by George I. H. Cooke
Irrespective of the state, each looks to improve its position,
accrue much and foster a healthy, dynamic and vibrant role in global politics. Given
the challenges, within the domestic political milieu and that with which states
contend globally, diplomacy comes to the forefront of interactions, especially
with regard to the latter.
Small countries like Sri Lanka rely most heavily on diplomacy in
global engagement. It is not hard power in the form of military might or
economic prowess that may be nuanced through soft power that determines the
longevity or success of small states, but their reliance on engagement with all,
which is paramount.
Large countries, such as China, which Martin Jacques claims is
“not just a nation-state, it is also a civilization-state” given the gigantic size, the magnitude of population and
the propensity to effect change, have much at their disposal. While diplomacy
is a key tool, it is complimented with a variety of other embellishments. Such
continent-like countries strategize on equivalent terms but they too realize
that in the global community the need exists to cooperate with all.
Therefore from a bilateral perspective the engagement in
diplomacy by two countries, vastly different when considering Sri Lanka and
China, provides an example of collaboration and continuity which has been
mutually beneficial. The nexus created more than sixty years ago through the
rapport that was nurtured by Ceylon’s fourth Prime Minister S. W. R. D.
Bandaranaike and China’s first Premier Chou en Lai led to the establishment and
consolidation of diplomatic relations. Thus the question is asked about the
nature and impact of this profound friendship on their respective countries’
bilateral relations with the other, which continued to grow in a colossal way over
the succeeding decades. The degree of bilateralism enjoyed today between China
and Sri Lanka can be used as an example of a Major power-Small power
relationship.
The current Chinese global policy direction through the
amalgamated Belt and Road Initiative which in turn brings Sri Lanka closer to
China through trade, investment and economic cooperation, is yet another key
milestone. The China of 1949 and the China of 2021 are in complete contrast in
relation to many factors yet the country continues to preserve its primary
identity and basic character. The same could be said about Sri Lanka, although
it could also be argued that whilst the former strove to make progress the
latter has faltered. Yet it the degree of interaction between the two countries
that have seen a drastic change from 1950 to date with the leadership of the
two countries engaging in differing manner, yet maintaining sound relations.
The relationship between Bandaranaike and Chou in formulating a
firm foundation enabled successive leaders on both sides to build the sound
strategic partnership that exists today. Being examined is the initial foray
into engagement and the determined steps being taken by two persons to solidify
that which was present and strategize for that which was to come. Chou’s visit
to Ceylon in February 1957 may be termed the catalyst in the bonding between
the two leaders and countries, who enjoyed relatively similar upbringings, making
them resolute and trustworthy of the other.
While Bandaranaike had his Oxford-educated persona complimenting
his nationalistic outlook, Chou, who had been born into a genteel family in
Jiangsu Province, had struggled through the Revolution. Chou returned to China from
Europe in 1924 as a leader in the Communist Party, while Bandaranaike too
travelled home from Britain a year later and entered the political arena. Each
found in the other a comrade and it is their vision, it is argued, that stands testimony
to tangible and intangible aspects of Sino-Lanka relations from then to date.
China – Sri Lanka
relations
The travels of Fa Hien, the Chinese Buddhist monk and Zheng He,
the Chinese Admiral and navigator form but part of a vivid collection of references
in a rich tapestry which spans centuries of Sino-Lanka ties that have been
documented in detail in ancient manuscripts. Vernon Mendis notes that the
presence of Fa Hien at the funeral of the Arahat Mahinda during the reign of
Uttiya, successor to Devanampiyatissa, the role played by Zheng He during the time
of Vira Alakeshwara, and the civilizational contribution of China and Sri Lanka
along with India as three of the ‘foremost civilizations of Asia...linked by
ties of Buddhism and forming a kind of Buddhist commonwealth,’ are indicative
of the engagement that existed.
Mendis claims that the ‘establishment by Sri Lanka of these
relations with China at this early period was a significant initiative the full
characteristics of which and implications have not been sufficiently examined.’
