SRI LANKA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE: A FORGOTTEN VISION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Marking United Nations Day 2026

By Nethma Hettigedara

In October 2026, researchers representing the Awarelogue Asian Institute gathered at the United Nations Compound in Colombo for a knowledge seminar on ‘Sri Lanka and the United Nations General Assembly.’ They met with the UN Resident Coordinator, Marc-André Franche, to learn more about Sri Lanka's engagement with the UN. At a time when the UN is facing increasing scrutiny, and at a time when its complexities may not always be fully understood, this blog looks back at an important moment in Sri Lanka’s engagement with the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

Can a small island nation like ours influence the security of an entire ocean? Today, with all the geopolitics playing in the field, this might seem too ambitious to even talk about. But in 1971, Sri Lanka attempted exactly that. In 1971, at the 26th United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike proposed making the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. This was at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were expanding their naval presence. Now, more than five decades later, this remains a good example of the extent to which smaller states like Sri Lanka can influence international affairs.

The proposal was not something that appeared overnight. It emerged from decolonisation and the Non-Aligned Movement. On one hand, Britain was reducing its military presence east of Suez. On the other, the Indian Ocean was becoming an area of superpower competition involving warships, military bases and nuclear weapons. Sri Lanka feared that this rivalry could threaten the independence of newly sovereign countries. Needless to mention, there were regional concerns too, as removing foreign navies would not necessarily prevent a powerful neighbouring state from dominating the region.

Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike promoted this idea at the 1964 Cairo Non-Aligned Summit and developed it further at Lusaka in 1970. She stated at the Assembly that Indian Ocean countries needed peace to develop their economies and improve the lives of its people. Her proposal included restrictions on military installations, naval exercises and weapons testing. This was also while recognising the importance of international trade. Consequently, on 16 December 1971, the UNGA adopted Resolution 2832 (XXVI).

The resolution declared the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, a Zone of Peace. It received 61 votes in favour, none against and 55 abstentions. This showed that adopting a resolution did not necessarily mean everyone was in full agreement. Nonetheless, what Sri Lanka and its partners achieved was substantial. They were able to successfully bring the issue onto the UN agenda. In 1972, an Ad Hoc Committee was established to discuss implementation. However, getting an issue recognised was one thing, convincing powerful countries to act on it was another.

The proposal faced difficulties from the beginning. Sri Lanka’s original vision sought restrictions on military activities by both regional and external powers. But negotiations narrowed the focus mainly to great-power rivalry. The United States and the Soviet Union were unwilling to give up their military advantages. India supported the idea in principle but resisted restrictions on its own naval and nuclear capabilities. India's 1974 nuclear test further complicated matters. Furthermore, after 1977, Sri Lanka's changing foreign policy priorities and India’s influence also weakened the commitment.

Decades later, the Indian Ocean remains strategically important. Competition involving India, China and the United States now extends into ports, research vessels, investments and shipping routes. Given Sri Lanka's location, these developments can place the country under pressure from different sides.

Does all of this mean the idea of a peace zone has lost its relevance? Not necessarily. A completely demilitarised Indian Ocean may be difficult to achieve, but the need for peaceful cooperation still remains. Sri Lanka can continue supporting fair maritime rules, regional cooperation and an independent foreign policy.

Looking back, the proposal did not achieve everything it intended. Yet, calling it a failure would overlook an important achievement. We, as a small island nation, brought a major security concern before the world and made it part of the UNGA’s discussions.

Perhaps the most important lesson we can gain from this engagement with UNGA is that passing a resolution and making it a reality are two different things. The United Nations provides a platform for smaller nations to make their voices heard. But turning those ideas into action requires cooperation that goes beyond individual national interests. The challenge, then and now, is turning the vision of peace into reality.

References

Bandaranaike, S. (1971, October 12). Address to the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly. United Nations General Assembly, 1962nd plenary meeting.

De Silva, S. (2021). Disarmament, Indian Ocean and strategic externalities: The case of Sri Lanka. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 4(2), 268–286.

Joshi, Y. (2019). Whither non-alignment? Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and New Delhi's selective alignment with great powers during the Cold War, 1964–1979. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 30(1), 26–49.

Kandasamy, N. (2024). Indian Ocean internationalisms: The Sri Lankan pursuit of peace, 1971–89. Journal of Contemporary History, 59(4), 705–731.

Keerawella, G. B. (1988). The growth of superpower naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean and Sri Lankan response.

Waidyatilake, B. (2018). A smaller state’s quest for Indian Ocean security: The case of Sri Lanka. Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies.

A Gender-Sensitive Future for Sri Lanka-Netherlands Cooperation Post-Ditwah

By L. M. S. Navodya

A Shared and Uneven Past

Sri Lanka-Netherlands relations are among the island’s oldest European connections. Between 1640 and 1796, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was active on the island, leaving behind, through its administration, the thombos or the meticulous registers of families, estates, labour duties and taxes which are now preserved in the Sri Lanka National Archive. Reminding that the encounter between the two nations was never one between equals, the same scholarship notes that Sinhalese common law and Roman-Dutch law co-existed uncomfortably. Today, the thombos are also being used for gendered questions including those about excess female mortality and infanticide. This, therefore, suggests that even the shared archive contains women’s histories waiting to be read. The then Dutch Ambassador, Tanja Gonggrijp, in 2022, observed that the present relationship between the two nations has been shaped by this past and that the one-sided and unequal nature of colonial relations must be remembered alongside the collaborations worth celebrating.

From Colony to Partner

The post-independence relationship between the two nations shifted gradually from aid to partnership. Dutch engagement deepened after the 2004 tsunami with the Dutch Foreign Minister visiting Sri Lanka in 2005, in what was among the first high-level post-disaster missions. By 2014, in the post-war era, Dutch officials described a shift from aid toward trade that prioritized water, agriculture, life sciences and health. This shift was accompanied by a more literal reckoning with the past. In July 2023, the Netherlands agreed to return six colonial-era artifacts looted during the 1765 Dutch siege of the Kandyan kingdom, including the ceremonial Cannon of Kandy, a ceremonial weapon made of bronze, silver and gold adorned with rubies, which was held by Rijksmuseum. As the two nations celebrate the 75th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations in 2026, the bilateral engagement of the two nations now spans trade, development, culture and people-to-people ties. The anniversary year has also see the announcement of a Dutch trade mission linked to Sri Lanka Expo 2027. Furthermore, the Netherlands contributed financially to the rehabilitation of the Vystwyke Canal in Colombo under the Dutch-Sri Lanka Mutual Heritage Programme.

