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Friday, October 1, 2021

FAREWELL, FRAU MERKEL!

GUEST COMMENTARY by Sisaru Chithrasiri

Throughout the course of history, only a few democratically elected leaders enjoyed approval ratings with a median approval rate of 62% (Reinhart 2020). In fact, in some European countries such as in The Netherlands and Finland ‘Mutti’, as she is known in Germany, has enjoyed over 80% approval ratings (Reinhart 2020). The aim herein is to explore the legacy of Merkalism: the pragmatic politics of the center-right marked by managing alliances and eliminating rivals; pro Europeanism – the woman who steered her nation and a continent through tough times and bona fide her way from hardship to stardom as Europe’s de- facto leader.

Born Angela Dorothea Kasner, she was raised in the German Democratic Republic, commonly known as East Germany, by a pastor and his wife, who was a teacher. She obtained a doctorate in quantum chemistry and worked as a research scientist prior to her days in politics.

The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in Merkel’s political career securing a seat at the Bundestag (Federal German Parliament) in 1990. Elected Chancellor in 2005, Merkel is the first woman and the first East German to hold her nation’s highest elective office. As she steps down in 2021, she will be Germany’s second-longest-serving leader of the modern era, after her former mentor, Helmut Kohl. Over the years, her critics and supporters made comparisons between her and Kohl, who led Germany through reunification during the time after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This writer believes that it is not a fair comparison to make because the Kohl and Merkel eras share little in common. Over the past 16 years, Germany and Europe have needed a mediative and flexible problem-solver to guide the region through a debt emergency (the Euro crisis), the refugee influx from the Middle East and a once in a century pandemic – none of which Helmut Kohl had to face. However, this is not to belittle the achievements of the Kohl era.

Arguably, the Euro crisis was the litmus test for European unity since World War 2 and in the process, Merkel helped save the European Union – an achievement that deserves long lasting respect. Convinced that a strong EU is the only way forward for the European continent, the German Chancellor worked tirelessly to work for the best deal. Merkel once observed that “if the Euro fails, then Europe fails”, with that Merkel embarked on an austerity programme for the indebted countries of Southern Europe, particularly Greece along with loans and aid programmes for struggling economies of the EU. Furthermore, Merkel backed the European Central Bank in the purchase of large-scale government bonds and bringing interest rates down thereby fast tracking the recovery of the EU economies.

When hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers and refugees knocked on Europe’s borders following the collapse of the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya and other sub-Saharan and Sahel region states, Merkel opened Germany’s gates when most of Europe kept theirs closed. While Merkel received standing ovations from multilateral organizations and human rights groups, critics say this was a short-sighted move - gambling with European unity as it fueled tensions with other EU states such as Hungary, Poland, Austria, Greece, Italy, and Spain. Speaking to the VOA (2017), Robert Terrel a scholar on modern Germany at the Syracuse University New York, says Merkel was not cautious enough as this fueled the rise of populist nationalist parties and sentiments across Europe. He further goes on to say that this decision in fact divided Germany including Merkel supporters in the center-right of politics. Other critics accuse Merkel of encouraging hundreds of thousands of people to make the daunting and perilous journey through the Mediterranean Sea onto mainland Europe. But for now, in Merkel’s own words ‘wir schaffen das’ or ‘we will manage this’ remains.

Another field in which the Chancellor exemplified ‘Merkelism’ was in Foreign Affairs – not to mention that the Euro Crisis and the Middle Eastern refugee crisis were a crisis of international scale. Nonetheless, it is how Merkel manoeuvered through the precarious road of foreign affairs which makes her stand out from other world leaders; The US- China strategic competition, The Trump era, Russia’s President, and an increasingly nationalist Balkans region. Some criticize Merkel for making Germany dependent on Russian gas, particularly with the advent of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. However, unlike American and other Western leaders, Merkel maintained a working relationship with President Putin; enough to secure uninterrupted and cheap gas effectively keeping Germany warm during winter. Merkel has however not shied away from criticizing Russia on its poor human rights record, and she convinced the EU to impose sanctions on Moscow for the annexation of Crimea – all the while being cautious of the consequences if she steps out of line. All in all, a well-played game.

Towards China, the Chancellor has also taken a pragmatic approach. Merkel was among the few western leaders to give the green light to the Chinese telecommunications firms Huawei to build Germany’s 5G infrastructure, subject to safeguards. The Chancellor also played a key role encouraging EU-China investment, despite criticism from allies such as the United States. Knowing all too well that Germany’s automobile industry, which accounts for a mammoth share of the German economy continues to make profits in mainland China, Merkel worked tirelessly to have a cordial bilateral relationship with China thereby benefiting the everyday German worker as well German corporates.

It is an open secret that the Trump era ushered in an awkward phase of transatlantic relations. Trump was seen as rather undiplomatic in the way he accused his European counterparts of not contributing enough to NATO and cozying up to Russia while repeatedly making open remarks on how Germany is a ‘free rider ‘on American power. Unlike Macron of France, Trudeau of Canada, and the European Union at large, Merkel managed to navigate her way through the Trump era relatively better. Understanding the importance of the transatlantic alliance and the fact that US Presidents come and go but the alliance does not, Merkel endeavoured to keep it together for the greater good. In the case of Victor Orbán of Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński of Poland, Merkel adopted a less hands-on approach. It was, it may be argued, owing to Merkel’s understanding of the nationalist half of Europe and the liberal half: a compromise for European unity. Although not ideal, it was a pragmatic approach that kept the union from further friction.

Dedicated to making space for future generations, Merkel is standing down on her own terms. Critics are of the opinion that the outgoing Chancellor missed on important opportunities to, in the words of some critics, ‘tame’ the nationalist camp both in Germany and across Europe. Nevertheless, in her sixteen years as Chancellor, Merkel has seen many western counterparts come and go; four French Presidents, four US Presidents, five British PMs, seven Italian PMs, eight Japanese PMs and not to mention six Australian PMs. Merkel was able to manoeuver through tough times not just in Germany but the entire free world with grace. Her time was seen as liberal, pro-European and reformist thereby ushering a new era of conservative politics in Germany and Western Europe.

Merkel did not fail to be a role model for reliability, responsibility, and the impact of female leadership. Thus, it is obvious that whoever succeeds as Chancellor of Germany will have a massive void to fill.