Religion formed an integral part of connectivity while trade played a crucial
role with shipments of ‘…cotton goods, gold and silver filigree work and Buddha
images (sent) to ancient China’ as identified by S. F. De Silva, and other
material including silk were received in return. These interactions were taking
place at a time when travel was restricted to maritime excursions, perilous as
they may have been, yet Mendis maintains ‘the missions sent by Sri Lanka rulers
from the 5th to the 8th centuries [amount to] about 16
missions… in all.’ He also notes that ‘these missions ended abruptly in the 8th
century and after that there is no evidence of contacts with China until the
visit of Admiral Zheng He in the 15th century.’
Five centuries later on 06th January 1950, ‘the
Government of Ceylon (has) decided to recognize the new Government of China’
marking the first official recognition of the People’s Republic of China that
was being made by post-independent Ceylon. This saw a revival, although to a
negligible scale, of ancient ties that had existed. Berty Gajameragedara opines
that this recognition ‘established the fundamental juridical condition for the
eventual establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.’
The gesture though considered symbolic at the time was to prove
politically expedient as it laid the foundation for trade negotiation that took
place in mid-1952. Faced with a Hobson’s choice scenario owing to a fall in
rice purchases from East Asia and the dollar issue, Gajameragedara observes
that Ceylon decided to ‘turn to China, which after the embargo of May 1951 came
into effect, had repeatedly offered rice in exchange of Ceylonese rubber.’ The
negotiation and subsequent signing of the Agreement between Yeh Chi-Chuang and R.
G. Senanayake in Peking on 04th October 1952 was yet another
milestone in bilateral relations. Despite differences in political ideologies,
R. G. Senanayake justified the stance adopted arguing that they ‘should not
stand in the way of countries trading with each other, if that trade is to
their mutual benefit.’ Senanayake observed that in relation to China, ‘the late
Prime Minister even went so far as to protest against the imposing of bans on
the export of rubber from Malaya to China,’ attempting to dispel the often
construed pro-West stance of D. S. Senanayake and his sentiments towards
communism which had been articulated on earlier occasions.
Chinese Premier Chou en Lai’s first direct interaction with a
Ceylonese Prime Minister was to be with Sir John Kotelawala in Bandung on the sidelines
of the Afro-Asian Conference in April 1955. Yet in January that year, Chou had
extended an invitation to Kotelawala to visit China and in February ‘making yet
another gesture of friendship towards the Ceylonese Government, on the occasion
of the seventh anniversary of independence, sent a message of greetings,’ which Gajameragedara states was the first of its kind from a Chinese leader to Ceylon. Calling
for ‘Sino-Ceylonese relations to grow increasingly in the cause of maintaining
peace in Asia and the world,’ Chou’s gesture strengthened cordiality and sowed
the seeds for future interactions.
The precursor to Bandung having been the Colombo Conference of
April/May 1954 saw Kotelawala one of the hosts along with the leaders of Burma,
India, Indonesia and Pakistan. In addition to dispelling
misgivings and assuaging prejudice, the Chinese Premier led China into the
global arena with his own savoir-flair style of diplomacy. Mendis
claims that the highlight of Bandung
‘was no doubt the image of Chou en Lai as an apostle of sweet reasonableness,
disarming his critics and allaying fears and stealing the thunder.’
Of
the twenty nine countries convening in Bandung, only seven had established
relations with China. The tone set in Bandung, in announcing that China had
arrived on the world stage once again, this time as a nation-state, resulted in
what Mendis claims was ‘a parallel trend in
China where after Bandung it acquired a new and benign image thanks to the
diplomacy of Chou en Lai which allayed fears of its expansionist ambitions and
gave the impression of peace and goodwill and the desire to co-exist with all
states and cooperate with them meaningfully.’
Even before the nexus was forged between Bandaranaike and Chou,
it was the Chinese Premier who was making a continuous effort to engage with
Ceylon. Whether the repeated offers to trade rice for rubber before the Rubber–Rice pact was actually initialed, the attempts to send a delegation to Ceylon
to strengthen relations, the invitation to Kotelawala, the liberal attitude
adopted in renewing the pact, the Independence greeting, among others, may be understood
as diplomatic gestures aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation.
