SHINZO ABE: PRESERVING HIS LEGACY

Guest Commentary by Banura Nandathilake

Subscribers to international relations often come to a junction between theories: Realism, which posits a zero sum world where external circumstances such as hard power and anarchy that are beyond any individual define the ways in which states do what they do, and constructivism which understands an interdependent society of states where leaders truly have an tangible impact on inter-state relations through social mechanisms. The case for the latter seems to outweigh the former in the analysis of Shinzo Abe however, who left an ineffaceable mark on Japanese foreign policy, by guiding a largely pacifist Japan to one that actively moulds and shapes the security, economic and diplomatic architecture of the Indo Pacific and beyond.

As the heir of a distinguished political family, Abe entered politics in the 1990s where he sought to largely continue the policies of his grandfather, the former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi: Regain the ability to exert Japanese power on the regional and world stage by removing the shackles imposed by the US and a faction of the then Japanese political class. As such, Abe went on to become Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister with four terms (2006-7, 2012-14, 2014-17, 2017-20). On 8 July 2022 however, in an event that stunned the heavily gun restricted Japan, the former Japanese Prime Minister was shot and killed during his campaigning run for his party in the Japanese city of Nara. Despite the untimely passing of the "shadow shogun", the direction of Japan's future may be influenced by, thereby correlate with Abe's "vision" to a great extent (Green, CSIS 2022). Japan has built a full-fledged national security establishment, an estimated 1.7% growth in GDP in 2022, and is a bastion of neo liberal democratic policies in the Indo pacific. Below is an obituary for a man who had a heavy hand in reawakening Japan, wherein his effect on domestic and foreign policies will be appreciated.

Domestic Political Legacy

While for many, Abe’s career was one of dramatic and unlikely turns which spanned 14 years and saw him into extraordinary power to influence the direction of Japanese domestic policy, Sheila Smith of Council on Foreign Relations and others understand that a revised domestic constitution may be Abe's major legacy.

Just two days after Abe’s assassination, the Japanese voted in the Upper House election, awarding the government led by the current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida their anticipated victory. Interestingly, Smith notes that the assassination had no credible change in the election environment. The voter turnout was on par with previous years, and Abe’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a structural advantage as the smaller opposition parties did not form a united front thus further dividing the vote. As such, an Upper House win by the LDP could open an avenue for a Constitutional revision, once an ambition of the former Prime Minister. While factors that may postpone an immediate revision do exist, she notes that a revision could have a lasting impact on Abe’s legacy.

Abenomics

Abe’s vision was of regaining the ability to exercise Japanese power, by losing her shackles imposed by low domestic economic power and capital, which can then be turned into military might and diplomatic currency. However, Japanese capabilities were idling, due to the lack of opportunities as per legal and international constraints in the post WW2 era. In the understanding that securing Japan’s future would require an economy with a new foundation for growth, the economic programme “Abenomics” was born. The programme was an attempt to kickstart Japan’s dormant capabilities through expansionary monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, and a long list of industrial, labour, and regulatory policies to incentivise endogenous development. Abenomics aimed to shift production from agrarian or low value sectors to high income productive sectors to slow the decline of Japan’s labour force, in an “serious, sustained, and flexible attempt to grapple with Japan’s growth challenges” (Harris, FP 2022).

Abenomics was instrumental in reviving the Japanese economy, as well as supercharging Abe’s political career. The programme reversed years of stagnation, boosted corporate profits and state tax revenues, thereby reducing unemployment and crime. As such, Abe was able to coast past domestic elections, pausing the tradition of short-lived premierships in Japan. The resulting political durability allowed him to pursue long term ambitions, such as creating a National Security Council which distilled the defence apparatus through the Prime Minister’s office. Such a creation then allowed for a more active foreign policy over the existing passive structure, which sought to strengthen regional ties while balancing against regional hegemons. 

Japan-India Relations

Relations between Cold war Japan and India were one of polite distance: Japan was a US ally, while India was procedurally non-aligned with some overlap of interests with the USSR. Despite the deterioration of the said relations during the 1988 Indian nuclear missile test and the Japanese economic sanctions that followed, the two states were quick to repair and rebuild a “global partnership’’, proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro a few years later during his visit to India. However, it was Abe that built the stage for a more cohesive and interdependent Japanese-Indian relationship, such as the “India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership’’ (2007). Bilateral relations were further strengthened during Abe’s third term in 2014 through a “special and strategic partnership,” which encompassed diplomatic, security and economic sectors. Trade between Japan and India increased exponentially from 2007, while Japan and India cooperated on security issues in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad.