References

Dettmer, J 2021, What Did Merkel Achieve? viewed 30 September 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/what-did-merkel-achieve/6225780.html

Nevett,J 2021, Angela Merkel: Four expert verdicts on a contested legacy, viewed 30 September 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58570507

Matthijs, M 2021, Merkel’s Legacy and the Future of Germany, viewed 30 October 2021,< https://www-cfr-org.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.cfr.org/in-brief/merkels-legacy-and-future-germany?amp>

Reinhart, RJ 2020, Merkel Set to Leave Office With Germany on Top of the World, viewed 29 September 2021, https://news.gallup.com/poll/327701/merkel-set-leave-office-germany-top-world.aspx

The Federal Chancellor, Biography – Angela Merkel, viewed 30 September 2021, https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-en/angela-merkel/biography

POLITICO, 2021, In Pictures: Angela Merkel’s G7 history, viewed 30 October 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-germany-g7-summit-history/

 

 

 

Sunday, September 26, 2021

BANDARANAIKE - CHOU VISION: The consolidation of Sino-Lanka relations

by George I. H. Cooke

The rationale and spirit in which diplomacy is embarked upon, determines the nature, fruitful or otherwise, of the connectivity and collaboration that is to follow. Its usage spanning centuries, provides the student and practitioner with a sphere that has evolved, remained relevant and continues to flourish as a common language in International Relations. Identified by G. R. Berridge as ‘an essentially political activity and, well-resourced and skillful, a major ingredient of power’ diplomacy today provides a platform from which states are able to improve their political acumen thus promoting that which is at the core - national interest.

Irrespective of the state, each looks to improve its position, accrue much and foster a healthy, dynamic and vibrant role in global politics. Given the challenges, within the domestic political milieu and that with which states contend globally, diplomacy comes to the forefront of interactions, especially with regard to the latter.

Small countries like Sri Lanka rely most heavily on diplomacy in global engagement. It is not hard power in the form of military might or economic prowess that may be nuanced through soft power that determines the longevity or success of small states, but their reliance on engagement with all, which is paramount.

Large countries, such as China, which Martin Jacques claims is “not just a nation-state, it is also a civilization-state” given the gigantic size, the magnitude of population and the propensity to effect change, have much at their disposal. While diplomacy is a key tool, it is complimented with a variety of other embellishments. Such continent-like countries strategize on equivalent terms but they too realize that in the global community the need exists to cooperate with all.   

Therefore from a bilateral perspective the engagement in diplomacy by two countries, vastly different when considering Sri Lanka and China, provides an example of collaboration and continuity which has been mutually beneficial. The nexus created more than sixty years ago through the rapport that was nurtured by Ceylon’s fourth Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and China’s first Premier Chou en Lai led to the establishment and consolidation of diplomatic relations. Thus the question is asked about the nature and impact of this profound friendship on their respective countries’ bilateral relations with the other, which continued to grow in a colossal way over the succeeding decades. The degree of bilateralism enjoyed today between China and Sri Lanka can be used as an example of a Major power-Small power relationship.

The current Chinese global policy direction through the amalgamated Belt and Road Initiative which in turn brings Sri Lanka closer to China through trade, investment and economic cooperation, is yet another key milestone. The China of 1949 and the China of 2021 are in complete contrast in relation to many factors yet the country continues to preserve its primary identity and basic character. The same could be said about Sri Lanka, although it could also be argued that whilst the former strove to make progress the latter has faltered. Yet it the degree of interaction between the two countries that have seen a drastic change from 1950 to date with the leadership of the two countries engaging in differing manner, yet maintaining sound relations.

The relationship between Bandaranaike and Chou in formulating a firm foundation enabled successive leaders on both sides to build the sound strategic partnership that exists today. Being examined is the initial foray into engagement and the determined steps being taken by two persons to solidify that which was present and strategize for that which was to come. Chou’s visit to Ceylon in February 1957 may be termed the catalyst in the bonding between the two leaders and countries, who enjoyed relatively similar upbringings, making them resolute and trustworthy of the other.

While Bandaranaike had his Oxford-educated persona complimenting his nationalistic outlook, Chou, who had been born into a genteel family in Jiangsu Province, had struggled through the Revolution. Chou returned to China from Europe in 1924 as a leader in the Communist Party, while Bandaranaike too travelled home from Britain a year later and entered the political arena. Each found in the other a comrade and it is their vision, it is argued, that stands testimony to tangible and intangible aspects of Sino-Lanka relations from then to date.

China – Sri Lanka relations

The travels of Fa Hien, the Chinese Buddhist monk and Zheng He, the Chinese Admiral and navigator form but part of a vivid collection of references in a rich tapestry which spans centuries of Sino-Lanka ties that have been documented in detail in ancient manuscripts. Vernon Mendis notes that the presence of Fa Hien at the funeral of the Arahat Mahinda during the reign of Uttiya, successor to Devanampiyatissa, the role played by Zheng He during the time of Vira Alakeshwara, and the civilizational contribution of China and Sri Lanka along with India as three of the ‘foremost civilizations of Asia...linked by ties of Buddhism and forming a kind of Buddhist commonwealth,’ are indicative of the engagement that existed.

Mendis claims that the ‘establishment by Sri Lanka of these relations with China at this early period was a significant initiative the full characteristics of which and implications have not been sufficiently examined.’ Religion formed an integral part of connectivity while trade played a crucial role with shipments of ‘…cotton goods, gold and silver filigree work and Buddha images (sent) to ancient China’ as identified by S. F. De Silva, and other material including silk were received in return. These interactions were taking place at a time when travel was restricted to maritime excursions, perilous as they may have been, yet Mendis maintains ‘the missions sent by Sri Lanka rulers from the 5th to the 8th centuries [amount to] about 16 missions… in all.’ He also notes that ‘these missions ended abruptly in the 8th century and after that there is no evidence of contacts with China until the visit of Admiral Zheng He in the 15th century.’

Five centuries later on 06th January 1950, ‘the Government of Ceylon (has) decided to recognize the new Government of China’ marking the first official recognition of the People’s Republic of China that was being made by post-independent Ceylon. This saw a revival, although to a negligible scale, of ancient ties that had existed. Berty Gajameragedara opines that this recognition ‘established the fundamental juridical condition for the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.’