The Bandaranaike –
Chou vision
S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s election in 1956 signaled a distinct
change in Ceylon’s foreign policy, particularly in relations with China. His notion
of foreign policy expanded across divides of ideology and political leaning. In
the early 40’s Bandaranaike had actively supported and led a bid to establish
an Asian United Nations Organisation, based on suggestions made by Tagore and
other Indian leaders. He envisioned it ‘would be of substantial value to all
Asian countries at a moment in human history like the present when the world is
moving so rapidly towards a new age.’ This enthusiasm, although shared by Nehru was not unanimously
accepted, yet Bandaranaike was appointed, with George E. de Silva, to a
committee tasked with reporting on the proposal to the next Asian Conference that
was due to be held in China in 1949. The possibility of forging unity ‘not
merely within the various Asian countries but unity among the peoples of the
continent of Asia,’ was of great interest to Bandaranaike.
Bandaranaike’s pre-independence desire to forge Asian solidarity
and safeguard the interests of a region that was emerging from its colonial
period, resulted in him seizing the opportunity upon his election in 1956. His
was the view that Asia’s collegiality was paramount for facing the challenges
of the changing times. In this regard he understood that China’s presence and
potential needed to be an integral part of any equation determining the future
of Asia. The Ambassador to the UN, R. S. S. Gunewardena outlined this relevance
recalling that ‘at the Conference of the Colombo Powers of India, Pakistan,
Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia – a resolution was adopted unanimously to the
effect that the non-recognition of Communist China increased the tension in the
Far East and as a constant threat to peace.’
Thereafter heightening the call for inclusion of China not only
at the regional level but on the global stage, Bandaranaike used the maiden
speech of a Ceylonese Prime Minister at the UNGA to express regret ‘that there
are still some countries which are awaiting admission, countries whose claims
to such admission appear to many of us to be unquestioned, and whose admission
will undoubtedly make more fully representative the membership of this great
world Organisation for peace. Amongst them I wish to mention in particular such
countries as the People’s Republic of China.’
The Claude Corea Mission to explore the possibility of establishing
diplomatic relations in September 1956 resulted in the exchange of Ambassadors in
1957 and the signing of agreements on trade and payment, and economic aid. The
forthright manner in which Ceylon was reversing an earlier policy orientation
and venturing into hitherto unchartered territory was to be one of the most
prudent foreign policy decisions undertaken by Bandaranaike.
1957 thus ushered in a new era, for Ceylon and China, in which
policy expanded, relations were reformulated, global dynamics were understood
and new efforts were undertaken to traverse further down the path of
bilateralism. Chou’s visit to Colombo in February 1957 and their
interactions consolidated a bond of friendship that extended far beyond the two
individuals, and remains the foundation upon which diplomatic connectivity has
flourished ever since. Bandaranaike saw potential in the relationship. The
like-mindedness of these two leaders brought to fruition two visions;
Bandaranaike’s intention to engage across the ideological divide, especially
with a leader in Asia and Chou’s keenness to collaborate with Ceylon.
An aligning of vision occurs during the historic visit in 1957. Having
understood the opportunity afforded in intensifying cooperation with the East,
Bandaranaike welcomed Chou as special guest at the eighth Independence Day
celebrations, noting that ‘we in Ceylon and the countries of Asia look upon the
contribution which the People’s Republic of China is making in shaping the new
world as perhaps the greatest contribution any country has made.’ His choice of
words ‘perhaps the greatest contribution’ identified the potential Bandaranaike
saw in China, who was an ally and Asian neighbour.
The Chinese Premier, no less generous and equally
thought-provokingly pointed out that ‘the Chinese and Ceylonese people have more
or less the same destiny.’ He articulated the desire of both to ‘shake off our
legacies of backwardness and poverty from the past and build new happiness’ and
the determination ‘to safeguard everlasting world peace.’ The joint statement issued
at the end of Chou’s visit reflected their shared understanding of the period
as one of transition and that ‘in eras such as these, it is not unusual to find
divergent outlooks and varying conceptions of societies. But we believe that
nations can live in peace with each other despite these divergences and
different social systems.’
His observation of relations with Ceylon may be translated
further to encapsulate China’s view of Asia as the leaders reiterated that
‘while recognizing and respecting differences of outlook that may exist between
us, we are determined to strengthen those ties, develop our economic
cooperation and cultural exchanges and foster cooperation to our mutual
benefit.’ Alluding to their varied political ideologies, Chou characteristically
displayed his enthusiasm to ensure that relations would reach their zenith, irrespective
of their stances.
