NEUTRAL GROUND: Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Test amid Indo-Pak Tensions

By L. M. Sachini Navodya

The Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025 reignited the nuclear-tinged historical rivalry between India and Pakistan, raising concerns about regional stability. If the situation escalates into armed conflict, Sri Lanka, as a regional actor with historical and current ties to both countries, could face significant geopolitical, economic, and security repercussions. This article thus explores the implications of a possible inter-state conflict on South Asia and particularly on Sri Lanka, drawing on the complex history of the India-Pakistan conflict and Sri Lanka’s evolving role in South Asian geopolitics.

History of India-Pakistan Conflict

Looking back at the history of this rivalry, since independence from Britain in 1947, India and Pakistan have engaged in four major wars and numerous skirmishes, with the disputed territory of Kashmir at the heart of their rivalry. Key milestones include the: First Kashmir war (1947-1948), triggered by Pakistan-backed tribal incursions into Kashmir, leading to the Maharaja’s accession of the region to India and the establishment of the Line of Control (LoC) following a UN-brokered ceasefire; Second Kashmir war in 1965 sparked by border clashes and Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir, ending in a military stalemate and the Tashkent Agreement; Third Kashmir war in 1971 centered on the Bangladesh Liberation movement, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh and a decisive Indian victory and Kargil war in 1999 marked by Pakistani infiltration in Kargil, Ladakh, and intense fighting at high altitudes, with India regaining lost ground and Pakistan facing diplomatic isolation. These conflicts have thus entrenched a legacy of distrust, militarization, and nuclear brinkmanship in South Asia.

Impact on South Asia: A Region at Crossroads

The 21st century has been hailed as the ‘Century of Asia’, with South Asia poised to leverage its demographic dividend and economic potential. However, an India-Pakistan conflict could shatter this vision, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. The nuclear brinkmanship with both nations possessing nuclear arsenals, and heightened tensions risk accidental escalation, as seen during the 1999 Kargil War and 2019 Balakot crisis.

A potential crisis could also spur economic disruption in the region risking South Asia’s intra-regional trade (less than 5% of total trade) to collapse further, particularly if India-Pakistan border closures and airspace restrictions persist. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which traverses disputed Kashmir, could become a flashpoint, drawing China deeper into the conflict. It could also lead to humanitarian crises such as the triggering of refugee flows, straining of resources, and the revival of ethnic tensions, particularly affecting marginalized communities in Kashmir and border regions.

The potential rivalry could also result in an institutional paralysis leading regional organizations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), already weakened by the clash of the two, to face irrelevance, stalling initiatives like the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).

Sri Lanka’s Role in the Prolonged Conflict

Sri Lanka has historically played a nuanced and pragmatic role throughout the rivalry between its two neighbours, often leveraging its position to maintain autonomy and serve its national interests while navigating the sensitivities of both regional powers. In the 1971 India-Pakistan war, under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Sri Lanka notably allowed Pakistani civilian and military aircraft to refuel and use Colombo as a stopover, after India denied Pakistan overflight rights. This was a significant move since it enabled Pakistan to maintain air links with its eastern territory (now Bangladesh) while underscoring Sri Lanka’s willingness to assert its sovereignty and its non-aligned foreign policy —even at the risk of displeasing India, its much larger neighbour. The balancing act was furthermore visible with Sri Lanka maintaining strong diplomatic and economic ties with India despite providing Pakistan with logistical support.

What a Renewed Conflict could mean to Sri Lanka?

Thus, predicting what impact a possible conflict could have on Sri Lanka, as a fragile small power, a renewed conflict could force Colombo into a precarious diplomatic balancing act. It would compel Sri Lanka to avoid overt alignment, risking alienation from either power or both.

● Security and Strategic Autonomy

An India-Pakistan war would heighten regional insecurity, potentially drawing Sri Lanka into the conflict’s periphery. The island’s proximity to India and its reliance on Indian goodwill for security and economic stability would limit its foreign policy flexibility. Sri Lanka might face pressure to align with India, risking its defense ties with Pakistan and complicating its non-aligned stance. Furthermore, worsening the crisis, such a conflict could invite greater involvement from external powers (China, the US), with Sri Lanka potentially becoming a site for strategic competition, especially given its ports and location along key maritime routes. This potential involvement would also make the country’s act of balancing even complicated, with Sri Lanka’s increased alignment with India economically and diplomatically, particularly given China’s entrenched support for Pakistan and its footprint in Sri Lanka in terms of debt and investments.

The escalation of the potential conflict could also lead to possible dilemmas for Sri Lanka. If China intensifies military support to Pakistan, India might pressure Sri Lanka to restrict Chinese naval access to Hambantota emphasizing the threat to India’s security, testing Colombo’s diplomatic agility. Given the potential support of the US to India, enhanced Quad cooperation could offer Sri Lanka alternative investments, reducing reliance on China but requiring alignment with Western strategic interests on the other hand.

● Economic Vulnerabilities

Sri Lanka’s economy, still recovering from its 2022 debt crisis, remains fragile. A regional conflict could disrupt maritime trade routes in the Indian Ocean, affecting Sri Lanka’s ports, which handle transshipment for both India and global markets. Furthermore, tourism—a critical revenue source—could suffer due to perceived instability, echoing declines seen during the country's civil war. Additionally, rising oil prices from conflict-driven market volatility would strain Sri Lanka’s import-dependent economy further.

● Humanitarian and Diplomatic Fallout

A protracted conflict could exacerbate refugee flows to Tamil Nadu, indirectly affecting Sri Lanka through heightened sensitivities around Tamil minority rights. Colombo might also face pressure to condemn cross-border terrorism, aligning with India’s stance, while avoiding actions that could legitimize Pakistan’s position.