The gesture though considered symbolic at the time was to prove politically expedient as it laid the foundation for trade negotiation that took place in mid-1952. Faced with a Hobson’s choice scenario owing to a fall in rice purchases from East Asia and the dollar issue, Gajameragedara observes that Ceylon decided to ‘turn to China, which after the embargo of May 1951 came into effect, had repeatedly offered rice in exchange of Ceylonese rubber.’ The negotiation and subsequent signing of the Agreement between Yeh Chi-Chuang and R. G. Senanayake in Peking on 04th October 1952 was yet another milestone in bilateral relations. Despite differences in political ideologies, R. G. Senanayake justified the stance adopted arguing that they ‘should not stand in the way of countries trading with each other, if that trade is to their mutual benefit.’ Senanayake observed that in relation to China, ‘the late Prime Minister even went so far as to protest against the imposing of bans on the export of rubber from Malaya to China,’ attempting to dispel the often construed pro-West stance of D. S. Senanayake and his sentiments towards communism which had been articulated on earlier occasions.

Chinese Premier Chou en Lai’s first direct interaction with a Ceylonese Prime Minister was to be with Sir John Kotelawala in Bandung on the sidelines of the Afro-Asian Conference in April 1955. Yet in January that year, Chou had extended an invitation to Kotelawala to visit China and in February ‘making yet another gesture of friendship towards the Ceylonese Government, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of independence, sent a message of greetings,’ which Gajameragedara states was the first of its kind from a Chinese leader to Ceylon. Calling for ‘Sino-Ceylonese relations to grow increasingly in the cause of maintaining peace in Asia and the world,’ Chou’s gesture strengthened cordiality and sowed the seeds for future interactions.

The precursor to Bandung having been the Colombo Conference of April/May 1954 saw Kotelawala one of the hosts along with the leaders of Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. In addition to dispelling misgivings and assuaging prejudice, the Chinese Premier led China into the global arena with his own savoir-flair style of diplomacy. Mendis claims that the highlight of Bandung ‘was no doubt the image of Chou en Lai as an apostle of sweet reasonableness, disarming his critics and allaying fears and stealing the thunder.’

Of the twenty nine countries convening in Bandung, only seven had established relations with China. The tone set in Bandung, in announcing that China had arrived on the world stage once again, this time as a nation-state, resulted in what Mendis claims was a parallel trend in China where after Bandung it acquired a new and benign image thanks to the diplomacy of Chou en Lai which allayed fears of its expansionist ambitions and gave the impression of peace and goodwill and the desire to co-exist with all states and cooperate with them meaningfully.’

Even before the nexus was forged between Bandaranaike and Chou, it was the Chinese Premier who was making a continuous effort to engage with Ceylon. Whether the repeated offers to trade rice for rubber before the Rubber–Rice pact was actually initialed, the attempts to send a delegation to Ceylon to strengthen relations, the invitation to Kotelawala, the liberal attitude adopted in renewing the pact, the Independence greeting, among others, may be understood as diplomatic gestures aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation.  

The Bandaranaike – Chou vision

S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s election in 1956 signaled a distinct change in Ceylon’s foreign policy, particularly in relations with China. His notion of foreign policy expanded across divides of ideology and political leaning. In the early 40’s Bandaranaike had actively supported and led a bid to establish an Asian United Nations Organisation, based on suggestions made by Tagore and other Indian leaders. He envisioned it ‘would be of substantial value to all Asian countries at a moment in human history like the present when the world is moving so rapidly towards a new age.’ This enthusiasm, although shared by Nehru was not unanimously accepted, yet Bandaranaike was appointed, with George E. de Silva, to a committee tasked with reporting on the proposal to the next Asian Conference that was due to be held in China in 1949. The possibility of forging unity ‘not merely within the various Asian countries but unity among the peoples of the continent of Asia,’ was of great interest to Bandaranaike.

Bandaranaike’s pre-independence desire to forge Asian solidarity and safeguard the interests of a region that was emerging from its colonial period, resulted in him seizing the opportunity upon his election in 1956. His was the view that Asia’s collegiality was paramount for facing the challenges of the changing times. In this regard he understood that China’s presence and potential needed to be an integral part of any equation determining the future of Asia. The Ambassador to the UN, R. S. S. Gunewardena outlined this relevance recalling that ‘at the Conference of the Colombo Powers of India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia – a resolution was adopted unanimously to the effect that the non-recognition of Communist China increased the tension in the Far East and as a constant threat to peace.’

Thereafter heightening the call for inclusion of China not only at the regional level but on the global stage, Bandaranaike used the maiden speech of a Ceylonese Prime Minister at the UNGA to express regret ‘that there are still some countries which are awaiting admission, countries whose claims to such admission appear to many of us to be unquestioned, and whose admission will undoubtedly make more fully representative the membership of this great world Organisation for peace. Amongst them I wish to mention in particular such countries as the People’s Republic of China.’

The Claude Corea Mission to explore the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations in September 1956 resulted in the exchange of Ambassadors in 1957 and the signing of agreements on trade and payment, and economic aid. The forthright manner in which Ceylon was reversing an earlier policy orientation and venturing into hitherto unchartered territory was to be one of the most prudent foreign policy decisions undertaken by Bandaranaike.

1957 thus ushered in a new era, for Ceylon and China, in which policy expanded, relations were reformulated, global dynamics were understood and new efforts were undertaken to traverse further down the path of bilateralism. Chou’s visit to Colombo in February 1957 and their interactions consolidated a bond of friendship that extended far beyond the two individuals, and remains the foundation upon which diplomatic connectivity has flourished ever since. Bandaranaike saw potential in the relationship. The like-mindedness of these two leaders brought to fruition two visions; Bandaranaike’s intention to engage across the ideological divide, especially with a leader in Asia and Chou’s keenness to collaborate with Ceylon.

An aligning of vision occurs during the historic visit in 1957. Having understood the opportunity afforded in intensifying cooperation with the East, Bandaranaike welcomed Chou as special guest at the eighth Independence Day celebrations, noting that ‘we in Ceylon and the countries of Asia look upon the contribution which the People’s Republic of China is making in shaping the new world as perhaps the greatest contribution any country has made.’ His choice of words ‘perhaps the greatest contribution’ identified the potential Bandaranaike saw in China, who was an ally and Asian neighbour. 

The Chinese Premier, no less generous and equally thought-provokingly pointed out that ‘the Chinese and Ceylonese people have more or less the same destiny.’ He articulated the desire of both to ‘shake off our legacies of backwardness and poverty from the past and build new happiness’ and the determination ‘to safeguard everlasting world peace.’ The joint statement issued at the end of Chou’s visit reflected their shared understanding of the period as one of transition and that ‘in eras such as these, it is not unusual to find divergent outlooks and varying conceptions of societies. But we believe that nations can live in peace with each other despite these divergences and different social systems.’

