Britons decisively voted to end their 43-year membership with the European Union on the 23rd June 2016, effectively severing the UK’s economic, legal and labour market connectivity with the continent (BBC News,2016). As the UK completes a decade post-referendum, it can be argued that Britain is poorer, less influential, and more divided than it was in 2016.
This essay explores how the origins of Britain's troubles predate the consequences of the results of a single vote. In fact, this essay hopes to explore how Brexit was not the silver bullet its proponents were hoping for - a pivot to the Commonwealth and the Anglosphere in the hope for markets beyond the EU has arguably backfired as this strategy has come to terms with geopolitical, geographic and cultural realities. On the other hand, the topic of immigration - which garnered tremendous attention - an anxiety that ran deep in British society, which arguably was the key reason for the referendum, has indeed produced the opposite of what many “leave” voters wanted. Thus, this essay examines how the above two factors contributed to Britain’s woes a decade later before considering what Britain's future might be in the decade ahead.
A laggard of growth
A decade after the leave vote, economists are measuring the barometers of the economy to move past speculation. Measurements published by researchers concluded that Brexit has indeed become a burden to the UK economy over a structural drag rather than a permanent one-off shock. As the UK economy is no longer permeable to the EU free-market, the economic productivity of the UK is said to reduce by 4% year-on-year. In contrast, researchers claim this reduction in productivity is predicted not be as drastic had the UK remained in the EU (UK in a Changing Europe, 2026).
Nowhere is this rift more prevalent than the trade of merchandise and services across the channel from the UK to mainland Europe: it is estimated that exports from the UK are 10% to 15% lesser now than in the past. Key reasons quoted are complicated customs declaration forms, rules-of-origin paperwork and sanitary checks on all merchandise exports - this would not have been the case without Brexit as smaller to medium size UK exporters are unable to absorb legal and administrative costs as a result of these new non-tariff barriers (UK in a Changing Europe, 2026).
Brexit: The Straw that broke the Camel’s back
One must be forgiven if they treated Brexit to be the sole reason for all of Britain’s malaise. However, one must closely examine the destruction left by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 on the British economy. It is no secret that London is arguably the world’s premier banking and finance hub, this meant that the UK economy was overly exposed to the crash of 2008. What followed the GFC of 2008 was a brutal austerity package delivered by the Conservative government’s exchequer led by then-chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne - leading to widespread spending cuts throughout the 2010’s crippling public services such as the NHS whilst wages declined year on year (Global Banking and Finance,2026). Thus, one may deduce that sustained cuts to public spending left UK public services with broken systems, a trajectory which each UK government since was neither able to reverse, reform nor change.
It is true that Britons were experiencing their real wages decline year-on-year since the GFC of 2008 leading to a stagnation of British wealth and standard of living compared to their OECD peers. Brexit, therefore, is a compounding of the malaise rather than the cause.
A lack of interest
Proponents of Brexit argued that leaving the common market would inherently mean Britain taking control of how they do business with the rest of the world, thus opening up the market for and to emerging economies of Asia and the Americas and harnessing the partnerships with the old Commonwealth nations. An article published by the London School of Economics (2024) explains what the British government’s strategy was “Global Britain” - which one may even argue is a strategy to pivot away from the European Union and onto Asia and the Americas. The same study concluded that this strategy, a decade on, has simply failed (LSE, 2024).
The UK-Australia trade agreement was the first of many trade deals negotiated and ratified, and followed by another with New Zealand - however, given both countries are; a) geographical distance from the UK, b) their existing trade agreements with Asian neighbours and most importantly c) both Australia and New Zealand having very successful agriculture exports, meant that the UK did not, in essence, get what it hoped for. In fact, the Centre for European Reform (n.d.) analysed that the agreements between these countries would only add to the British economy very marginally with 0.008% from Australia and, with 0.003% from New Zealand, over a period of time till 2035.
India, the former jewel in the Empire’s crown, is a comprehensive negotiator. The potential trade deal with India was trumpeted by the then-government of the UK as the largest prize of the Commonwealth strategy. However, talks have dragged on for years and the yields of this process have been significantly disproportionate for the UK - said to only add approximately 0.2% to the UK GDP (Centre for European Reform, n.d.) While the trade deal with the United States has not yet taken place in full, the UK’s major trade partners with or without Brexit remain to be EU member states (LSE,2024).
Immigration, not trade
Brexit has often perplexed experts and economists in Britain and across the world, and one would be forgiven if they asked “So, why did Brexit happen?” The EU’s policy on free movement within member countries have become a lightning rod in the UK for quite some time, and the ensuing economic malaise has cast a spell away from the actual problem the many jobs taken by new faces across Britain - in low skills sectors like fruit picking and gig-workers to doctors and nurses in the NHS. This has undoubtedly caused anxieties about wages, housing and public services and above all, national identity amongst Britons (UK in a Changing Europe, 2026).
