REVISITING THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE ALTERATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Seventy years ago, President Harry S. Truman reformulated American foreign policy. From a nation that opted to remain isolated for much of its existence, to one that was forced to respond to the Pearl Harbour attack, America would have, it may be argued, returned to its usual reclusive self, if not for the demands of the day drawing the nation into global politics once again. Truman was instrumental in guiding this policy reformulation incorporating the economic with the political to charter a course, considered visionary given the massive returns to America and the heightened influence gained in the decades ahead.

President Harry S. Truman

Having served just 82 days in the Vice Presidency before being elevated to the highest position on the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Truman, had served as a judge and Senator for Missouri, when he was thrust into office at the tail end of the Second World War. Inheriting leadership of one of the strongest nations in the war, he faced the daunting task of ending it and deciding on the role of America in a changing world order.
On March 12, 1947, addressing Congress, the 33rd President highlighted the British decision to refrain from assisting Greece and Turkey, and forewarned that ‘it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.’ As Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State feared, Greece and Turkey would be the tip of the iceberg if allowed to fall, as the domino effect would result in considerable damage, if America retained a position of indifference or non-interference. The fear of Communism, given its potential for growth amid want and despair, that was gripping large swathes of Europe, drove Congress to agree to Truman’s proposal, giving birth to the Doctrine.  The $400 million provided to both countries, the Marshall Plan that would assist countries in Europe, from the following year, and the Doctrine, would alter the trajectory of America.

As Greece grapples with financial concerns, Turkey remains relevant, seven decades later. Keen on joining the European Union, garnering support for her membership bid and brokering deals in bearing the responsibility for the massive influx of refugees, Turkey, ever since the apology extended by President Erdogen for the shooting down of a Russian military aircraft and the attempted coup d’état of July 2016, has returned to play a catalytic role in the world. Joe Biden’s Turkish visit in August 2016 came as America scrambled to mend fences with an ally growing unnervingly close to the Russian Federation. Eager to allay doubts, the US Vice President, undertaking his second visit for 2016, said his visit was ‘to remind the world of the paramount importance that we place on the relationship between our nations as allies, partners and as friends.’

From witnessing the fall of Germany, to ordering the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, launching the Marshall Plan, as well as the signing of the Charter of the United Nations and starting the Cold War, Truman though attempting to preserve and promote US interests, made decisions which have retained the ability to spark controversy to date, a trait associated with several of his successors. Intervening in all continents, and almost all countries, the United States of America came to embody the global policeman, politician and provoker in an ever-changing scenario.
Seventy years later, Donald J. Trump’s enthusiasm to focus within, has enabled those on the exterior to engage more widely, whilst commencing the reversal of all that America stood for, for most of the twentieth century. Faced with the growing challenge of China and Russia, and the rise of states in Asia as they gear up to realize and embrace the Asian Century, America is today precariously balancing her policy, attempting to engage positively, yet at a minimum, as has been witnessed in the first couple of months of the new administration, chiefly towards China and Russia.

From Truman to Trump, it may be argued, US Presidents have endeavoured to take America deeper into global affairs, yet the incumbent on the contrary, through his unfolding policies has begun to resonate with the Father of the Nation. George Washington, in his Farewell Address, cautioned that ‘it is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world… (yet) let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.’ Withdrawing from the TPP, questioning NATO, distancing once close allies, and warming towards erstwhile enemies, the current administration appears resolute in reviving the Washington ethos, in the realm of foreign policy.

- Editorial

Guest Commentary: Can populism detract the centripetal forces of globalization?

Since the BREXIT vote in the United Kingdom and President Donald Trump’s election victory, informed political analysis have been focused on the rise of populism in Europe. Fears have been rife on the possible rise of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Marine Le Pen in the upcoming election in France. Many populist leaders have had significant media coverage and what they say and advocate for, has been posited by some to ‘resonate’ with the people. Leaving aside the argument whether such rhetoric resonates or not, one can clearly see that the broad implications of the rise of populist leaders (even if they do not obtain political power in the country) has a significant impact in shaping the direction of a country's  domestic policy. Such populist rhetoric also has the possibility of destabilizing the centripetal forces within a ruling party and may influence it to detract from ascribing to an inclusive domestic policy stance.