Sri Lanka’s Tightrope: Navigating Indo-Pak Conflict

At an hour of a renewed rivalry between India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka’s best strategy is to maintain a pragmatic, balanced, and non-aligned foreign policy, leveraging its geostrategic location to attract investment and security cooperation from multiple powers without becoming a proxy or flashpoint in their rivalries.

At an hour of foreign policy dilemma, it is vital that Sri Lanka emphasizes balanced engagement and sovereignty. Sri Lanka’s leadership has repeatedly articulated a desire to remain neutral and avoid entanglement in great power rivalries, as reflected in statements emphasizing non-alignment and the prioritization of national sovereignty. This approach allows Sri Lanka to maintain flexibility and avoid being drawn into the strategic competition between India and China, both of whom have substantial interests in the island—India as a regional hegemon and China as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The country could reinforce its neutrality through proactive diplomacy. It could publicize its non-aligned stance by issuing immediate statements emphasizing Sri Lanka’s neutrality, drawing from its historical non-aligned movement roots. Declare Colombo as a potential venue for peace talks, leveraging its 1971 precedent of facilitating dialogue during crises.

Sri Lanka could also activate regional platforms by using the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) or SAARC forums to advocate de-escalation, positioning Sri Lanka as a mediator while highlighting shared regional interests in maritime security and economic stability to rally consensus.

The strengthening of ties with regional organizations like SAARC and BIMSTEC would also aid in ensuring economic safety and trade continuity for Sri Lanka. This “concentric circles” approach places geographic neighbours at the center of engagement, which helps assuage Indian security concerns while still allowing space for economic cooperation with China and others.

The country could also leverage its strategic location for multilateralism at an hour of crisis. Sri Lanka’s position at the crossroads of major maritime routes gives it leverage to act as a hub for trade, logistics, and regional connectivity. By promoting itself as a neutral venue for dialogue, maritime cooperation, and disaster response, Sri Lanka can attract investment and security partnerships from a range of actors, including the US, Japan, and the EU, in addition to India and China. This multilateral approach reduces overdependence on any single power and increases Colombo’s diplomatic capital.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, the India-Pakistan conflict, amplified by external power rivalries, threatens to fracture South Asia’s fragile cohesion. For Sri Lanka, the crisis underscores the perils of multipolarity: economic dependencies and strategic alignments leave little room for autonomy. Its survival in an India-Pakistan war hinges on active neutrality, economic pragmatism, and multilateral hedging. By leveraging its geostrategic location, historical non-alignment, and partnerships with extra-regional powers, Sri Lanka can insulate itself from direct fallout while positioning itself as a facilitator of regional stability. The goal must be to emerge as an indispensable intermediary rather than a collateral casualty. Thus, unless regional leaders prioritize dialogue over brinkmanship, the promise of an Asian Century risks being eclipsed by perennial conflict and geopolitical fragmentation.

INDIA - MAURITIUS RELATIONS: A Multifaceted Analysis of Bilateral Cooperation

By Nishali Ranasinghe

The 2025 visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Mauritius made headlines in global news. Modi received Mauritius' highest honour, the Grand Commander of the Order of the Star and Key of the Indian Ocean, suggesting a strong connection. This visit by a prime minister to another country raises questions about why the PM traveled to Mauritius, an island with little influence in world politics. Analyzing the relationship between these two countries will provide an answer to that question.

The Historic Connection

Mauritius is a subtropical island country in the Indian Ocean, just over 1,130 kilometers east of Madagascar, off the southeastern coast of Africa. Its outlying territories include Rodrigues Island and other smaller islands (The Commonwealth, n.d.). Conversely, India is a rising global power in the Asian region with more than 1.4 billion populations. Mauritius and India may not share the same status in the global arena. However, these two countries share a strong bond, rooted for ages. According to Sinha (2024), after Mauritius became an English colony in 1810, approximately 470,000 Indians were sent to Mauritius as indentured labourers between 1834 and 1920 and this significantly impacted the sugar plantations. The human cargo was carried from Bihar, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. The people who migrated to Mauritius embarked on their new journey in Mauritius with a new identity but retained Indian values and cultures. As a result, out of the 1.2 million population in the country, 70% are of Indian origin.

In addition, in 1901, while traveling to South Africa, Mahatma Gandhi landed in Mauritius and advised the people to educate themselves and reclaim their identity. This message stayed with them and because of it, they celebrated their national day on the day Gandhi started his Dandi March also known as the Salt March on March 12.

After becoming an independent state in 1968, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam became the first prime minister of Mauritius, and his son, Navin Ramgoolam is the current prime minister. The connection between the two countries has not been reduced but expanded in many ways. This expansion has occurred in different sectors; Defense, Military and Strategy, Economy, Technology, and Capacity Building.

a. Defense, Military and Strategic Partnership

In 1974, the two countries signed a defense agreement, making India and Mauritius strategic partners. To date, India guarantees Mauritius’ security showcasing a powerful bond. The backing of India has been evident on several occasions. In 1983, there was a rumour about a coup by the MMM (Mauritius Military Movement), and even though it never occurred, it was believed that the then PM, Indira Gandhi wanted to send Indian troops to the country. In 2024, India welcomed the UK-Mauritius agreement for Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, which houses a US-UK military base, and Modi reiterated India’s “firm support” for Mauritius on this issue (Parashar, 2025).