Ditwah: A Test of the Partnership

Cyclone Ditwah affected Sri Lanka on the 28 November 2025, bringing strong winds, heavy rain, flooding and landslides that affected all 25 districts. By mid-December, roughly 2.2 million people had been affected, with over 100,000 houses been fully or partially damaged and more than 230,000 people been displaced at the peak of the emergency. As of 29 December, 646 deaths and 173 missing persons had been recorded by the Disaster Management Center.

At this critical hour of emergency, the Dutch response was swift at the diplomatic level. On the 2 of December 2025, Ambassador Wiebe de Boer pledged the Netherland’s support to Sri Lankan Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya to rebuild bridges destroyed by the floods and landslides while also engaging in a discussion on disaster risk reduction, flood management and inclusive development. Furthermore, in January 2026, the Deputy Minister of Defence appreciated the support extended by Netherlands during and after the disaster through its work with the European Union, while the Ambassador reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to sharing expertise, particularly on disaster risk reduction.

What Can the Netherlands Offer?

The most durable contribution of the Netherlands towards Sri Lanka may be institutional rather than material. The floods of 1993 and 1995 triggered a paradigm shift in Dutch flood management, from merely reinforcing defences to giving more room for rivers through the Room for River programme. The programme has received considerable scholarly credit for advancing integrated river basin management through a mixed centralized-decentralized governance approach. Operationally, the Dutch Disaster Risk Reduction and Surge Support (DRRS) programme deploys water experts across mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, and foreign governments and humanitarian actors may also request its support. Together with its MHPSS Surge Mechanism, it maintains rosters of experts in water management, WASH and mental health and psychological support. The suggested institutional mechanisms need to be adapted cautiously since Ditwah brought landslides as well as floods and Sri Lanka’s terrain is not the Dutch delta. Thus, what works best for a nation like Sri Lanka is the governance logic that includes long-term planning, coordination across levels of government and inclusive decision-making rather than any single engineering model.

The Veiled Dimensions of Disaster

Disasters have never been gender-neutral. According to Neumayer and Plumper’s study of 141 countries between 1981 and 2002, disasters kill more women than men on average or kill women at younger ages. The impact of disasters depends on the magnitude of the event, with the effect becoming stronger during severe disasters and weaker where the socio-economic status of women is higher. This, therefore, indicates that the vulnerability is socially constructed rather than biological. As Fisher notes, violence against women in post-tsunami Sri Lanka must be understood within the context of the violence that prevails in normal times and is exacerbated by the disaster.

Among these dimensions, menstruation remains one of the least visible. As noted by Muralidharan et al., menstrual health remains rarely discussed in the context of climate change, despite the disruptions to the access to menstrual information, products and services, as well as the intensification of existing inequalities caused by climate change. Sommer notes that although the attention to menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian settings is growing, consensus on the most effective and culturally appropriate responses remains insufficiently documented. My study on the impact of climate-induced disasters on menstrual rights, using India and Nepal as case studies, identifies a recurring causal chain where disaster-damaged WASH facilities and disrupted supply chains erode privacy and access to products, thereby making menstrual management unsafe and undignified. Adding to this context, the case of Sri Lanka demonstrates that this chain also intersects with a pre-existing problem in many South Asian contexts, since period poverty operates through inadequate education on sexual and reproductive health, weak infrastructure facilities in schools and workplaces and unaffordable products.

The international response to Ditwah shows both the need and the progress. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) delivered 700 pre-positioned dignity kits that included sanitary pads within the first 24 hours of the emergency declaration while also estimating that at least 50,000 more would be required. As per its March 2026 report, it had provided 2,997 dignity kits, 1024 maternity kits, more than 5,000 menstrual and adolescent kits and 50 transgender-specific kits. However, demonstrating that gendered vulnerability intersects with wider marginalization, OCHA cautioned that estate communities and people relying on informal livelihoods, land or housing remain disproportionately affected and may fall outside some assistance schemes.

A Call for Inclusive Assistance

Three practical directions follow regarding the post-Ditwah assistance from the Netherlands to Sri Lanka. First and foremost, ‘inclusive development’, which was already on the table when the Prime Minister met the Ambassador, needs an operational meaning that constitutes sex-disaggregated data and space for women’s organizations at the table in flood management and resilient-rebuilding planning. Furthermore, Dutch surge support could pair its water and WASH expertise with menstrual health expertise so that safe sanitation can be designed into safety centres rather than retrofitted. Last but not least, much of the Sri Lankan evidence on gender and disaster dates from the 2004 tsunami. Thus, Ditwah offers an opportunity for Sri Lanka and Dutch institutions to build a contemporary evidence base together.

An asymmetric partnership at the beginning has now reached 75 years of cooperation. Its next chapter should be measured not only by infrastructural development but also by whether resilience reaches those whose needs are least visible.

BREXIT: A Decade Later

By Sisaru Diyunuge

Britons decisively voted to end their 43-year membership with the European Union on the 23rd June 2016, effectively severing the UK’s economic, legal and labour market connectivity with the continent (BBC News,2016). As the UK completes a decade post-referendum, it can be argued that Britain is poorer, less influential, and more divided than it was in 2016.

This essay explores how the origins of Britain's troubles predate the consequences of the results of a single vote. In fact, this essay hopes to explore how Brexit was not the silver bullet its proponents were hoping for - a pivot to the Commonwealth and the Anglosphere in the hope for markets beyond the EU has arguably backfired as this strategy has come to terms with geopolitical, geographic and cultural realities. On the other hand, the topic of immigration - which garnered tremendous attention - an anxiety that ran deep in British society, which arguably was the key reason for the referendum, has indeed produced the opposite of what many “leave” voters wanted. Thus, this essay examines how the above two factors contributed to Britain’s woes a decade later before considering what Britain's future might be in the decade ahead.

A laggard of growth

A decade after the leave vote, economists are measuring the barometers of the economy to move past speculation. Measurements published by researchers concluded that Brexit has indeed become a burden to the UK economy over a structural drag rather than a permanent one-off shock. As the UK economy is no longer permeable to the EU free-market, the economic productivity of the UK is said to reduce by 4% year-on-year. In contrast, researchers claim this reduction in productivity is predicted not be as drastic had the UK remained in the EU (UK in a Changing Europe, 2026).

Nowhere is this rift more prevalent than the trade of merchandise and services across the channel from the UK to mainland Europe: it is estimated that exports from the UK are 10% to 15% lesser now than in the past. Key reasons quoted are complicated customs declaration forms, rules-of-origin paperwork and sanitary checks on all merchandise exports - this would not have been the case without Brexit as smaller to medium size UK exporters are unable to absorb legal and administrative costs as a result of these new non-tariff barriers (UK in a Changing Europe, 2026).