The optics of the populist movement have reshaped and altered the global public discourse on political behavior to a level as yet unseen since the end of the Cold War. Utilizing social media many around the world have vented their frustration on Trump’s ‘Muslim ban’. Another case in point is when Seb Dance, a Labour MEP sitting behind Nigel Farage (who was a BREXIT campaigner)  held up a sign reading ‘He’s lying to you’ with an arrow pointing towards Farage.

Gone are the days where one can put his/her eggs in the basket based on ‘credible’ polling. 2016 saw many political decisions going the ‘wrong’ way, despite being broadly touted otherwise. Among these one could cite the FARC – Columbia peace deal (the first one, which went to a referendum) as well as Matteo Renzi’s defeat in a referendum to alter the constitution as notable cases. What is really happening? Is the world witnessing the rise of populism and is this going to permanently detract and destabilize the movement towards globalization?

To better examine and contextualize these questions one first needs to define globalization. Understandably globalization is among the hardest of lexicon to define. Its meaning differs because globalization contextualizes many aspects of the world we live in today. The World Economic Forum outlines globalization in a simple yet lucid manner.

“In simple terms, globalization is the process by which people and goods move easily across borders. Principally, it's an economic concept – the integration of markets, trade and investments with few barriers to slow the flow of products and services between nations. There is also a cultural element, as ideas and traditions are traded and assimilated.”

The question that begs to be asked is whether globalization has in fact been detrimental to the world? Why has the backlash against globalization and a neoliberal institutional world order in general, increased over the past few years? Does globalization face a mortal threat with the rise of populist leaders? Although these questions are undeniably difficult to tackle without more understanding of the policy rhetoric and actual policy implementation by such populist leaders; one cannot refrain from questioning the present political situation of the world.

Since Donald Trump’s election the U.S abandonment of the TPP, Trump’s expressed desire to drop out or at least alter the NAFTA and his infamous ‘Muslim ban’ are symbolic of his desire to follow a neo isolationist foreign policy of “making America great again.” The BREXIT campaign saw a majority of voters expressing their desire to have more control over immigration and over domestic policy making, especially with regard to the economy. Theresa May’s recent comments suggest that a hard BREXIT involving the U.K leaving the EU's single market is the most probable option once article 50 is triggered in March 2017. Despite the Prime ministers desire to position the U.K as being more open to the world the underlying irony as stated by the prime minster earlier last year is that “BREXIT means BREXIT.”

So do these factors among others entail a move against globalization? A poll by Yougov.com in 2015 showed that the public perception of the benefits of globalization as benefitting them is reducing. In a background where OXFAM reports that ‘the world’s eight richest billionaires control the same wealth between them as the poorest half of the globe’s population’ one can see significant asymmetrical income division around the world. As the rich get richer those in the middle class are being increasingly squeezed. This sentiment of resentment appears to play into the hands of populist leaders who have tapped into these fears, fashioned an enemy/enemies responsible for all the peoples’ economic woes and thereby obtained public support despite own their controversial comments.

Establishment candidates have been routinely scorned for either not understanding the people or double dealing so as to obtain personal benefits. Xenophobia in the west has burgeoned since the migrant/refugee ‘crises’ began on European shores.  Hate speech and racist comments have reinforced divergence in society; resulting in increasingly fractured communities dotting the European continent as well as America. Parlance of this nature appeals to certain sections of communities which have supported the rise of populist leaders.   

As American commitment to the structure - it established since the end of the Cold War - wanes; the possibility of China obtaining that position is a likely prospect. Chinese president Xi Jinping’s resounding defence of globalization and open trade in the WEF is one such example. However with regard to the human rights regime one could foretell that China will certainly not play a leading role. In a recent article Professor Yong Deng notes that China will not seek to be a traditional revisionist power having risen to the height it has today, due to the forces of globalization and free trade. According to him, China would remain “deeply committed to economic globalization” but not to further the existing international regimes such as the human rights regime or to put a significant stake in ending conflicts by military action in the Middle East. Thus globalization in an economic sense would receive Chinese support, especially through the OBOR but not in any other dimensions of globalization.