Chou’s visit Kandy and his paying homage at the Temple of the
Tooth Relic in addition to making a personal contribution to its building fund,
is seen as a revival of the ancient linkage of Buddhism. In the wake of the
1958 floods China granted loan assistance worth Rs, 50,000,000 for flood relief
and rehabilitation work. Similarly the 1959 Agreement on air transport and
Protocol on the exchange of commodities of the same year did much to nurture
bilateral relations. Yet the lasting nature of diplomatic connectivity was dependent
on the rapport built up by the two leaders.
Anticipating much potential in their respective countries which had
both emerged as players on the international stage less than a decade earlier,
the Bandaranaike–Chou visionary outlook included an essence of convergence with
a mutually beneficial impact on interactions. Premier Chou having stridden
the world stage just two years earlier at Bandung had taken the message of what
China was and would be, to the world. Bandaranaike provided undivided support
as the paths of the two countries became intertwined to a greater degree in the
decades to follow.
Belt and Road
Initiative
Xi Jinping’s 2013 initiative to revive the ancient Silk Road and
optimize on the potential of it as a vehicle of fostering connectivity was
received as yet another prudent measure adopted by the Chinese leadership.
Already yielding results, the Belt and Road initiative has crossed the
continents of Asia, Europe and Africa and even reached out to Latin America.
The potential of linking vibrant East Asian economies with those of Africa, and
more developed economies of Europe generate much needed certainty and promote
potential.
Following Xi’s unveiling of it in Kazakhstan, the mega-project
sought to include Central Asia in building a Silk Road Economic Belt which
expanded to the ASEAN community in constructing the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) ‘to finance infrastructure
construction and promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration” Xi’s strategic vision saw an
acceleration of the linkage among neighbouring countries even including Russia
connecting the initiative to the latter’s Euro-Asia Railways. Deeper
cooperative mechanisms such as the Economic Corridors encompassing
China-Pakistan and China-India-Myanmar brought the initiative to South Asia as
other countries including Sri Lanka were to be made integral partners.
Jacques Martin has outlined that ‘Today China’s diplomacy with
Asia has morphed from a rigid state-guided scheme into an eclectic array of
initiatives from many stakeholders: the state, the Party, the military, the
provinces, cities, companies, [and] thinks tanks.’ Resonating that which was
projected by Chou in Bandung more than sixty years ago, the current leadership
has utilised an array of resources, a gamut of policies and most importantly
the ancient tool of diplomacy to effect change.
Having reached out and
strengthened relations in Asia and in Africa over the last several decades,
China’s venture even further into Latin America has proved noteworthy. Amidst
such progress, China’s desire in dealing with Sri Lanka, in accordance almost with
Chou’s vision that ‘the Chinese and Ceylonese
people have more or less the same destiny,’ has seen the further strengthening and deeper
consolidation of engagement to a level of strategic partnership. The many
projects completed and others being implemented and still more in the pipeline,
whilst being indicative of the concretized partnership between two vastly
different countries, augurs well for Sri Lanka, if the island nation makes the
most out of every single project. Providing much needed capital for development
in the wake of the devastating conflict, China has proven to be an
‘all-weather’ friend cooperating across the spectrum from guaranteeing
political support, to providing economic aid.
The Major power – Small power relationship in play in this
instance portends much potential. As China rides into the Asian century at the
helm, Sri Lanka is guaranteed a ringside seat. Thus the impact of the BRI on
Sri Lanka would, in time to come, prove monumental. It can therefore be argued
that it is testimony to the visionary leadership of two leaders of yesteryear,
who, unknowing of the future, sought to reach out to each other and undertake a
journey together.
Auguring well for South-South cooperation, the fast changing tide with
which China gradually assumes a higher, if not the highest role in the
international hierarchy, augurs well for Sri Lanka. It stands testimony to the
fruit of the Bandaranaike-Chou vision that is being reaped today. It needs to
be understood in the Asian context and then the region as a whole can share the
success of an Asian neighbour.