Moreover, it could be understood that Abe's 2007 visit to India was not only significant for the Japan-India relationship, but also India’s perception of itself and its role in the region (Miller, CFR 2022). Miller understands that it was Japan that influenced India, ‘a notoriously reluctant and cautious actor in global politics’ to join Abe’s Indo-Pacific vision, which now serves as an ideological, economic and military buffer to the rise of China. This vision of the “confluence of the two seas” - Pacific and Indian, were first outlined by Abe in his speech during his first visit to India in 2007, and laid the foundation for the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept which was later adopted by the United States.

China and the Quad

China’s rise in the contemporary era has been unprecedented. An authoritarian political system combined with a quasi-capitalist economic system has allowed China to gain regional hegemony and a global great power ranking, allowing its influential military, economic and diplomatic alliances. Such a rise presents a growing threat and demands a balance of power between China and the US and Allies. Of those allies, Abe represented a significant one: Japan.

While Abe was central in expanding India's position in the Indo-Pacific, his pragmatic approach to relations with China demanded a closer look. Abe could be considered a soft liner on Sino-Japan relations, so much so that he was called a "traitor" by many Japanese patriots. This may be so since the uneven economic balance of power weighed more towards China than Japan: Japan needed China for trade and manufacturing, than vice versa. However, as Mireya Solís, the director of the Centre for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution understood, despite his efforts to maintain closer relations with China “Abe felt very strongly that Japan could not live in an Asia where China had hegemony”. As such, Abe’s pragmatism recognised that despite interdependence and globalisation, China represented a challenge on all fronts, diplomatic, economic and military. Ergo, Abe may have been instrumental in setting the tone for the Japanese defence apparatus. Furthermore, Abe subscribed to right leaning nationalist policies domestically, as he helped coax a pacifist Japanese public to oppose China’s meteoric and bullish rise, further laying the groundwork for the direction of Japanese foreign policy.

However, his vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific may have trumped all else. His influence soon superseded national and regional boundaries, as President Joe Biden, who once worked with Abe as the vice president during the Obama administration, put it “He (Abe) was a champion of the Alliance between our nations and the friendship between our people”, and promised to continue Abe’s “vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific” (2022). The US and Japan, along with India and Australia, form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which represents a bulwark against China in the Indo-Pacific. While the US had more economic and military might than Japan, Abe was still paramount in laying the rhetorical groundwork for the Quad, “providing structural, conceptual ideas to things that needed to be provided at a time when it seemed like it was crumbling.” (Hornung, 2022).

On Taiwan

A great power conflict in East Asia appears to brew over the Island of Taiwan which stands a stone's throw away from the shores of China. While the ideological divide stems from the great powers US and China, US allies such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are not passive watchers either.

Japanese leaders before Abe were uncomfortable with using force to defend Taiwan, as implications of such a move for Japanese security, and how Japan's responses to such scenarios were heavily debated. But it was Abe that argued in 2021, “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance. President Xi Jinping in particular, should never have a misunderstanding in recognizing this”. Abe was thus paramount in transforming Japan’s relationship with Taiwan to counter threats from China, for he recognised a hegemonic China posed a risk not just to the security of the liberal democratic states of East Asia, but their economic and sociological institutions as well. As such, Prime Minister Abe emphasised shared economic, political and ideological values between Japan and Taiwan, where he referred to Taiwan as a “precious friend,” an angle the incoming governments adopted thereafter. Abe was an advocate of stronger relations with Taiwan so much so that he went on to argue that the US policy of strategic ambiguity was “fostering instability in the Indo-Pacific region” as he called out the US to “make clear that it will defend Taiwan against any attempted Chinese invasion.”

Furthermore, it was during Mr. Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister that one of the major sore points in the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Japan were resolved. After 17 years of negotiations, in 2013 Japan and Taiwan concluded Japanese recognition of Taiwanese Fishing rights in the East China Sea. As such, affection for Abe and Japan in Taiwan have reached record highs. Thus, after the news of Abe’s passing had reached Taiwan, President Tsai Ing-wen honoured “Taiwan’s most loyal best friend” with the national flag flown at half-mast.

