In
2009, Sri Lanka defeated terrorism on its soil, ending the terrorist conflict
that claimed thousands of lives, destroyed the Sri Lankan economy and set the country
back by several decades. In the same year the country entered into partnership
with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was a milestone for the
grouping as it welcomed its first Dialogue Partner. For Sri Lanka, having ended
a ruthless conflict, it was an opportunity to share the experience and enhance
cooperation with a vital region of the world. A decade later an assessment of
this relationship indicates the vast potential, untapped areas and hitherto
unexplored prospects, for both the SCO and Sri Lanka, especially in the wake of
the Easter Sunday attacks and the rise of extremism on the island. It questions
the original rationale for gaining partnership and denotes the inherent need
for strategizing foreign policy, on the part of Sri Lanka, if the relationship
is to be strengthened and a mutually beneficial bond nurtured.
When
the Council of Heads of State met in Yekaterinburg in June 2009, it was to
implement a decision taken the year before, wherein the SCO was creating
Dialogue Partner status for ‘a state or an organisation (that) shares the goals
and principles of the SCO and wishes to establish relations of equal mutually
beneficial partnership with the Organisation’ and to accord such status ‘to a
state or an organisation who cooperates with the SCO in specific areas of
activity envisaged by the Charter and other treaty documents in the framework
of the Organisation.’
Pursuant
to the signing of the Memorandum granting Sri Lanka Dialogue Partner status in
May 2010, Russia observed that its implementation would lead to a strengthening of international
connectivity and expand spheres of interaction between the SCO member states
and Sri Lanka. This, Russia believed, would be mainly in the areas of ‘ensuring
security and stability, combating terrorism and developing economic, trade and
investment cooperation.’ A founder member of the Organisation, with whom
bilateral ties have grown since such connectivity was embarked upon in 1957, Russia
has remained an unwavering ally of Sri Lanka. The degree of cordiality, even
during the Cold War and thereafter, is evidence of the strength of the
foundation, and bodes well for the decades ahead.
China has consistently called for ‘upholding the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ of mutual trust,
mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and
pursuit of common development, in a bid to build a community of shared destiny
in the region’. President Xi Jinping highlighted the relevance of the ‘Shanghai
Spirit’ as “a guide to safeguard international fairness and justice, advocate
multilateralism and the ideal of opening, respect each other's interests,
oppose interference in other countries' internal affairs, solve disputes
through peaceful means, and boost common development with the win-win ideal.”
Collaboration through other mechanisms including the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as direct
economic partnerships have seen the building of a relationship based on
history, but one that is directly relatable to the Rubber-Rice Pact of 1952 and
the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1957.
Although Russia and China remain the key guiders of the
SCO, the role played by the four Central Asian countries, notably Kazakhstan,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan cannot be discounted. Identified
as critical for the achievement of the Asian Century, these four countries have
experienced improving economies and thereby growing prosperity. The inclusion
of India and Pakistan as the newest Members in 2017 reinvigorated the SCO, as
its geography, population, economic potential and overall power grew in leaps
and bounds, making it the largest regional organisation.
Although disturbing activities, in early 2019, raised
the propensity for doubt to rise over the decision of including these two
countries, it is in the long term, that the fruit of such action would be truly
understood. The need for all members to engage in joint all-SCO military
exercises, partake in military cooperation, as well as share intelligence,
would, in hindsight be a realization of the sentiments expressed by President
Xi at the Summit in Ufa in 2015. He called for members “to increase the
action ability, create a strong security wall in the region.” The espousal of
collective action included Xi’s emphasis on members being “more proactive in
political contacts and coordination, work out response measures and together
defend the security as well as stability in all member states of our
organization.”
Though
apparent that collective action would bode well for SCO members, it is the
impact that such action would have elsewhere, that is significant. India and
Pakistan, as members of the SCO, would be called upon to engage at varied
levels and on numerous occasions. Given that all member states must uphold the core principle of non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs,
in addition to conformity to the origin objective of creating a confidence-building forum to demilitarize
borders, India and Pakistan would recognize the potential for
themselves, of working together, for the realization of the Asian Century in
the long term, and the need to counter terror in all its forms in the immediate
to medium term. The results would be seen in their bilateral interactions and
equally importantly in the South Asian region, in a decade and a half.
Whilst
countering terrorism, extremism and separatism within its region became the raison d'être of the SCO, it didn’t limit itself to these three
‘evils’ but explored economic connectivity and the promise of closer cooperation
to enhance trade and prosperity among its member states.
In
2015, Sri Lanka sought to upgrade the relationship to Observer Status, during
the presidency of the Russian Federation, at
the High Level Conference on ‘Security and Stability in the Region of SCO’ in
Moscow.
Noting the new security challenges, including ‘illegal migration, human trafficking, drug trafficking, trans-national
organised crime and cyber-terrorism,’ all of which constitute serious threats
to regional and global security, Sri Lanka highlighted the efforts being taken
to combat this menace, as the representative informed the gathering of how the
island was being used by drug syndicates as a destination as well as a transit
point. A call that was made then, that remains relevant to date is the
need for cooperation with SCO member states to overcome and thwart such
attempts.