Brexit: The Straw that broke the Camel’s back

One must be forgiven if they treated Brexit to be the sole reason for all of Britain’s malaise. However, one must closely examine the destruction left by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 on the British economy. It is no secret that London is arguably the world’s premier banking and finance hub, this meant that the UK economy was overly exposed to the crash of 2008. What followed the GFC of 2008 was a brutal austerity package delivered by the Conservative government’s exchequer led by then-chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne - leading to widespread spending cuts throughout the 2010’s crippling public services such as the NHS whilst wages declined year on year (Global Banking and Finance,2026). Thus, one may deduce that sustained cuts to public spending left UK public services with broken systems, a trajectory which each UK government since was neither able to reverse, reform nor change.

It is true that Britons were experiencing their real wages decline year-on-year since the GFC of 2008 leading to a stagnation of British wealth and standard of living compared to their OECD peers. Brexit, therefore, is a compounding of the malaise rather than the cause.

A lack of interest

Proponents of Brexit argued that leaving the common market would inherently mean Britain taking control of how they do business with the rest of the world, thus opening up the market for and to emerging economies of Asia and the Americas and harnessing the partnerships with the old Commonwealth nations. An article published by the London School of Economics (2024) explains what the British government’s strategy was “Global Britain” - which one may even argue is a strategy to pivot away from the European Union and onto Asia and the Americas. The same study concluded that this strategy, a decade on, has simply failed (LSE, 2024).

The UK-Australia trade agreement was the first of many trade deals negotiated and ratified, and followed by another with New Zealand - however, given both countries are; a) geographical distance from the UK, b) their existing trade agreements with Asian neighbours and most importantly c) both Australia and New Zealand having very successful agriculture exports, meant that the UK did not, in essence, get what it hoped for. In fact, the Centre for European Reform (n.d.) analysed that the agreements between these countries would only add to the British economy very marginally with 0.008% from Australia and, with 0.003% from New Zealand, over a period of time till 2035.

India, the former jewel in the Empire’s crown, is a comprehensive negotiator. The potential trade deal with India was trumpeted by the then-government of the UK as the largest prize of the Commonwealth strategy. However, talks have dragged on for years and the yields of this process have been significantly disproportionate for the UK - said to only add approximately 0.2% to the UK GDP (Centre for European Reform, n.d.) While the trade deal with the United States has not yet taken place in full, the UK’s major trade partners with or without Brexit remain to be EU member states (LSE,2024).

Immigration, not trade

Brexit has often perplexed experts and economists in Britain and across the world, and one would be forgiven if they asked “So, why did Brexit happen?” The EU’s policy on free movement within member countries have become a lightning rod in the UK for quite some time, and the ensuing economic malaise has cast a spell away from the actual problem the many jobs taken by new faces across Britain - in low skills sectors like fruit picking and gig-workers to doctors and nurses in the NHS. This has undoubtedly caused anxieties about wages, housing and public services and above all, national identity amongst Britons (UK in a Changing Europe, 2026).

One would be mistaken to believe, or perceive that anxieties about Britain’s immigration woes were limited to the precariat class, however a CNN report on the tenth anniversary of Brexit (2026) sheds light on a software developer named Geriant who voted “leave”, constantly citing that Britain did not have control over its borders due to EU laws and was anxious about what the impact would be to the NHS and other public services if inundated with foreigners, despite the decades of long austerity.

However, it can be argued that Brexit did not usher in the desired outcomes. “Taking back control” paved the way for over 550,000 immigrants, a far greater number than the approximately 250,000 in the pre-Brexit era, resulting in a peak in 2023 with approximately 950,000 (CNN Business, 2026). Essentially, intra and inter-EU migration was replaced by non-EU migration from the former Commonwealth, Latin-America and Africa who were needed to replace Britain’s ageing workforce.

As of 2025 and 2026, Britain’s net migration levels are down, but this is thanks to tough migration policies adopted by both the Conservative as well as Labour governments and not Brexit (Office for National Statistics, 2026; Full Fact,2026).

And the decade ahead?

It can be understood that Brexit did not deliver the intended results, and in fact, the reverse occurred in relation to immigration and nothing at all when it comes to international trade. Nonetheless, the investment bank Goldman Sachs (2026) reported that Britain may have weathered the worst of the Brexit malaise. The Labour-led government since 2024 has pursued a long-term reform agenda and has made inroads to iron-out any friction that might have existed with partners (Idea Farm,2026).

However, the long-term damage caused by years of austerity and Brexit, goes beyond the economy. Today, Britain is divided, more than ever whilst voters have become increasingly impatient with both the Conservative and Labour parties. This is evident through the recent polls which ensured wins for the far-right Reform UK party led by Nigel Farage, arguably one of the chief architects of the “leave” campaign (CGTN, 2026). While there is a renewed campaign to rejoin the EU via the “National Rejoin March” - this has been limited to urban areas like London, Manchester and are only popular amongst young urban university-educated voters.

The promises made by the leave campaign clearly did not bear fruit - Global Britain via the Commonwealth did not yield desired results, and the debate on immigration got even hotter. The case for Global Britain is weak, and is a hard nut to crack - years of austerity led to a stagnation of wages and a sharp decline in the standard of living. Brexit was simply the straw that broke the camel’s back. Once, the mighty British Empire - the greatest ever known to mankind, struggles today to lead a delegation to successfully negotiate a trade deal, struggles today to keep social cohesion and unity within its borders while the Commonwealth moves on from the days of the Empire. A decade on, the UK finds itself at a crossroad, no closer to a settled answer to the question it once asked its citizens.

References

BBC News (2016) EU Referendum Results, http://www.bbc.com.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results

Centre for European Reform (n.d.) Weighed down by gravity: UK trade policy after Brexit, https://www.cer.eu/insights/weighed-down-gravity-uk-trade-policy-after-brexit

CGTN (2026), Analysis: 6 PMs in a decade - Why is UK stuck in political turmoil?, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2026-06-23/Analysis-6-PMs-in-a-decade-Why-is-UK-stuck-in-political-turmoil--1Od38p1ro5i/p.html

CNN Business (2026), Ten years on: How Brexit has impacted the UK economy, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/06/22/business/brexit-anniversary-uk-economy-impact-intl

FULL FACT (2025), How many migrants come to the UK?, https://fullfact.org/immigration/net-migration-to-the-uk/

Global Banking and Finance (2026), UK political instability: PM Turnover and Economic Challenges, https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/anyone-fix-britain-regular-change-pm-symptom-uks-malaise/

Goldman Sachs Investment Research (2026), UK - The Economic Cost of Brexit, Ten Years On, https://www.gspublishing.com/content/research/en/reports/2026/06/24/487d9f10-f31c-4e8d-ac71-b248ce8a8aaf.html

