GUEST COMMENTARY
by Sisaru Chithrasiri
While the United States of America has historically found this region
relatively difficult to influence, the United Kingdom and France has had some
luck in the region, mainly due to their colonial past. However, Britain’s influence
did not stand the test of times in her former colonies. Out of the main
colonial powers, France remains dominant in the region; culturally and
politically with French overseas territories (La France d’outre-mer) – La
Réunion and Mayotte whilst Madagascar and the Seychelles being former French
colonies. This article will examine how France is working to exert its
influence in the region and how it’s allies in the west may use it to deter
China’s rise.
As of
lately, France’s concerns in the region have been defense focused as evidenced
by the presence of several military bases in La Réunion and a 270 strong legion
detachment in Mayotte. The French have also committed to opening a military
base in the United Arab Emirates – Camp de la Paix as well as another in
Djibouti: a former French colony in the horn of Africa (Bouchard & Crumplin
2011). Since the beginning of this century, France and India enjoy warm
bilateral relations. As stated by Saint-Mézard
(2015), France’s military exercises with India began in 2001 in the areas of,
civilian nuclear technology, space programs and counterterrorism initiatives. Thus,
one can assume that the relationship between India and France is strategic,
particularly when it comes to deterring China’s influence in the region. In
fact, one may even conclude that India is desperate for closer ties with the EU
and its powerful member states. France, in this regard, understands that it is
crucial to have important strategic allies and partners in the Indian Ocean.
In comes Australia – a country that has enjoyed a significant trade
relationship with China and a western democracy in the Asian region, bordering
the Indian Ocean to its west and the Pacific Ocean to its east. Australia’s
relationship with China has turned relatively sour with its Prime Minister Scott
Morrison calling for an independent investigation into the origins of the
COVID-19 pandemic (Karp 2020). France, like its allies, sees Australia as a key
strategic partner in the region. To reiterate, France sees Australia as a
like-minded country and one of the very few regional states capable of
contributing substantively to regional stability. The Royal Australian Navy
joined the United States, India and Japan for military exercises in the Indian
Ocean between October and November 2020 in what is known as the “quad” (Greene,
Dziedzic & Oaten 2020) – a hostile, yet subtle message to China; all of
whom are allies and partners of France. In such a case scenario, France with
its territories and defense forces scattered across the Indian Ocean might
provide vital logistical and technical support.
France’s cultural ties and military capabilities may further influence the
rhetoric in countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Madagascar and other Indian
Ocean region countries to France’s benefit. Given the increasing involvement of
China in the affairs of many countries in Asia, France may look to increase its
own regional involvement as a way of staying relevant in the Indian Ocean
region and its efforts may be backed up by traditional allies such as Australia
and the United States. For France, forging much closer political, economic and
security ties with these democracies should be an opening for the Europeans to
establish a deterrent force against Chinese influence in the region. The D10 –
a group of democracies that comprises Australia, Britain, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the U.S and the E.U provides a platform for
like-minded countries to adjust the wind from tilting towards China in the
region and will establish a solid stance for France to exercise their will in
the region (The Economist 2018).
The possibility of the western powers making use of French influence and power
in the region is becoming a reality in order to deter China’s ever-growing
influence. Smaller states such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and the Seychelles
must be aware of this realistic possibility and chose to construct, if not mend
their foreign policies to the more realistic possibilities that may send
shockwaves in the near future or risk being another pawn in the great power
rivalry.
References
Bouchard, C & Crumplin, W 2011, ‘Two faces of France: France of the Indian
ocean / France in the Indian Ocean’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region,
vol.7, no.2, pp.161-182.
‘Fatwin V MAGA’ 2018, The Economist, vol.428, iss.9103, pp.51-52.
Greene, A , Dziedzic, S & Oaten, J 2020, Australia to rejoin quad naval
exercises in move certain to infuriate Beijing, viewed 28 December 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-20/australia-rejoins-naval-exercise-in-move-certain-to-anger-china/12784186
Karp, P 2020, China bristles at Australia’s call for investigation into coronavirus origin, viewed 28December 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/australia-defends-plan-to-investigate-china-over-covid-19-outbreak-as-row-deepens
Saint – Mézard, I 2015, ‘The French Strategy in the Indian Ocean and the Potential for Indo-French Cooperation’, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PR150312_French-Strategy.pdf
