The foreign policy of a
country, whilst being an extension of its domestic policy, is chiefly the manner
in which it deals, responds and cooperates with the international community. Hardly
set it stone, the policy and policy making process evolve according to
circumstance and situation. Thus it is of added significance when the country
formulating that policy is a relatively small state, attempting to balance its
policy towards two of the largest states in the world. Adapting to developments
at the national, regional and global level, while strategizing for the future, remains
at the core of decision making.
Sri Lanka’s relations
with the global community date back centuries, with the importance of the
country’s location being paramount. Apparent through the manner in which other
countries have sought to maintain ties, Ceylon has from the times of the
ancient kings, and the special envoys they dispatched to foreign courts, to the
heightened commercial connectivity along the trading routes and through to the
colonial period, when three of the most powerful empire builders of their time,
sought to ‘engage’ with the country, in more ways than one, experienced a foreign
policy that has been complex, competitive, and colourful to say the least.
From independence
onwards, the country has striven to be ‘a friend to all and enemy to none’ in
the international community, yet faced trying and decisive moments when
decisions were taken, or forced to be taken, owing to a plethora of factors. A
noteworthy degree of this engagement and these decisive moments have pivoted on
relations with China and India.
With China, from the
recognition accorded by D. S. Senanayake in 1950, to the Rubber-Rice Pact during
the premiership of Dudley Senanayake in 1952, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s
decision to establish diplomatic relations in 1957, Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s
engagement in shuttle diplomacy at the time of border tensions between China
and India in 1962, and her close ties with Mao Tse Tung and Chou en Lai, as
well as the diplomatic engagement of all Presidents from J. R. Jayewardene to
Maithripala Sirisena, have seen a steady, sometimes meteoric rise in
connectivity, as during the period from 2005 to 2015, with even Xi Jinping visiting
Sri Lanka in 2014. The Chinese stake in the development drive is high in Sri
Lanka. These are not funds that China chose to freely pour into the Sri Lankan
economy, but instead loans that Sri Lanka sought. Hence while China looks to expand
its sphere of influence globally and finds a ready partner in Sri Lanka, it is
of paramount importance to note that Sri Lanka reached out to China and that country
reciprocated. Terms and conditions that accompany such finances, and through
them prosperity, obviously come at a cost, as would be the case with all loans.
India, given its
geographic proximity has remained a critical factor in policy formulation.
Whilst independence itself in 1948 is attributed to the freedom struggle on the
island, the departure of the British from India remains a pivotal factor that
is often overlooked. The signing of vital agreements with the British to
safeguard defence and external relations by D. S. Senanayake owing to his
anxiety of having to ward off any untoward action, to the strong bond of
friendship between Nehru and the Bandaranaikes, which continued through Indira
Gandhi and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the Sirima-Shastri Pact of 1964, claiming the
island of Kachchativu in 1974, the training of rebels by Mrs Gandhi and her deep
dislike of J. R. Jayewardene as well as the infamous humanitarian air
intervention by India in the north of Sri Lanka and the signing of the
Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987 between Rajiv Gandhi and J. R. Jayewardene, the saga
that was the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the action of Ranasinghe Premadasa,
the closeness of relations during the presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike
Kumaratunga, the straining of them in the second term of Mahinda Rajapaksa, and
the intimacy of ties post 2015 with Narendi Modi having visited Sri Lanka twice
in two years, have all seen the formulation of policy with India remaining a
cornerstone in the foreign policy framework.
29th July
2017 marks three decades since the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, the
assault on Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the first steps towards the
establishment of the Provincial Council system. Politics remained at the core
as India, her coterie of diplomats and abundance of politicians from Tamil Nadu
to New Delhi took umbrage at developments in the island.
Reflecting on the
period, the Oxford educated, political heavyweight Lalith Athulathmudali once observed
that ‘the Indians came in only because we were winning. …Their purpose was to
use our acute problem, which they helped to intensify, in order to get us to
change our policy on several points.’ A domestic issue had spiraled into an
international one as global attention turned to the island with the riots of
July 1983. As refugees sought asylum overseas the issue ceased to be domestic. Whilst
Jayewardene sought the support of the United States of America and the Western
world, especially through his open market policies, his tackling of relations
with his immediate neighbour, remained critical.
Yet his attempting to
cooperate with Rajiv Gandhi, especially in light of the already deep-rooted
involvement of India, even won them both a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize
in 1988 but which was eventually secured by the UN Peace Keeping Forces. From
1987 to date relations with India have soured and improved at varied times,
signaling change yet the abiding factor has been the need for positive
relations owing to geography. Elections and their results do not move the
island nation from its geographic positioning, and hence, neighbours do not
change. Jayewardene and almost all his successors have understood the need to
work with a country they wouldn’t be able to survive without.
In the last three
decades China has experienced a steady rise as a global power, marking her
presence on the world stage and surging ahead of countries like India, in a
gamut of areas. Interestingly the thirtieth anniversary of the Indo-Lanka
Accord coincides, with the signing of a landmark agreement with China over the
Hambantota port, which lies in close proximity to international sea lanes and
is one of the many assets Sri Lanka possesses.
Once again we are
reminded that foreign policy remains an extension of domestic policy. Domestic
compulsions continue to drive foreign policy and its formulation as Sri Lanka,
having undergone a virtual stagnation of economy growth and development,
sacrificing prosperity and losing out on the opportunities due to the conflict,
is attempting today to regain her position in the region and the world at
large. Countries like Singapore which took a cue from then Ceylon have raced
ahead and are in the vanguard of global affairs. South East Asia, since
adopting a collaborative mechanism in 1967 is reaping immense benefits fifty
years later, while others in South Asia are trying to ride the wave of the One
Belt One Road initiative of China.
Sri Lanka’s choice to
proceed with the signing of the Agreement with China, to service the debt and
ensure usage of facilities the country possesses, is judicious, to say the
least. The agreement is a lease and needs to be understood as such. At the same
time the efforts to lease the Trincomalee oil tanks in the East to India
indicate the ability of a small island nation to balance her foreign policy.
Satisfying two global giants at the same time, involves massive effort,
dedication and strategy. Evidenced through the action of the Sirisena - Wickremesinghe
government is that bipartisan cooperation can bring about change, which would
transcend into prosperity of the island and her people.
Foreign policy is therefore not
set in stone, yet strategy remains a crucial element if a state is to benefit from
location, resources and infrastructure. The maturity of the process of policy
making makes it clear that irrespective of developments in China or India, and
despite the international machinations enveloping these two countries, Sri
Lanka, her leaders and people, need to focus on a strategic, Sri Lanka-first
policy through which the state’s interests are safeguarded, sustained and promoted.
That policy needs to be set in stone.
- AWARELOGUE EDITORIAL