Idea Farm (2026), Brexit 10 Years On: What’s worked, what hasn’t, what’s next?, https://theideafarm.com/markets/brexit-10-years-on-whats-worked-what-hasnt-whats-next/

LSE (2024) Global Britain has failed - what next? British Politics and Policy Blog, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/global-britain-has-failed-what-next/

Office for National Statistics (2026), Long-term international migration, provisional:year ending December 2025, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingdecember2025

UK in a Changing Europe (2026), Brexit ten years on: the economy, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-ten-years-on-the-economy/

SRI LANKA'S SIGNATURE SUMMIT OF 1976 - A Case Study in Strategizing Foreign Policy

By George I. H. Cooke

It was a Monday like no other in the history of Sri Lanka, as ceremonial convoy after convoy of cars bearing heads of state and government, foreign ministers, and their delegations made their way from different parts of the city to the sparkling new Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall in Colombo 07. Having been opened a few years earlier, the halls of the BMICH was to see history being created. With the dawn of 16th August 1976, preparations which had been ongoing for years were now reaching the ultimate moment of implementation as world leaders had been arriving over the preceding weekend and were now heading to the venue of the fifth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. This was to be the largest gathering of world leaders in the country, and remains so to date, fifty years later. Eighty-six member states were represented at the senior most level, along with nine observer nations, auguring well for Sri Lanka’s positioning on the world stage.

With many arriving in their personal planes, the airport at Katunayake took on significance as each leader was welcomed, dignitaries were present to greet them, national anthems were played, and honour guards were accorded. The arrival ceremonies at the airport had been coordinated by the Chief of Protocol, Manel Abeysekera, who had to ensure the precision of flight times, anthems, flags, and readiness to deal with any eventuality. It was an era bereft of mobiles which could have eased communication, yet the ceremonies were executed well owing to the precision with which they have been planned.

The visiting leaders were received by the first President of Sri Lanka, William Gopallawa and Prime Minister Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike, who knew most of the leaders personally. They were counterparts with whom she had engaged extensively at other summits, and multilateral fora such as the United Nations and Commonwealth, and also at the bilateral level with visits exchanged regularly. This was the fifth Summit of the Movement, and she had been present at the first one in September 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia; the second in October 1964 in Cairo, United Arab Republic as the country was then known; the third in September 1970 in Lusaka, Zambia, when she returned to power, and the fourth in September 1973 in Algiers, Algeria.

This Summit would see Mrs Bandaranaike reaching the pinnacle of her political journey. The ensuing years would see elections and her party’s defeat, her loss of civic rights, and divisions within her party. It would take another seventeen years for her party to gain momentum, and for her to return as Prime Minister in a government led by her daughter. Hence it can be deduced that the Colombo Summit of 1976 was a momentous occasion for her. It was also a global endorsement of Sri Lanka and the opportunity for the country to take her place among leading nations of the global south.

From becoming the world’s first woman Prime Minister when the party she was heading, formed a government in July 1960, to now hosting the Non-Aligned Movement, 1976 would go down in history as her most rewarding year from a foreign policy perspective. While much is debated on varied aspects of her domestic policy, it was her foreign policy for which she is still remembered, and endorsed, as much effort was made to continue the policy of her husband, Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, who was assassinated in 1959 just three years into his term, while serving as the fourth Prime Minister of Ceylon.

Herself the eldest child in her family, she had learnt leadership at an early stage as her parents both worked. Thereafter upon marriage to S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, a young Miss Ratwatte stepped further into the political arena as her husband was a Member of the Board of Ministers who had been appointed in 1936 and would function till 1947. His portfolio of Local Government required extensive travel in the island, and even overseas, when he would be frequently accompanied by his wife. His assassination, the swearing-in of Dr W. Dahanayake, the election of March 1960, and her subsequent acceptance to lead the Sri Lanka Freedom Party at the July 1960 General Election propelled her higher up the political ladder, making her globally renowned. From a relatively shy bride of 24, to be sworn in as the world’s first woman prime minister two decades later, Sirimavo Bandaranaike took to national and international politics with relative ease.

The team she built up and engaged with comprised senior civil servants and diplomats, whose advice she sought and relied on. Their support and her charisma guaranteed a winning formula that ensured her remarkable success in the foreign policy arena, and gave Sri Lanka much recognition on the world stage. These officials were able to caution when they feared a misstep and their opinion was taken into consideration. Whilst the final decision was that of the political leadership, the members of this senior group of the bureaucracy, whose counsel the Prime Minister relied on, were able to place options on the table for due consideration.

Many of them were gathered around her as she welcomed the visiting dignitaries on that August morning. Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who had arrived earlier at the BMICH, from her private residence on Rosmead Place, was at the main entrance. She was surrounded by her senior officials, including Dr Vernon L. B. Mendis, who was serving as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in London, and had been brought to Colombo to be the Secretary General of Movement at the Colombo Summit. Alongside him were Mr M. D. D. Peiris, Secretary to the Prime Minister, and Mr W. T. Jayasinghe, the Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs and Defence, as well as many others. Much emphasis was placed on her political colleagues and party members, yet it was the group of civil servants who were considered the closest, and on whom she could rely.

As the summit commenced, Sirimavo Bandaranaike received a standing ovation as she climbed the steps of the stage in the main hall. She took the country to an all-time high as the leader of a grouping that was the third force in a world that was bitterly divided owing to the Cold War. This was a moment she had been waiting for, as counterparts from the developing world, traveled from all continents to Colombo, having accepted the invitation, to support the Movement and its goals.

Aside from the personalities, protocol and pageantry, the summit achieved results. The grouping had grown from twenty-five in 1961, to forty-seven in 1964, fifty-three in 1970, seventy-five in 1973, and had reached eighty-six in 1976. Bringing together such a large membership, its richness lay in the diversity of economic, social and political systems. The summit would see the commitment of member states to collective political and economic objectives, which would remain fundamental in their policy formulation. They would also identify an Action Plan for a plethora of global activities.

Of importance was that the grouping was a collective voice, expressing concern at times, cautioning at others, yet consistently calling for a peaceful and just world. At the Colombo Summit, member states, in their Political Declaration, ‘recalled that at the Lusaka Summit, Non-Aligned nations paid special attention to the situation in the Indian Ocean and called upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great Power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition be excluded.’ NAM possessed the strength and capacity to highlight collective issues, and call for international action.

The Economic Declaration reiterated the need for the establishment of the ‘New International Economic Order’ and stressed that ‘the elimination of foreign aggression, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, apartheid, imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and all other forms of dependence and subjugation, interference in internal affairs, domination and exploitation are crucial to the economics of Non-Alignment.’ Definitive action was taken on raw material and the financing of buffer stocks; on trade and the need for multination marketing enterprises; on monetary and financial cooperation; on industrialization, among others.