His observation of relations with Ceylon may be translated further to encapsulate China’s view of Asia as the leaders reiterated that ‘while recognizing and respecting differences of outlook that may exist between us, we are determined to strengthen those ties, develop our economic cooperation and cultural exchanges and foster cooperation to our mutual benefit.’ Alluding to their varied political ideologies, Chou characteristically displayed his enthusiasm to ensure that relations would reach their zenith, irrespective of their stances.

Chou’s visit Kandy and his paying homage at the Temple of the Tooth Relic in addition to making a personal contribution to its building fund, is seen as a revival of the ancient linkage of Buddhism. In the wake of the 1958 floods China granted loan assistance worth Rs, 50,000,000 for flood relief and rehabilitation work. Similarly the 1959 Agreement on air transport and Protocol on the exchange of commodities of the same year did much to nurture bilateral relations. Yet the lasting nature of diplomatic connectivity was dependent on the rapport built up by the two leaders.

Anticipating much potential in their respective countries which had both emerged as players on the international stage less than a decade earlier, the Bandaranaike–Chou visionary outlook included an essence of convergence with a mutually beneficial impact on interactions. Premier Chou having stridden the world stage just two years earlier at Bandung had taken the message of what China was and would be, to the world. Bandaranaike provided undivided support as the paths of the two countries became intertwined to a greater degree in the decades to follow.

Belt and Road Initiative

Xi Jinping’s 2013 initiative to revive the ancient Silk Road and optimize on the potential of it as a vehicle of fostering connectivity was received as yet another prudent measure adopted by the Chinese leadership. Already yielding results, the Belt and Road initiative has crossed the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa and even reached out to Latin America. The potential of linking vibrant East Asian economies with those of Africa, and more developed economies of Europe generate much needed certainty and promote potential.

Following Xi’s unveiling of it in Kazakhstan, the mega-project sought to include Central Asia in building a Silk Road Economic Belt which expanded to the ASEAN community in constructing the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) ‘to finance infrastructure construction and promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration Xi’s strategic vision saw an acceleration of the linkage among neighbouring countries even including Russia connecting the initiative to the latter’s Euro-Asia Railways. Deeper cooperative mechanisms such as the Economic Corridors encompassing China-Pakistan and China-India-Myanmar brought the initiative to South Asia as other countries including Sri Lanka were to be made integral partners.

Jacques Martin has outlined that ‘Today China’s diplomacy with Asia has morphed from a rigid state-guided scheme into an eclectic array of initiatives from many stakeholders: the state, the Party, the military, the provinces, cities, companies, [and] thinks tanks.’ Resonating that which was projected by Chou in Bandung more than sixty years ago, the current leadership has utilised an array of resources, a gamut of policies and most importantly the ancient tool of diplomacy to effect change.

Having reached out and strengthened relations in Asia and in Africa over the last several decades, China’s venture even further into Latin America has proved noteworthy. Amidst such progress, China’s desire in dealing with Sri Lanka, in accordance almost with Chou’s vision that ‘the Chinese and Ceylonese people have more or less the same destiny, has seen the further strengthening and deeper consolidation of engagement to a level of strategic partnership. The many projects completed and others being implemented and still more in the pipeline, whilst being indicative of the concretized partnership between two vastly different countries, augurs well for Sri Lanka, if the island nation makes the most out of every single project. Providing much needed capital for development in the wake of the devastating conflict, China has proven to be an ‘all-weather’ friend cooperating across the spectrum from guaranteeing political support, to providing economic aid.

The Major power – Small power relationship in play in this instance portends much potential. As China rides into the Asian century at the helm, Sri Lanka is guaranteed a ringside seat. Thus the impact of the BRI on Sri Lanka would, in time to come, prove monumental. It can therefore be argued that it is testimony to the visionary leadership of two leaders of yesteryear, who, unknowing of the future, sought to reach out to each other and undertake a journey together.

Auguring well for South-South cooperation, the fast changing tide with which China gradually assumes a higher, if not the highest role in the international hierarchy, augurs well for Sri Lanka. It stands testimony to the fruit of the Bandaranaike-Chou vision that is being reaped today. It needs to be understood in the Asian context and then the region as a whole can share the success of an Asian neighbour.

Tuesday, August 31, 2021

COMPLEXITIES OF GOVERNANCE AND POLICY: 90th Anniversary of Universal Franchise in Sri Lanka

 Lecture delivered by Dr Jane Russell, Historian, at the inaugural Awarelogue Lecture Forum of the Awarelogue Initiative to mark the landmark of Universal Franchise in Sri Lanka

I am greatly honoured to be asked by the Awarelogue Initiative to speak at their Lecture Forum in this year of 2021, celebrating the 90th anniversary of the advent of universal franchise in Sri Lanka. In my lecture, I shall touch on some of the complex problems of governance and policy faced by a small multi-ethnic island, flanked as it is and always has been, by economic and political superpowers

Today, I want to briefly revisit the grant (and in using that word I have already encountered a problem, one that I shall look at later) of universal franchise to Sri Lanka, then called Ceylon, 9 decades ago. But I am not so much interested in Ceylon’s perspective of getting universal franchise, as I   covered that ground in my book written over 40 years ago. As an activist historian, I am now more interested in the motives of the British overlords, in particular the Colonial Office during the 1927-1931 period, in giving Ceylon universal franchise. Why did the Colonial Office send out those particular Donoughmore Commissioners? Why did the Donoughmore Commission decide that universal franchise and the Executive Committee system of government was the most appropriate to foster successful self-government in Sri Lanka? Why did the Commission even want to foster democracy and self-government in an imperial dependency? These are the questions I shall try to answer.    

I should also like to make one disclaimer: in this brief lecture, I use the terms Ceylon, British Ceylon and Sri Lanka almost interchangeably. There is some vague method to my usage, based loosely on the date 1948, although that is in itself arbitrary, as it was in January 1973, when I first arrived in the island to take up a Commonwealth Scholarship at Peradeniya that Sri Lanka, the name of the new Republic, came into existence. If you find it at all confusing, I apologise in advance but I would ask you to bear with it – in the end it is the island of Lanka, Taprobane, Serendib, that I am talking about and no other!