In his recent visit to Mauritius, Modi again confirmed that India will support Mauritius’ sovereignty over the Chagos Island following the statement made by US President Trump that he would support a deal between Mauritius and Great Britain over the future of the United States-United Kingdom base in the Islands. It can thus be understood how India has always been a country that supports Mauritius in protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity proving to be a friend in need.

Additionally, the Indian Prime Minister also unveiled "Vision MAHASAGAR – Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions” for the Global South which vision builds upon the foundation of the earlier "Vision SAGAR" (Security and Growth for All in the Region) that encompasses principles of trade for development, capacity building for sustainable growth, and mutual security for a shared future (Laskar, 2024).

Furthermore, since 2009, the Indian Navy has been deploying ships to Mauritius bi-annually to assist in patrolling the vast EEZ of the island country. The joint patrolling focuses on preventing piracy and illegal fishing and helps reinforce maritime security in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Mauritius (Padmaja, 2017). As reported in Firstpost (2024), since the EEZ in Mauritius extends up to 2.3 million square kilometers and is difficult to monitor, India built an airstrip costing $250 million in Agalega Islands after signing a memorandum in 2015. The airstrip is 3km long and is suitable for Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare (LRMR-ASW) aircraft which are used for maritime surveillance and strike, electronic warfare missions, and search and rescue missions. This will ultimately assist them with their goal to combat contemporary non-traditional security threats such as piracy, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

In this manner, Mauritius has the security and defense backing from one of the rising global powers in the world. From India’s side, they are capable of protecting Mauritius as well as countering any non-traditional security threats and constructing the influence from China coming into the country.

b. Economic Partnership

Mauritius being an island nation, has grown to be a nation with significant status after its independence in 1968. Being a small state, the country mainly depends on many sectors such as tourism, manufacturing, construction, financial services, and agriculture. Due to the shared history, India has been supporting Mauritius to achieve their targeted economic goals, and is one of the major players and drivers of Mauritius’ economy.

India’s support in successfully implementing several infrastructure projects, such as India-Mauritius Metro Express Project, New Supreme Court Building, New ENT Hospital, 956 Social Housing Units, and Educational Tablets, showcases the bond between the two countries developed over time and India has overall invested $1.1 billion in Mauritian projects (Government of India, 2025).

As Singh (2023) points out, Mauritius has emerged as a significant source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India, and with the Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) India aims to streamline taxation, reduce complexity, and gradually eliminate tax exemptions. By enhancing the taxation framework, India aims to create a fair and conducive environment for foreign investors while promoting economic growth and investment in the country. It is apparent that this has contributed to Mauritius' emergence as a significant financial hub in the global market.

Further strengthening bilateral economic ties, the two countries have also signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA). The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA), signed in 2021, marked India’s first trade agreement with an African country. This agreement further solidified the bilateral relationship and paved the way for increased trade between the two nations. In the fiscal year 2021-2022, the total trade between India and Mauritius amounted to $ 786.72 million, with significant growth witnessed over the past 15 years (Singh, 2023). The CECPA encompasses a wide variety of areas, including Trade in Goods and Services, Rules of Origin, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, Dispute Settlement, Movement of Natural Persons, Telecom, Financial services and Custom procedures.

The initiatives demonstrate the effort by both countries to foster mutually beneficial economic cooperation. They also highlight how strategic partnerships like India and Mauritius can drive sustainable economic growth in their respective nations.

c. Technology Partnership

Within the technological parameters, India assists Mauritius in many ways, especially in people-centric digitalization. India has supported the implementation of the e-judiciary system, and digitization of archives and records at the Mahatma Gandhi Institute, strengthening cooperation in the field of ICT including cyber security, Digital Public Infrastructure, and capacity building for the same, and explore the implementation of successful digital tools developed by India, such as PM Gati Shakti digital platform, as per Mauritius’ requirements.

Similarly, since 1986, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India's national space agency, has operated a satellite tracking system in Mauritius which helps India guide its missions in space. The press release by the High Commission of India, in Port Louis, Mauritius (2009), states that ‘The Government of India may assist in the training of scientists and technicians, upon request from Mauritius, at various facilities under the Department of Space in the use of remote sensing data in applications relevant to Mauritius. Moreover, the Government of India may also provide, upon request, technical assistance for the establishment of a remote sensing cell or unit in Mauritius, selection of equipment and training of staff, and operationalization of the Station, and that a Mauritian scientist shall be attached to the TTC Station.’ This exhibits Indian presence in Mauritius for a considerable period. Thus, it can be noted that both countries share a genuine connection that expands in many areas.

d. Capacity Building

Strengthening bilateral relationships between the two countries, capacity building is one aspect that both these countries focus on. Capacity building encompasses many actors. For instance, Public Service and Administration, Diplomacy, Trade and Commerce, Finance, Infrastructure, and Health.

As reported by the India News Network (2024), during the visit to India in 2024, officials from both sides discussed opportunities for collaboration, particularly focusing on enhancing the administrative capabilities of Mauritian public officers through capacity-building programs and faculty development initiatives. Moreover, out of the 8 agreements that were exchanged between Mauritius and India in the recent visit in 2025, the two countries focused on other important aspects such as diplomacy, commerce, and trade. According to the Government of Mauritius (2025), an MoU was signed between the Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service in New Delhi, India, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade of the Republic of Mauritius, for the exchange of information on the structure and content of training program for diplomats and another MoU between the Ministry of Industry, SME and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic of India was signed to develop micro, small and medium enterprises in the respective countries.