The Action Plan further allocated responsibility to Member States in specific areas as they were tasked with coordinating activities. Sri Lanka was identified as a coordinating country in the areas of Financial and Monetary Cooperation, Food and Agriculture, Employment and Human Resources Development, as well as Research and Information Systems. Thirty-two resolutions were drafted, debated and passed during the Colombo Summit, with twenty focused on political affairs and the other twelve giving emphasis to economic relations.

Fifty years later, while the concept of non-alignment has been referred to in countless speeches in the Sri Lanka and overseas, reflection and review of its meaning in the 21st century is timely. Much has changed internationally, in the global south, and in Sri Lanka’s own neighbourhood, yet what remains paramount, then as it is now, is the need to identify clear national interests, and strategize in order to ensure the best results for the country.

Whilst leaders collectively cautioned against the use of the Indian Ocean for great Power rivalry and competition, fifty years later there is only silence, as countries have weakened the Movement through their individual actions, and are left isolated. While specific threats were identified as being detrimental to the economics of the Non-Alignment then, a grim reality unfolds half a century later, where collective action is unheard of, and unity against injustice is completely absent.

While leaders of the past endeavoured to formulate and implement policy that was relevant for those times, it is now critical to refocus on short range, middle range and long range goals. Whilst numerous factors influence and determine the foreign policy of a country, wherein some are static and others are in a state of continuous change, it is paramount to review, restructure, reach out and be ready for any eventuality.

Sri Lanka has had many firsts. The NAM Summit of 1976 was the first to be held in Asia, and was yet another first for Sri Lanka. Half a century later, it is opportune to reflect on how many other firsts we could achieve as a nation, hopefully in a positive sense, or have our quota of firsts been expended, and is our heyday now confined to the past?

Sri Lanka needs, and yet often lacks, a strategic Foreign Policy in engaging with the international community. Non-alignment as a concept has been yoked with neutrality, indicating a lack of understanding of both, and the inability to decipher the nuances embedded in such concepts. Sri Lanka is not, and has not been a neutral country, but it has, at times been non-aligned. In recent decades, silence has been interpreted as neutrality, when in fact it has been ignorance or ill-conceived policies that have led to the misinterpretation of Sri Lanka’s stance. This has been to the detriment of the island nation and generated much confusion and concern.

Opportunities for growth and prosperity have been found in abundance in the post-independence period. While some have been grabbed, many have been lost. With heightened uncertainty in the world, it is prudent for the incumbent leadership to realise the relevance of a strategic Foreign Policy for a secure Sri Lanka. From promoting a positive image of the country, to meaningfully contributing on the world stage and ensuring that Foreign Policy benefits the country and its people, every anniversary and passing year is yet another opportune moment.

Whether it will be grabbed or lost remains conjecture, but what is understood is that Sri Lanka has potential, given the path the country has traversed, and the policies that have been formulated and implemented. From the lessons learnt thus far, it is evident that a strategic Foreign Policy was the need of the hour in the past, and remains so to date, if successful engagement is to be achieved in the international arena.

INDIA AND CHINA’S ABSENCE AT THE FIFA WORLD CUP: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR SOFT POWER?

By Sisaru Diyunuge

Forty-eight countries played in the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which was sixteen more than the previous tournament in Qatar. This expansion opened the door for nations which were unheard of by spectators of football, notable examples are Cape Verde with a population of 500,000, and Curacao with a population of just 150,000 (Fortune, 2026). The presence of these two tiny nations at what is arguably the world’s biggest sporting event made two absences impossible to ignore – India and China, the world’s most populous nations.

Naturally, one might enquire how the world's most populous nations failed to find 11 persons to represent their sides at the world stage. Throughout the history of this tournament, China has had one appearance, whilst India has had none (NPR, 2026) - which is fewer times than Haiti, or even North Korea (ABC 2026; Al Jazeera 2026).

Often, one might argue that China and India do not prioritize football and that they excel at the Olympics, and at cricket, respectively. However, it is reported that China may boast a football fan base of approximately 200 million with a growing domestic league (Reuters 2026), whilst India is not far along. This article explores the question of why China and India are consistently unable to turn this huge amount of interest in the sport into talent and why this might be costing them soft power on the global stage.

It is understood that if any country wants to make the world cup, let alone play well in it, it has to turn its youth into elite players. These countries often build institutions with a strict hierarchy – at the foundation is the most basic necessity, a space to play, i.e. hard infrastructure such as pitches and stadiums. This is because more pitches allow as many members as possible of the youth to showcase their talents early on.

Next, there are multiple developmental organizations such as clubs and academies which oversee the talent of these youngsters. Further up the hierarchy, one will find the football leagues. And finally, the last stage is making it for the national team – there is no better example of this hierarchy working that in the French national team and star player Kylian Mbappe (The Guardian, 2022). Nonetheless, India and China’s problem is not that they do not have this hierarchy, instead, their hierarchy is chaotic.

INDIA

Bobby Ghosh writes (2026) that India was in fact a world-power in the sport of football in the 1960s and even made it to the semi-finals in the Olympics and was invited to play the FIFA world cup. Ghosh (2026) goes to mention that a key ailment India’s football culture faces is a lack of self-confidence – in 1971 India beat England, its former colonizer in cricket, a decade later India became world champions of cricket and by the 21st century cricket was practically a religion in India.

By the mid 2000s, India invested heavily in building a solid cricket hierarchy – stadiums, academies, leagues such IPL which turn out to be multibillion dollar success stories. Cricket’s rise came at the demise of India’s football culture. In its 2023 report, India’s football federation cites many obvious hurdles such as low participation, lack of urban facilities, lack of trained personnel. Even members of the youth who start playing would soon run out of places to play (Khel Now, 2023), and the Indian football federation stated that there were less than 100 developmental clubs and for the very few players who end up making it to the Indian super league have to deal with constant chaos.

When the Indian football federation put the league up for sale, they could not attract commercial sponsors due to a lack of demand in viewer interests (The Guardian, 2026). To add to the already existing concerns, the federation’s officials are constantly accused of mass corruption and football’s governing body FIFA even banned India’s football federation temporarily for malpractices and bad governance (The Times of India 2024; The Times of India, 2022). Ghosh (2026) argues that because the wider Indian population does not show an interest towards football, there will be no interest shown by politicians thus the necessary institutional reform might never come through.

CHINA

Unlike in India, China’s approach is top-down. In fact, China’s President Xi Jinping has mentioned a three-step plan: 1) qualify for the world cup, 2) host the world cup, and 3) win the world cup (Reuters, 2026; The Guardian, 2015). China is no stranger to making the top-down approach work – China's extraordinary performance at the Olympics was the result of carefully crafted state policy in lifting the image of the country. However, experts say it is in fact the opposite approach needed to make football work – the bottom-up approach.