First, I want to make it clear in discussing universal franchise as the basis for democracy that I am in complete agreement with wartime British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who stated in 1947 at the end of the last global war that “Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government - except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.…’

 

Democracy is (and I quote here from the Merriam-Webster American English dictionary) “government by the people especially a). rule of the majority and b). a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation, usually involving periodically held free elections.”

 

This otherwise acceptable definition is strangely wanting in one respect: it does not specify who the ‘people’ are: that is it does not state the criteria for deciding who may be eligible to vote. Nowhere does it specify the age, race, the language, birthplace, religion, gender, the sexual preference, educational standard, wealth and property, skin colour, or indeed any other discriminator determining who can vote in an election.  

 

From the turn of the 21st century, the USA, which has long prided itself on its democratic norms and indeed paraded its democratic institutions as a model for other countries to follow, has come up against powerful geo-economic and political forces that do not recognize democracy as a particularly valid form of government and certainly not one that trumps   their own forms of governance.   Whether those challenging the primacy of democracy are from one-party states or one-person dictatorships or indeed violent anti-establishment Islamic religious movements like the Taliban, Islamic State or Boko Haram, these challenges are undermining US confidence in its democratic exceptionalism to the point where it is finding that its earlier, easy accommodation with elections and voting now under threat internally from anti-democratic proto-authoritarians like Donald Trump. The US political culture is now faced with the dilemma, which covertly has always dogged its democratic credentials, of deciding whether non-white members of its populace, and more specifically the black and/or mixed descendants of formerly enslaved peoples have a right to vote equal to those who consider themselves ‘truer Americans’ because of their paler skin colour and non-slave background.

 

Another reason I chose the Merriam Webster definition of democracy is because it baldly states that democracy is government based on rule by the majority. And this is where Sri Lanka’s ninety year experience of universal franchise becomes so historically valuable.

 

When the Donoughmore Commissioners came to British Ceylon in 1928, they were acutely aware that the political turbulence caused by the October 1917 revolution in Russia had changed the world forever.  The Commissioners came to Ceylon from a Britain where the more left-wing representatives in parliament and government had already started to realise that the political and economic costs of maintaining Empire were escalating to a point where it was becoming more rational to let Empire go rather than try to hang on to it.

 

An Edinburgh trained medic, and holder of the Military Cross, Dr. Thomas Drummond Shiels was appointed as a Donoughmore Commissioner by the newly-appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies Sydney Webb, who’d just been brought into front-line politics by being made a peer, (Lord Passfield) by the Labour Party, who were in government in Britain, in a coalition with the Liberals, for the very first time.

 

Webb was a neo-marxist and a great admirer of the Soviet Union. He knew Drummond-Shiels, his fellow-travelling Marxist and equally fierce anti-imperialist, would definitely become the intellectual driving force behind the Commission, which had been tasked to find a new constitutional settlement for British Ceylon. Privately, Drummond-Shiels was instructed by Webb to use this opportunity to find some constitutional process, an institutional mechanism, which would serve as a precedent, and so allow the government in London to dispose of their imperial possessions and responsibilities in a manner both politically practicable and ethical but also as timely as possible.

 

Ceylon was therefore chosen to be a laboratory for an experiment in ‘not-quite but almost’ self-government: a self-government which would lead, not to outright independence, but Dominion Status, the same status accorded within the Empire to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, ie. the white dominions. And here we can see the white supremacist basis which underpinned the British Empire and which would inevitably lead to its demise - a demise which neo-marxist politicians in Britain in the 1930’s could clearly envision, though without discerning how it might happen.

 

It seems that Ceylon was considered the perfect vehicle for this attempt at 7/10ths self-government - so-called because 3 British colonial civil servants sitting in the Colombo parliament, or State Council, served as Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Internal Security, while all other Ministerial posts were given to elected State Councillors. But why did the leftists in the Colonial Office think Ceylon so well suited for democratic development? Well, for one British Ceylon was insulated from the influence of India and its other south and south-east Asian neighbours by its Crown Colony status.

 

Please allow me to digress a little here and explain something about Crown Colonies. These were special entities within the Empire; they were usually small islands,- Hong Kong, Bermuda, Jamaica, the Falklands for example - but Ceylon was considered the Premier Crown Colony. Why? Well, it was wealthy from the trade of its tea, rubber and coconut plantations; it had a two and a half thousand year plus history of Buddhist civilization; it did not have any large urban centres dominated by a plutocratic class where revolution might be seeded; the population density was low and the literacy rate was higher than in any other non-white imperial territory and English education among the elite was widespread; generally speaking, women had property and marriage rights equal to men; it had putative trade unions; a recognizable political party, the Ceylon National Congress; and the white, mostly British, but what was deemed ‘European’, plantation-owning class was small (unlike say in Kenya or Uganda). To British leftist eyes, Ceylon was a recognizably ‘westernized’ country, ripe for fully-fledged democracy.  


Yet it also had all the complexities associated with other Indo-Asian political cultures: caste division; racial, religious and language divisions; differing climatic zones; tribal peoples, etc. In short, Ceylon seemed a society that could be used as a model for future constitutional settlements, not just in the other Crown Colonies, but for all Imperial possessions, including the crown jewel of Empire, India. The Donoughmore Commission was therefore sent to Ceylon in 1928 as the harbinger of Imperial divestment: its job was to write the template for the leaving card of British Empire.

 

The institutional insulation of British Ceylon from its neighbours was an important element in this constitutional experiment. British India, which included today’s Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, was administered from London by the India Office, a completely separate department to the Colonial Office, which looked after Ceylon.

 

Of course the position of Indian Tamils, nowadays referred to as’ Up-Country Tamils’ in Sri Lanka and ‘Highland Tamils’ in India, was anomalous because they were in effect dual citizens of both British Ceylon and British India. Although having said that, they were, along with the least liberated caste groups of the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, the poorest educated, lowest paid and worst housed segment of the island’s population.

 

But they were also one of the most commercially valuable groups as it was from their labour that the bulk of foreign exchange earned from the plantation economy was generated. However, because British India had no administrative input into Ceylon’s governance, this group could be disenfranchised willy-nilly under the Donoughmore settlement, which is what happened as soon as the Commissioners left. Imagine how impossible this disenfranchisement might have been if India had been a sovereign nation in 1931? Imagine as well how Indian politics might have become enmeshed with Sri Lankan politics if India had been able to have a say in the writing of the Donoughmore Constitution? Isn’t it likely that India would have claimed Ceylon as a natural part of India? Just think about it - if things had been otherwise, British Ceylon might have been casually handed to British India, as Hong Kong was to China in 1997, as a gift from one Empire to another….