Shinzo Abe could be called a realist, for he understood that despite diplomacy and the multilateral handshaking, states with different value systems and interests must communicate through hard power and deterrence. But to call him a pragmatist through the constructivist lens could be more apt, as he understood that despite anarchy and hard power considerations, leaders are still able to make a difference in the domestic and foreign policies of a state, thereby keeping up with an evolving world stage. As the world honours him in his passing, it is now up to his successors to carry his legacy forward.

 

COMPREHENDING CHINA’S DIPLOMACY: INSIGHTS ON STRATEGIZING

- George I. H. Cooke

Strategic decision making in governance is considered the catalyst for success. When examining China and the model being created and grown, the impact of strategizing resonates in every policy that is formulated, statement that is made and action taken by the state. China completes four decades of openness in 2018 and is looking to the future in ensuring prosperity within, and promoting development not just with key allies, but across the board in order to increase opportunities, raise standards for development and drive growth in the global economy.  

 

As a country grows itself it looks to reach outside through an effective foreign policy. The formulation and implementation of such a policy requires clarity in understanding internal and external factors that influence foreign policy. Of even greater significance is the ability to understand the entire structure of the country with which relations are being established or expanded. When examining key post-independence developments in China-Sri Lanka relations from 1950 as the first Prime Minister recognized the People’s Republic of China, to the signing of the historic Rubber Rice Pact in 1952, the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1957 and all key developments, the most intrinsic aspect throughout has been the need to comprehend the other. When comprehension has been grasped in its entirety, relations have flourished, and when critical aspects have been ignored, issues arose.  

China’s international relations, connectivity and investments, though under constant scrutiny as states grapple to comprehend the process by which the Chinese mechanism operates, are the main factors that ensure the possibility of an effective foreign policy. Whilst the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) notches half a decade, the large scale planning behind the projects, have created a massive impact in pushing China up the ladder of influence in the global arena.

Comprehension of China remains the most critical factor if states are to realize a mutually beneficial relationship. From the development prospects of the ‘Two Centenary’ goals, to the five pronged approach of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, to building up a socialist economy, a socialist democracy, a socialist advanced culture, a socialist harmonious society and a socialist ecological civilization, the Chinese leadership has sought to strategize foreign policy efficiently by basing it on domestic demands and policy.

China’s four-pronged Comprehensive Strategy for implementation requires deeply integrated measures whereby emphasis is laid on the comprehensive nature of the deed. This results in improving effectiveness and efficiency but more crucially guarantees an inclusiveness of varied sectors from completing the building of a moderately prosperous society to deepening reform, advancing the rule of law and exercising strict discipline for the party in keeping with the Chinese system. Further augmentation occurs through the five major development concepts to promote innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development. This model which has been activated in China is what the country looks to export to contemporaries internationally.

Addressing the Central Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2014, President Xi Jinping called for devotion to “safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, foster an international environment that is friendly to our peaceful development, and take advantage of this important period of strategic opportunity for China.” His call identifies crucial factors that China is keen on safeguarding and promoting. Just as Aristotle advocated the importance of ‘knowing thyself’ China has clearly done her homework before embarking internationally, and teaches a valuable lesson to all countries, especially Sri Lanka on the need to understand that which is within, and attempt thereafter to formulate policy accordingly.

Bilateral relations remain the bedrock upon which China has grown relationships, particularly with countries like Sri Lanka. The Rubber – Rice Pact though concluded more than six decades ago, is highly appreciated by China due to the significance of the deed. The failure to conclude this agreement would have jeopardized the provision of a vital import for China owing to the embargo at the time and severely affected Sri Lanka’s supply of rice. One understood the needs of the other and was able to secure a mutually beneficial arrangement. Cultivating varied degrees of relations with countries in all regions of the world, China has displayed the potential of a country to deeply engage with another irrespective of size.

In his commitment to multilateralism, Xi used the 70^th anniversary of the United Nations to call for the adoption of “a new vision of seeking positive outcomes for all, and reject the outdated mindset of zero-sum game or winner-takes-all [and] forge a global partnership at both international and regional levels, and embrace a new approach to state-to-state relations, one that features dialogue rather than confrontation, and seeks partnerships rather than alliance.” Through interactions in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), the East-Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China is striving to give effect to what Xi called “a new model of international relations underpinned by mutually beneficial cooperation.” Recognizing a unique niche, China is not attempting to change the existing system, which has undergone much trial, but is instead looking to evolve a new one.