In addition, the launching of India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) can be considered as one of the key steps in strengthening the banking and finance systems in Mauritius and it will also create not only a connection between the two countries but also trust. This new payment infrastructure will enable customers of participating banks to make seamless and secure payments both in Mauritius and in India. RuPay cards issued in Mauritius will be accepted at ATM and Point of Sales (POS) terminals in India, and Indians will be able to make UPI QR transactions at participating merchants in Mauritius. Commenting on this new payment service, the Governor of the Bank of Mauritius, Harvesh Kumar Seegolam, stated that "the launch of the RuPay and UPI linkage between Mauritius and India marks a significant milestone in our efforts to enhance financial connectivity and promote digital transactions. This collaboration will not only facilitate seamless and secure cost-effective payments for our customers but also strengthen the economic ties between our two nations." (Bank of Mauritius, 2024)

In terms of infrastructure, India has assisted in contributing to the implementation of several development projects in Mauritius. During the recent visit to Mauritius, both leaders agreed to work towards timely delivery of 100-electric buses and the associated charging infrastructure, implement Phase II of High Impact Community Development Projects, finalize discussions on the new Parliament building on a site to be identified by Mauritius, and conclude framework understanding to implement this project with India’s grant assistance, finalize discussion on the redevelopment of the Ganga Talao Spiritual Sanctuary and conclude framework understanding to implement this project with India’s grant assistance and explore new areas of development cooperation, as per the needs and priorities of Mauritius.

Apart from the above initiatives, the two countries have collaborated in the health sector as well. As reported by the Economic Times (2024), India launched their first overseas Jan Aushadi Kendra in Mauritius. Chandna (2024) noted that the scheme is promoted as an affordable medicines scheme by the Modi government where they offer generic drugs priced 50-90% lower than their branded counterparts in the market and Mauritius has shared a list of 16 therapeutic areas based on which the stock of drugs is being prepared such as cancer, anti-diabetic, antibiotics, nervous system, urology, painkillers, antifungal drugs, and supplements.

Conclusion

The connection between India and Mauritius dates back many decades, and from the examples mentioned, we can see how these two countries have developed and expanded their ties across many sectors. Like any other relationship, the connection between these two countries encounters challenges. For instance, there is a rise in geopolitical influence in the region, and balancing the interests of superpowers like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and China is an important and challenging task not only for Mauritius but also for India. Consequently, maritime security threats and challenges will increase due to the region's importance and the strategic location of Mauritius.

Furthermore, there is a rise in non-traditional security threats globally, such as climate change and cybersecurity threats, that could jeopardize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries. Additionally, balancing ethnic engagement within Mauritius, given its significant population of Indian origin, will affect decision-making by the government of Mauritius. Such challenges will arise from rapid regional and global changes, but it is the responsibility of both countries to reach a common agreement and work toward a shared vision for the future that brings mutually beneficial outcomes for both nations.

References

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DIPLOMACY WITH A DIFFERENCE: Chile’s Bold Feminist Foreign Policy

By L. M. Sachini Navodya

Having begun with Sweden’s introduction of the world’s first explicit feminist foreign policy (FFP), which was initially met with “giggles” and doubt, FFPs have gained significant traction in contemporary global affairs. A foreign policy of a country is generally how a country conducts its relations with other countries in the world. ‘Feminist’ derived from the theory of feminism refers to the stance of advocating for political, economic and social equality of all genders. An ideal working definition for an FFP would thus be a:

...policy of a state that defines its interactions with other states and movements in a manner that prioritizes gender equality and enshrines the human rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups, allocates significant resources to achieve that vision and seeks through its implementation to disrupt patriarchal and male-dominated power structures across all of its levels of influence (aid, trade, defense and diplomacy), informed by the voices of feminist activists, groups and movements.” (Clement & Thompson, n.d., p. 7)

This article thus offers an overview of the Chilean FFP.

Chile’s Feminist Foreign Policy Framework

In March 2022, the government of Gabriel Boric announced its shift towards adopting a feminist foreign policy. This was followed by the official presentation of Chile’s FFP by Minister Alberto van Klaveren, the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Gloria de la Fuente and the Under Secretary of International Economic Relations, Claudia Sanhueza.

As an extension of the government’s emphatic focus on human rights, the novel policy attempts to establish gender equality as a guiding principle in the work arena of the Foreign Affairs Ministry instead of merely relegating the responsibility to smaller departments. Often known as a ‘living document’, the FFP was portrayed by the Gloria de la Fuente “as a strategy of international insertion in accordance with the challenges posed by the global agenda” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 2023, para. 2).

With progressive track record of gender mainstreaming with initiatives such as: the inclusion of gender related clauses in trade agreements; establishment of a feminist government with 14 ministers, out of the 24, being women, and the 2020 Global Trade and Gender Agreement (GTAGA) between Chile, Canada, New Zealand, Columbia, Mexico and Peru, as depicted in Figure 01, the policy promotes participation, inclusion, transversality and intersectionality under the 8 priority themes of: Strengthening Democracy; Empowerment and Representation; Women, Peace and Security (WPS); Trade and Gender; Climate Change; Science; Technology and Innovation; and Healthcare (The Gender Security Project, n.d.):

Figure 01 Chilean Feminist Foreign Policy Framework

Note. The image is an AI generated image portraying the four areas promoted by the Chilean FFP and the 8 priority themes.

According to the Gender Security Project (n.d.), the policy becomes participatory and inclusive since it recognizes that gender gaps are obstacles for democracies and therefore should be designed in a way that it benefits each and everyone. It becomes transversal since it aims to make the approach to gender equality a norm that would lead all areas of work and engagement of the Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, it becomes intersectional, since it recognizes the structural violence and the impact of overlapping identities that exist in the interactions between various genders in varying contexts.

What measures have been taken to put the policy into practice?