 

I shall now return to my narrative.

 

Significantly, Drummond-Shiels was the only Donoughmore Commissioner to have had experience of serving as an elected Councillor on London County Council, the LCC. In 1929, there were 148 Councillors and Aldermen elected by universal franchise to the LCC. London in the decade after the 1st world war was a city of 8 million people, and owing to its position as the metropolis of Empire, as cosmopolitan as it is today. From 1919, all London’s residents, including women, had the right to vote and stand in LCC elections. In fact, many women were elected as London Councillors in the 1920’s. Moreover, a number of south Asians ran in the lower tier of local borough elections, some of whom were elected. When I interviewed Doric de Souza many years ago, he told me he’d been elected as a local borough councillor while living in London as a young man. London local elections were therefore ethnically diverse and incorporated an equal female franchise.

 

The LCC was a prestigious political institution. It had a huge budget raised from property rates and enormous responsibilities. Although a municipal agency, London’s government was larger than that of many countries. Councillors served on Executive Committees overseeing housing, education, transport and roads, social welfare, health and sanitation, police, fire brigade, courts and justice etc. Executive Committees, as anyone who has ever served on the EC of a sports club knows, are vehicles for cooperative management. The three political parties represented in the LCC were offshoots of the Liberals, the Conservatives and the Labour Party. On their chosen EC’s, Councillors from different parties and representing very different electorates, from the slums of the East End to the mansions of Mayfair, had to cooperate to make London governance work. London was therefore a microcosm, not just of Great Britain, but of the Empire as a whole.

 

Together with the Webbs, Sydney and Beatrice, and Leonard Woolf, the ex-Ceylon Civil Servant, husband to novelist Virginia, who by 1927 had become a pivotal back-room thinker on the Labour Party’s Foreign Policy Committee, Drummond-Shiels sketched out a plan to introduce London’s electoral and governmental system into British Ceylon. This leftwing brains trust thought universal franchise, together with an Executive Committee system of governance, would produce stable self-government in Ceylon, They hoped that this would then give the lie to imperialists in Britain -  politicians like Churchill, Chamberlain and other Tory grandees, plus Lord Rothermere and his fellow right-wing press barons who were mouthpieces of the financiers and corporate shareholders who had gained so much from Empire - when they argued that peoples of the non-white British colonies and imperial possessions were incapable of running their own affairs.

 

And this was not a forlorn hope. If you look at the constitutional settlement in Northern Ireland enacted after the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, it is made up of an electoral system of large multi-member constituencies, incorporating neighbourhood Protestant and Catholic communities, which uses the Single Transferable Vote System of Proportional Representation and the D’Hondt procedure for awarding seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly. It is a mechanism somewhat like the Duckworth-Lewis method used in cricket: it ensures fair proportionality given the fact that no Catholic will vote for a Protestant and no Protestant will vote for a Catholic. The system of government involves an Executive Committee at its head, and a mandatory coalition in which the First Minister is always drawn from the Protestant majority and the Deputy First Minister from the Catholic minority. If one resigns the other is constitutionally forced to resign as well. This form of power-sharing, also known as co-sociational democracy, was not devised by a Britisher at all but by a Belgium, Arend Lijphart, for societies emerging from conflict or those with potential for conflict. Switzerland, Belgium and the Lebanon also employ the co-sociational model.

 

If you study the Donoughmore Constitution, you will find that it is a forerunner of this model of democracy. However, because it used the First Past the Post voting system, which in 1931 was virtually the only recognized system of voting, it led to a situation where the Sinhalese majority in the State Council was able to prevent Tamil, Muslim and Burgher Councillors getting any real administrative power and so undermined the power-sharing idea behind its composition.

 

If, and this is the last of my many hypotheticals, if the Donoughmore Constitution had been combined with proportional representation plus a greater constituency weightage for minority areas, the Executive Committee system might still be in use in Sri Lanka, The Commissioners had tried to design a system for Ceylon that would prevent conflict arising from the permanent Sinhalese majority in parliament that universal franchise would engender. They tried to invent a system of democratic government that would fit Ceylon, Sri Lanka, like a glove. They failed and their failure has resulted in civil war and economic under-achievement.  

 

For let me be clear. Universal franchise was not something demanded by anyone in the Sinhalese, Tamil or Muslim communities. Neither George E. de Silva nor A E Goonesinghe, who were the most insistent that the franchise be extended, thought of asking for or indeed expected to get, even a full male franchise. They argued for a franchise for males over the age of 21, resident in Ceylon, who had at least had a primary education, ie men who could read and write in the vernacular and who had some kind of income. What they got was beyond their wildest dreams and indeed was the stuff of nightmares for all other representatives of Low Country and Kandyan Sinhalese, Ceylon Tamil, Muslim and Burgher communities consulted by the Commission.

 

Only the representatives of the Indian Tamil community, for obvious reasons, were in favour of full male franchise, regardless of any educational or income element. No-one, and I repeat no-one, except perhaps George de Silva’s wife Agnes and a few of her Colombo female friends, argued for votes for women. Messrs. De Silva and Goonesinghe, to give them their due, supported their wives in asking for equal votes for women but again what was asked for was votes for educated women.

 

This brings me back to the word which I used in my opening remarks, and which seemed so problematic:  that is the’ grant’ of universal franchise to Ceylon in 1931. This word ‘grant’ suggests that the people of Ceylon were demanding and lobbying for universal franchise in the late 1920’s. Nothing could be further from the facts. What most of the political and commercial elite of the island wanted and asked for when the Commission came, was a slight extension of the existing, very proscriptive, male franchise.  What they got in universal franchise destabilised the island’s political culture immediately. It led to the Jaffna boycott, the Pan-Sinhala Board of Ministers and the final rejection by all communities of the Executive Committee system, in favour of the Westminster model of parliamentary government, which proved even more unsuitable and has now been replaced by a French model.

 

Universal franchise was foisted on Ceylon in 1931. In the minds of its authors, it was a necessary act, done for the greater good of the world – it was done to rid the world of the racial and political injustice of Empire while introducing democratic values in governance in former imperial entities and as an exemplar for modern governance throughout the globe.