When strategizing for diplomacy in general and when attempting to build a sound relationship with China a thorough comprehension of several factors is required. Firstly, understanding oneself whereby countries assess their internal requirements, are aware of ramifications and enter the international arena with a clear vision of what it is they wish to contribute to and gain from the international system.

Secondly, understanding the process within China, given the energetic strategizing, in which the BRI is just one of three massive programmes that also includes the coordinated development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei province, and the Yangtze River economic belt.

Thirdly, realizing the potential of consolidating bilateral relations and assessing the value that China attaches to bilateral interactions as well as the significance of history through which these ties have been fostered.

Finally, recognition of the international environment, and to note that as China continues to rise and strides the world stage, she is taking partners and allies with her. Changing dynamics in global governance, which have seen a rise in nationalism, isolationism and self-centered policy formulation, have resulted in China benefiting through the adoption of innovative measures of inclusion and cooperation.

The Brussels-based academic Jonathan Holslag, opines that ‘today China’s diplomacy with Asia has morphed from a rigid state-guided scheme into an eclectic array of initiatives from many stakeholders: the state, the Party, the military, the provinces, cities, companies, (and) thinks tanks.’ The strategic manner in which China develops within, the cooperative manner through which all countries are being embraced and the pioneering means by which China aims to revolutionize global governance in the 21^st century, on the eve of the 70^th anniversary of the revolution, are collectively indicative of the progress made thus far and the goals to which she aspires.

Although Martin Jacques identifies China ‘not just as a nation-state, [but] also [as] a civilization-state,’ the insight that may be derived of the overall strategic approach of such a country requires detailed comprehension, if countries are to succeed in their interactions with China.

Agreements and Anniversaries: China, India and Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy - 1987 and 2017

The foreign policy of a country, whilst being an extension of its domestic policy, is chiefly the manner in which it deals, responds and cooperates with the international community. Hardly set it stone, the policy and policy making process evolve according to circumstance and situation. Thus it is of added significance when the country formulating that policy is a relatively small state, attempting to balance its policy towards two of the largest states in the world. Adapting to developments at the national, regional and global level, while strategizing for the future, remains at the core of decision making.   

Sri Lanka’s relations with the global community date back centuries, with the importance of the country’s location being paramount. Apparent through the manner in which other countries have sought to maintain ties, Ceylon has from the times of the ancient kings, and the special envoys they dispatched to foreign courts, to the heightened commercial connectivity along the trading routes and through to the colonial period, when three of the most powerful empire builders of their time, sought to ‘engage’ with the country, in more ways than one, experienced a foreign policy that has been complex, competitive, and colourful to say the least.

From independence onwards, the country has striven to be ‘a friend to all and enemy to none’ in the international community, yet faced trying and decisive moments when decisions were taken, or forced to be taken, owing to a plethora of factors. A noteworthy degree of this engagement and these decisive moments have pivoted on relations with China and India.

With China, from the recognition accorded by D. S. Senanayake in 1950, to the Rubber-Rice Pact during the premiership of Dudley Senanayake in 1952, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s decision to establish diplomatic relations in 1957, Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s engagement in shuttle diplomacy at the time of border tensions between China and India in 1962, and her close ties with Mao Tse Tung and Chou en Lai, as well as the diplomatic engagement of all Presidents from J. R. Jayewardene to Maithripala Sirisena, have seen a steady, sometimes meteoric rise in connectivity, as during the period from 2005 to 2015, with even Xi Jinping visiting Sri Lanka in 2014. The Chinese stake in the development drive is high in Sri Lanka. These are not funds that China chose to freely pour into the Sri Lankan economy, but instead loans that Sri Lanka sought. Hence while China looks to expand its sphere of influence globally and finds a ready partner in Sri Lanka, it is of paramount importance to note that Sri Lanka reached out to China and that country reciprocated. Terms and conditions that accompany such finances, and through them prosperity, obviously come at a cost, as would be the case with all loans.