In 2015, the Chinese state took the first steps to building a strong football governing body in the country from the bottom – China pledged to build 70,000 pitches, 20,000 training centers and eventually get 30 million children playing football while strengthening the academies and leagues and finally to turn the Chinese Super League into one of the world’s best (British Council, 2016). While everything China did looked just right on paper, there was one social aspect which the system could not break; the Gaokao exams left millions of teenagers with no choice but to leave their sporting careers behind.

Eventually, due to a lack of players in the system, financial woes from the Evergreen crash and the COVID-19 pandemic, all collectively resulted in many of the super league clubs folding. Worse still, the Chinese system placed individuals from non-football, non-sports related government institutions to head and manage the hierarchy.

THE QUESTION OF DUAL NATIONALITY

Cape Verde and Curacao, along with countries like Qatar have allowed foreign-born players with the relevant countries’ ancestry along with others with dual passports to play for their national teams (Forbes, 2026). However, India and China, although possessing a large diaspora spread across the globe, have not done so because these two countries have no option for their citizens to hold dual citizenship.

HOW IS IT RELEVANT TO SOFT-POWER?

While governments do not negotiate trade agreements or security partnerships based on football, the influence it has in contemporary times is not an aspect that one could ignore. Both China and India are making inroads in Africa for influence in trade and security. Africa by and large is a footballing continent, and this can be a great tool for both countries to use.

Often India and China must deal with Europe, West Asia and Central Asia for the same reasons of trade and security – all footballing continents. Football can be used as a tool of influence, and in tougher conversations a deal-breaker. Thus, their absence is highlighted amongst football fans and noticed by its global partners.

References

ABC News (2026) 'The first Asian team to win a game at the World Cup finals', ABC News, https://www.abc.net.au/asia/the-first-asian-team-to-win-a-game-at-the-world-cup-finals/106779976

Al Jazeera (2026) 'For Haitians in the US, the pride and joy of the World Cup comes with fear', Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2026/6/25/for-haitians-in-the-us-the-pride-and-joy-of-the-world-cup-comes-with-fear

All India Football Federation (2023) Vision 2047: The Indian Football Strategic Roadmap. https://www.the-aiff.com/media/uploads/2023/01/Vision-2047-The-Indian-Football-Strategic-Roadmap-2023-2047.pdf

British Council (2016) 'Medium and long-term plan for Chinese football development points to increased demand for education in sports-related fields', British Council Opportunities Insight, https://opportunities-insight.britishcouncil.org/short-articles/news/medium-and-long-term-plan-chinese-football-development-points-increased-demand

Forbes (2026) 'How diaspora recruitment has reshaped World Cup rosters', Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/clementelisi/2026/06/15/how-diaspora-recruitment-has-reshaped-world-cup-rosters/

Fortune (2026) 'The legend of Cape Verde: how an island of half a million built the best team at the World Cup', Fortune, https://fortune.com/2026/07/16/roberto-lopes-linkedin-spam-cape-verde/

Ghosh, B. (2026) 'The 156,000 and the 1.4 billion', Foreign Policy, 15 May. Republished by Almendron. https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/the-156000-and-the-1-4-billion/

Khel Now (2023) 'Indian football: AIFF roadmap simplified – youth leagues planned, structure, objectives, development', Khel Now, https://khelnow.com/football/2023-01-indian-football-aiff-roadmap-simplified-youth-leagues-planned-structure-objectives-development

NPR (2026) 'Why India and China, two of the largest countries, didn't have World Cup teams', NPR, https://www.npr.org/2026/07/10/nx-s1-5876069/why-india-and-china-two-of-the-largest-countries-didnt-have-world-cup-teams

Reuters (2026) 'FIFA faces World Cup broadcast crisis as India's Reliance offers $20mln in China deal', Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/fifa-faces-world-cup-broadcast-crisis-indias-reliance-offers-20-mln-china-deal-2026-05-04/

The Guardian (2015) ‘China sets goal of hosting World Cup with master plan for football’, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/17/china-sets-goal-of-hosting-world-cup-with-master-plan-for-football

The Guardian (2022) 'Project Mbappé: the making of France's football superstar', The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/dec/09/project-mbappe-the-making-of-frances-football-superstar

The Guardian (2026) 'No games, no league: City Football Group and Indian football's "global embarrassment"', The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2026/jan/07/no-games-no-league-city-football-group-indian-football-global-embarrassment-mumbai-city-manchester

Times of India (2024) 'AIFF terminates service of its legal head after he accused President Kalyan Chaubey of corruption', The Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/football/top-stories/aiff-terminates-service-of-its-legal-head-after-he-accused-president-kalyan-chaubey-of-corruption/articleshow/108184049.cms

BEING NEUTRAL IN A WAR-TORN WORLD: Exploring Swiss Foreign Policy of Neutrality

By Sachinthani Ketakumbura

In an increasingly war-driven world, for a state to be neutral or to ‘not pick a side’ is viewed in different ways. Some might call it wisdom, some cowardice, and some might even say neutrality itself is choosing a side. Awarelogue Asian Institute had the pleasure of engaging in a fruitful conversation with the Ambassador of Switzerland to Sri Lanka and the Maldives, Her Excellency Dr. Siri Walt, on her thoughts on the foreign policy of Switzerland and much more, at her official residence on 12th May 2026.

Understanding Neutrality

Neutrality, by definition, refers to a stance adopted by a nation or state to not ally with any parties involved in a conflict. It simply means refraining from actively engaging in war, avoiding joining alliances, and treating all parties equally. It also means not supplying any mercenary troops and not allowing other states to use its territory (Neutrality (Political Relations) | Diplomacy and International Relations | Research Starters | EBSCO Research, n.d.). While understanding neutrality, it is also important to know the distinction between neutrality and non-alignment, since they are not the same. Neutrality, by definition, is when a state decides not to pick a side, whereas non-alignment falls under the same broad category but is also motivated by promoting friendly relations and peace while standing together for a common cause.

Switzerland's Neutrality: A Philosophy that Dates Back 500 Years

Switzerland’s stance on neutrality existed long before the World Wars or the Cold War. Neutrality is a philosophy that has shaped Swiss foreign policy for over 500 years. As Switzerland’s patron saint Nicholas of Flüe (also known as Brother Klaus) has said, “Do not mix in the affairs of others or ally yourself with a powerful stranger. Protect your country and do not hold yourself distant from it…” (Why Is Switzerland a Neutral Country? | Expatica, 2025).