One would be mistaken to believe, or perceive that anxieties about Britain’s immigration woes were limited to the precariat class, however a CNN report on the tenth anniversary of Brexit (2026) sheds light on a software developer named Geriant who voted “leave”, constantly citing that Britain did not have control over its borders due to EU laws and was anxious about what the impact would be to the NHS and other public services if inundated with foreigners, despite the decades of long austerity.
However, it can be argued that Brexit did not usher in the desired outcomes. “Taking back control” paved the way for over 550,000 immigrants, a far greater number than the approximately 250,000 in the pre-Brexit era, resulting in a peak in 2023 with approximately 950,000 (CNN Business, 2026). Essentially, intra and inter-EU migration was replaced by non-EU migration from the former Commonwealth, Latin-America and Africa who were needed to replace Britain’s ageing workforce.
As of 2025 and 2026, Britain’s net migration levels are down, but this is thanks to tough migration policies adopted by both the Conservative as well as Labour governments and not Brexit (Office for National Statistics, 2026; Full Fact,2026).
And the decade ahead?
It can be understood that Brexit did not deliver the intended results, and in fact, the reverse occurred in relation to immigration and nothing at all when it comes to international trade. Nonetheless, the investment bank Goldman Sachs (2026) reported that Britain may have weathered the worst of the Brexit malaise. The Labour-led government since 2024 has pursued a long-term reform agenda and has made inroads to iron-out any friction that might have existed with partners (Idea Farm,2026).
However, the long-term damage caused by years of austerity and Brexit, goes beyond the economy. Today, Britain is divided, more than ever whilst voters have become increasingly impatient with both the Conservative and Labour parties. This is evident through the recent polls which ensured wins for the far-right Reform UK party led by Nigel Farage, arguably one of the chief architects of the “leave” campaign (CGTN, 2026). While there is a renewed campaign to rejoin the EU via the “National Rejoin March” - this has been limited to urban areas like London, Manchester and are only popular amongst young urban university-educated voters.
The promises made by the leave campaign clearly did not bear fruit - Global Britain via the Commonwealth did not yield desired results, and the debate on immigration got even hotter. The case for Global Britain is weak, and is a hard nut to crack - years of austerity led to a stagnation of wages and a sharp decline in the standard of living. Brexit was simply the straw that broke the camel’s back. Once, the mighty British Empire - the greatest ever known to mankind, struggles today to lead a delegation to successfully negotiate a trade deal, struggles today to keep social cohesion and unity within its borders while the Commonwealth moves on from the days of the Empire. A decade on, the UK finds itself at a crossroad, no closer to a settled answer to the question it once asked its citizens.
References
BBC News (2016) EU Referendum Results, http://www.bbc.com.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results
Centre for European Reform (n.d.) Weighed down by gravity: UK trade policy after Brexit, https://www.cer.eu/insights/weighed-down-gravity-uk-trade-policy-after-brexit
CGTN (2026), Analysis: 6 PMs in a decade - Why is UK stuck in political turmoil?, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2026-06-23/Analysis-6-PMs-in-a-decade-Why-is-UK-stuck-in-political-turmoil--1Od38p1ro5i/p.html
CNN Business (2026), Ten years on: How Brexit has impacted the UK economy, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/06/22/business/brexit-anniversary-uk-economy-impact-intl
FULL FACT (2025), How many migrants come to the UK?, https://fullfact.org/immigration/net-migration-to-the-uk/
Global Banking and Finance (2026), UK political instability: PM Turnover and Economic Challenges, https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/anyone-fix-britain-regular-change-pm-symptom-uks-malaise/
Goldman Sachs Investment Research (2026), UK - The Economic Cost of Brexit, Ten Years On, https://www.gspublishing.com/content/research/en/reports/2026/06/24/487d9f10-f31c-4e8d-ac71-b248ce8a8aaf.html
Idea Farm (2026), Brexit 10 Years On: What’s worked, what hasn’t, what’s next?, https://theideafarm.com/markets/brexit-10-years-on-whats-worked-what-hasnt-whats-next/
LSE (2024) Global Britain has failed - what next? British Politics and Policy Blog, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/global-britain-has-failed-what-next/
Office for National Statistics (2026), Long-term international migration, provisional:year ending December 2025, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingdecember2025
UK in a Changing Europe (2026), Brexit ten years on: the economy, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-ten-years-on-the-economy/