India, given its geographic proximity has remained a critical factor in policy formulation. Whilst independence itself in 1948 is attributed to the freedom struggle on the island, the departure of the British from India remains a pivotal factor that is often overlooked. The signing of vital agreements with the British to safeguard defence and external relations by D. S. Senanayake owing to his anxiety of having to ward off any untoward action, to the strong bond of friendship between Nehru and the Bandaranaikes, which continued through Indira Gandhi and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the Sirima-Shastri Pact of 1964, claiming the island of Kachchativu in 1974, the training of rebels by Mrs Gandhi and her deep dislike of J. R. Jayewardene as well as the infamous humanitarian air intervention by India in the north of Sri Lanka and the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987 between Rajiv Gandhi and J. R. Jayewardene, the saga that was the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the action of Ranasinghe Premadasa, the closeness of relations during the presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the straining of them in the second term of Mahinda Rajapaksa, and the intimacy of ties post 2015 with Narendi Modi having visited Sri Lanka twice in two years, have all seen the formulation of policy with India remaining a cornerstone in the foreign policy framework.

29^th July 2017 marks three decades since the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, the assault on Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the first steps towards the establishment of the Provincial Council system. Politics remained at the core as India, her coterie of diplomats and abundance of politicians from Tamil Nadu to New Delhi took umbrage at developments in the island.

Reflecting on the period, the Oxford educated, political heavyweight Lalith Athulathmudali once observed that ‘the Indians came in only because we were winning. …Their purpose was to use our acute problem, which they helped to intensify, in order to get us to change our policy on several points.’ A domestic issue had spiraled into an international one as global attention turned to the island with the riots of July 1983. As refugees sought asylum overseas the issue ceased to be domestic. Whilst Jayewardene sought the support of the United States of America and the Western world, especially through his open market policies, his tackling of relations with his immediate neighbour, remained critical.

Yet his attempting to cooperate with Rajiv Gandhi, especially in light of the already deep-rooted involvement of India, even won them both a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 but which was eventually secured by the UN Peace Keeping Forces. From 1987 to date relations with India have soured and improved at varied times, signaling change yet the abiding factor has been the need for positive relations owing to geography. Elections and their results do not move the island nation from its geographic positioning, and hence, neighbours do not change. Jayewardene and almost all his successors have understood the need to work with a country they wouldn’t be able to survive without.

In the last three decades China has experienced a steady rise as a global power, marking her presence on the world stage and surging ahead of countries like India, in a gamut of areas. Interestingly the thirtieth anniversary of the Indo-Lanka Accord coincides, with the signing of a landmark agreement with China over the Hambantota port, which lies in close proximity to international sea lanes and is one of the many assets Sri Lanka possesses.

Once again we are reminded that foreign policy remains an extension of domestic policy. Domestic compulsions continue to drive foreign policy and its formulation as Sri Lanka, having undergone a virtual stagnation of economy growth and development, sacrificing prosperity and losing out on the opportunities due to the conflict, is attempting today to regain her position in the region and the world at large. Countries like Singapore which took a cue from then Ceylon have raced ahead and are in the vanguard of global affairs. South East Asia, since adopting a collaborative mechanism in 1967 is reaping immense benefits fifty years later, while others in South Asia are trying to ride the wave of the One Belt One Road initiative of China.      

Sri Lanka’s choice to proceed with the signing of the Agreement with China, to service the debt and ensure usage of facilities the country possesses, is judicious, to say the least. The agreement is a lease and needs to be understood as such. At the same time the efforts to lease the Trincomalee oil tanks in the East to India indicate the ability of a small island nation to balance her foreign policy. Satisfying two global giants at the same time, involves massive effort, dedication and strategy. Evidenced through the action of the Sirisena - Wickremesinghe government is that bipartisan cooperation can bring about change, which would transcend into prosperity of the island and her people.  

 

Foreign policy is therefore not set in stone, yet strategy remains a crucial element if a state is to benefit from location, resources and infrastructure. The maturity of the process of policy making makes it clear that irrespective of developments in China or India, and despite the international machinations enveloping these two countries, Sri Lanka, her leaders and people, need to focus on a strategic, Sri Lanka-first policy through which the state’s interests are safeguarded, sustained and promoted. That policy needs to be set in stone. 

- AWARELOGUE EDITORIAL

Hong Kong and the Chinese ‘Empire’

The marking of anniversaries in global politics is usually confined to the creation of new states through the cessation of provinces or regions, by generally violent means as has been experienced at varying times in history. The unification of Germany is a critical exception that stands out. Yet 2017 marks a unique anniversary of the unification of a country that is fast emerging as the greatest powerhouse the world has ever known.