 

And overall, one might argue that it has, generally speaking, worked. Looking at the imperial dependencies, India is still the largest functioning democracy in the world. Ghana, and to a lesser extent, Nigeria, Zambia and Kenya are functioning democracies in Africa. We’ll leave out Hong Kong, as it’s a special case, but Jamaica and other islands of the ex-British Caribbean have stuck with democratic norms.  Burma is trying to get democracy back after decades of military rule. Pakistan and Bangladesh swing between democracy and army take-overs but they seem always to want to return to democratic ways and oftentimes do. South Africa has, after decades, overturned minority race-government in favour of majority rule.

 

There are dreadful failures of course: Nigeria and Uganda have been through terrible periods of bloodletting and Uganda, like Kenya, oversaw mass deportation of unwanted Asians. The Lebanon is sadly, and through no fault of its own, a basket case and the Israel-Palestine issue is still a running sore on the world’s body politic. But Ceylon’s contribution to world history in taking on universal franchise, unasked and probably prematurely, yet making it work so well for so long, has resulted in perhaps a fairer and more equal world than otherwise might have been the case.

Tuesday, June 8, 2021

MARITIME CONVENTIONS, DISASTERS AND HUBS: SRI LANKA’S DECISIVE HOUR IS HERE

 World Oceans Day 2021

 By George I. H. Cooke

The territorial waters of Sri Lanka have experienced maritime disasters for centuries. The presence of numerous hulls on the sea bed around the country are testimony to the battles that were fought, and the accidents that occurred in close proximity to the island nation. Whilst the hulls are a grim reminder of the past, the impact on the environment at that time remains sketchy, and hardly any lessons seem to have been learnt from each disaster. Much has remained unaccounted for and hence the repetition of such catastrophes is witnessed. Sri Lanka, known by various names in the centuries gone by, was a shipping hub with the presence of numerous international traders, trading companies and countries that vied for engagement with the island from pre-colonial through to colonial times.

Sri Lanka's strategic maritime importance

The island remained of strategic maritime importance to the British, whose military expressed concern at the granting of independence, owing to the connectivity the island afforded. A report of the British Chiefs of Staff dated May 05, 1947 noted that “The island forms an essential link in our cable and wireless network to Australia and the Far East. It is also the centre of our naval intelligence organisations for countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Inability to use Ceylon would deprive us of the only existing main fleet base between Malta and Singapore and would seriously weaken our control of the Indian Ocean…”

From the first Prime Minister onwards, attention was focused on the strategic importance of the island. D. S. Senanayake in his independence message observed that “We are in a specially dangerous position because we are on one of the strategic highways of the world. The country which captures Ceylon could dominate the Indian Ocean.” Such was the importance attached to the locality not only from a strategic perspective of geopolitics, but also owing to the relevance of the island from security and commercial angles.

At the height of the Cold War nuclear action by the two power blocs in their tussle with each other could have had far reaching repercussions. In 1971, Ceylon’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Hamilton S. Amerasinghe called for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the 26th session of the UN General Assembly on the ‘Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace’. Later in October 1971, Ceylon’s Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike called for the acceptance of this proposal to avert a crisis in the Indian Ocean by prohibiting the passage of military vessels. The effort was to raise concern about the potential impact that war could have on the countries of the Indian Ocean, and the disasters that would grip the countries of South Asia and its neighbourhood. 

The Blue Economy

The continuous stress on the relevance of the oceans, is now on the concept of the Blue Economy and its potential, especially for a country like Sri Lanka. As the island looks to strategize beyond merely fishing, and focuses on the multitude of opportunities that oceans provide, Sri Lanka is looking to enhance its shipping connectivity, and evolve into a maritime hub once again. This potential could be realized through the multifaceted aquatic resources, aquaculture, seabed deposits, marine biotechnology, as well as the beaches which heavily support the tourism industry. However they would all be heavily affected not only in the short to medium term after maritime disasters, but would also face the long term impact which damages the ecosystem and the economy. At present urgent commitment to the improvement of standards, abiding by international regulations, and enhancement of facilities remain critical areas that deserve immediate attention.

Maritime Hub 

In order to evolve into a maritime hub in the 21st century unlike how it was centuries ago, Sri Lanka needs to be more aware of its international obligations and effectively study the conventions which have been ratified, as well as those which have been bypassed for varied reasons at the time they were adopted at the international level.

In the last two decades alone several maritime disasters caused immense concern, and much damage in Sri Lanka’s territorial waters. In 1999 MV Melishka began sinking off Dondra and finally ran aground off the Bundala coast. It subsequently deposited 16,500 metric tonnes of fertilizer and 200 metric tonnes of heavy fuel oil. 2006 saw MV Amanat Shah causing a spill of 25 metric tonnes of oil and dropping over 800 teak logs into the ocean off Kogolla. Further up the eastern coast of Sri Lanka, in the seas off Trincomalee, the MT Granba experienced a leak in 2009, leading to the eventual sinking of the ship and its cargo of 6,250 tonnes of sulphuric acid. In 2019, when the vessel, Sri Lankan Glory washed ashore in Galle timely action resulted in the removal of 15 tonnes of fuel on board which averted a further disaster. Similarly in 2020, another large scale disaster was mitigated when the MT New Diamond carrying 270,000 tonnes of oil caught fire east of Sri Lanka but was eventually towed out of territorial waters although an oil slick was reported at the time.

The latest incident concerning MV X-Press Pearl off the western coast of the island highlights once again the risks faced by maritime nations but more importantly draws attention to the need for countries to be prepared for such eventualities. Whilst the preparation remains very much national, it is only through international collaboration that countries are able to raise standards and ensure readiness for any form of disaster that might occur within and beyond its territorial waters. 

Maritime Conventions

It was collective action that saw a Convention establishing the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) in 1948, as the main specialized agency of the United Nations mandated to ensure ‘the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine and atmospheric pollution by ships.’ The Convention came into operation in 1958 and IMCO convened for the first in 1959. Whilst the name of IMCO changed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1982, the objective of ‘Safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans’ continued.

Sri Lanka ratified the Convention in 1972 only after the country called for international action to safeguard the Indian Ocean. Whilst the Convention had been in operation for well over a decade it was a national requirement that led to the subsequent ratification. Several Conventions that were initiated from then onwards have been ratified by Sri Lanka while many others remain unratified. It takes a national requirement to re-examine these Conventions. The current development off the western coast of Sri Lanka and the environmental disaster that is already being witnessed for miles along the coast is a critical juncture for Sri Lanka to re-examine the maritime conventions that have been ratified and ensure complete implementation, while also identifying those which have not been ratified and to take suitable action at the earliest.