Although American commitment to military alliances and defense pacts was at one stage in doubt, I do not believe that Trump may rescind U.S commitment to that extent. The statements by James Mattis and Rex Tillerson seem to suggest that US foreign policy would not alter to the extent once assumed under the leadership of President Trump. Especially as south East Asian countries and Japan desires to balance China with American influence (in the backdrop of island-building by China in the South China Sea), one could assume that American presence in south East Asia may also not diminish to a great extent. Tillerson’s recent visits to Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing appear to reflect a continued desire by the American establishment to reassure allies and work with China. However the Trump promise of “America first” continues and a neo isolationism is still discernable to many foreign policy observers. Thus globalization in an economic sense has lost the leadership it once had from America. This can clearly be deciphered in the G20 finance ministers meeting where US refused to endorse “open trade” any longer.

As America attempts to adopt a neo isolationist foreign policy (yet engage with allies whom it has to reassure), and populist politics rise in Europe one could expect more multi-lateral trade agreements to face increasing pressures from political leaders. The demand for benefits from such multi-lateral trade agreements, especially in the short term would rise. So on the whole, I perceive China’s desire of assuming the mantle of ‘globalizations hero’ being counterpoised by anti – Chinese sentiments being voiced on the global stage; especially with regard to its investment ‘beneficiaries’ dotted along the belt and road initiative.

In terms of global trade; despite the possibility of ups and downs in the short and middle term, the likelihood of a full blown trade war between China and U.S.A coming to the fore is unlikely. Thus globalization may sustain damage from the populist movements in Europe and elsewhere but I do not believe that such movements will gain as much traction as we saw in 2016 and if they fail to win elections they may eventually lose the limelight. This does not mean that they will fade from being a significant political force in shaping domestic policy making; in fact they may seek to alter public perceptions of contentious issues relating to trade, welfare and immigration. Thus establishment candidates and front runners in recognized parties may want to increasingly take into account the problems and difficulties that ordinary lower middle classes face.

Be that as it may, economically the world is too connected. This economic connection has been strengthened with the increased use of technology, especially social media. Therefore to answer the title question; populist movements may alter the centripetal forces of globalization but as the “women's march” and vociferous condemnation to trump’s Muslim ban has showcased, globalizations once started is certainly a hard train to detract.  

Guest Commentary - Shakthi De Silva

MARKING MILESTONES AND MOVING MOUNTAINS? The balancing act that is foreign policy

Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena and
Russian President Vladimir Putin shaking hands at the Kremlin.

William J. Mozdzierz of the US State Department highlighted ‘the important steps that Sri Lanka has taken toward protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms,’ noting that ‘Sri Lanka’s co-sponsorship of this resolution is a testament to the Sirisena administration’s positive engagement with the international community.’ While an American representative was expressing these sentiments on a co-sponsored resolution in Geneva, President Sirisena himself was entering the Kremlin for bilateral talks with his Russian counterpart. A milestone may have been marked in which a Sri Lankan leader was being accorded a State Visit after forty three years, yet of greater significance was the fleeting moment in which once arch enemies were in support of a single state, at the same time.
The relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation is one that is best described, rather than defined. Two states which fought together for a sizable portion of the Second World War, parted ways to wage the much longer Cold War, pitted against each other in almost every conflict that existed on the planet. The animosity with which these two states, following distinctly diverse ideologies, systems of governance and trade, resorted to hostile stances saw countries involuntarily engulfed in a battle that spanned the world.

Formulation and adoption of foreign policy became, for a greater part of the twentieth century, a challenge, more for those other states than for the main protagonists. The dilemma was further complicated as decolonization swept most parts of Asia and Africa, and countries were re-emerging after centuries of foreign rule. Bereft of choice, states were forcibly engulfed in the Cold War, at least at its commencement. The summoning of the Colombo Conference in April/May 1954, although contested as to whether it was an idea of Ceylonese Prime Minister Kotelawala or one pushed by India’s Nehru, provided states with a much needed alternative. The conference brought together five Asian nations, notably Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, with each articulating a position of their own desire, while Indonesia identified the need for Afro-Asian solidarity.
The journey from Colombo, to Bogor and Bandung drew much attention, owing to the newly emerging stance being explored by countries of Asia and Africa. This third force wielded power, which has not, and unfortunately cannot be measured against Joseph Nye’s barometer of power. The American professor’s assessment of hard, soft and smart power leaves countries represented at Bandung bereft of any position on the power ladder, which Cline’ formula would otherwise help formulate.