In January 2017, it was reported
that the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and the defence establishment
‘will in the near future finish the preparation of the legal base for
cooperation’. Auguring well for the future, it needs to be operationalised
through a process of institutionalization through which accredited legal
departments, specific arms of the military and law enforcement agencies would commence
activities of cooperation, on basis of priority and with much urgency.
A
decade after Sri Lanka became a Dialogue Partner it is prudent to reflect upon
that which has been, and comprehend the diverse, indepth role that the country
can play in and through the SCO. It must be a decision within the foreign
policy establishment to enhance relations with the SCO, specifically in areas
of countering terrorism, extremism, drug smuggling and transnational organised
crime. The role that the Foreign Ministry could play in bridging the divide
between and among law enforcement agencies and the military of Sri Lanka, with
those of the SCO member states would augur well to consolidate a strong and
timely deterrent to those engaging in such illegal activities, and more
importantly improve standards at the national level. The mutual benefit that
could be accrued to Sri Lanka remains vast.
The
Easter Sunday attacks saw the island gripped once again with violence and
mayhem, as extremists resorted to the usage of the most blatant form of terrorism
- suicide bombers. They claimed 253 lives, attempted to destroy revered shrines
and dealt a blow to the tourism industry. Three weeks later other extremist elements
resorted to rioting in parts of the island, in a bid to gain political mileage.
These are unfortunate occurrences on such a significant anniversary, as the
programmes of reconciliation had begun to bear fruit, the communities on the
island were looking ahead and the characteristics of democracy were clearly
evident.
Yet
the lesson to be learnt a decade later is that while terrorism can be quelled,
as proved by Sri Lanka in 2009, extremism is much harder to fight, owing
to the ingrained nature of this phenomenon which results in the radicalization
of individuals over and beyond the dogma of religious belief. Amidst the pain,
anguish and fear that grips society at large, Sri Lanka stands at a cross road
where a concerted effort would need to be made to abandon the far right. These attacks
will enter the annals of history not just on the island but across the
international domain as a day on which extremist elements used terror to wreck
havoc, bring death to hundreds, injure hundreds more and instill a fear
psychosis in society that will be felt for a considerable period of time.
The
impact is manifold. While the grief stricken mourn those whose lives were
ruthlessly sacrificed, the injured face the daunting task of recovery and
moving on with life amidst recollections of that bloody day, and society at large
copes with the stress and strain, it is the divisions caused that would be
the hardest to heal.
The
military’s success in curbing further attacks, identifying networks and rapid
counter action proves, once again, its ability and capacity. It is at this
juncture that Sri Lanka should be focused on building an image based on counter
terrorism expertise that may be shared within the region and beyond. With the
natural terrain within the country, the troops having first-hand experience in
battling terrorism, the military hierarchy possessing the expertise of
thwarting terror in all its forms and manifestations, contribute to a
collective process wherein Sri Lanka has much to offer. The ideal platform for
such an exercise is the SCO.
Although still
a Dialogue Partner, Sri Lanka does possess the ability to play a greater role
of engagement than it does at present. A precedent was set in 2017 when Turkey
another Dialogue Partner, was unanimously elected to preside over the SCO
Energy Club, after a proposal was made to permit all members having varied
degrees of partnership to chair the Club for a year. While Sri Lanka is also a member of the
Energy Club and would, in due course, be able to preside over its deliberations,
it is noteworthy that initiative could be taken in proposing similar
arrangements in the fields of increased military and counter-terrorism
cooperation, and intelligence sharing.
If the
main rationale for including Dialogue Partners is to be realized wherein an ‘equal
mutually beneficial partnership’ is built and cooperation engaged upon by such
countries and the ‘SCO in specific
areas of activity’, it is important that Dialogue Partners, particularly Sri
Lanka, avail the opportunity of not only contributing towards the sustenance of
the SCO but also comprehend the unique platform the SCO provides.
Validating
the partnership must not be a process left to the SCO to embark upon solely,
but one that is enthusiastically sought by Sri Lanka. In strategizing Foreign Policy
for the next decade, it is the understanding of the importance of the Sri Lanka
– SCO partnership that requires immediate attention. While the goal should be
the attainment of full membership and the prospect of closer cooperation in the
future, it is to the present that Sri Lanka must look in emphasizing the
contribution that she can make to the SCO.
The
SCO has emerged as a powerful entity within less than two decades since its
formation in 2001. Starting off as the Shanghai Five in 1996, including Kazakhstan
in 2001, and then India and Pakistan in 2017, it has evolved into a force that
is yet to exercise its muscle but one which possesses immense potential on the
world stage, and an entity to which Sri Lanka can contribute and from which the
country could gain in the years ahead, This would be possible only if foreign
policy was strategized to include the SCO as an integral organisation and not
one in which Sri Lanka maintains token partnership.