The International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC) which came into force in 1977 is yet to be ratified by Sri Lanka. First drawn up in 1972, after a study of the safety of containerization in marine transport, the CSC has two objectives. Whilst it is aimed at maintaining internationally accepted levels of safety of human life, it also attempts to lay out international safety regulations. This uniformity is crucial given the universality of the shipping industry.

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) which was adopted in 1973 and has several Protocols that were introduced in the ensuing years, has seen Sri Lanka ratifying Annexes I, II, III, IV and V, but not VI. Covering the prevention of pollution of the marine environment and ecosystems by ships due to operational or accidental causes, the Convention’s six technical annexures call for strict adherence in the areas of oil, noxious liquid substances, harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form, sewage, garbage and air pollution. The Convention remains a landmark agreement that deserves much deeper study especially in addressing the current situation in Sri Lanka.

The International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties was adopted in 1969 and came into force in 1975. While Sri Lanka ratified the Convention, the 1973 Protocol is yet to be ratified. This Convention gives countries like Sri Lanka ample area for action when vessels cause maritime disasters and is yet another Convention that needs to be invoked in the current scenario.

The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) which was adopted in 1990 and came into operation in 1995, has not been ratified by Sri Lanka. This Convention calls upon parties to it to “establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other countries.” These are not adhoc measures but instead are ones which are strategized upon well in advance and are thus operationalized as and when disasters occur. Ships are required to have a ‘shipboard oil pollution emergency plan’ and member states to have ‘stockpiles of oil spill combating equipment, the holding of oil spill combating exercises and the development of detailed plans for dealing with pollution incidents.’ With the IMO playing the crucial role of coordination, this Convention is essential for countries, especially Sri Lanka as the island develops into a maritime hub. Further, a Protocol related to hazardous and noxious substances was adopted in 2000.

The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) was adopted in 1969 and came into force in 1975, and thereafter was replaced by the 1992 Protocol which came into force in 1996. Sri Lanka has ratified the 1992 Protocol which calls for adequate compensation at times of oil pollution damaging the territory and territorial sea of a State Party to the Convention. The 1992 Protocol also expanded the operability of the Convention to include the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

The International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS) was first adopted in 1996 but did not come into force. It was superseded by the 2010 Protocol which is also yet to come into force. Only Canada, Denmark, Norway, South Africa and Turkey have ratified the Protocol which proposes the establishment of a two tier system for compensation wherein the first tier involves the ship owner’s insurance providing funds and the second tier draws from a fund formed by recipients of the HNS. The payment of dues towards this fund is seen as a stumbling block in its ratification as the amount is calculated based on the amount drawn in the preceding year. For it to come into force ‘at least twelve States, including four States each with not less than 2 million units of gross tonnage, [need to] have expressed their consent to be bound by it’.

The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (BUNKER) which was adopted in 2001 and came into force in 2008 is yet to be ratified by Sri Lanka. The Convention lays emphasis on damage owing to spillage of fuel from the ships’ bunkers, and is free-standing covering pollution damage only, and applies ‘to damage caused on the territory, including the territorial sea, and in the exclusive economic zone of States Parties.’ This is yet another convention that enables countries to recover from disasters.

Conclusion

Some of the aforementioned Conventions have been ratified, others have not been fully ratified and still others have not been ratified at all. Although the immediate action required on the ground and at sea is to curtail the spread of the pollutants from the sinking vessel, it is paramount that steps are taken to address the issue from a holistic perspective wherein Sri Lanka does not have to suffer similar consequences and is instead further prepared to tackle such challenges, which will undoubtedly occur in the future.

In the short term, the disaster caused by the MV X-Press Pearl remains a clarion call for immediate action to ensure that the Conventions that have been ratified are invoked and adequate measures taken to address the catastrophe that is unfolding along the western coast of the island and has the potential to spread further. Coordination with IMO and States Parties to the ratified Conventions need to be explored instantly to identify avenues for technical cooperation that is needed at present.

In the medium term, a comprehensive study is required of Conventions which have not been ratified to date, noting the reasons for non-ratification and attempting to overcome challenges that might have been perceived in the past which stopped Sri Lanka from ratifying these Conventions. Further, measures are required pursuant to a comprehensive analysis, to ratify these internationally recognized, standard setting instruments which are critical for island nations, and especially for Sri Lanka given its geographical positioning, and future ambitions.

In the long term, a widespread study is required of all Convention that have been ratified and action taken to ensure that Sri Lanka continues to abide by the stipulations enclosed therein, which would eventually be rewarding for the country as it improves standards and journeys further down the path towards becoming a maritime hub.

Sri Lanka has long yearned to be identified as a maritime hub. Yet maritime incidents such as that which occurred in May 2021 which possess the potential of escalating into massive environmental catastrophes the impact of which will continue to be felt for years, remain challenges that require concerted, strategized action. It is only when, at the national level, action is taken to implement Conventions, which are directly beneficial to signatories as they hold States Parties to high standards and regulations that concrete steps would be taken towards maritime hub status. Such status is rewarding from an economic prism, and it is relevant to ensure that the standards prescribed by internationally binding Conventions are implemented as they thwart all forms of damage, if not, try to mitigate the damage that could be caused through maritime incidents.

However the damage experienced by each and every maritime incident cannot be undone or overcome completely, the compensation cannot bring the marine creatures back to life, the underwater world which was already under immense stress due to global warming has now been further impacted and those who relied on the seas to sustain lives and livelihoods have been collectively affected. It is a truism that development comes at a cost.  Nevertheless urgent measures are needed to reduce the impact on the environment, stringent plans are required to have been formulated and rushed into operation when an incident occurs, and an overall vision is vital to diminish the negative impact of progress and development. All of this can only be achieved through thorough strategizing across all sectors, under a comprehensive national plan of action.

The disaster of 2021 is not the first to hit Sri Lanka, and will not be the last that the country experiences, but it should at least become a moment of realization. Realization of how all sectors are closely integrated across the country, how engaged Sri Lanka is with the international community, and very importantly, how cooperating in a proactive and mutually beneficial manner, will give Sri Lanka the opportunity to rise and take her place among counterparts in the region and beyond. Until this moment of realization dawns, and appropriate action is taken, maritime hub status, or any other form of hub status, will remain elusive.