Committed to neutrality, decolonization, promotion of peace and cooperation, the ten principles formed the basis upon which this third force would brace itself to counter the Americans and Russians, both of whom were eager to understand the nature of the organization which would come to fruition in Belgrade in 1961 as the Non-Aligned Movement. Becoming a corner stone of foreign policy for a significant portion of the global community, non-alignment remained within the armory of leaders and diplomats alike.

Whilst the Movement remains fluid permitting member states to choose their own interpretation of non-alignment, at their discretion, the United States of America remains a formidable force while Russia having seen the end of the Soviet Union, has within a span of less three decades rebound and returned to global power politics, with President Putin at the helm. The rivalry with which these arch rivals engaged each other, has it is argued, dissipated, if only within the realm of the media, which has shed light on connections between the respective administrations.

Irrespective of the veracity of such reports, attention is due on Sri Lanka. A small state, which has achieved major feats in the sphere of foreign policy, once mediating between India and China when the border issue threatened to see the explosion of war, is today straddling two giants once again. The accordance of a State Visit, while displaying confidence, brings into focus Russia’s continued interest in Sri Lanka, and more importantly her position. Ever since S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike chose to establish diplomatic relations in 1957, Russia has remained an ‘all-weather’ friend, defending Sri Lanka in numerous multilateral fora. Despite hostile, frosty relations that dominated foreign policy in the first years of independence wherein Russia chose to veto Ceylon’s entry into the United Nations, the countries, have since 1957, consolidated bonds of solidarity, while, quite interestingly Sri Lanka remained non-aligned for the most part.

This, it may be argued is the art of foreign policy. Cardinal Richelieu’s oft quoted remarks, that ‘diplomacy should be a continuous process aimed at creating durable relationships rather than attempting to make opportunistic advances’ remain the edifice of foreign policy formulation and execution. Whether it is the United States of America, the Russian Federation or even Sri Lanka, engagement, in a sustainable manner has been, is and will be the basis upon which mountains may be moved, and foreign policy successfully implemented.

- Editorial

Russia and SCO: Enabling the Asian Century?

One hundred years after the revolutions, Russia is well entrenched as a global leader once more. 1917 brought about change at every level in Russian society, from deposing the tsar and his regime to introducing communism and its varied trappings. The centenary marks a resurgence of a country, whose fortunes and travails have undergone rapid transformation faster than even the Bolshoi pirouettes.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping
shake hands after signing an agreement. CARLOS BARRIA, POOL/AP 

Withdrawing from the First World War, entering the second and signing a pact with Hitler, encountering the Germans themselves thereafter in Operation Barbarossa, capturing Berlin while being in an alliance with Britain and America, waging the decades long Cold War when ally turned adversary, installing the ‘Iron Curtain,’ watching it crumble and embracing Glasnot and Perestroika, only to reject such liberal ideals, and rising once more. Russia has truly seen it all, and in the short space of a hundred years.

Despite the challenges encountered, Russia would rebound, always has and always will. The present state of buoyancy could be traced to April 1996. The establishment of an organisation with neighbours in the region saw the birth of the Shanghai Five. While the alliance with China was significant, the inclusion of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in 2001, resulting in the renaming of the grouping, would prove to be timely. Incorporating these Central Asians states into the Shanghai-based body saw the building of an alliance which would grow to three-fifths of the Eurasian continent with India and Pakistan included.

Whilst treading differing paths in the understanding and utilization of communism, Russia and China chose to work in unison. Running contrary to T. N. Kaul’s description of a meeting between Mao and Khrushchev in which the Chinese leader had directed ‘You look after Europe and leave Asia to us,’ drawing a sharp response from the Russian who retorted ‘no one has authorized us to look after Europe, who has authorized you to take care of Asia?’ That was in 1958. Many decades later the leaders of the two countries have displayed the ability to work together. From facing a common enemy to military drills, Presidents Xi and Putin have pledged to build ‘global strategic stability,’ as they realistically consolidate ties. 

The nomenclature for Asia is roughly spread into South Asia, East Asia, South-East Asia, West Asia and Central Asia. Yet conveniently or otherwise, North Asia remains ignored. Russia thus gains an extended Asian identity through geography. In October 2016 Putin welcomed neighbouring countries stating that ‘we cannot choose our neighbours and that is a good thing.’ Possessing strength, influence and determination, the Russian leader is today identified as one of the strongest, if not the strongest man to strut the world stage, as Chancellor Merkel retains the title for the opposite gender.