Various measures have been initiated at the institutional level to ensure that the benefits of the gender-sensitive framework would extend from the local institutional level to the international level. Portraying progressive signals of a successful policy implementation, it established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to weigh the outcomes of the measures taken. Having recognized the flaws of predecessors who had adopted feminist foreign policies without follow-up mechanisms, a Gender Affairs Division was established by the Foreign Ministry to oversee the implementation of the policy.

In addition, Chile also dedicated a website to track the progress while ensuring regularly updated information and explanatory materials and clearly communicated monitoring mechanisms.

The Minister further signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Gender Equality Seal for Public Institutions of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which seeks to establish a framework for collaboration in this area. As a part of this cooperation the action plan would be resumed following the identification of the gender gaps existing within the institution. As the final phase of the program, a certification will be issued after the final evaluation recognizing the Under Secretariat as one conforming with the gender equality standards which acts as a cornerstone for the success of the FFP.

Efforts have also been extended to increase the count of women in embassies while acknowledging that the feminist foreign policy agenda extends beyond numbers (Winter, 2023). Furthermore, for the purpose of ensuring the continuity of the policy while promoting greater women’s participation in decision-making spaces, the policy has also proposed the establishment of an Advisory Committee of Experts which will provide strategic advice to the authorities to reach progress on parity by 2030.

Why is the Chilean FFP significant?

With its feminist policy, Chile has become the first South American country to have adopted an FFP. Apart from this, several historical and structural factors portray the significance of the policy. With a history of being governed by conservative and centrist parties which resisted progressive gender policies and even left-leaning administrations often contesting such policies and its history of authoritarianism with the military dictatorship of Pinochet that involved severe suppression of women, it is surprising for a left-wing government to push for gender mainstreaming at an international level.

The FFP is also a significant departure from the country's conservative backdrop with the Catholic church having a strong influence on Chilean politics and society, particularly on abortion and reproductive rights. It is also a departure from the strong machismo culture in Chilean society with the persistence of gender-based violence, wage gaps and limited political representation of women.

The adoption of the feminist policy is also a shift from Chile’s traditionally pragmatic and trade focused foreign policy which prioritized economic interests over social justice. This shift thus suggests a redefinition of national priorities, emphasizing human rights and gender justice alongside trade and diplomacy.

What challenges lie ahead for the Chilean FFP?

Despite the progressive efforts, the Chilean FFP also faces certain obstacles. Chile would have to face challenges in the implementation of the policy when conducting its trade and diplomacy with non-feminist regimes like China and West Asian nations with which it has strong economic ties.

Furthermore, given Chile’s unsatisfactory gender equality status in the domestic arena especially in relation to high rates of femicide, wage gaps and lack of comprehensive reproductive rights, there lies a possibility of the creation of a policy paradox when advocating for feminist principles in its foreign policy. This scenario is furthermore highlighted with the statement of the Under Secretary Gloria de la Fuente which emphasized that despite the progress achieved overtime, the rate of women ambassadors in 2023 was only 30% (Winter, 2023), far from reaching parity.

The policy could also face backlash from conservative segments ranging from the opposition parties to businesses to the general public who believe feminist policies to be ideological rather than strategic.

In addition, given the inconsistency of many global FFPs which were criticized for being symbolic rather than substantive, Chile has the challenge of proving its commitment, ensuring that its foreign policy is not just a statement but a long-term actionable strategy supported by resources and institutional reforms.

Chile’s FFP thus marks a bold redefinition of national priorities, positioning gender equality as a fundamental pillar of diplomacy. By embedding feminist principles into international engagement, Chile is not only challenging its own historical and structural constraints but also setting a precedent for other nations. However, the success of this policy depends on its resilience against both domestic and international resistance. Its true impact will be measured by its ability to sustain long-term institutional change, bridge the gap between rhetoric and action, and navigate global complexities while maintaining its commitment to gender justice. If Chile succeeds, it will not only transform its own diplomatic landscape but also inspire a new global standard for inclusive and equitable international relations.

References

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. (2024, March 4). Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents Chile’s feminist foreign policy and announces new ambassadors. https://www.minrel.gob.cl/news/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-presents-chile-s-feminist-foreign-policy-and

The Gender Security Project. (n.d.). Feminist foreign policy – Chile. https://www.gendersecurityproject.com/feminist-foreign-policy-countries/chile

Thompson, L., & Clement, R. (2019). Defining feminist foreign policy. International Center for Research on Women. https://www.icrw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICRW_DefiningFeministForeignPolicy_Brief_Revised_v5_WebReady.pdf

Winter, B. (2023, December 19). A spotlight on Chile’s feminist foreign policy. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/a-spotlight-on-chiles-feminist-foreign-policy/

China's Rising Status as a Mediator

 By Trivan Annakkarage

A mediator is often a neutral and respected third-party that aims to resolve prolonged disputes. In the context of International Relations, these prolonged disputes are usually associated between governments (of either two or more nation-states) or it may even be internal disputes within a nation-state, between its government and non-state actors such as secessionist movements, drug cartels, trade unions or even fundamentalist organizations. In all these instances, it is the public that suffer, and prolonged disputes would result in conflicts where the suffering is passed down to future generations thus fueling more resentment and complications. Hence, mediators are vital to bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table to agree on peaceful solutions.  

In China, mediation has a strong connection to the country’s three main religious philosophies namely Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism. Mediation is a practice that is considered as a means to preserve social harmony and relationships thus leading to social stability and inclusive development of societies. During its imperial period, China intervened as a mediator in international disputes. Examples include the Tang Dynasty (618-907) resolving disputes between nomadic groups in Central Asia to prevent potential disruptions to the Silk Route and during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) where Admiral Zheng He intervened to resolve internal disputes in the Malacca Sultanate. However, as technologically advanced European colonial powers and Imperial Japan overpowered Imperial China, Beijing gradually lost its leverage to act as a decisive mediator in international conflicts. With China entering its Century of Humiliation (1839-1945), its status as an international mediator gradually diminished.                     