When Chris Patten sailed out of Hong Kong’s Victoria Harbour on board HMS Britannia in June 1997, it was not merely a handover of governance from the United Kingdom to China, but more importantly the curtain falling on one empire and gradually rising on another. The presence of the British in southern China since the founding of the Hong Kong Crown Colony on 26 January 1841 had been a long and arduous task, as was the experience between all colonizers and their respective colonies.

Occupied in the midst of the First Opium War which lasted from 1839 to 1842, Hong Kong was ceded to Britain in the Treaty of Nanking, the signing of which saw the ending of the War as the Chinese were defeated. Yet it was the 1898 Second Convention of Peking that saw the establishment of a 99 year rent-free period, giving the British what seemed to be an indefinite stay in the territory. With the opening of discussions between the British and Chinese in 1982 when Deng Xiaoping stressed the need for the handover to Margaret Thatcher, the result was the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984, and the stage was set for the dismantling of control over yet another jewel in the crown. 

Today the statue of Deng Xiaoping positioned as it is in Shenzhen ‘walking’ towards Hong Kong is more than symbolic. His tedious efforts of reclaiming Hong Kong from the British were seen through his steadfast position that Hong Kong would return to China, highlighted through his assertion that pursuant to a lapse of a year or two, China would announce her intention to recover the territory. Unlike in the Falklands, Thatcher didn’t have the opportunity to assert British sovereignty over Hong Kong and had to abide by the 1898 Convention.

The twentieth anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong is an opportune moment to reflect upon the vast changes taking places in China as a whole and the position the country has come to occupy on the global stage. Large countries, such as China, which Martin Jacques claims is ‘not just a nation-state, it is also a civilization-state’ given the gigantic nature of size, the magnitude of population and the propensity to effect change, have much at their disposal. He goes on to say that the term China encompasses ‘its history, the dynasties, Confucius, the ways of thinking, the role of government, relationships and customs, the Guanxi or network of personal connections, the family, the filial piety, ancestral worship, the values and distinctive philosophy, all of which long predate China’s history as a nation-state.’

Yet diplomacy is a key tool, and it is complimented with a variety of other embellishments. Such continent-like countries strategize on equivalent terms but they too realize that in the global community the need exists to cooperate with all. The China of today is well equipped and is using all its diplomatic capabilities to its advantage.

The current Chinese global policy direction through the amalgamated One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and the AIIB brings several countries closer to China through trade, investment and economic cooperation. Lest we forget China is the largest holder of US treasury bonds. During the global financial crisis, China did not trim its bond holdings, but actually increased them, a move which ensured stability in the United States, mobile financial markets, eased its credit crunch and promoted trade financing, thus being beneficial to the country’s goal in macroeconomic regulations.

President Xi has been at pains to stress that ‘the pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative is not meant to reinvent the wheel. Rather, it aims to complement the development strategies of countries involved by leveraging their comparative strengths.’ President of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) Ambassador Su Ge recently noted that China is ‘looking for a more inclusive world order with more respect for diversity, not a new world order.’ It is here that a clear thought-process becomes relevant. The comprehension of contemporary China calls for primarily understanding the contemporary world.

Chou Enlai succeeded in dispelling qualms and apprehensions that existed sixty years ago and thrust China into the global arena. Xi Jinping has marked the milestone with far reaching vision and cemented the position of China as a key leader, in world affairs. His initiatives in resurrecting the ancient Silk Road and thereby creating an ‘economic belt’ has widely enhanced the influence of China not only across the Asian region but beyond into Africa, the Middle East and Europe as investments are targeted in the areas of road, rail, port and pipelines across scores of countries.

Furthering interest and engagement in the region, China’s assumption of the chairmanship of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), saw a reiteration of the Chinese policy of integrating to a greater degree. President Xi stressed that ‘with our interests and security so closely intertwined, we will swim or sink together and we are increasingly becoming a community of common destiny.’ The close affinity being nurtured through investment and commerce has benefited countries throughout the region and is expected to bear more fruit as the growth of the relationship expands.

While the British saw the sun set on their empire when they left Hong Kong, the Chinese sun is on the ascent and so is their ‘empire.’ With a growing global presence, which is physical, economical, financial and political, the building of an empire, is evident.

-          Awarelogue Editorial