Thereby the SCO, growing as it has from a ‘confidence-building forum to demilitarize borders’ to focus on increased military and counter-terrorism cooperation, and intelligence sharing. Having seen political summits amalgamated with peace games in Bishkek in 2007, intense cooperation between the SCO and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the formulation of an Anti-Extremism Convention, the outfit has realized the need to respond to growing challenges from outside the region and to respond collectively if an impact is to be made.

The inclusion of India and Pakistan bodes well for many. Enabling the SCO to shake off the common criticism of authoritarianism, the inclusion of the largest democracy annuls any qualms critics may have. India and Pakistan receive the opportunity of working closely with each other and with China and Russia respectively as they allay their past misgivings, and bilateral differences for a greater cause. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation has a sliver of hope if neighbours decide to work in unison. The formula is thus a win-win situation.     

Just as the 20^th century was dubbed the American Century and the 19^th identified as the British Century, the 21^stit is widely argued belongs to Asia. Robust economic growth, rapid development, expanding populations and poor performances in other quarters of the world, indicate a possible realization of an Asian Century. With the inclusion of Russia, through the SCO and as a northern neighbour in the greater Asian region, aspects of power are thrown into the formula.

With Russia, China and India, the prospects remain endless.  

- Editorial

Identifying the American problem: process over product

Donald J. Trump

He didn't stage a coup d'état. He didn't lead a revolution. He didn't hold anyone at gunpoint and demand their vote. Donald J. Trump entered the Oval Office through a legally accepted process. From the primaries through to the electoral college, he progressed from one victory to another. This, we need to accept. While the notion of populism is touted for his occupation of the White House, why then has protest upon protest broken out? Why are Americans in particular and the world in general surprised with each executive order he signs? Why are his actions seen as alarming and parallels drawn to a leader from Europe who attempted in similar vein to make his country great again? Why does populism appear to overwhelm itself?

2017 unfolded with much emphasis based on nationalism especially in the wake of 2016 revealing the result of Brexit and the possible impact a final exit of the British would have on the European Union and regionalism. Refugees continue to flow, tensions remain high, uncertainty reigns supreme and violence has not dissipated. The news out of America dominates the media as the world sits livid, helplessly watching that which is unfolding in a country which was said to have led the free-world, policed the world at large and been the only super power for the last couple of decades. Yet amidst the debate and drama over the product of the polls, the process escapes unscathed.

The American system is flawed. It is not everything it is held out to be. If a contender with two to three million votes more loses owing to the electoral college opting otherwise, hasn't the system failed? Is this how the will of the people is expressed? The last time it happened in 2000, Al Gore lost out on the White House, despite winning the popular vote. It was the only time since 1888, when Benjamin Harrison won over Grover Cleveland, that the winner of the popular vote lost the election. Earlier occasions are attributed to 1876 and 1824. In 2016, we had a repetition.

When the electoral college was instituted it was done to protect the rights of people across the country. To ensure that those on one coast or one region didn't have the opportunity to 'manipulate' or 'control' power over other regions. In a democracy, everyone is expected to have the opportunity to voice their opinion irrespective of gender, colour, creed or religious belief. How then do we comprehend the American narrative where restrictions are superimposed and barriers installed, limiting the rights of people to express their opinion.

What of those who choose to keep away from polling booths? In 2016, 40% of eligible voters didn't exercise their franchise. While the lowest figure in this century, American  polls have seen 54 % staying away in 2000, 60% in 2004, it climbed to 62% in 2008 and 57% in 2012. The revelation of the Brexit vote was alarming not owing to the number who wanted to remain or leave the European Union, but the 28% of British voters who chose to remain silent. The apathy with which citizens view their civic duties has always been a concern. We want our rights but neglect our responsibilities.

What then is this form of populism? Is it the response to the neoliberal era or an excessive dependence on a system that has failed over and over again, or is it a hybrid of the two? While the liberal ideology prospered during the Obama years, and is in part what led to the Trump candidacy, shouldn't we critically examine the American electoral system, the process in this case, instead of focusing on Trump, the product? While his actions at present warrant concern, someone far more radical and damaging could occupy the seat next and nothing is being done about it.

- Editorial

Wilders’ ‘Patriotic Spring’ meets its Waterloo: Will Nationalism too?