During the Cold War (1947-1991), the United States and the Soviet Union intervened as mediators in several international disputes. Examples include United States’ role as a mediator in the Camp David Accords of 1978 that resulted in the normalization of Israel-Egypt relations and the Tashkent Declaration of 1965 which was mediated by the Soviet Union that marked the end of the Indo-Pakistani War which broke-out that year. However, the role of a mediator was not solely limited to the superpowers at the time because countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also acted as decisive mediators. The Algiers Accords of 1981 mediated by Algeria saw the United States and Iran amicably ending the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981. Notably, the Colombo Proposals of 1962 which were jointly mediated by six NAM countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic) paved the way to end the Sino-Indian War which took place that year.     

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party maintained a non-interventionist foreign policy into the affairs of other nation-states. It could be argued that this policy was beneficial because in 1971, the majority of countries voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) that recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the UN.

However, China did directly intervene in the affairs of other neighbouring countries only when there was a perceived threat to its sovereignty. Examples include direct intervention on the North Korean side in the Korean War of 1950-1953 and providing intelligence to North Vietnam in the Vietnam War of 1955-1975. These actions were a result of China’s determination to limit the influence of foreign powers in its neighbourhood – a key factor that would determine China’s rise as a mediator in the 21^st century.  

After the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 (between America’s Nixon Administration and Mao’s Government in China) followed by Beijing adopting the reform and opening up policy in 1978, China was on its path to becoming the factory of the world. As China reaped financial benefits from these initiatives it was vital for Beijing to develop and maintain strong economic links with many countries that invested and imported Chinese manufactured goods. This strong focus on economic development distanced China being involved in geopolitical tensions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. 

As the 21^st century unfolded, and with China overtaking Japan as the second largest economy in the world in 2010 (during the Presidency of Hu Jintao) followed by President Xi Jinping unveiling China’s monumental vision to resurrect the Silk Route via the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) three years later, it was evident that China was on its path to becoming a prospective global power. Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, it was a necessity for China to expand its footprint around the world. Nevertheless, for Beijing, it is paramount that China’s global image is not tarnished in the process as a positive force in the world. Hence it could be assessed that the relatively lesser negative historical baggage (associated with colonizing countries), and being a vital country in the global value chain, has benefitted China because its growing influence is both acknowledged and respected at the same time by many state and non-state actors. Hence, such a global standing permits China to engage in the affairs of mediating international disputes – complimenting Beijing’s commitment to preserve China’s image as a positive force in the world.    

However, as revealed by political scientist, Niklas Swanström (Executive Director, Sweden’s Institute for Security Development & Policy), mediation was an area that the People’s Republic of China had lack of knowledge and experience. Hence, before venturing into this space, China acted with caution. As highlighted by Helena Lagarda (Lead Analyst, Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies) China has engaged in low-key mediation in the Korean peninsula (since 2003) and in the conflict between Sudan-South Sudan (from 2008-2011). Although these mediation efforts have not resulted in successes, it was a testing ground for China to familiarise the art of mediation and learn how to secure its interest while maintaining its public image in the process.

These harbinger efforts to China’s rise as a mediator could be elaborated as follows. Facilitating between the United States (including its allies in the region - Japan and South Korea) and North Korea (about its nuclear weapons programme) placed China as a crucial stakeholder in this dispute. Hence as noted by Swanström, China’s mediation has prevented North Korea from reaching out to Russia for security guarantees that would have undermined China’s status in the region. With regard to Sudan and South Sudan, by intervening in the conflict, China has been able to secure its oil and mining contracts in both countries along with maintaining amicable relations – despite prevailing diplomatic tensions between Sudan and South Sudan over oil revenue.    

By the time BRI was formally announced in 2013, China had reasonably been exposed to the art of mediation. Since peaceful and stable nation-states and regions are vital to BRI’s success, the need to resolve conflicts in various regions along the land and maritime routes soon became a necessity if China wished to realise BRI. Therefore, BRI could be argued as a reason for China’s rising status as a mediator.    

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or commonly referred to as the Iranian Nuclear Deal) could be argued as a notable commitment by China in a multilateral mediation effort. Despite the United States withdrawing from the agreement in 2018 (during the first Trump Administration), China together with Russia stood firm with Iran. Regardless of repudiating the conditions under JCPOA, this resulted in Iran continuing cordial relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and not acting in isolation – a result that would have been detrimental to the stability of West Asia and ongoing BRI projects in the region.  

Given how difficult it is for the two nuclear-armed South Asian countries to agree on being part of a regional security body, China played a crucial mediating role to admit both India and Pakistan as members to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2018. As argued by Samuel Ramani (Associate Fellow, Britain’s Royal United Services Institute) in spite of close ties with Islamabad, Beijing is aware that for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC; a land route part of BRI) to bear fruit, it is essential to have New Delhi on its side because the proposed corridor cuts through the disputed region of Kashmir.

In 2022, Xi announced China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Boao Forum held that year. GSI is inspired by the concept of ‘indivisible security’. This rejects the idea of isolating national security of one country and emphasizes that one country’s national security is linked to other countries. Therefore, mutual dependence on security is the best way forward to create peace and stability in the world.    