Swiss neutrality as a foreign policy measure dates back to 1515, when the Confederates were defeated at the Battle of Marignano, and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), during the Thirty Years’ War. However, it was at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that this was formally recognised by the international community, and Switzerland formalized this position in 1907 by signing the Hague Convention governing the rights and obligations of neutral states in the event of war (Neutrality, n.d.).

Swiss Neutrality in Modern Times

Despite taking a stance as a neutral state, Switzerland has had to redefine its version of neutrality due to certain global conflicts. Switzerland took part in economic sanctions against Iraq during the first Gulf War in 1991, and it joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme in 1996, stressing the need to promote peace and security while keeping its right to withdraw when needed. In 1999, Switzerland also sent unarmed volunteers to support peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo (Neutrality, n.d.).

Looking at the proximity of the Russia-Ukraine war, the worldly implications of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the volatile situation surrounding Iran and its West Asian neighbours, one cannot help but question the purpose of Swiss neutrality. When international law is being violated, when civilians are being killed, and when human rights are being stripped away in plain sight, does staying silent not make you complicit? While Switzerland may be perceived this way, the reality happens to be much more complex. Swiss neutrality is more of a strategy than silence. By refusing to align itself with any side, Switzerland positions itself as a state that all parties can trust, making it one of the few countries in the world capable of mediating between conflicting powers and hosting the kind of negotiations that can actually move toward peace. A country that has picked a side cannot play that role.

Most importantly, while the Swiss follow neutrality as their foreign policy, they have also been consistent and outspoken in issuing statements condemning violations of human rights across these conflicts, making clear that neutrality does not mean the absence of values or being morally indifferent, but rather the careful exercise of them.

Switzerland as a Mediator

Switzerland has played a major role as a successful mediator in global conflicts. The Swiss facilitated secret communications and hosted negotiations that led to the Evian Accords and a ceasefire agreement in the Algerian War (1961–1962). During the Cold War era, Switzerland hosted high-profile meetings, especially the 1985 Geneva Summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, which signaled a thaw in the Cold War (Tognina, 2024).

At present, Switzerland acts more as a messenger or go-between for countries with severed or strained diplomatic relations. Switzerland has agreed to represent the interests of the USA in the cases of Venezuela and Iran. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Swiss government also offered to represent Ukraine's interests in Russia, a proposal reiterated by the Swiss President to the Russian Foreign Minister in 2022 (Tognina, 2024).

This shift from the role of mediator to messenger is a result of the fact that international bodies like the United Nations are now the primary drivers of conflict resolution, even if the UN’s efficiency in mitigating certain conflicts is being questioned at present. Swiss foreign policy focuses on maintaining basic diplomatic channels, which is part of Switzerland’s ‘good offices’ tradition, and is often driven by a combination of humanitarian values and national self-interest (Tognina, 2024).

The Paradox of Having an Army: Armed Neutrality

Switzerland’s decision to have an active army is another interesting debate. Despite having a neutral foreign policy, what does it really mean to have an army if you are not going to war? Switzerland practises the policy of ‘armed neutrality’ by maintaining an active military. Neutrality alone is not a guarantee of peace. Thus, armed neutrality is a way of deterring potential attackers while maintaining neutral status. Having an active army also allows the Swiss military to actively contribute to global peace under the Swiss Constitution. In a 2001 referendum, the Swiss electorate narrowly voted in favour of arming Swiss military personnel deployed in peacebuilding missions (Neutrality, n.d.).

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, considering its geographical proximity, makes the threat of invasion or possible attacks from outside a very real concern. It is therefore inevitable that the Swiss government take steps to protect its territory and citizens should it ever come to that. This reality has led to a renewed focus on military readiness and an increase in the defence budget to address gaps in equipment and infrastructure that resulted from decades of peace (Admin Hit, 2025).

Neutrality, as Switzerland has demonstrated for over 500 years, is neither simple nor passive. It is a deliberate choice by a nation to position itself as a space for mediation and negotiation in a time of global conflict. With Geneva serving as the headquarters for some of the world’s most important human rights institutions, Switzerland, both by action and by symbol, does not look away from violations of human rights. It condemns what is happening in this complex global order. Swiss neutrality is about being a state that keeps the door open for everyone, for the sake of peace in the long run.

References

Admin_Hit. (2025, October 28). The Swiss military: How a neutral country prepares for war. -. https://howitticks.ch/podcast/mathias-muller-swiss-military/

Neutrality. (n.d.). https://www.aboutswitzerland.eda.admin.ch/en/neutrality

Neutrality (political relations) | Diplomacy and International Relations | Research Starters | EBSCO Research. (n.d.). EBSCO. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/diplomacy-and-international-relations/neutrality-political-relations

Tognina, A. (2024, January 28). Switzerland as a mediator – the successes and failures. SWI swissinfo.ch. https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/switzerland-as-a-mediator-the-successes-and-failures/48073942

Why is Switzerland a neutral country? | Expatica. (2025, April 23). Expatica Switzerland. https://www.expatica.com/ch/moving/society-history/neutral-switzerland-107842/

LADY PAMELA HICKS AND INDIA: A REFLECTION

By George I. H. Cooke

History is replete with persons who contributed to its making, and those who enjoyed a ringside seat of experiencing all that was unfolding. Lady Pamela Carmen Louise Hicks (nee Mountbatten) belongs to the latter. As the younger daughter of Lord Louis Mountbatten and Lady Edwina Mountbatten, she lived through numerous historic moments, throughout her life, but in particular, during her early formative years. Born in Madrid, Spain on 19 April 1929, Pamela was baptized two months later in the Royal Chapel at St James Palace, and had amongst her many godparents, King Alphonso XIII, the then King of Spain.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, Pamela and her sister Patricia were sent to the United States of America. However, her life took a drastic turn in 1947, with two particularly significant events – a new home in India and a family wedding in the United Kingdom. Both these events would have an extraordinary impact on the young girl, as she experienced firsthand, much that unfolded in both countries at that period of time.

A new home in India

The first, was her new home, in India, which was a considerable distance from the environs she had been used to and grownup in. Her father of course was no stranger to South Asia having lived in Ceylon in the early 1940s at the height of the Second World War, when he was the Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia. Her passage to India in February 1947, was owing to her parents being tasked with a new responsibility at the last stages of the colonial period in that country. A 17-year-old Pamela joined her parents on what would be a very adventurous trip to the subcontinent, with which connections would remain for years to come. Her daughter, India Hicks reflects that “The moment she arrived in India at the tender age of 17, following her parents who had been appointed as the last Viceroy and Vicereine, she was put to work in the medical camps just outside Delhi. This led to a lifelong involvement with charitable organisations - and to me being aware from an early age that ‘from whom much is given much is expected’.”

