon.

An aligning of vision occurs during the historic visit in 1957. Having understood the opportunity afforded in intensifying cooperation with the East, Bandaranaike welcomed Chou as special guest at the eighth Independence Day celebrations, noting that ‘we in Ceylon and the countries of Asia look upon the contribution which the People’s Republic of China is making in shaping the new world as perhaps the greatest contribution any country has made.’ His choice of words ‘perhaps the greatest contribution’ identified the potential Bandaranaike saw in China, who was an ally and Asian neighbour. 

The Chinese Premier, no less generous and equally thought-provokingly pointed out that ‘the Chinese and Ceylonese people have more or less the same destiny.’ He articulated the desire of both to ‘shake off our legacies of backwardness and poverty from the past and build new happiness’ and the determination ‘to safeguard everlasting world peace.’ The joint statement issued at the end of Chou’s visit reflected their shared understanding of the period as one of transition and that ‘in eras such as these, it is not unusual to find divergent outlooks and varying conceptions of societies. But we believe that nations can live in peace with each other despite these divergences and different social systems.’

His observation of relations with Ceylon may be translated further to encapsulate China’s view of Asia as the leaders reiterated that ‘while recognizing and respecting differences of outlook that may exist between us, we are determined to strengthen those ties, develop our economic cooperation and cultural exchanges and foster cooperation to our mutual benefit.’ Alluding to their varied political ideologies, Chou characteristically displayed his enthusiasm to ensure that relations would reach their zenith, irrespective of their stances.

Chou’s visit Kandy and his paying homage at the Temple of the Tooth Relic in addition to making a personal contribution to its building fund, is seen as a revival of the ancient linkage of Buddhism. In the wake of the 1958 floods China granted loan assistance worth Rs, 50,000,000 for flood relief and rehabilitation work. Similarly the 1959 Agreement on air transport and Protocol on the exchange of commodities of the same year did much to nurture bilateral relations. Yet the lasting nature of diplomatic connectivity was dependent on the rapport built up by the two leaders.

Anticipating much potential in their respective countries which had both emerged as players on the international stage less than a decade earlier, the Bandaranaike–Chou visionary outlook included an essence of convergence with a mutually beneficial impact on interactions. Premier Chou having stridden the world stage just two years earlier at Bandung had taken the message of what China was and would be, to the world. Bandaranaike provided undivided support as the paths of the two countries became intertwined to a greater degree in the decades to follow.

Belt and Road Initiative

Xi Jinping’s 2013 initiative to revive the ancient Silk Road and optimize on the potential of it as a vehicle of fostering connectivity was received as yet another prudent measure adopted by the Chinese leadership. Already yielding results, the Belt and Road initiative has crossed the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa and even reached out to Latin America. The potential of linking vibrant East Asian economies with those of Africa, and more developed economies of Europe generate much needed certainty and promote potential.

Following Xi’s unveiling of it in Kazakhstan, the mega-project sought to include Central Asia in building a Silk Road Economic Belt which expanded to the ASEAN community in constructing the 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) ‘to finance infrastructure construction and promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration” Xi’s strategic vision saw an acceleration of the linkage among neighbouring countries even including Russia connecting the initiative to the latter’s Euro-Asia Railways. Deeper cooperative mechanisms such as the Economic Corridors encompassing China-Pakistan and China-India-Myanmar brought the initiative to South Asia as other countries including Sri Lanka were to be made integral partners.

Jacques Martin has outlined that ‘Today China’s diplomacy with Asia has morphed from a rigid state-guided scheme into an eclectic array of initiatives from many stakeholders: the state, the Party, the military, the provinces, cities, companies, [and] thinks tanks.’ Resonating that which was projected by Chou in Bandung more than sixty years ago, the current leadership has utilised an array of resources, a gamut of policies and most importantly the ancient tool of diplomacy to effect change.

Having reached out and strengthened relations in Asia and in Africa over the last several decades, China’s venture even further into Latin America has proved noteworthy. Amidst such progress, China’s desire in dealing with Sri Lanka, in accordance almost with Chou’s vision that ‘the Chinese and Ceylonese people have more or less the same destiny,’ has seen the further strengthening and deeper consolidation of engagement to a level of strategic partnership. The many projects completed and others being implemented and still more in the pipeline, whilst being indicative of the concretized partnership between two vastly different countries, augurs well for Sri Lanka, if the island nation makes the most out of every single project. Providing much needed capital for development in the wake of the devastating conflict, China has proven to be an ‘all-weather’ friend cooperating across the spectrum from guaranteeing political support, to providing economic aid.

The Major power – Small power relationship in play in this instance portends much potential. As China rides into the Asian century at the helm, Sri Lanka is guaranteed a ringside seat. Thus the impact of the BRI on Sri Lanka would, in time to come, prove monumental. It can therefore be argued that it is testimony to the visionary leadership of two leaders of yesteryear, who, unknowing of the future, sought to reach out to each other and undertake a journey together.

Auguring well for South-South cooperation, the fast changing tide with which China gradually assumes a higher, if not the highest role in the international hierarchy, augurs well for Sri Lanka. It stands testimony to the fruit of the Bandaranaike-Chou vision that is being reaped today. It needs to be understood in the Asian context and then the region as a whole can share the success of an Asian neighbour.