With GSI now being part of the Chinese Communist Party’s policy, China’s most recent successful mediation effort was restoring diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023. According to Amrita Jash (Assistant Professor, India’s Manipal Academy of High Education), this achievement by China is as significant as the US-led mediation triumphs such as the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Abraham Accords of 2020. Regardless of being the present super-power, it is unfortunate that the United States was unable to amend relations between these two countries. It could be argued that it is primarily due to Washington’s interest in fostering tensions so that Saudi Arabia remains a market that imports American state-of-the art weapons to defend its borders and immediate neighbourhood from Iran. On the other hand, China’s goal to enhance international trade in general via BRI makes inclusivity easier hence delivery of mediation efforts.

As stated by Wang Huiyao (Founder, Centre for China & Globalization), China is able to leverage itself as a mediator due to its strong economic relations. China is the largest trading partner for India, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. This makes it relatively easier to project its soft power on disputing parties. China’s ongoing efforts include mediating conflicts between Russia versus Ukraine and Israel versus Palestine. Even among these countries China emerges as one of their largest (or even largest) trading partners. In 2023, taking note of China’s rising status as a mediator, French President Emmanuel Macron urged Xi to convince President Vladimir Putin to end its conflict with Ukraine. According Galia Lavi and Oded Eran (senior research personnel, Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies) the US-Israel bond would be challenged if the people of West Asia (including Israelis) begin to increasingly view China positively via its infrastructure projects in the region.     

As revealed by the British academic Hugo Slim, unlike the United States and its European allies, China does not impose liberal ideologies when mediating conflicts. What gives the Chinese Government leverage as a mediator is its deep understanding of the historic context of the dispute and being able to respect and work with governments that have different ideologies.       

As much as it seems that China focuses on fostering trade via BRI as means to resolve conflicts, in the process Beijing is also trying to gradually balance Washington’s influence. Moreover, with the United States shifting its focus to domestic affairs, there is opportunity for China to fill the vacancy of a mediator. In the process and in the words of Slim, China wishes to “de-occidentalise” the approach to mediation. According to Samir Bhattacharya (Associate Fellow, India’s Observer Research Foundation), China’s mediation follows a careful mix of three 3Is – interference, influence and intervention from which creative involvement is developed.

The following map depicts China’s past and current efforts in the world. 

Source: Taken from Helena Legarda’s article titled, China wades into the Israel-Palestine conflict once more https://merics.org/en/comment/china-wades-israel-palestine-conflict-once-more

Nevertheless, there are several factors that challenge China’s rising status as a mediator. They include China’s dispute over the South China Sea, China’s attempts to incorporate Taiwan into its sovereign territory and China’s border disputes with India. As pointed out by the Brazilian Journalist, Fábio Galão, major criticism about China’s mediation is the lack of concern to hold conflicting parties accountable on human rights.

Traditionally, the country focuses strongly on working with state-actors rather than with non-state actors such as civil society organizations. This could be the reason why human rights and other similar concerns take a back-seat in the mediation agenda. Moreover, as the 21^st century unravels, mediation on topics such as climate change, migration and tariffs seem to take centre stage along with geopolitical tensions. This would further complicate mediation efforts. How well China navigates these issues and developments would depend on the Chinese Communist Party’s commitment to GSI and its creative involvement in mediation.        

References

Bhattacharya, S. (2024, August 7). China's conflict resolution mechanism in Africa: Mediation with Chinese characteristics. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-s-conflict-resolution-mechanism-in-africa-mediation-with-chinese-characteristics

Galão, F. (2023, May 9). How China has become the new mediator in global geopolitics. The Rio Times. https://www.riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/new-multipolar-world-order/how-china-has-become-the-new-mediator-in-global-geopolitics/

Huiyao, W. (2024, August 16). Why China is becoming a top choice mediator for global conflicts. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3274330/why-china-becoming-top-choice-mediator-global-conflicts

Jash, A. (2023, June 23). Saudi-Iran deal: A test case of China’s role as an international mediator. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/

Lavi, G., & Eran, O. (2023, April 4). Could China serve as an international mediator? Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48747

Legarda, H. (2018, August 22). China as a conflict mediator. MERICS. https://merics.org/en/comment/china-conflict-mediator

Ramani, S. (2018, July 9). Can China mediate between Pakistan and India? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/can-china-mediate-between-pakistan-and-india/

Slim, H. (2024). Mediation in the world and wars of the 2020s. Still Time to Talk. Conciliation Resources. https://www.c-r.org/accord/still-time-talk/mediation-world-and-wars-2020s

Swanström, N. (2024, June 5). China as a mediator in North Korea: Facilitating dialogues or mediating conflicts? The Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2024/china-as-a-mediator-in-north-korea-facilitating-dialogues-or-mediating-conflicts/

 

FROM DIPLOMACY TO DEVELOPMENT: Decoding Sri Lankan President Dissanayake’s UAE Visit

By Sachin Hassim

Sri Lanka and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have maintained strong diplomatic and economic ties since the establishment of formal relations in 1979. Over the decades, both nations have engaged in high-level visits and signed numerous agreements and MOUs, fostering collaboration across various sectors. The UAE has consistently supported Sri Lanka during critical periods, such as the conflict with the LTTE and the tsunami aftermath, providing emergency aid and assistance to strength Sri Lanka's economic resilience.

Impact of the New Leftist Government

Sri Lanka elected Anura Kumara Dissanayake as its 9^th President on 21^st September 2024, ushering in a new chapter in Sri Lanka, which would undoubtedly impact foreign relations. As the first leftist President, he has tried to be saner and more prudent in foreign policy, such as expansion of strategic alliances, economic recovery and partnerships. Regarding the UAE as a key player in Sri Lanka’s development journey, his administration sought to expand diplomatic and commercial relations beyond conventional partners.