Her father’s term as Viceroy ended at the dawn of India’s independence in August 1947, and thereafter, he was appointed the first Governor-General on the Union of India, serving till 21 June 1948. Yet her association with India would continue. Prior to her father’s term ending, Pamela had been appointed as Assistant to Major General Thomas Wynford Rees, the head of the Military Committee of the Indian Emergency Cabinet. She had access to some of the most sensitive information of that time, as the partition was unfolding, leading to the creation of Pakistan and independence of India. She also served for a brief period as Secretary to V. K. Krishna Menon, following his appointment as India’s High Commissioner in London, widening her knowledge and understanding of India in that post-independence period.

Although young in years, Pamela’s work and enterprising nature had seen her engaging with many leaders, including Mahathma Gandhi with whom she had meditated, and the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, who would even write lengthy letter to the younger daughter of the Mountbattens. His association with the Mountbatten family has been extensively discussed, especially his closeness friendship with her mother, Lady Edwina Mountbatten, yet the trouble he took to write to young Pamela, long after she had left India and returned to London, was significant.

In one letter, preserved in the Nehru Archive, he writes to her about a short story she had given him for his views. “I liked reading it, and I think that it is very well written. It flows on smoothly without any padding. The reader becomes more and more interested in Neola and to some extent, of course, in the girl and her reactions to Neola. Thus, it becomes a live story which leaves an impression and a memory after reading it. Looked at from the point of view of an animal story, it is good, as it shows a great deal of intimate observation. I doubt if any expert zoologists have observed a Neola so carefully and noted its characteristics. Thus, your story has a certain scientific value.” He goes onto encourage her writing abilities noting that “I think it is so good that you are sure to find a periodical which will publish it. You must go ahead with this and you must also write some more.”

Nehru goes on to refer to a dinner the night before, at which he was joined by her mother, and an American singer and actress, Eartha Mae Kitt, and confiding in Pamela, he writes that “I am afraid that I was not terribly impressed in any way by the lady. It is not fair for me to judge her because I have not seen her performing. But I did not see anything terribly attractive or exciting about her.”

A month after Pamela Mountbatten married David Hicks in January 1960, her mother Lady Edwina Mountbatten died. The Indian Prime Minister’s sister, Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, serving at the time as India’s High Commissioner in London, wrote to her brother ahead of his visit to the United Kingdom stating that “He (Lord Mountbatten) clings to those who knew and loved Edwina. So, I have come to realise that he is very anxious that you should go to Broadlands. I know that a visit by you will help him and also Patricia and Pammy very much.” The closeness of these families was evident, well beyond their years of association in India, and ‘Pammy’ as Pamela Mountbatten is fondly referred to, cherished her time in India, even naming her youngest daughter after the country.

She would return to India many times, with her mother, husband or on her own, and most often stayed with Prime Minister Nehru. One of those visits with her mother was in the first quarter of 1959, when they travelled to various parts of the country. For Nehru however, the moment that stood out the most, and about which he wrote to Lord Mountbatten, “This afternoon I did something which I had been thinking of for the last ten years or more. Edwina and Pammy took me right up the great dome of Rashtrapati Bhavan and we looked at the city of Delhi spread out before us on all sides. It has grown greatly.”

Pamela’s connection to India was due initially to her accompanying her parents in 1947, but the strength of the relationship was evident just a year later when, Nehru acknowledged her in his farewell speech to the Mountbattens in June 1948, when he stated that “She came here straight from school, and possessing all the charm she does, she did a grown-up person’s work in this troubled scene of India. I do not know if all of you who are present here know the work she has done, but those who do know well how splendid that has been and how much it is appreciated.”

In the first two decades of the 21st century, the passion for writing, so carefully nurtured in her youth, as well as the exotic places and intriguing personalities she met across India, resulted in the publication of two particularly significant books - ‘India Remembered: A Personal Account of the Mountbattens During the Transfer of Power’ which was co-authored with her daughter, India, and published in 2007, and the second, ‘Daughter of Empire: Life as a Mountbatten’ which was released in 2014.

Closer to the Royal Family

The other significant development of 1947, was when her father’s sister’s son, Philip Mountbatten, married Princess Elizabeth, the heir to the British throne, on 20 November 1947. A young Pamela Mountbatten, who returned briefly from India, was one of the eight bridesmaids attending to the young princess at this wedding. Although their friendship extended to her younger days, even before the marriage, they would remain close over the years as Pamela was made a Lady-in-Waiting to the princess and thereafter continued in this position, when Elizabeth became Queen.

In 1952, when Princess Elizabeth was in Kenya on the first leg of a Commonwealth tour that would have also taken her to Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon, her father King George VI passed away. Lady Pamela Hicks, who was traveling with her, was present at Treetops Hotel, in Kenya’s Aberdare National Park, witnessing Princess Elizabeth becoming Queen Elizabeth.

When the postponed 1952 royal tour commenced at the end of 1953 and flowed into the next year, the royal couple, visited Ceylon in April 1954, and Pamela Mountbatten was Lady-in-Waiting to the Queen. She has been photographed at several events during the royal visit, the most notable being the opening of Parliament, which took place at the Independence Memorial Hall in Colombo.

Lady Pamela Hicks, served the Queen for many decades, travelling with her across the United Kingdom, and also to many countries, as she supported her longstanding friend, relative and sovereign. She was even seen at her funeral in September 2022, when an era ended, and the world that Pamela had grown-up in and known so well was gradually coming to a close. She had enjoyed the thrills of life, known kings and prime ministers, toured extensively, gained immense knowledge, and yet had also endured personal tragedy as when her mother passed away in her sleep in Malaysia in 1960, and when her father was assassinated on 27 August 1979 in Mullaghmore, Ireland by the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Her father had been in his fishing boat, with his eldest daughter, Patricia, her husband, John Knatchbull, their twin sons, and his daughter’s mother-in-law. The bomb claimed the lives of the last viceroy of India, one of his grandsons, the child’s grandmother and a boat assistant.

Following the death of her own husband, David Hicks on 29 March 1998, Lady Pamela Hicks continued to make the most of the years ahead of her. As her daughter India Hicks, in announcing her mother’s passing noted, “through the prism of a crowded and remarkable past, she made incomparable company, carrying her memories lightly, and always with humour. My mother maintained right up to the end, the impeccable style, sharp mind, and effortless charm that made her not only a cherished institution, but truly the last of her kind.”

The death of Pamela Carmen Louise Hicks (nee Mountbatten) on 5 June 2026 has seen the closure of yet another window into a past, that saw so much, meant so much and yet remains much of a mystery to many, especially in South Asia. ly the last of her kind.”

This article is part of 'The Window Series'