Geert Wilders

The ‘Patriotic Spring’ has ended, or has it? If Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s election at the German Federal Convention in February 2017 gave Europeans a glimmer of hope in trouncing the rise of nationalism, Mark Rutte and the Dutch ensured Geert Wilders ‘patriotic spring’ ended, and with it, the tide has been reversed. Wilders, having campaigned heavily on immigration issues and promising exit from the EU, was set to benefit tremendously if the Rotterdam rallies went ahead. Intended to shore up support for the Turkish leader, the rallies would have served as ideal ammunition for heightened tension and possible violence if the Turkish Ministers took to the stage. Thwarting the move, the Dutch Prime Minister drew fierce criticism from Erdogen but his hard stance contributed to another term.

Securing a majority of seats, Rutte’s People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy will, over the next few days, begin coalition talks and form a government. Leaders across the continent have breathed a sigh of relief welcoming the news. Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy noted ‘the Dutch people made a show of responsibility and maturity.’ France’s leader-in-waiting Emmanuel Macron claimed ‘you can defeat the extremes.’ European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker hailed the Dutch for preserving the values of Europe of free and tolerant societies, given that the Netherlands risked electing a leader who would have marked the 60^th anniversary of the European Union with an ignominious exit of a founding member state.

The celebrations will die down and euphoria soon disappear. Yet this Dutch election seen as a litmus test by many will remain a critical platform from which the sphere of International Relations and her adherents will engage in much reflection. How and why was the rise of nationalism stymied?

‘Trumpism’ and the possible fall out of Brexit have woken voters. Stirred out of the nationalist rhetoric that seemed to engulf everyday discourse as tension flared, animosity grew and violence remained imminent, most Europeans appear to have realized the gravity of the experiences of their British and American counterparts. Rallying as they did on the eve of the Brexit referendum, European countries used their heritage monuments, including the Eiffel Tower and Spanish Palace among others to display the colours and the Union Jack itself, sending the strongest possible signals across the Channel to refrain from opting out.

The referendum is history. As Prime Minister May prepares to invoke Article 50, Britain, having sought the preservation of sovereignty is today poised with a bigger and possibly more worrying issue: that of Scotland and Nicola Sturgeon’s repeated calls for a second referendum on independence. The impact of Brexit will be felt for decades to come, yet it is what the British wanted and it is what they will get. They wanted to retain the Pound over the Euro, and they did. They wanted to remain out of the Schengen Agreement and they did.

Impacting regionalism and integration, the British move questions the relevancy of integration. Timo Behr and Juha Jokela’s assertion that regional cooperation provided the high-demand global good of ‘certainty’ appeared to fail owing solely to Brexit, which proved just the opposite. Questioning the appropriateness of deeper integration and shaking the European Union to its very core, the effect has and is being felt by Europeans. Le Pen’s calls for a looser Union, Wilders’ promise to leave it and the general far-right taking umbrage at Brussels, although raising alarm bells, has stirred the European psyche to wake up and take note of ramifications and the rigors of the past.

Across the Atlantic, Americans, and more rightly the American electoral system chose to abandon the vision of Truman, for the vulgarity of Trump, and those cautionary remarks to Congress that faltering ‘in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.’ His warning seventy years ago, whilst unheeded locally, has gained credence with global and particularly European populations, many of which he endeavored to assist through his Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Whether it is the protests, climate change ignorance, travel bans or the high degree of frivolity with which attempts are being made to ‘make America great again,’ the United States is fast becoming an unenviable model of governance. Arguably herein lies the secret to the receding tide of nationalism.

Democracy and its intricacies, costly as they are, are weathering some of the roughest of storms, but experience remains the winner. The media, most of which in America has earned the wrath of the White House, has reveled in the disclosure of everything from minute details to gross misdemeanors and of course errant policies emanating from Washington. The information has if anything jolted populations. The level of awareness however remains questionable. Wilders may have lost his chance at governing, but his party garnered five more seats and taking their total to twenty, thereby becoming the second largest party in the Netherlands. Yet the Patriotic Spring he articulated has, if only for the present, passed.

While Steinmeier will be sworn in as the new German President on 19 March and the Dutch Premier as soon as he forms a coalition, Macron and Merkel have gained greater confidence in facing their own constituencies. Wilders has lived to face another day and unlike Napoleon this will not be the last we hear of him. 

- Editorial