President Dissanayake visited the United Arab Emirates on the invitation of President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan from February 10–13, 2025. The visit included attending the World Government Summit 2025 which provided him a significant opportunity to discuss high-level bilateral issues, highlight Sri Lanka's economic vision, and look into new investment prospects.

The focus of discussions with the UAE leadership was trade, tourism, and investments, to align with the country's broader strategy of attracting foreign direct investment and forging economic partnerships. The visit put a spotlight on renewed engagement with Middle Eastern economies in highly desirable sectors, ranging from infrastructure, energy, and financial services. Sri Lanka, within the new government, views the ongoing diplomatic outreach to the UAE as a pragmatic, forward-looking effort ensuring that bilateral ties are reinforced in support of the country’s longer-term development objectives.

Key Highlights of President Dissanayake’s UAE Visit

·         Speech at the World Government Summit

Dissanayake’s speech at the World Government Summit 2025 was a pivotal moment in reestablishing Sri Lanka on the international stage under the new leftist administration. In a speech to world leaders, policy makers and industry experts, he stressed the importance of multilateral governance to the issues of global economic disparities, climate change and technological change.

Dissanayake highlighted that it is imperative that countries work together across borders as they tackle significant global issues. Whether it was climate change or economic instability or the disruption of rapid technological advancement, he argued persuasively for nations working in unison rather than isolation. His vision illuminated that in an interconnected world, no country, large or small, can afford to do it alone.

The importance of equal economic policies that empower developing countries was a major focus of his speech. According to Dissanayake, rising economies need fair access to financial resources, trade opportunities, and technical breakthroughs in order to achieve true global stability. He urged world leaders to make sure that the base of global economic frameworks continues towards sustainable growth.

·         High Level Bilateral Meetings

An important turning point in Sri Lanka-UAE ties was reached when Dissanayake met with Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the UAE's vice president and prime minister, beginning in a new era of diplomatic and economic cooperation. Dissanayake encouraged investors based in the United Arab Emirates to take advantage on Sri Lanka's new leftist government's economic recovery plan during the discussions, which centered on economic regeneration. A major item on the agenda was trade and export clients, with both presidents looking into strategies to increase Sri Lanka's exports of tea, clothing, seafood, and gemstones to the United Arab Emirates.

The discussions also focused on the growth of tourism, utilizing Sri Lanka's natural beauty and rich cultural legacy to attract more tourists from the United Arab Emirates. The signing of the Sri Lanka-UAE Investment Protection Agreement on February 12, 2025, was a significant outcome of this summit. Stronger legal protection for investors from both nations is provided by this agreement, which is anticipated to increase trust in important areas like digital economy initiatives, renewable energy, and tourism infrastructure. This renewed cooperation creates a solid foundation for mutual prosperity and sustainable progress by cultivating long-term business partnerships.

·         Strengthening Relations across the World via Bilateral Meetings

In addition to the relations between Sri Lanka and UAE, Dissanayake met prominent world leaders at the World Government Summit 2025 to bring attention to economic growth and diplomatic relations strategy of Sri Lanka. During their meeting, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Dissanayake concentrated on the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and member nations bilateral trade relationships and how to enhance these economic relations.

In the meeting with the Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Ahmed Abdullah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Dissanayake brought attention to the need for better regulation of over 120,000 Sri Lankan expatriate employees in Kuwait and discussed with Al-Sabah how to improve social welfare and job opportunities for participants. Similarly, his discussion with Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister focused on expanding trade in agriculture, seafood, and textiles, promoting tourism through direct flight connectivity, and deepening investment partnerships for mutual economic progress.

The meeting with former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, revolved around technical knowledge in agriculture, climate resilience, and governance changes. Blair emphasized international support for Sri Lanka's progressive policy agenda by pledging to send a team of experts to the country to help with sustainability and economic development projects. Through these meetings, Sri Lanka maintains its position as an active participant in international diplomatic and economic issues, guaranteeing sustained expansion and strategic partnerships.

·         Partnerships in Business and Technology: Bringing International Investments

Dissanayake met the CEOs from global tech companies such as Roblox, Oracle, Alibaba, and Dow Jones, highlighting Sri Lanka's dedication to innovation-driven development and digital transformation. He acknowledged the transformative impact of technology in propelling economic progress. In the meantime, talks with Roblox centered on digital innovation projects and AI-driven education initiatives, establishing Sri Lanka as a potential participant in the digital economy. Dissanayake discussed the implementation of AI-powered public sector reforms in his discussions with Oracle, with the goal of improving efficiency and governance via technology.

By establishing these partnerships, Sri Lanka is actively establishing its future as a regional center for technology, utilizing innovation to provide job and economic possibilities and promote long-term digital development.

A Milestone Visit for Sri Lanka’s New Foreign Policy

A significant change in Sri Lanka's foreign policy under the new leftist government happened with Dissanayake's visit to the United Arab Emirates. This visit adopted a bold, varied approach, bolstering relationships with the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and international business leaders, in contrast to previous strategies that mostly relied on traditional alliances. The message was obvious: Sri Lanka welcomes investment, cooperation, and innovation.

What’s Next?

By using foreign relationships to stabilize the economy, draw in investors, and open up new opportunities for its citizens, this visit has established a strong foundation for Sri Lanka's economic recovery. Sri Lanka is forging a new direction in diplomacy under Dissanayake's guidance, one that promotes innovation, inclusivity, and sustainability. The world is currently watching as Sri Lanka reshapes its destiny on the international scene due to the inspiration provided by this historic visit.